Case Highlights

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This 2010 constitutional amendment, the Eighteenth Amendment, made sweeping changes to Pakistan's Constitution. It formally repealed the military-era Legal Framework Order of 2002 and the Seventeenth Amendment, declaring them to have been made without lawful authority. It renamed the provinces North West Frontier Province and the spellings of Balochistan and Sindh correctly. It strengthened the definition of high treason to cover anyone who abrogates, subverts, suspends or attempts to suspend the Constitution by force, and barred courts from ever validating such acts. The amendment also added important fundamental rights not previously guaranteed, including the right to a fair trial and due process, the right to information on matters of public importance, and the right to free and compulsory education for children aged five to sixteen. It expanded freedom of association rules for political parties, including requirements to disclose funding sources, and added provisions ensuring provinces get fair shares in federal services. It also adjusted presidential powers, including rules about how the President acts on advice from the Prime Minister and procedures for dissolving the National Assembly and calling elections.

This amendment matters because it reshaped the balance of power between the federation and the provinces, strengthened parliamentary democracy over presidential authority, undid changes made during military rule, and enshrined new fundamental rights for citizens, marking one of the most significant constitutional reforms in Pakistan's history.

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This is not a real court judgment deciding a dispute between parties. It is the full text of a Punjab provincial law, the Punjab Partition of Immovable Property Act 2012 (Act IV of 2013), which sets out rules for how co-owners of jointly-held property (other than agricultural land) can have that property legally divided or sold.

The Act explains the procedure courts must follow when someone files a suit asking for partition of property they jointly own with others. It covers how defendants (other co-owners) must be notified and respond, what happens if they fail to appear or file a written statement, how disputes over ownership share are resolved, and how rental income from the property is handled while the case is pending. It also introduces methods for dividing property that courts can use once ownership is settled, including appointing a neutral referee to propose a fair division, or holding an internal auction among co-owners, or an open auction, if the property cannot be physically split. The law also allows co-owners to reach a private settlement and sets time limits meant to make these cases move faster through the courts.

Because this document is legislation rather than a judgment resolving a specific legal dispute, there is no court decision, ruling, or reasoning about particular facts to summarize. It is simply the statutory framework that courts in Punjab apply when handling property partition cases.

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This explainer covers the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, a Pakistani law rather than a court ruling, so there is no judicial decision to summarize. The text sets out rules governing Muslim marriage, divorce, and inheritance across Pakistan. It requires all Muslim marriages to be officially registered through licensed Nikah Registrars, with penalties for failing to report unregistered marriages. It restricts polygamy by requiring a man to get written permission from an Arbitration Council before marrying again while still married, and imposes fines, imprisonment, or immediate payment of dower if this rule is broken. The Ordinance also sets procedures for divorce (talaq), requiring written notice to a local Chairman and a 90-day waiting period intended to allow reconciliation efforts through an Arbitration Council, with special protection extending the waiting period if the wife is pregnant. It also changes inheritance rules so that grandchildren can inherit the share their deceased parent would have received, ensuring orphaned grandchildren are not excluded from inheritance. The law declares that these provisions override conflicting customs or other laws, and that ordinary court procedures and arbitration laws do not apply to the Arbitration Councils it creates. Overall, this Ordinance reflects a mid-20th century effort to reform and modernize Muslim family law in Pakistan by introducing formal registration, checks on polygamy, due process in divorce, and expanded inheritance rights.

PLD 1975 Pesh. 161; Islamia University Bahawalpur through its Vice-C · Islamabad High Court

This case, decided by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, is the well-known landmark ruling on Riba (interest) in Pakistan, often cited as PLD 2000 SC 225. It brought together dozens of appeals filed by banks (including Allied Bank, United Bank, Habib Bank, National Bank, MCB, ABN AMRO), government bodies (the Federation of Pakistan, Punjab government), and individual borrowers, all arising from earlier Federal Shariat Court rulings that had declared interest-based banking transactions un-Islamic and contrary to the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah.

The banks and government argued they should be allowed to continue charging and paying interest on loans, while individuals and petitioners supported the Federal Shariat Court's findings that all forms of interest, including bank interest, amount to Riba, which is strictly prohibited in Islam. The appeals were consolidated because they raised the same core legal and religious question: whether existing laws permitting interest-based financial transactions violate Islamic injunctions under the Constitution.

While this excerpt does not contain the court's final reasoning or ruling in detail, it confirms the Supreme Court's Shariat Appellate Bench examined this massive, consolidated set of appeals together. The case matters because its outcome shaped Pakistan's ongoing debate over Islamic banking, affecting how financial institutions, government bodies, and courts approach interest-based transactions under Islamic law.

PLJ 1996 AJK (FSC) 179 = 1996 MLD 692 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This entry reproduces part of Pakistan's Limitation Act, 1908, along with case notes summarizing how Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistani courts have interpreted it, rather than a single court judgment deciding one dispute.

The core legal point highlighted concerns how limitation periods apply to appeals from Family Court decisions. The Family Courts Act prescribes a specific 30-day period for filing appeals against a Family Court's judgment, which differs from the general limitation periods listed in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908. The cited ruling (PLJ 1996 AJK (FSC) 179) clarifies that when a special law like the Family Courts Act sets its own distinct limitation period, that specific period governs, rather than the general provisions of the Limitation Act. However, Section 29 of the Limitation Act still applies to such appeals, meaning certain general principles of the Limitation Act (such as rules on computing time or condoning delay) continue to operate alongside the special period, unless expressly excluded.

This matters because it establishes a clear rule of statutory interpretation: specific laws override general ones on matters they specifically address (such as timeframes for appeals), while general procedural safeguards under the Limitation Act can still supplement specialized statutes where not inconsistent. This principle affects how litigants calculate deadlines for appeals in family law disputes and ensures consistency in how Pakistani and AJK courts handle conflicts between general and special limitation laws.

PLJ 2025 Civil (Note) 86 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a man who repeatedly complained to the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) alleging corruption, fake nursing college approvals, and financial irregularities within the Pakistan Nursing and Midwifery Council (PNC). He filed a petition in the Islamabad High Court asking the court to direct the FIA to register a formal criminal case (FIR) based on his complaints, arguing that the agency was taking too long and had been evasive.

The court explained that under the FIA Act and its 2002 Rules, the agency is required to first conduct an inquiry into complaints and is not legally obligated to immediately register an FIR before that process is complete. The judge found that the petitioner had failed to provide solid evidence backing his allegations, and that many of the issues raised actually fell within the PNC's own regulatory authority to handle internally.

More importantly, the court found the petitioner had not come to it with "clean hands." He had filed contradictory cases in different courts about the same PNC affairs, concealed earlier related litigation from this bench, and could not explain how he obtained certain official documents he submitted as evidence. The judge concluded he acted in bad faith, possibly as a proxy for other interests, and had misused the court's process.

As a result, the petition was dismissed, and costs were imposed on the petitioner for his conduct. The case underscores that courts expect honesty and transparency from litigants and won't force agencies to bypass their standard investigative procedures without solid justification.

PLJ 1990 SC 204 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case is about a dispute over inheritance under Islamic family law in Pakistan, specifically how to calculate the share of a granddaughter whose mother died before the grandmother (the person whose estate is being inherited).

The family involved was: Mst. Daulan (grandmother), her daughter Mst. Lalan (who died before her mother), and Mst. Lalan's daughter Mst. Manzooran. Since Mst. Lalan died before Mst. Daulan, Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 treats her as if she were still alive when the inheritance opened, so she would notionally receive her share (one-third of the estate).

The dispute was over how much of that one-third share should then pass to her daughter, Mst. Manzooran. The petitioner (another family member) argued that Manzooran should only get half of her mother's notional share (one-sixth), with the rest going to other relatives, based on a Lahore High Court ruling. The lower courts, however, had awarded Manzooran the entire one-third share, following a Peshawar High Court ruling that said the full notional share passes to the deceased daughter's children.

Since the Lahore High Court and Peshawar High Court had given conflicting interpretations of Section 4, the Supreme Court decided the matter needed a final, authoritative ruling. It granted leave to appeal so this legal question could be settled definitively, while allowing partial interim relief to the petitioner pending the final decision.

PLJ 2024 Cr.C. (Note) 232 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man convicted under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with issuing a cheque that bounces due to insufficient funds or a closed account, essentially dishonest cheque issuance. He had been sentenced by a trial court in Khushab to three years of simple imprisonment plus a fine, and his appeal against that conviction had already been dismissed by an Additional Sessions Judge. He then filed a criminal revision petition before the Lahore High Court.

Notably, the petitioner's lawyer did not challenge the conviction itself, only asking for a reduced sentence, citing that the petitioner was a first-time offender who had already spent about one year, five months, and twenty-three days in jail. The prosecution and complainant's lawyers did not object to this request.

The High Court reviewed the evidence and found that the prosecution had clearly proven the offense occurred, and that the key witnesses, including the complainant, gave consistent testimony even under lengthy cross-examination, with no major contradictions. Because of this, the court upheld the conviction as correctly decided.

However, considering the time already served, the court reduced the sentence to match the period the petitioner had already spent in jail, while keeping the fine and default punishment unchanged. This case illustrates how courts balance upholding valid convictions with showing leniency in sentencing based on time already served and witness credibility.

PLJ 2002 · Peshawar High Court

This is an explainer about a civil procedure case from the Peshawar High Court.

The dispute began when a man sued another for Rs. 40,000 over a property sale, claiming he had paid for the land but the seller never transferred it to his name. The trial court proceeded against the defendant without his presence (ex-parte), assuming he had been properly notified, and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant later discovered this decree during execution proceedings and tried to get it set aside, but both the trial court and the district court on appeal rejected his request, partly on the grounds that he had filed his application too late.

The High Court found serious flaws in how the case was handled. The court summons had not been served according to the proper legal procedure, there was no clear record of how or why the defendant was served at an unusual location instead of his home address, and the trial court had never examined the process server under oath as required by law before proceeding ex-parte. Additionally, the lower courts miscalculated the deadline for the defendant's application by failing to exclude the summer court vacation period from the limitation period, as required under the Limitation Act.

Because of these procedural failures, the High Court set aside the previous judgments and sent the case back to the trial court to be decided fresh, with both parties given a proper chance to present their case. This ruling reinforces that courts must strictly follow service-of-summons rules and correctly calculate limitation periods, including excluding vacation time, before deciding cases without a party's participation.

PLJ 2021 Lahore (Note) 74 · Lahore High Court

This case arose from a family dispute over maintenance payments for two minor children. After the dissolution of his marriage, the children's mother filed a suit seeking maintenance, reimbursement of delivery expenses, and return of dowry articles. The Family Court ordered the father to pay interim maintenance, but when he failed to pay on time, the court struck off his defence and passed a decree against him granting monthly maintenance to the children.

The father then tried to appeal this decision, filing his appeal on 21 August 2010, during the courts' summer vacations. The Additional District Judge dismissed his appeal as time-barred, reasoning that it was filed too late.

The Lahore High Court disagreed. It held that under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a person has the choice to either file an appeal during court vacations or wait until the courts reopen and file it then. Since the father could have validly filed his appeal as late as 1 September 2010 (when courts reopened), his filing on 21 August 2010 was actually within time, not late.

The High Court therefore set aside the order dismissing the appeal and directed the Additional District Judge to hear the appeal on its merits. This case matters because it clarifies that litigants are not penalized for filing appeals during court vacations, protecting their right to a fair hearing rather than losing cases on technical timing grounds.

PLJ 2019 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a man named Muhammad Aslam who was accused of fraud related to fake visa promises. According to the complainant, Aslam took Rs. 700,000 in two installments in October 2016, promising to arrange employment visas to Dubai for the complainant and his brother. He allegedly never delivered the visas or returned the money, leading to an FIR being registered against him under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, which deals with illegal emigration-related offences.

Aslam was arrested and sought post-arrest bail from the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench). The court noted several weaknesses in the prosecution's case: there was a significant and unexplained delay of about a year between the alleged incident and the filing of the FIR, and the complainant failed to specify exact dates for the payments. The court found these gaps sufficient to warrant "further inquiry," a legal standard under Section 497(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code that allows bail when the case against the accused is not clearly established.

The court also considered that Aslam had no prior criminal record, had cooperated with the investigation, and was not needed for further questioning. Since his trial was unlikely to conclude soon, the court ruled that keeping him in jail indefinitely served no purpose.

The court granted him bail, requiring a bond of Rs. 200,000 with one surety. This case illustrates how delays and lack of specific evidence in a complaint can support a bail application, even in fraud-related cases.

SCMR 2027) and · Islamabad High Court

Getz Pharma, a pharmaceutical company, had employed several individuals as sales managers. These employees either resigned or were dismissed after the company accused them of breaching their contracts and violating a conflict-of-interest policy by setting up a rival business, Sun Health Care, while still employed. As a result, the company withheld their final dues, including gratuity, relying on a rule that denies gratuity to employees dismissed for misconduct or who resign under such circumstances.

The employees filed claims under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, before the Assistant Commissioner/Magistrate, who ordered the company to pay the outstanding dues and compensation. Getz Pharma challenged this order before the Islamabad High Court through writ petitions, arguing that the employees were not "workmen" under labour law, that the dispute should be handled in Karachi courts as per their contracts, and that the National Industrial Relations Commission, not the Payment of Wages authority, had jurisdiction.

The High Court dismissed the petitions. It held that since no labour court functions in Islamabad, the writ petition was the only available remedy and was maintainable. However, it found that the Assistant Commissioner had properly considered all evidence and arguments before ruling. In writ proceedings, the court's role is limited to checking for legal or jurisdictional errors, not re-examining factual findings. Since Getz Pharma failed to show any such error, the original order directing payment stood, reinforcing that courts generally won't disturb factual findings of lower author

PLJ 2023 Karachi 124 (DB) · Sindh High Court

This case involved a family dispute over a house in Karachi left behind by a woman who died in 1993, with her two sons as heirs. After one son also passed away, his many children (the appellants) and the other son (respondent) could not agree on how to divide the property, so a partition suit was filed. Since the property could not be physically divided among so many heirs, the court appointed a Nazir (court officer) to arrange its sale, first by private agreement among the family, then by auction if needed.

Disputes arose over the property's value. The respondent offered to buy it for Rs. 3 crore, but the appellants insisted it was worth more and demanded over Rs. 4 crore. The court gave them repeated chances to either match that price, deposit the money, or bring in another buyer willing to pay more. They failed to do any of this. As a result, the single judge confirmed the sale to the respondent at Rs. 3 crore.

The appellants challenged this decision before a larger bench, asking for more time to find a better buyer. The High Court rejected their appeal, finding that they had already been given ample opportunity and had not fulfilled any of the court's conditions. The judges upheld the original order, confirming the sale at Rs. 3 crore and dismissing the appeal as meritless.

This case illustrates how courts handle property disputes among multiple heirs when physical division is impossible, emphasizing that parties must act on opportunities given by courts rather than indefinitely stall proceedings.

PLJ 1999 Lahore 947 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a citizen who applied to the telephone department for a new connection but never received one, even though he was billed for a number that was never actually installed. Frustrated, he filed a complaint with the Wafaqi Mohtasib (federal ombudsman), who investigated, found the telephone department guilty of maladministration, and ordered it to install the connection free of cost within 30 days. The department neither complied nor challenged this order through the legal channels available to it, such as appealing to the President of Pakistan or approaching the courts. Instead, it simply ignored the ombudsman's direction.

The petitioner then went to the Lahore High Court asking it to enforce the ombudsman's order. The department argued that installing the connection required erecting 14 poles, calling it a policy matter beyond the court's jurisdiction, and suggested the petitioner should have filed a contempt case instead.

The High Court rejected these arguments. It held that public functionaries are legally bound to obey directions of the Wafaqi Mohtasib unless they formally challenge them before the President or the courts. Since the department did neither, its failure to act showed bad faith. The court ordered the telephone department to implement the ombudsman's order in letter and spirit within four months.

This judgment matters because it reinforces that government agencies cannot simply ignore ombudsman rulings; they must either comply or formally contest them through proper legal avenues.

PLJ 2016 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a woman who, while traveling with her husband and others from Karachi to Larkana on a national highway, met a serious accident when her car hit small crash stones scattered on the road near Tando Masti. There were no warning signs or cautionary boards, even though several similar accidents had reportedly happened at the same spot before. The petitioner and her companions were injured and her car was badly damaged. She approached the Sindh High Court asking that the National Highway Authority (NHA) and other authorities be directed to take proper safety precautions on highways and to compensate her for the losses suffered.

The court examined the NHA Act, 1991 and the National Highways Safety Ordinance, 2000, holding that NHA, as the body controlling and managing national highways, has a mandatory duty to ensure road safety, including placing proper traffic and warning signs, maintaining speed checks, and enforcing rules, not merely on paper but in practice. Since NHA collects toll tax on such roads, it cannot avoid its safety obligations. The court directed NHA to provide round-the-clock patrolling, establish emergency medical aid and ambulance facilities at toll points, and report compliance within a specified time.

However, the court held that it could not determine the actual compensation or damages in a constitutional petition, since that requires evidence-based findings. It therefore allowed the petitioner to approach a civil court for compensation.

This judgment is significant because it clarifies that highway authorities have an enforceable duty to ensure road safety, not just collect tolls.

PLJ 2018 SC (Cr.C.) 90 · Balochistan High Court

This Supreme Court judgment deals with several narcotics cases together because they raised the same important legal questions about how drug evidence must be handled before someone can be convicted.

Under Pakistan's Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, once police seize a suspected narcotic substance, a sample must be sent to a Narcotics Testing Laboratory for analysis. The Government Analyst's report is given strong evidentiary weight in court and is treated as conclusive unless rebutted. Because so much weight rests on this report, the Court examined the rules governing how samples are collected, preserved and tested.

The Court held that the "chain of custody" - the unbroken record of who handled the sample from the moment of seizure until it reaches the laboratory - must be safe, secure, and free of suspicion. Any gap or irregularity in this chain undermines the reliability of the final report.

The Court also analysed the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, distinguishing between rules that are merely "directory" (good practice, non-compliance doesn't invalidate the report) and those that are "mandatory" (essential, non-compliance invalidates the report). It ruled that the requirement to record full testing protocols in the analyst's report is mandatory, while other procedural requirements like multiple signatures or copies are merely directory.

This judgment matters because it sets clear standards protecting accused persons from convictions based on unreliable or improperly documented drug testing.

PLJ 2017 Lahore 720 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a father seeking custody of his young son through Pakistan's family courts. The father, Shabir-ul-Hassan, had divorced the child's mother, Tanveer Zaidi, back in 2008. Years later, concerned that the mother was unable to properly care for the boy, possibly due to financial difficulties, health issues, and the fact that the child was actually being raised by his paternal aunt rather than his mother, the father filed a petition asking the court to give him custody.

The trial court heard evidence from both sides but rejected his request. When he appealed, the appeals court simply upheld that decision in a very brief, half-page ruling without properly explaining its reasoning.

The father then approached the Lahore High Court, arguing that the lower courts had mishandled the evidence and failed to think the matter through carefully.

The High Court agreed that something had gone wrong, not with the trial court, which had analyzed the evidence thoroughly, but with the appellate court, which had dismissed the appeal too quickly without explaining its reasoning or properly discussing the evidence. The judge emphasized that courts must always give clear reasons for their decisions, even when upholding a lower court's ruling, especially in sensitive matters like child custody.

As a result, the High Court set aside the appellate court's judgment and sent the case back for a fresh, more careful decision. This case highlights the importance of thorough, reasoned judicial decision-making, particularly in cases affecting children's welfare.

PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 3 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a woman, Mst. Asia, whose custody was repeatedly disputed between several men and her father, leading to multiple court proceedings under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a provision that allows courts to order the recovery of persons held in illegal custody.

The petitioner, Hadayat Ullah, claimed to be her husband and sought her recovery, alleging she was being illegally held. Earlier court appearances showed shifting accounts: at one point Asia said she wanted to live with her father, then later said she wanted to live with Hadayat Ullah. Eventually, it emerged that Hadayat Ullah had divorced her, and a later application for her recovery was dismissed on that basis.

When the matter came before the Lahore High Court, Asia herself appeared and gave a detailed statement describing a troubling history, including being married off multiple times by her family, allegedly sold at a shrine to another man who forced her into marriage, mistreatment, and fear of being sold again. She said she had not actually divorced Hadayat Ullah and wished to live with him.

The court's decision was limited: it set Asia free to go wherever she chose, since that was within its power in this type of case. However, it held that the serious allegations of buying and selling a person required detailed factual inquiry that could not be resolved in this kind of summary revision petition, and that the disputed divorce issue should be pursued through proper separate legal channels. The case highlights how courts distinguish between immediate custody relief and deeper allegations of human trafficking or marital fra

PLJ 2015 Karachi 51 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a divorce petition filed by Geeti Mahyar Dhatigara against her husband, Mahyar Mehrwan Dhatigara, under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. The couple were Parsis, a community governed by this special law rather than general divorce law, and their case was heard by the Sindh High Court, which appointed a judge along with "delegates" (community representatives) to assist, as required under the Act.

The wife sought divorce under Section 32(g) of the Act, which allows dissolution of marriage when a couple has not lived together for a specified period. She did not pursue earlier allegations of cruelty against her husband, relying instead simply on the fact that the couple had been separated for more than three years. The husband, appearing in person, confirmed this separation and stated he had no objection to the divorce, saying he did not want his wife to remain in a marriage against her will.

The delegates present also agreed that the couple should not be forced to stay married against their wishes. The court held that the legal requirements for divorce under Section 32(g) were satisfied, given the prolonged separation and mutual lack of objection. It therefore dissolved the marriage and ordered that a divorce decree be prepared and sent to the Registrar of Marriages.

This judgment illustrates how Pakistan's Parsi community has its own distinct marriage and divorce law, and shows a straightforward, consent-based dissolution of marriage based on long-term separation.

PLJ 2013 Lahore 329 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a husband who challenged a family court's decree ordering him to pay his former wife dower in the form of gold ornaments, Rs. 500,000 under a special condition in their marriage contract (Nikah Nama), and maintenance during her waiting period (iddat) after divorce.

During the trial, the husband himself proposed a special oath procedure: he offered that if his wife's grandfather swore on the Holy Quran that the conditions written in the Nikah Nama matched what the couple had actually agreed to at the time of marriage, then the case should be decided against him. The grandfather took this oath, and the husband and his lawyer acknowledged this with their thumb impression and signature. The Lahore High Court held that under the Oaths Act, 1873, this amounted to a binding admission that could not later be challenged, so the findings on the dower and ornaments stood.

However, the court drew a distinction regarding the Rs. 500,000 payment tied to wrongful divorce or expulsion from the house. It ruled that this amount was not dower or personal property, and therefore did not fall within the Family Court's jurisdiction—it was a civil matter that should be decided by a civil court instead. The special oath procedure could not expand the Family Court's powers beyond what the law allows. As a result, the petition was partly accepted, meaning this specific claim was set aside while the rest of the decree remained intact. The judgment highlights that courts must stick to their statutory jurisdiction even when parties agree to alternative methods of proof.

PLJ 2018 Cr.C. ( · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case is about a man named Syed Javed Hussain who was convicted under Pakistan's Control of Narcotic Substances Act for allegedly possessing 12.35 kilograms of charas (hashish) found in ten packets on his motorcycle. A trial court had sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine. He appealed to the Lahore High Court's Multan Bench.

The High Court found serious flaws in the prosecution's case. First, the Chemical Examiner's report did not properly test and record results for each individual sample packet separately, as required by law, and relevant testing protocols had been crossed out, meaning compliance with proper procedure could not be verified. Courts have previously ruled that such lapses undermine the reliability of forensic evidence.

Second, and more critically, the two police investigating officers who testified actually contradicted the prosecution's own story. Their evidence suggested the narcotics were not found on the appellant riding his motorcycle as claimed, but were instead recovered from the house of another man, identified as "Ghulam Mustafa" (called "G"), where the appellant had merely been a guest at a family gathering when police raided the house. Since the narcotics were not found in the appellant's exclusive possession, he could not be definitively linked to the recovery.

Given these contradictions and procedural failures, the court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant's conviction was overturned. This case highlights how improper evidence handling and inconsistent police

YLR 2176), · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a young domestic servant, Tayyaba Bibi, who was under ten years old and worked as a maid in the home of Mst. Maheen Zafar and her husband Raja Khurram Ali Khan, who was an Additional District and Sessions Judge. The child was allegedly beaten, burned, confined, and mistreated while in their care, leading to an FIR and criminal charges including wrongful confinement, causing hurt, criminal intimidation, child abuse under section 328-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, and causing the disappearance of evidence to shield a co-accused.

After examining testimony from sixteen witnesses, medical evidence, and photographs of the child's injuries, the Islamabad High Court found that some charges were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, including wrongful confinement, criminal intimidation, and causing disappearance of the child to protect a co-accused, due to insufficient direct evidence.

However, the court found both accused jointly guilty under section 328-A, which criminalizes willful assault, ill-treatment, neglect, or abandonment of a child causing harm. The court held that as the employers responsible for the child's care in their household, both the husband and wife bore joint responsibility for the harm she suffered, relying on circumstantial and medical evidence forming a complete and credible chain.

This case is significant because it reinforced legal protections for child domestic workers and clarified that circumstantial evidence, when forming an unbroken chain, can support a conviction even without direct eyewitness testimony.

PLJ 2014 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a custody dispute over an 11-year-old boy, Amaan Hassan, between his parents. The mother had filed a petition in the Guardian Judge's court in Islamabad seeking custody of the child under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The father objected, arguing that the Islamabad court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, since the family had never actually lived there together. The couple had lived in Peshawar, then Lahore, and eventually settled in Abu Dhabi.

The Guardian Judge in Islamabad rejected the father's objection, reasoning that courts where a wife resides generally have jurisdiction over such matters. The father challenged this decision before the Peshawar High Court.

The High Court examined the relevant law, particularly Rule 6 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965, which says jurisdiction belongs to the court where the cause of action arose, or where the parties reside or last resided together. Relying on a Supreme Court precedent, the Chief Justice held that since the mother never lived in Islamabad and the family had no connection to that city, the Islamabad court had no jurisdiction to hear the custody case.

As a result, the court set aside the Islamabad Guardian Judge's order and directed that the mother's petition be filed instead before a court that actually has proper jurisdiction. This case highlights that in custody and guardianship disputes, choosing the correct court based on where the parties actually lived is a crucial legal requirement, not a mere technicality.

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a petition filed before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, seeking to quash an FIR registered against Muhammad Munir under Section 216 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with harbouring an offender. The FIR alleged that Munir helped his two sons, who were wanted in a separate case, escape from police custody when officers tried to arrest them.

The petitioner argued that there was no real evidence proving his sons were ever legally declared proclaimed offenders, and that no proof existed connecting him to the alleged act of harbouring them. The police had relied only on the original complaint and a site plan, without properly verifying the sons' status as proclaimed offenders or establishing any concrete evidence against the petitioner.

The court examined the legal definitions of harbouring under Section 52-A and the offence under Section 216 of the PPC, and found that the essential elements of the offence were missing. Since there was no credible evidence linking Munir to the crime, the court held that forcing him to stand trial would be a futile and unjust exercise, likely to end in acquittal anyway. It emphasized that while offenders must be punished, individuals also have a constitutional right to protection against false or baseless charges, and courts should resolve such matters early rather than let innocent people suffer the ordeal of a trial.

The court ruled that the police had committed a clear illegality in registering the FIR, making the entire proceeding void

PLJ 2008 Karachi 121 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a property dispute in Karachi. A father had given his son an irrevocable General Power of Attorney, allowing the son to deal with a plot of land. The son sold the property to a buyer (the applicant in this case) for Rs. 36,000, and the buyer built on it and took a bank loan against it. Later, the father claimed he had actually intended the document to be a "will," not a power of attorney, and that he had since cancelled it. He filed a suit for declaration, cancellation, and possession, and won at the appellate level, with the buyer being dispossessed without ever having been properly notified of the case.

The Sindh High Court overturned that decision. It clarified a fundamental legal distinction: a power of attorney and a will are completely different instruments. A power of attorney authorizes an agent to act on someone's behalf during their lifetime, while a will only takes effect after death. The document in question was clearly meant to operate during the father's lifetime, so it was a valid, functioning power of attorney, not a will. The court also noted that the alleged "cancellation" was neither signed by the attorney (the son) nor properly registered, making it legally ineffective.

As a result, the son's sale of the property was valid, and the buyer's ownership and possession were restored. The case matters because it reinforces that powers of attorney and wills serve distinct legal purposes and cannot be reinterpreted after the fact to undo transactions already carried out in good faith.

PLJ 2015 · Islamabad High Court

This case was about a property dispute between Musa Khan, who claimed he had secretly funded the purchase of a plot in Islamabad while living in the UK, and Ashram Bibi, in whose name the plot was officially registered. Musa Khan argued this was a benami transaction, meaning the property was only held in Ashram Bibi's name on paper while he was the real owner, because he had sent the purchase money through a jointly operated bank account and she had acquired the property through misrepresentation. The trial court agreed with him and declared him the owner. Ashram Bibi appealed to the Islamabad High Court.

The High Court overturned the trial court's decision. It explained that anyone claiming a property is benami must prove four things: the source of funds used to buy the property, who held custody of the original title documents, who was actually in possession of the property, and the motive behind disguising the real ownership. The court found that Musa Khan had only argued that he provided the money, but failed to address or prove the other three essential elements, particularly possession and custody of documents, which were shown to be with Ashram Bibi. The court also noted that such claims often surface only after relationships sour, which undermines their credibility.

This judgment matters because it reaffirms the strict evidentiary standard required to prove benami ownership claims in Pakistani law, protecting registered property owners from claims based on incomplete or weak evidence.

PLJ 2007 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute between an advertising agency and a bank over a terminated advertising agreement. The agency had been appointed as the bank's exclusive advertising agent, with the contract set to run for an initial period and then automatically renew, and with a clause requiring two months' advance notice for termination by either side. The agreement also contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be resolved by arbitrators rather than through ordinary litigation. When the bank sought to end the relationship, the agency approached the Sindh High Court, arguing the termination was premature and that its agency was a special kind called an agency coupled with interest, which under the Contract Act cannot be revoked without honoring that interest.

The court held that genuine disputes about whether proper notice was given had to go to arbitration, as the parties had agreed. On the substantive point, the judge found that this agency was not coupled with interest, since it lacked any pre-existing interest of the agent in the subject matter being protected, so it did not qualify for special protection against revocation. Even if termination was premature or improper, the court said money damages, not an order forcing the bank to continue the relationship, was the appropriate remedy. The court allowed the matter to proceed to arbitration while declining to grant the injunction sought.

This matters because it clarifies that most commercial agency agreements can be ended by payment of damages rather than forced continuation, and that arbitration clauses will generally be enforced over court intervention.

PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a landlord-tenant dispute in Islamabad. The landlord sought to evict her tenant from a house, claiming she needed it for personal use—specifically, to accommodate her mother-in-law, a cancer patient who required frequent treatment in Rawalpindi/Islamabad, making travel back and forth from Wah Cantt inconvenient. The tenant argued, among other things, that a similar eviction petition had previously been filed and withdrawn, so the second petition should not be allowed without special permission, and that although the lease had expired, it had been orally extended.

The Rent Controller initially dismissed the landlord's eviction request, but an appellate court reversed this and ordered the tenant to vacate within 60 days. The tenant then challenged that decision before the Islamabad High Court.

The High Court upheld the eviction. It ruled that since the earlier petition was withdrawn without any final decision on its merits, filing a fresh petition was legally permissible. The court also clarified that under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, a landlord's genuine statement of personal need is generally sufficient to justify eviction, especially since the law protects tenants by allowing them to reclaim possession if the landlord doesn't actually occupy the property within six months. Additionally, since the lease had expired and wasn't formally renewed, the tenant was liable to vacate. The petition was dismissed, reinforcing landlords' rights to reclaim property for genuine family needs.

PLJ 1997 FSC 61 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a married woman, her alleged lover, and a third person who were convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge in Multan under Pakistan's Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The allegations centered on a woman accused of disguising her identity under a false name to remarry while still legally married to the original complainant, leading to charges of adultery (zina) and related fraud offences. The accused received lengthy prison sentences, whipping, and fines.

On appeal, the defense argued that the trial court had failed to follow a mandatory legal requirement: before trial, the accused should have been given copies of the complaint, witness statements, and other key documents under Section 265-C(2)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. This failure meant the accused couldn't properly cross-examine witnesses or prepare their defense. Notably, both the complainant's lawyer and the state prosecutor agreed that this requirement had not been met, and they consented to sending the case back for retrial.

The Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) accepted the appeal, relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent establishing that compliance with Section 265-C is mandatory, not optional - and that failing to follow it invalidates the entire trial. The court set aside the conviction and ordered a fresh trial after the missing documents are properly supplied, directing the lower court to resolve the matter within three months.

This case matters because it reinforces a fundamental fair-trial safeguard: accused persons have a legal right to see the evidence

PLJ 2016 · Islamabad High Court

This case concerns a landlord-tenant dispute over a shop in Jinnah Super Market, Islamabad. The new owners of the shop filed for eviction of the tenant, Nadeem Younas, claiming the lease had expired and rent had gone unpaid since 2011. They said they had bought the property from its previous owners and had notified the tenant of the change in ownership, though the tenant denied receiving such notice and disputed that any landlord-tenant relationship existed at all.

The case went through multiple rounds of proceedings, including an attempt by the tenant's son to intervene, claiming he was the actual tenant, which was rejected. Eventually the Rent Controller and the Appellate Court both ruled in favor of eviction, partly because the tenant repeatedly failed to appear and present evidence, leading to his right to cross-examine or present a defense being closed.

The Islamabad High Court dismissed the tenant's petitions. It held that when ownership of a rented property changes hands, the new owner automatically becomes the landlord, and defects in the previous ownership documents do not concern the tenant. The filing of the eviction case itself was considered sufficient notice of the change in ownership. Since the tenant continued to not pay rent during the proceedings, he was found to be a willful defaulter.

This case matters because it clarifies that tenants cannot use technical objections about ownership documents to avoid rent obligations, and that buyers of rented property step into the landlord's shoes without needing elaborate formalities.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute between three brothers over property left by their father, a retired judge. One brother filed a suit asking the court to divide ("partition") property that had been gifted by their father to all three sons in equal shares through a registered gift deed. One brother contested the suit, while another agreed with it.

The brother challenging the suit tried to get the case thrown out by arguing that the plaintiff had not properly filed a list of witnesses as required by law. The trial court rejected this attempt and, since all parties had effectively admitted that the property was jointly owned in equal one-third shares (based on the admitted gift deed), the trial court went ahead and issued an order equivalent to a "preliminary decree" declaring the shares, without taking further evidence.

The challenging brother approached the High Court, arguing that a preliminary decree could not be passed without first recording evidence after issues were framed. The High Court disagreed, holding that when parties have already admitted the key facts (joint ownership in equal shares), no evidence needs to be recorded, and a preliminary decree can validly be passed at that stage.

However, the High Court noted one technical flaw: the trial court had not prepared a formal, properly drafted preliminary decree document. It dismissed the petition but directed the trial court to prepare this formal decree to fix that procedural gap. The case clarifies that while courts can decide partition shares based on admissions without full trials, they must still formally document the decree.

PLJ 2013 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a petition before the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) seeking suspension of sentence and bail for a convicted prisoner named Yasin, pending the outcome of his criminal appeal. Yasin had been convicted by a trial court for house-trespass and kidnapping/abduction offenses and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and life imprisonment respectively, to run concurrently.

The petition was filed on medical grounds, as Yasin was suffering from AIDS. Two other petitioners initially named in the case, Zafar and Ashiq Hussain, were dropped from the petition by their own counsel and their case was dismissed as not pressed.

The court examined medical reports from jail and hospital doctors. These showed that Yasin's health was steadily worsening - he had lost over 15 kg in weight, suffered recurring critical episodes requiring hospital transfers, and needed continuous specialist supervision that the jail could not provide. The state opposed the petition, arguing adequate treatment was available in jail, but the court found the medical evidence persuasive.

The court accepted the petition, suspended Yasin's sentence, and ordered his release on bail with bond conditions, pending final decision of his appeal.

This judgment matters because it illustrates how courts can use their discretion under Section 426 of the Criminal Procedure Code to suspend sentences when a prisoner's serious illness cannot be adequately managed within jail facilities, balancing humanitarian medical concerns against the state's interest in enforcing pun

PLJ 2015 Lahore · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a family court dispute in Taunsa Sharif, where a wife, Mst. Shaheen Bibi, had filed a suit against her husband, Muhammad Irfan, for jactitation of marriage (a declaration that no valid marriage existed), or alternatively for dissolution of marriage through khula.

During the trial, the wife and one other witness gave their statements in court, but the husband's lawyer could not cross-examine them right away because he was busy in another court. The next two hearing dates were disrupted because lawyers were on strike. When the case came up again, the Family Court judge refused to let the husband's counsel cross-examine the witnesses and closed his right to do so, even though his lawyer was present in court that day.

The husband challenged this decision in the Lahore High Court, arguing the order was passed in haste and unfairly denied him a basic right. The wife's side argued he had already had enough chances and only had himself to blame.

The High Court agreed with the husband. It held that the right to cross-examine witnesses under Section 11(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 is a valuable legal right that cannot be taken away without strong justification. Since the delays were due to genuine reasons, not bad faith, and the lawyer was present and willing to proceed, the court struck down the Family Court's order and sent the case back, allowing cross-examination to proceed, with clear conditions to avoid further delay. This case reinforces that courts must have solid grounds before denying a party's right to cross-examine witnesses.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court

This case involves two petitioners, Muhammad Imran and Muhammad Asif, who sought post-arrest bail in a theft case registered under Sections 381-A and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code, relating to the alleged theft of a tractor. The complainant said his tractor went missing overnight while parked on a farm, but the FIR was lodged eight days after the incident without any explanation for the delay.

The petitioners were not named in the original FIR and there was no direct evidence against them. They were implicated only later, through a supplementary statement by the complainant. The court noted that recovery of the stolen property was allegedly made jointly on the pointing out of the petitioners along with a co-accused, who had already been granted bail by a lower court, a decision the complainant never challenged.

The Lahore High Court held that since the offenses did not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, bail is generally the rule rather than the exception. Given the unexplained delay in the FIR, the lack of direct evidence, the reliance on a later supplementary statement, and the fact that investigation was complete with no trial yet started, the court found the matter required further inquiry into the petitioners' guilt. It granted bail, emphasizing that denying bail indefinitely serves no real purpose for persons not yet convicted. This case illustrates how delays and weak initial evidence can support bail in non-serious offense categories.

PLJ 2015 Lahore 748 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns minors whose property rights were at stake in a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement. When their father died during the lawsuit, the minors were brought into the case as his legal heirs. Since they were minors, the trial court appointed court officials, a reader and later another court employee, as their guardian ad litem, meaning someone to represent their interests in court. However, this appointed guardian failed to properly defend the minors, most critically by not cross-examining key witnesses whose testimony formed the basis of the decree against them. As a result, an ex parte decree was passed against the minors. When they later asked the trial court to set aside this decree, citing the guardian's negligence and fraud, the trial court refused.

The Lahore High Court disagreed with the trial court. It held that a guardian ad litem is a trustee of the minor's rights and must actively protect their interests. If a decree is obtained because the guardian failed in this duty, even without proving intentional fraud, the minor should not be bound by it. The court also noted it was improper to appoint a court official as guardian when the children's mother was alive and had not been properly asked whether she wished to take on that role.

The High Court therefore set aside the trial court's dismissal and ordered the ex parte decree set aside, allowing the minors to defend the case properly, with their mother's involvement. This case matters because it reinforces that courts must ensure minors are genuinely and competently represented in litigation, not just formally assigned a guardian.

PLJ 2001 Lahore 1133 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute between two people who ran a carpet business together. One party, Muhammad Younas, claimed that a sum of money was owed to him and that an agreement to sell had been signed, and he registered a criminal case (FIR) under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with criminal breach of trust, against Muhammad Abbas.

However, Abbas had already filed a civil suit earlier, challenging that very agreement, claiming his signature had been obtained by force. He argued that only after the complainant received court notices about this civil suit did the criminal case suddenly get registered against him, suggesting it was done to pressure him into dropping the civil case rather than because a real crime had occurred.

The Lahore High Court examined the FIR and the timeline of events and agreed that the criminal case appeared to be a tactic to turn a civil/business dispute into a criminal matter, apparently driven by bad faith and ulterior motives. While the court did not fully quash the FIR, it ruled that the criminal proceedings should be put on hold until the civil suit was finally decided.

This judgment matters because it reinforces a legal principle: when a dispute is essentially civil in nature (like unpaid debts or contested agreements) but someone tries to use criminal law as a pressure tactic, courts can pause the criminal case until the underlying civil matter is resolved, preventing misuse of the criminal justice system.

PLJ 2015 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a dispute between parties who had entered into property exchange agreements in 2012. After disagreements arose, one party filed a civil suit to stop property transfers, and shortly after, also got an FIR (criminal case) registered against the petitioners under Sections 406 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, accusing them of criminal breach of trust.

The petitioners asked the Islamabad High Court to quash the FIR, arguing that the underlying dispute was purely civil in nature, arising from property exchange agreements, and that the essential ingredient of criminal breach of trust, namely entrustment of property, was not even made out from the agreements themselves. They also pointed out that the FIR was filed over a year after the alleged incident and only after the civil suit had already been initiated.

The respondents opposed this, arguing that quashing an FIR is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly, that alternate remedies already exist under the Criminal Procedure Code for the petitioners to seek discharge at trial, and that a pending civil case does not automatically bar criminal proceedings.

The court decided not to quash the FIR itself. Instead, it held that the question of whether property was truly entrusted should be examined by the trial court, which has proper mechanisms to decide this. The High Court exercised judicial restraint, directing the petitioners to pursue alternate remedies before the trial court rather than deciding the factual dispute itself. This shows courts' cautious approach to using constitutional powers to stop criminal cases prematurely.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over admission to the MBBS program at Sheikh Zayed Medical College, Rahimyarkhan, through a seat specially reserved for Cholistani students. Two candidates, Murad Ali Khan and Tehreem Fatima Lashari, both claimed entitlement to this single reserved seat on the basis of being Cholistani by birth.

Initially, Lashari's name appeared on the merit list, but it was later replaced by Khan's name without any notice to her. She challenged this change through a writ petition before a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, arguing that Khan's claim to Cholistani origin was not genuine, since his documents had gaps, such as blank entries regarding place and date of arrival in his domicile certificate, and no record of his birth in the relevant Cholistan birth registration record. The Single Judge agreed and restored the original list favoring Lashari.

Khan then filed an Intra Court Appeal against this decision. However, the Division Bench ruled that the appeal itself was not legally permissible. It held that under the University of Health Sciences Ordinance, 2002, an internal remedy of revision was available against admission decisions, and such a revision had already been filed and allowed by the university authorities. Because of this, under Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, a further intra-court appeal was barred.

This judgment highlights how procedural remedies and proper documentation of eligibility criteria, especially for reserved seats meant for specific communities, are strictly scr

PLJ 2013 · Islamabad High Court

This judgment from the Islamabad High Court deals with a challenge to the appointment of the Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). A petitioner, who was an FBR employee, challenged two notifications: one appointing Respondent No. 1 as Chairman FBR, and another giving him additional charge as Secretary of the Revenue Division. The petitioner argued that the appointment process was flawed, non-transparent, and failed to follow objective criteria or open competition, despite the position being a key public office requiring specialized expertise in taxation and economics. He claimed the appointment violated principles of good governance, equality of opportunity, and due process under the Constitution.

The respondents raised preliminary objections, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because service matters fall under the Federal Service Tribunal, and that the petitioner lacked standing since he wasn't personally harmed by the appointment.

The court rejected these objections, holding that the petitioner, as an FBR employee, was not a stranger to the organization and had legitimate concerns about unqualified appointments. It also noted that in matters of public interest, a petitioner need not show personal grievance.

On the merits, the court found the appointment was made through a colourable exercise of authority, lacking due process, transparency, fairness, and merit-based selection. It set aside both notifications and allowed the petition. The case highlights judicial scrutiny over appointments to important public offices and emphasizes transparency and merit in government appointments.

· Lahore High Court

This case involved a petitioner who approached the Lahore High Court asking it to quash an FIR (a criminal complaint) registered against him, using the Constitution's writ jurisdiction under Article 199.

The judge did not rule on the merits of the FIR itself. Instead, he used the occasion to clarify the proper limits of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction. He explained that the Constitution exists to provide a governing system and to protect people's fundamental rights, and that Articles 184(3) and 199 exist specifically to safeguard those rights when violated. However, this power is not meant to bypass other legal and statutory mechanisms, nor to interfere with the normal functioning of institutions like the police. Criminal investigation is a statutory police function, and the High Court is not meant to act as a "super investigator." The Court should only intervene when police authorities fail to perform their duties or exceed their powers - not immediately after an FIR is filed, as increasingly seen in many petitions rushing to court before investigation even begins.

The judge also criticized the growing trend of filing frivolous constitutional petitions that burden the High Court and delay more serious appellate and constitutional matters, reminding lawyers of their duty to avoid misusing court time.

Ultimately, the petitioner was directed to approach the Superintendent of Police (Investigation) with his grievance, rather than have the High Court intervene. The petition was disposed of accordingly.

This judgment is significant because it reinforces boundaries on when constitutional courts should intervene in police investig

PLJ 2013 SC 37 · Lahore High Court

This case was about a disputed land sale agreement dating back to 1966, allegedly signed by several pardanasheen (secluded, illiterate) women. A buyer sued for specific performance of the sale agreement, claiming the women had agreed to sell land to him, while later purchasers of the same land, including the appellant, disputed the validity of that original agreement.

The central legal issue was whether proper procedures had been followed in verifying that the women actually understood and consented to the transaction, as required under Section 38 of the Registration Act and prior Supreme Court precedent (Janat Bibi v. Sikander Ali). Witnesses who were supposed to confirm the women's identities and execution of the document gave contradictory or doubtful testimony, and some denied the women's signatures or thumb impressions were genuine.

The Supreme Court held that when pardanasheen women are involved in a transaction affecting their property rights, the person claiming the benefit of that transaction must affirmatively prove the women understood what they were doing and had independent advice. Since this had not been properly established, and since the lower courts had decreed the case without carefully weighing the evidence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the earlier decisions.

This case matters because it reinforces strong legal protections for vulnerable parties, particularly illiterate or secluded women, ensuring they cannot be bound by major property transactions without clear proof of informed consent.

PLJ 2014 SC 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case concerns a major Supreme Court review of how civil servants were appointed, transferred, and absorbed into government service in Sindh. The petitions challenged various laws and practices, including the Chief Minister's power to appoint officers to posts like Assistant Commissioner by transfer beyond his prescribed quota, and laws allowing employees from other organizations to be "absorbed" into civil service cadres with backdated seniority, bypassing the normal competitive examination process.

The Supreme Court found these practices unconstitutional. It held that appointments made in excess of the Chief Minister's quota disrupted the legitimate seniority of officers who had earned their positions through competitive examinations, and ordered such officers reverted to their original posts. The Court also struck down legislation (including the Sindh Civil Servants Regularization of Absorption Act and related ordinances) that allowed non-civil servants to be absorbed into government service with backdated seniority without competing through proper recruitment. The judges reasoned that this deprived genuine civil servants of their constitutional rights to status and reputation, encouraged nepotism and corruption, and violated principles of equality under the Constitution.

This judgment matters because it reinforces that government appointments and promotions must follow merit-based, transparent processes rather than political patronage. It protects the rights of civil servants who qualify through proper competitive procedures and sets limits on executive power to manipulate civil service rules for favoritism, reinforcing constitutional safeguards against arbitrary governance.

PLJ 2014 · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court dealt with a request to cancel bail that had already been granted to an accused person. The accused, Respondent No. 1, had been named in a criminal case involving allegations of theft, criminal intimidation, kidnapping, and related offences. He had been granted pre-arrest bail by a trial court. The complainant then approached the High Court asking that this bail be cancelled, arguing that the accused was specifically named in the police report, that the offences were serious in nature, and that he was still needed for further investigation.

The High Court refused to cancel the bail. It explained that cancelling bail already granted requires much stronger justification than what is needed to grant bail in the first place, since the two situations involve different legal considerations. If bail is wrongly refused, the wrongly jailed person cannot be compensated even if later found innocent, whereas if bail is wrongly granted, the situation can still be corrected through conviction after trial. The court noted there was an unexplained delay in filing the police report, no independent witnesses, no recovery of evidence from the accused, and no proof that he had misused his bail or was likely to flee, especially since he was a government servant. Simply being named in the FIR was not enough to deny bail. The petition was dismissed, reaffirming the principle that courts should rarely interfere with bail once properly granted.

PLJ 1990 Tr.C (Misconduct) 101 · Not specified

This case was heard by the Tribunal of the Pakistan Bar Council and dealt with a professional misconduct complaint filed by Mst. Razia Begum against an advocate, Sardar Muhammad Ishaq.

The complainant alleged that the advocate had charged large sums of money from her family for arranging her son's marriage at his own residence, for filing a restitution of conjugal rights case, and for defending her son in a criminal case under the Hudood Ordinance. She also claimed he secretly took money from the opposing party and gave bad advice that harmed her son's interests, eventually leading to a divorce.

The Tribunal examined the evidence and found that most allegations, including claims that the advocate was bribed by the opposing side or deliberately mishandled the case, were not proven. However, it did find two things established: first, that the advocate had allowed his own home to be used for the marriage and had charged a fee of Rs. 10,000 for this, which was improper; and second, that he had acted as defense counsel in the Hudood case despite being himself a prosecution witness in that same case, a clear conflict of interest he should have avoided from the start.

Based on these findings, the Tribunal reprimanded the advocate, ordered him to pay Rs. 12,000 in costs to the complainant (including reimbursement of the improperly charged fee), and directed that the reprimand be recorded in the official rolls of advocates. The case highlights the importance of lawyers avoiding conflicts of interest and acting with transparency regarding fees.

PLJ 2013 SC (AJ&K) 305 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a family property dispute between co-sharers (described as sisters and their representatives) who were fighting over possession of a house in Kotli. After police reported possible breach of peace, a magistrate attached (took control of) the disputed property under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, appointing a receiver to manage it. This order was upheld by the Sessions Judge but later challenged before the High Court, which quashed it. The matter then reached the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal. It found that the magistrate had attached the property without properly applying his mind or following the legal requirements of Section 145. The police report did not show any real emergency justifying attachment, and the magistrate failed to hold a proper inquiry before acting. The court also noted that since the magistrate had already taken action to prevent breach of peace under separate provisions (Sections 107, 150, 151), that concern had effectively been addressed, making the attachment unnecessary. Additionally, the court observed that when a civil court is already handling a property dispute, criminal attachment proceedings become largely unnecessary, since civil courts have broader powers to protect property during litigation.

This ruling matters because it reinforces that magistrates cannot attach property as a matter of routine or convenience, they must genuinely assess whether an emergency exists, and it clarifies the relationship between civil and criminal proceedings over the same property dispute.

PLJ 2014 · Peshawar High Court

This case concerns a long-running property dispute over a small house in Charsadda, District Peshawar, involving competing claims based on a gift deed and inheritance rights.

Muhammad Israr claimed ownership of the house through a registered gift deed, allegedly executed in his favour by his maternal grandmother, Mst. Kishwara, in 1997. Jehanzeb and other relatives disputed this, arguing the house actually belonged to one Masaib Shah and should be divided among his legal heirs according to Islamic inheritance shares. After multiple rounds of litigation, including a case reopened under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code due to procedural irregularities, the trial court ruled in favour of Jehanzeb and the heirs, but the appellate court reversed this and upheld Israr's claim based on the gift deed.

The Peshawar High Court, hearing a revision petition, examined whether old or registered documents automatically deserve a "presumption of correctness" under Article 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (Pakistan's law of evidence). The Court held that merely being registered or old does not automatically prove a document's authenticity, especially when its execution is seriously challenged. The beneficiary of such a document must still prove it was properly executed, including requirements like offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession for a valid gift. Since Israr failed to produce key witnesses or sufficiently prove these elements, the High Court found the appellate court's reasoning flawed.

This judgment matters because it cl

PLJ 2014 · Sindh High Court

This case is about whether a bank can recover a loan guarantee from the heirs of a man who had personally guaranteed a company's debt but died before the bank filed its recovery suit.

Meezan Bank sued Focus Apparels and others for recovery of over 84 million rupees under a finance agreement. One of the guarantors, Defendant No. 3, had died before the suit was filed, so his name was removed from the case. The bank then asked the court to add his legal heirs as defendants, arguing that the guarantee document itself stated his successors would be liable after his death, and that under the law, death of a surety only ends a guarantee if there is no agreement saying otherwise.

The heirs argued they never knew about any such guarantee, were not parties to it, and that a personal guarantee is a personal obligation that should not automatically pass on to them.

The Sindh High Court agreed with the heirs. It held that a personal guarantee is tied to the individual who gave it and does not bind his legal heirs, since no contract existed between the bank and the heirs themselves. The court also noted that no demand or legal proceeding had been initiated against the guarantor during his lifetime, and the guarantee was effectively revoked by his death. The bank's application to add the heirs was therefore dismissed.

The case matters because it clarifies that banks cannot automatically pursue the heirs of a deceased guarantor for debts unless those heirs had separately agreed to take on that liability.

PLJ 2011 Lahore 775 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case was about who should inherit the land of a deceased man, Muhammad Razaq. After his death in 1982, a mutation (official land record change) listed his wife, daughter, and sister as his legal heirs. However, the petitioners, who were other relatives claiming a share of the inheritance, argued that the wife and daughter had actually disappeared 16-17 years earlier and their whereabouts were unknown, meaning they were presumably already dead before Muhammad Razaq died. If that were true, they would not be entitled to inherit from him, since a person cannot inherit from someone who outlives them.

The respondents countered that the wife and daughter were alive, pointing to a power of attorney document supposedly signed by them in favor of a third relative after the husband's death.

The Lahore High Court found serious problems with this power of attorney document, including inconsistent dates suggesting it had been fabricated or manufactured after the fact. Because the document was unreliable, the Court held that the respondents had failed to prove the wife and daughter were actually alive at the time of the husband's death. The Court ruled that a wife who dies before her husband cannot inherit from him. Since the respondents could not prove the women were alive, the petition was allowed, meaning the lower courts' decisions were overturned in favor of the petitioners.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a constitutional petition filed by the Young Doctors Association and others challenging a Punjab government project to build a signal-free junction at Azadi Chowk, Lahore. The petitioners argued that the project would damage or demolish parts of Lady Willingdon Hospital, a historic facility over 80 years old, which they said was protected as a heritage building under special preservation laws and could not be diverted from its public health purpose. They claimed the project violated patients' and citizens' right to life and health, lacked proper environmental clearance, and breached the legal doctrine that land set aside for one public purpose, like a hospital, cannot simply be repurposed for another, such as road infrastructure.

The government countered that the project served a genuine public interest by easing severe traffic congestion, reducing accidents and delays, and supporting sustainable urban development. It said a proper Environmental Impact Assessment had been conducted and approved, and that any hospital facilities affected, such as washrooms, the maternity ward, kitchen and stores, would be rebuilt at alternate locations within 45 days at a defined cost, with the hospital's own Medical Superintendent agreeing to this arrangement. A revised bus-stop design also avoided damage to the doctors' mess.

The Lahore High Court held that since authorities had properly planned, consulted experts, obtained environmental approval, and arranged adequate rehabilitation of hospital facilities, the public trust over the hospital's land had been safeguarded. It therefore dismissed the petitions, allowing the

PLJ 2014 AJ&K 267 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a long-running dispute over forest land in Village Sehr Mandi, District Kotli, which was originally government-owned "crown land" (Khalsa Sarkaar). A plaintiff, Muhammad Sabir, claimed that this land had been converted into communal village land (Shamlat Deh) through a mutation entry, and that forest department entries in the revenue record claiming the land as forest were wrong. In 2000, the trial court issued a consent decree in favor of Sabir and another person, declaring them owners. The Forest Department and other parties appealed, and the appellate court set aside this consent decree and sent the case back for fresh trial. Both sides then approached the High Court.

The High Court upheld the appellate court's decision to overturn the consent decree. It found that such decrees transferring crown land or Shamlat Deh land through sale, gift, or private compromise, without including all necessary parties, are not valid in law. It also noted that disputes about correcting revenue records concerning crown land fall outside the jurisdiction of civil courts. Importantly, the court held that when crown land becomes village common land (Shamlat Deh), all landowners of that village are necessary parties to any suit concerning it—not just select individuals. Since the original case excluded other village landowners, the decree could not stand. This ruling reinforces protections against improper private deals over public and communal land.

PLJ 2002 Karachi 117 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute over where a divorce lawsuit could be heard. A husband and wife had married in Karachi through a Nikahnama (Islamic marriage contract) registered with the Nikah Registrar in Garden West, Karachi. They later moved to Canada, went through a second Nikah ceremony there to satisfy Canadian legal requirements, and the wife eventually obtained a judicial separation from a Canadian court. When the wife filed a suit in Karachi seeking dissolution of the marriage, the Family Court initially returned her plaint, saying it lacked jurisdiction since both parties had become Canadian nationals. She appealed, and the Additional District Judge set aside that order, ruling that evidence needed to be recorded before deciding the jurisdiction question. The husband then challenged this in the High Court.

The Sindh High Court dismissed the husband's petition. It held that he could not prove the couple had actually given up their Pakistani citizenship, and since the original Nikah was validly registered in Karachi, the Karachi courts could hear the case. The court also noted that under Islamic law, a second Nikah performed on top of an existing valid marriage is meaningless, and a foreign judicial separation does

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court dealt with a woman who sought dissolution of her marriage, return of dowry items, and maintenance allowance shortly after her wedding in 2008. The marriage was never consummated. The trial court dissolved the marriage through khula (a wife-initiated divorce) because she could not prove that her husband was cruel or impotent, but she had expressed extreme hatred toward him and an unwillingness to continue living with him. Since she was the one refusing to fulfill marital obligations, the court denied her maintenance allowance. The trial court also ordered return of her dowry articles but did not require her to return gold ornaments given to her at the time of rukhsati (sending the bride to the groom's house). On appeal, the appellate court ordered that the gold ornaments be returned to the husband, since in a khula divorce where the wife is ending the marriage without fault on the husband's part, he is entitled to recover what was given as dower.

The High Court upheld both the khula divorce and the return of the gold to the husband. It reasoned that when a wife says she cannot live within the bounds set by God due to hatred for her husband, courts must grant khula even without an explicit plea, and in such cases it is fair for the husband to recover the dower he gave. This case clarifies that courts can grant khula based on the wife's expressed hatred alone, but that such wives who aren't at fault-free may lose both maintenance and retained dower.

PLJ 2009 Quetta 76 (DB) · Balochistan High Court

This case is about a Mitsubishi Pajero Jeep that was stopped in Quetta in 1999 because its chassis number appeared to have been tampered with. Customs officials, acting on intelligence, seized the vehicle after examination suggested it had been smuggled into the country and its chassis number altered to avoid detection. The Additional Collector of Customs ordered the vehicle confiscated, and this decision was upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal. The vehicle's possessor then challenged this before the Balochistan High Court.

The main legal question was who bears the burden of proving a vehicle was legally imported: the customs authorities, or the person possessing the vehicle. The applicant argued customs had failed to prove the vehicle was fake or smuggled, and also claimed the show-cause notice was issued late.

The High Court rejected both arguments. It held that under Section 187 of the Customs Act, 1969, once someone is found in possession of goods and a question arises about lawful authority or import, it is that person's responsibility to prove they lawfully imported the item and paid applicable customs duties and taxes - not the other way around. The court also found that the notice had in fact been issued within the legally required time frame. As a result, the confiscation order was upheld, and the reference was decided against the applicant.

This case is significant because it clarifies that individuals possessing vehicles suspected of being smuggled must prove legal ownership and importation, rather than requiring customs authorities to prove illegality.

PLD 1960 SC (Pak) 85; Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble · Lahore High Court

This Lahore High Court judgment explains the role and powers of a "Justice of the Peace" and "ex-officio Justice of the Peace" under Pakistan's Criminal Procedure Code, particularly sections 22, 22-A, 22-B and 25. The court traced the historical origins of the concept from England, noting that while some countries gave Justices of the Peace judicial powers over minor cases, in the Indo-Pak subcontinent their role remained limited because an elaborate system of Magistrates already existed to handle judicial matters.

The court clarified that in Pakistan today, an ordinary Justice of the Peace can make certain arrests, call on police for help in preventing crime, and certify or attest documents, but mainly serves as an assistant to the police in keeping peace. An ex-officio Justice of the Peace, which includes Sessions Judges, has the additional power (added in 2002) to direct police on complaints about refusal to register a case, transferring an investigation, or police neglect or misconduct.

Crucially, the court held that none of these powers are judicial in nature. They are purely administrative and ministerial functions, not an exercise of judicial authority to dispense justice.

This matters because it clarifies the limits of what Justices of the Peace can legally do, preventing them from overstepping into judicial territory and ensuring the proper separation between administrative assistance to police and actual judicial decision-making.

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. ( · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court involved a woman, Mst. Umme Kulsoom, who had been divorced by her first husband, Muhammad Javed. After completing her waiting period (iddat), she freely married another man, Muzamil-ur-Rehman, and the couple had a child together.

Her former husband, however, refused to accept the divorce and claimed she was still his wife. He filed a police report alleging that she had left his home with cash and jewelry and eloped with Muzamil-ur-Rehman for the purpose of marriage. Based on this complaint, police registered a criminal case against her, her new husband, and others under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, which criminalized sexual relations outside a recognized marriage.

Meanwhile, the woman had already filed a separate civil suit for "jactitation of marriage" in the Family Court, essentially asking the court to formally declare that she was not married to her former husband and to settle her dower and dowry claims.

The High Court found that since this civil matter was already pending before the Family Court, which had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the marital status dispute, there was no justification for pursuing a criminal case based on the same facts. The judge ruled that the FIR was an abuse of court process and quashed it, discharging the petitioners from their bail obligations.

This case illustrates how pending family court proceedings over marital status can protect individuals from being prosecuted under criminal law for the same dispute, preventing misuse of the Hudood laws to har

PLJ 2009 SC 711 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a legal challenge over whether Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif could validly contest and hold office as Chief Minister of Punjab, based on questions about his qualifications under the Constitution and election laws. A citizen had raised objections during the nomination process, arguing that Shahbaz Sharif had made statements prejudicial to the judiciary's independence and had submitted an incorrect declaration, which could disqualify him under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. These objections went through the Election Tribunal and Election Commission, and eventually to the Lahore High Court, which ruled in his favor and allowed him to continue functioning as Chief Minister. The Federation and others then challenged that High Court decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined technical questions about election law, particularly the difference between two provisions, Section 14(5) and Section 14(5-A), of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. It held that ordinary citizens have the right to bring information about a candidate's disqualification to an Election Tribunal, that such challenges are not bound by the strict time limits meant only for formal appeals, and that the word source in the law covers both individuals and organizations. The Court also confirmed that a citizen could challenge a candidate's qualifications through a writ petition even before elections were completed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's reasoning and upheld its decision, reinforcing accountability and transparency in the electoral process.

PLJ 2004 Tr. C. (Services) 261 · Islamabad High Court

This case was about whether Telephone Operators working in Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd (PTCL), a statutory corporation, were entitled to promotion from BPS-8 to BPS-11. A group of employees had been denied promotion despite meeting educational and experience requirements they believed qualified them, while a colleague in a similar position, Muhammad Akram, had earlier won a case before the same tribunal and was granted the promotion, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court.

The employees argued that PTCL's own notifications from 1992, 1995, and 1997 set out clear rules for promotion to BPS-11, and that these rules applied to all Telephone Operators across the company's system, not just those working in specific overseas exchanges. They contended that since Akram had been granted relief, they deserved the same treatment under identical rules.

The Federal Service Tribunal examined the relevant notifications and found that promotion to BPS-11 was indeed available to Telephone Operators throughout the PTCL system, based on either experience and qualifications for promotion, or separately through direct recruitment limited to overseas exchange postings requiring graduate qualifications and an English test. The tribunal directed PTCL to re-examine all the appellants' cases under this interpretation and decide on their eligibility for promotion within six months.

This case matters because it clarifies that employees of statutory corporations can claim promotion rights created by internal company notifications, and that such rights must be applied consistently across similarly situated staff.

SCMR  1373     SUPREME-COURT · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case involved a property dispute between Mst. Azmat-e-Bibi and her step-brothers over agricultural land she had inherited from her father. The step-brothers claimed she had orally gifted the land to them, and this was recorded through a revenue mutation entry. She denied ever making such a gift and sued for a declaration that the mutation was invalid.

The trial court and the first appellate court both ruled against her, but the High Court, exercising its revisional powers, reversed those decisions, finding the gift mutation was not genuine. The step-brothers appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the High Court had wrongly interfered with concurrent findings of two lower courts, which is generally not permitted in revisional jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's decision. It found that the step-brothers failed to produce credible evidence proving the plaintiff had actually made the gift or was even present when the mutation was attested. Key witnesses, like the person who supposedly identified her, were never examined, and the official who attested the mutation admitted he didn't personally know the parties. The Court also rejected the argument that a village council (Panchayat) had validated the gift, noting there was no proper evidence of this, and that asking someone to swear on the Holy Quran couldn't substitute for real evidence.

This case highlights that mere documentary entries in revenue records don't automatically prove a valid gift—courts require solid, credible evidence, and fraudulent transactions don't gain protection simply through the passage of time or official-

· Not specified

This case was about a woman, Mst. Neelam Parveen, who filed a criminal complaint claiming she had been illegally dispossessed of land that belonged to her late husband. She said she stayed connected to the property until 1995, after which the accused persons took it over with the help of the land's previous owners. The accused, on the other hand, claimed they were genuine buyers of the land, having purchased it through a properly sanctioned mutation (an official land transfer record).

The Lahore High Court examined whether this dispute could be pursued as a criminal complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which is meant to punish land grabbers and criminals who forcibly dispossess people of their property. The court found that this was essentially a civil property dispute, not a criminal matter of forcible dispossession. Importantly, the complainant herself admitted she was not in physical possession of the land, which contradicted her claim that she was forcibly dispossessed. Since the accused held a valid mutation and did not fit the profile of land grabbers or criminals targeted by the Act, the court ruled that the proper remedy was to file a civil suit to reclaim ownership or possession, not a criminal complaint.

The court dismissed her petition, finding no legal error in the lower court's decision. This case clarifies that the Illegal Dispossession Act is meant for genuine criminal land-grabbing, not for resolving ordinary ownership or title disputes, which belong in civil courts.

· Not specified

This is an explainer of a Lahore High Court decision from 2008 dealing with how Pakistani law treats DNA testing when a father disputes his child's legitimacy.

In this case, a mother and her minor son filed a maintenance suit against the father, who denied the child was his and asked the Family Court to order a DNA test. The Family Court refused, and the father challenged that refusal before the High Court.

The High Court dismissed the father's petition. It held that legitimacy of a child is a serious matter with far-reaching consequences and cannot be decided casually. Under Pakistani law, a child born within a lawful marriage is presumed legitimate, following the principle that the "child follows the bed." A father cannot defeat this presumption through mere denial or accusation; he must provide solid proof and credible evidence, or pursue the formal legal procedure known as Liyan (a special court process for disowning paternity), which the father in this case had not done.

Since there was no real evidence to support the father's claim that the child was illegitimate, the court ruled the child, born during the marriage, must be treated as legitimate and was entitled to maintenance from the father.

This judgment matters because it shows that Pakistani courts protect children's legitimacy strongly, requiring solid legal grounds and proper procedure—not just a father's unsupported denial or a DNA test request—before paternity can be challenged.

· Not specified

This case, decided by the Federal Shariat Court (2012 YLR 847), involved an appeal by a man named Zulfiqar Ali against his conviction for raping his own daughter.

The victim testified that her father had sexually assaulted her on three occasions. She did not report the crime immediately, explaining that she feared the consequences for her father and was conscious of her family's honour, only going to the police once she could no longer bear his behaviour. The court found her testimony credible and consistent, noting she had complained to her mother each time the abuse occurred. Her account was backed up by medical evidence, a Chemical Examiner's report, and DNA evidence. There was no evidence suggesting she had a bad reputation or ulterior motive, and the court dismissed the defence's claim that she was involved with another man as baseless and unsubstantiated.

The court held that a delay in filing a police report does not automatically weaken a prosecution's case if the delay is reasonably explained and other evidence is strong. It emphasized that a daughter would not fabricate such a serious accusation against her own father without real cause. Given the severity of the crime, the court ruled that the father deserved exemplary punishment and upheld his conviction and sentence.

This judgment matters because it reinforces that courts should sensitively consider the psychological and social pressures victims of familial sexual abuse face, rather than treating delayed reporting as automatically suspicious.

PLJ 2004 Cr.C. (Lahore) 348 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man accused of murder under sections 302, 34, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, arising from a violent incident during a village meeting where two people were shot dead. The complainant's original FIR named the petitioner as one of the shooters, firing at one of the deceased.

However, several things undermined the prosecution's case. The complainant kept changing and expanding his account over time, giving fresh statements that added more and more accused, eventually implicating 17 people in a later complaint, while the deceased's brother filed a separate complaint naming 12 accused. This inconsistency raised doubts about the reliability of the allegations.

More importantly, six different police officers investigated the case at various stages, and each one independently concluded that the petitioner was not present at the scene and was innocent. Based on this, the police placed his name in Column No. 2 of the police report (challan), meaning he was not recommended for prosecution despite being named in the FIR.

The Lahore High Court held that while police opinions are not admissible as evidence in court, they are still relevant when deciding bail, especially since the police report is the basis on which courts take cognizance of a case. Given the repeated findings of innocence and the inconsistent complainant versions, the court ruled this was a case requiring further inquiry and granted the petitioner bail, setting surety at Rs. 50,000.

PLJ 2012 SC 44 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a murder appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The appellant, Muhammad Nadeem alias Banka, was convicted of murdering a man named Tahir and sentenced to death under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code. A co-accused was acquitted at trial. Both the trial court and later the Lahore High Court upheld his conviction, relying on eyewitness testimony, recovery of the murder weapon (a pistol), and an alleged motive.

The Supreme Court re-examined the evidence and found serious problems. The eyewitnesses were close relatives of the deceased, and while relationship alone doesn't discredit testimony, their accounts contained inconsistencies. More importantly, the Court found the alleged recovery of the pistol highly suspicious, noting that it made no logical sense for someone who committed murder to keep carrying the weapon around for 10 to 11 days before being arrested, rather than disposing of it quickly. The investigating officer and witnesses also gave contradictory accounts of where the arrest and recovery actually took place. The Court also questioned why an identification parade was held for a co-accused whose name and address investigators had apparently already learned.

Concluding that neither the eyewitness account nor the weapon recovery was free from doubt, and that the prosecution had failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the accused and allowed the appeal, overturning the death sentence. The case highlights how courts

PLJ 2012 FSC 94 · Federal Shariat Court

This case involved two men, Tahir Mehmood and Sajid Ali alias Sajjad Ali Munna, convicted by a trial court in Jhang for murdering two women, Mst. Ferhat Bibi and her maid Mst. Hajran Bibi, and for robbery. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and additional rigorous imprisonment for robbery. They appealed to the Federal Shariat Court challenging their convictions.

The killings were not witnessed by anyone, meaning there was no eyewitness to the actual murders. The court explained that in such unseen occurrences, judges must apply deeper scrutiny to the available evidence rather than relying on ordinary methods of analysis. It held that testimony from relatives of the victims, such as a brother or husband, is still legally valid evidence even though they have a personal interest in the case, since in murder cases outsiders rarely come forward as witnesses. The court also addressed a technical objection about how the complainant's statement was recorded by police, ruling that the complainant should not suffer because of procedural lapses by the police, and that such statements can still be used for specific purposes under the law.

After reviewing recoveries of weapons, blood-stained clothes, cash, and jewellery, along with supporting witnesses, the court found the prosecution had proven its case beyond doubt and found no legal flaw in the original judgment. The appeals were dismissed, and the convictions and sentences were upheld. This case is significant for clarifying how courts should evaluate evidence when a crime

PLJ 2002 Karachi 148 · Sindh High Court

This case was about a husband, Din Muhammad Wagan, who claimed that properties registered in the name of his deceased wife, Mst. Farkhanda Khatoon, actually belonged to him alone. He said these were "benami" transactions, meaning the properties were bought with his own money but registered in his wife's name only for convenience, while he remained the real owner. After his wife died, her sister, Mst. Rashida Khatoon, claimed a share in the properties as a legal heir. The husband sued to have the court declare him the true owner of several properties, a bank locker's contents, and a loan receivable, and to block his sister-in-law from claiming any share.

The Sindh High Court ruled against the husband. It held that in benami claims, the burden of proof lies on the person asserting that the property, though registered in someone else's name, was actually bought with his own funds. The court found that all the documents were in the wife's name, and the husband failed to provide any evidence that he had actually paid for the properties from his own resources. Because he could not prove the benami claim, the properties were treated as genuinely belonging to the wife. As her legal heirs, her sister was entitled to inherit half the share, while the husband would inherit the remaining half as her surviving spouse.

This case matters because it clarifies that merely claiming a transaction is benami is not enough—concrete proof of payment and intent is required, protecting the inheritance rights of other legal heirs.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 332 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a husband, Muhammad Imran, who challenged where his wife's lawsuit for recovery of dowry articles was being heard. After a family court in Bahawalpur had already decided the couple's divorce case and rejected the wife's maintenance claim, a separate suit by the wife to recover her dowry items remained pending in the same court. The husband argued that the Bahawalpur court had no territorial jurisdiction to hear this dowry suit, claiming his wife actually belonged to Khanewal district, where the marriage had also taken place. The family court rejected his objection, and he then approached the Lahore High Court to overturn that decision.

The High Court dismissed his petition. It explained that under a 2002 amendment to the Family Courts law, along with the Family Courts Rules, a wife is entitled to file a suit for recovery of dowry articles in the family court located wherever she ordinarily resides, regardless of where the marriage occurred or where dissolution and dower cases are filed. The court also noted the husband had not objected to the same court's jurisdiction when it handled the earlier divorce and maintenance cases, making his sudden objection in the dowry case inconsistent.

This ruling matters because it clarifies that family courts must prioritize convenience for wives seeking recovery of dowry items, allowing them to sue in their own place of residence rather than forcing them to travel to where the marriage was performed.

PLJ 2000 Karachi 230 · Sindh High Court

This case involved two linked disputes between Dabur India Ltd. (maker of Hajmola digestive candies) and Hilal Confectionery over use of the "Hajmola" trademark and its distinctive candy wrappers. Dabur, which had used and registered Hajmola in India and other countries since the 1970s-80s, argued that even though its mark was not registered in Pakistan, it had acquired a "trans-border reputation" there through spillover advertising, satellite television, imported goods, and travel by Pakistanis abroad. It sought copyright protection under Pakistan's Copyright Ordinance, 1962, relying on Pakistan's membership of the Berne Convention, and sought an injunction against Hilal Confectionery for passing off and trademark infringement.

The Sindh High Court explained key legal concepts: passing off protects traders from unfair competition and deception that harms business goodwill, and "trans passing off" applies when a foreign trader's reputation extends into Pakistan even without local registration, provided the local user acted dishonestly.

In the first case (Suit No. 14/1995), the court found Dabur had a genuine trans-border reputation, that reciprocity existed under Indian law, and granted an interim injunction. In the second case (Suit No. 227/1998), it refused an injunction because the defendant had openly used the mark for a different product since 1988, dishonesty wasn't shown, and reciprocity wasn't established. The judgment is significant for clarifying how foreign trademarks without Pakistani registration can still

PLJ 2011 Lahore 721 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over whether property pledged as surety in a court case could actually be seized to pay off a debt, given that it had earlier been given away as a gift through a marriage contract.

A man named Muhammad Hafeez stood as surety for someone else's debt, offering a house as security. When the debt wasn't repaid, the court ordered the property attached and sold to satisfy the decree. However, Hafeez's wife objected, arguing the house was not his to pledge because he had already given it to her at the time of their marriage, as recorded in their Nikahnama (marriage contract), in lieu of her dower rights. The trial court rejected her objection and allowed the attachment to proceed.

On appeal, the Lahore High Court sided with the wife. It held that an entry in a Nikahnama recording the transfer of property to the wife is sufficient legal proof of that transfer, and no separate registration or additional documentation is needed to make the gift valid. Since the husband had already given up his ownership rights over the property before offering it as surety, he had no legal right to pledge it, and the property could not be attached for the debt.

This ruling matters because it confirms that property gifted to a wife through a Nikahnama is legally hers, protecting such transfers from being treated as still belonging to the husband, including shielding them from his creditors or legal obligations.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 411 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case concerned a dispute over the right of pre-emption, a legal right that allows certain persons, such as co-sharers or neighbors, to buy property before it is sold to someone else, or to claim it after sale by filing a lawsuit within a strict time limit.

The petitioner, claiming superior pre-emption rights as a co-sharer and neighbor, filed a suit for possession of land that had been sold to Respondent No. 3 through a registered sale-deed dated 28.12.2005. He argued he only learned of the sale on 19.07.2006 because the vendee kept it secret, and since the Revenue Officer never issued the notice required under Section 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the four-month limitation period should run from his date of knowledge rather than the registration date. His suit, filed 31.07.2006, would then be within time.

The trial court initially agreed, but the Additional District Judge reversed this on revision, rejecting the plaint as time-barred. The Lahore High Court upheld that decision. It ruled that under Section 30 of the Act, the limitation period starts from the date of registration of the sale-deed itself, which is treated as public notice. Section 31's notice requirement is a separate, independent provision and failure to issue it does not extend the limitation period. Since the suit was filed more than four months after registration, it was rightly dismissed as time-barred.

PLJ 2001 Lahore 560 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a petition filed in the Lahore High Court by a citizen who wanted a criminal investigation transferred from one police officer to another. He approached the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, which allows courts to issue writs such as directions, declarations, habeas corpus, or quo warranto.

The court dismissed the petition at the outset. It explained that before a High Court can use its special constitutional powers under Article 199, it must be satisfied that no other adequate legal remedy exists. This is a basic requirement, not optional. In this case, the petitioner had another clear remedy: if unhappy with how an investigation was being conducted, he could complain to a higher-ranking police officer, since the police force has its own internal hierarchy under the Police Act and Rules to handle such matters.

The judge also explained the legal framework governing police investigations under the Criminal Procedure Code, noting that investigating crimes is the statutory duty and right of the police, not something courts should interfere with except in limited circumstances. Quoting earlier Privy Council and Supreme Court rulings, the judge stressed that courts and police perform complementary but separate functions, and that courts stepping into police investigation work would disrupt the proper functioning of the justice system.

This judgment matters because it reinforces the principle that constitutional writ jurisdiction is a last resort, not a substitute for available administrative remedies, and that police investigations should generally proceed without premature judicial interference.

PLJ 2010 Tax Cases (Lah.) 6 · Not specified

This case involved a government irrigation department (Lower Jehlum Canal Quarry Sub-Division) that supplied stones for flood protection and development works to other parts of the Irrigation Department in Punjab. It had been filing sales tax returns and paying sales tax for years. After an audit covering 2001 to 2005, the tax department found that the division had been miscalculating its sales tax by failing to include royalty, excise duty and other incidental charges in its tax base, as required by law. A tax demand of over one crore rupees was raised, and this was upheld by lower appellate forums.

The petitioner argued it was really just an arm of the Provincial Government, operating on a no-profit, no-loss basis, so it should not be taxed like a commercial entity. The Lahore High Court rejected this argument. It held that Article 165-A of the Constitution makes clear that government-owned or controlled corporations and bodies are still separate legal entities liable to tax on their income or business activities, regardless of who ultimately benefits from that income. The court also noted the petitioner's own conduct, filing returns and seeking a tax exemption, contradicted its claim of being exempt. However, the court did limit the tax department's power by ruling that under Section 36(2) of the Sales Tax Act, notices could only be issued for the three years before the notice, not further back.

The case confirms that government-linked entities cannot escape sales tax merely by claiming to be part of the state, while also protecting taxpayers from open-ended retrospective tax claims beyond the statutory limitation period.

PLJ 2011 Lahore 253 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a husband working in Germany and his wife in Pakistan, who sued for maintenance allowance for herself and their son, and for her dower money. The wife claimed her husband had stopped supporting them after moving abroad and had hidden the fact that he was already married with children in Germany. The husband argued he had divorced her in March 2000 under Islamic law, and so owed nothing further.

The Family Court ruled in the wife's favor, ordering him to pay maintenance for her during her iddat period (the waiting period after divorce) and for the child until custody changed. On appeal, the wife's claim was extended to cover the period from 1997 to 2000. The husband then challenged these decisions before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court upheld the lower courts' decisions. It noted that the husband himself admitted in his written statement that he had divorced his wife without notifying the local Union Council Chairman, as legally required under the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961. Despite this procedural lapse, the divorce was still treated as having taken effect, triggering the wife's entitlement to maintenance through her iddat period. The court also found the husband had substantial financial resources, including property and foreign benefits, making the maintenance amount reasonable rather than excessive.

This case matters because it illustrates that a divorce can be recognized as valid in practice even when the legal notification requirement is not fulfilled, while still carrying financial obligations like maintenance and dower for the wife.

PLJ 2009 Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court

This case was about whether an election petition that had been dismissed because the petitioner failed to appear in court could later be restored and heard on its merits.

Syed Fakhar Imam had filed an election petition, but it was dismissed on 20 June 2008 when neither he nor his lawyer was present, due to a mix-up about when the case would be called by the Tribunal. He then applied for restoration, explaining through affidavits that his counsel had been misinformed about the timing and had come to court both before and after the case was actually taken up.

The key legal question was whether the Election Tribunal, under the Representation of the People Act, 1976, had the power to restore a petition dismissed in default, even though the Act does not expressly provide for this. The petitioner's lawyers argued that since the Tribunal has all the powers of a civil court, and since general legal principles allow courts to do what is necessary to further justice even without express provision, restoration should be permitted. They also argued the petition could not have been validly dismissed under Section 76 because the trial had not yet begun.

The Tribunal accepted these arguments, noting the returned candidate never contested the restoration application despite being served, the explanation for the absence was genuine, the petition for restoration was filed promptly, and the case was still at an early stage. The petition was restored, confirming that Election Tribunals can revive dismissed election petitions when there are genuine and sufficient reasons, protecting litigants from losing their case over procedural mishaps.

PLJ 2011 SC 614 · Peshawar High Court

This Supreme Court decision dealt with a series of appeals by Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) against rulings from several High Courts that had ordered reinstatement of employees or granted them benefits like the Voluntary Separation Scheme after their contracts were terminated or they were otherwise let go.

The central legal question was whether PTCL, a partly privatized company (with the federal government still holding a majority 62% stake), could be taken to court through constitutional petitions, and whether its employees had enforceable statutory rights or were simply governed by ordinary contract law, known as the "master and servant" principle.

The Supreme Court held that since the government retained majority ownership, PTCL remained subject to the High Courts' constitutional jurisdiction. However, because PTCL had no statutory service rules, its employment relationships were governed by ordinary master-servant principles rather than public law protections. This meant contract employees had no vested right to continued employment or regularization once their contracts ended; the employer had discretion to end their service, subject only to standard notice requirements under labor law. The Court set aside the High Court judgments that had reinstated employees, ruling that such terminations were lawful, though affected employees remained entitled to one month's notice or pay in lieu, as applicable to workmen.

This judgment matters because it clarified the limits of judicial protection for employees of partially privatized state enterprises lacking formal statutory service rules.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 89 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a property dispute where a buyer sued a seller for specific performance of a sale agreement after the seller allegedly failed to complete the sale. During proceedings, the seller's representative made a statement conceding the case, but the seller later changed his position, disputed the authority of his attorney, and sought to be added as a party to contest the matter on merits. The trial court initially accepted the seller's applications, which the buyer challenged. Later, the trial court actually signed and announced a judgment decreeing the suit in the buyer's favor based on a compromise statement, but then, on the very same day, recalled its own judgment.

The Lahore High Court held that once a judge signs and pronounces a judgment, the court becomes functus officio, meaning it loses the authority to alter or recall that judgment on its own. The proper procedure would have been to file an appeal or a formal review, not for the trial court to simply reverse itself on a verbal request. The court also found that the seller's conduct did not amount to an unconditional admission, so Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows courts to decree cases based on clear admissions, did not strictly apply. The High Court ruled that the matter required proper evidence and formal issues to be framed, and sent the case back to the trial court for a fresh decision on merits. This case clarifies that courts cannot casually undo their own final orders after pronouncing them.

PLJ 2012 AJ&K 1 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a government doctor, a Civil Medical Officer at Sheikh Zaid Hospital in Muzaffarabad, who wanted to pursue specialized training in pulmonology at a medical college in Abbottabad. He had obtained a no-objection certificate from that institution, but the health department rejected his application to be released for this training. He challenged this rejection through a writ petition filed in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court.

The court dismissed the petition on two main grounds. First, the petitioner had failed to include the Director Health Services, the official who actually issued the rejection order, as a party to the case. The court held that a writ cannot be issued when a necessary party has not been included in the proceedings. Second, and more fundamentally, the court ruled that since the petitioner was a civil servant, challenges to orders affecting his terms and conditions of service could not be brought through a constitutional writ petition at all. Such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, not the High Court. The court relied on a Supreme Court of Pakistan precedent establishing that any order affecting an employee's service conditions, whether a general policy or an individual decision, qualifies as a departmental order that must be challenged before the appropriate Service Tribunal.

This case matters because it reinforces an important jurisdictional principle: civil servants seeking to contest decisions about their employment, training, or deputation must use the specialized Service Tribunal system rather than filing writ petitions directly in the High Court.

PLJ 2014 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a bail application before the Peshawar High Court by a man named Azizur Rehman, who was accused of murdering Suleman Shah. According to the First Information Report, the complainant, the victim's mother, witnessed the accused shoot her son with a pistol in broad daylight during a confrontation rooted in a pre-existing blood feud between the families. The accused had already been refused bail twice by lower courts and approached the High Court seeking the same relief.

His lawyers argued there was a delay in filing the police report, that medical evidence contradicted the complainant's account, that no independent witnesses existed, and that a separate police report suggested the killing may have resulted from crossfire between rival groups since the victim was allegedly a drug dealer.

The court rejected these arguments. It found the complainant's account direct, consistent, and supported by physical evidence like a bullet casing and bloodstains. It also noted that the alternative police theory was unsupported by actual evidence and that courts are not bound to accept police claims at face value. Significantly, the accused had evaded arrest for over a year, was declared a proclaimed offender, and the trial had already begun with witnesses testifying in his absence.

The court held that a person who flees from the law loses certain normal legal protections, and bail can be refused simply because of this absconding, regardless of the case's other merits. The bail petition was dismissed.

PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 757 · Islamabad High Court

This case arose from the tragic crash of Bhoja Air flight B4-213 on 20 April 2012 near Islamabad, in which all 127 people on board, including crew, died. Two FIRs were registered over the incident, initially citing Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code (murder/qatl-e-amd) along with other offences. Before framing charges, the trial court examined whether the accused should face trial under Section 302 (murder) or the lesser charge of Section 322 (qatl-bis-sabab, causing death indirectly through an act), and concluded that only Section 322 applied. The complainant challenged this decision before the Islamabad High Court.

The High Court did not decide which section ultimately applied. Instead, it found that the trial court's order lacked proper reasoning. The judgment emphasizes a long-standing principle from Pakistani case law that any judicial decision must clearly state the points for determination, the decision itself, and the reasons supporting it, especially important material like the official Commission report that had held the airline responsible for endangering passengers' lives. Without such reasoning, an order is merely administrative, not a valid judicial verdict.

Because the trial court's order fell short of this standard, the High Court set it aside and sent the matter back for fresh determination, directing the trial court to properly consider all evidence and hear both sides again. This case highlights the judiciary's insistence on reasoned decisions, particularly in matters involving mass casualties and serious criminal liability.

PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This Supreme Court case deals with the "Fake Bank Accounts" scandal, in which the Court took up the matter on its own initiative (suo motu) under Article 184(3) of the Constitution after reports surfaced of numerous fictitious bank accounts allegedly used for money laundering, bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal financial dealings involving large sums of money.

The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) identified individuals and companies, including the Omni Group, linked to these accounts. A Joint Investigation Team (JIT) was formed because specialized expertise in banking, corporate transactions, and cyber-tracing of funds was needed—expertise the FIA alone lacked. The JIT's investigation implicated several high-profile individuals, including Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and Murad Ali Shah, whose names were placed on the Exit Control List, along with others like Hussain Lawai, who was arrested.

The Court found that the funds had been layered through fake accounts to hide the real beneficiaries and legitimize questionable money. It ruled that the JIT's full report and evidence should be sent to the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) for formal legal action under accountability laws. The Court also directed that unfinished parts of the investigation continue, that NAB conduct any further probes within two months, and that resulting references be filed in accountability courts in Islamabad/Rawalpindi, with progress monitored by the Court.

This judgment is significant because it triggered one of Pakistan's most high-prof

PLJ 2023 Lahore 323 · Lahore High Court

This case was about whether a father is legally required to pay for his daughter's wedding expenses, in addition to her regular maintenance.

A man divorced his wife, and their daughter grew up in her mother's custody. When the daughter got married, the mother paid Rs. 300,000 for the wedding and then sued the father to recover this amount. A Family Court ordered him to pay Rs. 150,000, and an appellate court reduced this to Rs. 100,000. The father challenged this in the Lahore High Court, arguing that since he had regularly paid maintenance for his daughter until her marriage, he should not have to pay additional marriage expenses.

The Lahore High Court dismissed his petition and upheld the Rs. 100,000 award. The court explained that under Islamic law, "maintenance" is not limited to just food, clothing, and shelter but also covers other necessary expenses for a person's wellbeing, including education, medical costs, and marriage expenses. A father's duty to maintain his daughter continues until she marries, and this includes helping bear reasonable marriage costs according to his financial means. The court also noted the father had successfully supported five other daughters from an earlier marriage without hardship, so the amount ordered was not excessive given his financial status.

This judgment matters because it clarifies that a Muslim father's financial responsibility toward his daughter extends beyond routine living expenses to include contributing to her wedding costs, reinforcing protections for daughters under family law.

PLJ 2008 Cr.C. ( · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case concerns a mother's petition before the Lahore High Court seeking the recovery of her two minor children, a daughter and a son, from the custody of their paternal uncle and grandmother. She alleged that after her husband disappeared (following an abduction in 1997), his relatives took her dowry items and the children away to Rawalpindi, later pressured her to marry her brother-in-law, and threw her out without the children when she refused.

The respondents countered that they took responsibility for the mother and children after the husband's disappearance, enrolled the children in good schools, paid for their education, and that the children were thriving and happy in their care. They also noted that a separate guardianship case was already pending before the Guardian Court.

The court examined the facts and concluded that the children had not been forcibly or recently snatched from the mother, were not in illegal or unsafe custody, and were doing well academically while being cared for affectionately by their grandmother and uncle. It held that habeas corpus petitions under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code are meant for emergency situations involving illegal custody or danger to a child's life, not for resolving ordinary custody disputes. The final determination of custody and the children's welfare, the court ruled, must be made by the Guardian Judge. The petition was therefore dismissed, leaving the custody matter to the pending guardianship proceedings.

PLJ 2023 Quetta 130 · Balochistan High Court

This case involved a dispute over land in Quetta district. The plaintiffs (respondents in this petition) had filed a suit seeking declaration, cancellation of partition, transfer of mutation, specific performance, and related relief, claiming their predecessor had purchased the disputed land through a 1995 agreement that was never fully acted upon, leaving the property still recorded in the name of the defendants predecessor.

The defendant (petitioner here) asked the trial court to reject the plaint outright under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, arguing the agreements did not match the property's survey numbers and that disputes over revenue record entries could only be handled by revenue authorities, not civil courts. The trial court agreed and rejected the plaint. On appeal, the appellate court overturned that decision and sent the case back for a full trial. The defendant then challenged that reversal before the High Court.

The High Court upheld the appellate court's decision, dismissing the defendant's petitions. It held that a plaint can only be rejected if it is clearly barred by law based on its own contents, not by considering the defendant's objections or the merits of the case. Since genuine, serious factual disputes existed, particularly about ownership and the authenticity of the agreement, these could only be resolved through evidence and a proper trial, not by dismissing the case at the outset. The ruling reinforces that civil courts have jurisdiction to protect legal rights and that factual disputes must go to trial rather than be cut short procedurally.

PLJ 2022 Cr.C. (Note) 154 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute between separated parents over their minor child, Kian Munir. The mother filed a petition under the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2013, alleging domestic abuse, and the Magistrate issued a notice directing the father to produce the child in court. The father challenged this order, arguing that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction and that custody matters should instead be handled under the Guardian and Wards Act. After losing before the Sessions Court in revision, he approached the Sindh High Court.

The High Court dismissed his application and upheld the lower courts' orders. The judge explained that the Domestic Violence Act was specifically created to protect the most vulnerable members of society, women and children, who often cannot speak up about abuse due to fear of being hurt, abandoned, or thrown out of their homes. The court noted that the Act allows an aggrieved person to file a complaint before a Judicial Magistrate, who can issue notices and even grant temporary custody of the victim. Since the mother had made specific allegations of abuse, the Magistrate was right to take up the case under this law.

The court held that the father still had full opportunity to defend himself and prove his innocence before the Magistrate, and that his challenge was merely an attempt to stall proceedings early on. This case matters because it reinforces that courts should not allow procedural objections to undermine the protective purpose of domestic violence legislation.

PLJ 1990 SC 346 · Peshawar High Court

This Supreme Court order concerns Mst. Fazal Jan, an elderly woman who, without a lawyer, had pursued a civil suit claiming inheritance rights over land she said came down from her grandfather, Fazal Din, through either her father or an uncle. Her suit for declaration had been dismissed by the trial court, the appellate court, and finally by the Peshawar High Court in a civil revision, partly because her own statements about her family connection to Fazal Din were inconsistent.

The Supreme Court, after hearing her in person, found that she was clearly unable to present her complicated case coherently, and that the confusion in her statements likely stemmed from her inability to express herself clearly rather than dishonesty. It also noted that the opposing side's claim, based on a woman called Mst. Piari, was equally unclear, and that the property had passed through several suspicious transactions, including gifts, sales, and a pre-emption decree, raising the possibility that Fazal Jan's vulnerability had been exploited.

The Court granted her leave to appeal and ordered that she be provided a competent lawyer, holding that this assistance was required under Article 25(3) of the Constitution, which mandates special protection for women. It clarified that such protection covers not just physical safety but also property rights, and that courts themselves fall within the "State's" duty to protect women. This case is significant for recognizing that constitutional protection of women extends to ensuring fair access to justice and safeguarding their property rights.

PLJ 2000 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over compensation money for land that had been acquired by the government for the Motorway Project. Six landowners had given a general power of attorney to one Asghar Ali, authorizing him to pursue the land acquisition case on their behalf, including receiving and depositing compensation money for case-related purposes. However, Asghar Ali opened a bank account in his own name at a National Bank of Pakistan branch, deposited the entire compensation amount there, and then withdrew the money, leaving the actual landowners with nothing.

The landowners complained to the Wafaqi Mohtasib (federal ombudsman), who investigated and found that the bank, through its branch manager, had actively colluded with Asghar Ali in this fraud. The bank had violated its own rules by allowing a large withdrawal without the required seven-day notice, and had ignored internal warnings from its own inquiry officer and legal counsel that the power of attorney did not actually authorize Asghar Ali to open an account in his own name. The Mohtasib ordered the bank to repay the landowners. The bank challenged this, and its appeal to the President was rejected.

The Lahore High Court upheld the Mohtasib's decision, ruling that the power of attorney never authorized Asghar Ali to receive the money into his personal account, and that the bank bore responsibility for enabling the fraud. The court declined to interfere, noting its constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and that justice had already been done for the defrauded landowners. The case highlights banks' accountability for verifying

PLJ 2001 Karachi 263 (DB) · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute between a bank and two of its customers over forged cheques. The customers, N.J.N. Garments and Hosiery and Mrs. Nighat Nusreen, complained that cheques worth Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 1,30,000 were fraudulently encashed from their accounts, as the signatures were forged. The bank rejected their complaint, so they approached the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Federal Ombudsman). An investigation, including forensic analysis by police handwriting experts, confirmed the signatures were forged, and the Ombudsman ordered the bank to refund the money. The bank, Allied Bank of Pakistan, challenged this order in the Sindh High Court, arguing that since it had been privatised before the Ombudsman's order, it was no longer a government "agency" and thus outside the Ombudsman's jurisdiction.

The High Court dismissed the bank's petition. It held that at the time the account holders suffered the loss and when the Ombudsman first took up the complaint, the bank was still government-owned, meaning jurisdiction had properly attached. This jurisdiction continued even after privatisation, since there was no law saying pending Ombudsman proceedings would end upon denationalisation. The court also clarified that Ombudsman proceedings are not judicial in nature, so strict procedural and evidence laws do not apply, and the burden was on the bank to prove lack of jurisdiction, which it failed to do.

This ruling matters because it confirms that privatisation of a

PLJ 2023 Lahore 307 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over inheritance rights under the Punjab Enforcement of Women's Property Rights Act, 2021. A widow and her daughters filed a complaint with the Punjab Ombudsperson, alleging that their rightful shares in the deceased husband's property had been fraudulently taken from them through a fake gift deed in favor of the sons. However, before filing this complaint, the women had already filed a civil suit in court seeking to have the same gift declared invalid, and that suit was still pending when the Ombudsperson took up the complaint.

The sons challenged the Ombudsperson's decision, arguing she had no authority to decide the matter while the civil suit was still pending, and that she failed to follow the specific procedure required by law, which mandates that when a related case is pending in court, the Ombudsperson must file a report with that court and wait for permission before proceeding further.

The Lahore High Court agreed with the sons. It found that the Ombudsperson ignored the pending court case and failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 7 of the Act. The Court also noted that the Ombudsperson improperly made her order's implementation conditional on the women withdrawing their civil suit, something the law did not permit. As a result, the Court declared the Ombudsperson's order legally flawed and allowed the petition, while clarifying that the law itself was not unconstitutional.

PLJ 2000 Tr.C. (Services) 102 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved multiple employees of the National Highway Authority (NHA) who challenged a seniority list prepared under the NHA's service rules. The employees, represented by several senior lawyers, disputed how seniority was calculated, particularly regarding appointments made on an acting-charge basis and the status of regular versus work-charge employees.

The Federal Service Tribunal examined the legal history behind NHA's employment rules, tracing them back to the earlier National Highways Board Employees Services Rules of 1974, and clarified that even though no law explicitly repealed the 1974 rules, they were effectively superseded once the newer 1995 Rules were enacted, since two sets of rules on the same subject cannot operate simultaneously.

On the substantive issue, the Tribunal ruled that being appointed on an acting-charge basis does not automatically entitle an employee to regular promotion or seniority rights. It also found that seniority is correctly counted from the date of regular appointment, following the principle of seniority-cum-fitness, and that an employee appointed later cannot be made senior to one appointed earlier. Since the appellants were found to be junior to the respondents under the rules, their appeals against the seniority list were dismissed as not legally sustainable.

This judgment matters because it clarifies how seniority and promotion rights are determined for government authority employees, confirming that temporary

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case concerned how police investigations can be transferred between officers under the Police Order, 2002. An FIR had been lodged over a death, and during investigation the police cleared some accused of involvement. The main accused then successfully applied to have the investigation transferred to a different officer, and later the petitioner and the accused jointly got it transferred again to another officer, with approval at the Regional Police Officer level. Later, the complainant also approached the Regional Police Officer and got the investigation changed a second time by that same officer. The petitioner challenged this latest change in the Lahore High Court, arguing the Regional Police Officer had no power to order a second transfer, and that the new team's composition also violated the law's rank requirements.

The court examined Article 18-A of the Police Order, which allows a district police chief to transfer investigation once, and the Regional Police Officer to do so a second time if asked to review that first transfer - but no provision allows repeated, open-ended transfers of investigation. The court also noted that by the time of the disputed order, a challan (charge sheet) had already been filed and the trial court had taken cognizance of the case. At that stage, reinvestigation is not legally permissible; police lose authority to reinvestigate once a court is seized of the matter. The court therefore quashed the impugned order allowing a second change of investigation.

This matters because it clarifies limits on police power to repeatedly change investigating officers, especially after a case has reached court, protecting the integrity and finality of judicial proceedings from administrative interference.

PLD 1964 SC 451), Ummatullah v. Province of Sindh (PLD 2010 · Sindh High Court

This Supreme Court suo motu case examined a Joint Venture Agreement between the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and the Multi-Professional Cooperative Housing Society (MPCHS) for developing 54 acres of land in Sector E-11, Islamabad. The matter began after a newspaper report alleged that valuable CDA land had been handed over to MPCHS through a suspicious, underhand deal, prompting the Chief Justice to take notice and call for an official explanation.

CDA explained the land's history: originally part of a larger estate acquired decades earlier, portions had been allotted to local claimants over the years, leaving 54 acres. Despite repeated public advertisements inviting developers to take up the project, the land remained unattractive due to illegal occupation (adverse possession) by squatters, discouraging bidders. Eventually, after a competitive process involving multiple bidders, CDA's Board approved MPCHS's proposal, and a formal agreement was signed in December 2008. MPCHS subsequently cleared the illegal occupants, obtained necessary approvals, and completed most of the construction work without any cost to CDA.

CDA and its counsel argued that all rules, regulations, and transparency requirements had been followed throughout the bidding and approval process, and that no other bidder had objected.

This case is significant because it shows the judiciary's role in scrutinizing government land deals for transparency and legality, especially regarding public land and development agreements involving private housing societies.

PLJ 1998 · Sindh High Court

This case comes from the Sindh High Court and deals with a civil dispute originally about specific performance of a property sale agreement. During the trial, after both sides had presented their evidence and the case was pending final arguments, the defendant asked the trial court for permission to further cross-examine the plaintiff, explaining that his lawyer had been unavailable due to illness and other court commitments, so the earlier cross-examination had been incomplete. The trial court allowed this request. The plaintiff challenged this decision before the High Court, arguing that there was no legal basis to reopen cross-examination once both parties had closed their respective sides, and that the request was simply an attempt to cover gaps in the defendant's case.

The High Court disagreed and dismissed the challenge. It held that even without an explicit law permitting it, courts have inherent power to recall witnesses for further examination or cross-examination at any stage of proceedings, whether on their own initiative or at a party's request, if justice and fairness require it. This power exists under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, and courts may also use Section 151 CPC when parties make such requests. The guiding principle is that courts must strive to uncover the truth rather than rigidly enforce procedural closure.

This judgment matters because it clarifies that procedural technicalities should not prevent courts from ensuring a fair and complete examination of evidence, especially in exceptional circumstances.

PLJ 2018 · Balochistan High Court

This case from the Balochistan High Court concerns a woman named Fatima who applied for the post of Manager (Legal) at State Life Insurance Corporation under a Prime Minister-directed recruitment drive meant to fill vacant government jobs reserved for people from Balochistan. She topped the merit list after tests and interviews, securing the highest marks. However, before she could receive her appointment letter, a workers union filed proceedings before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) alleging the recruitment violated earlier restraining orders, leading to delays, show-cause notices, and the matter eventually being clubbed with ongoing litigation. Despite being the top candidate, she was effectively denied the appointment without valid justification.

The High Court ruled in her favor, holding that once she was selected on merit through a lawful, transparent process, the authorities created a legitimate expectation and legal right in her favor. Relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and constitutional guarantees of equality and fundamental rights (Articles 4, 18, and 27), the court held that the government could not arbitrarily withdraw or deny her appointment after the selection process had legally taken effect. While authorities generally have power to recall or modify their own orders, this power does not extend to cases where rights have already vested in an individual. The petition was allowed, meaning the court ordered that her appointment be honored.

This case matters because it reinforces that government recruitment promises, once fulfilled through fair process and merit, create enforceable rights that cannot be arbitrarily rev

PLJ 2017 Islamabad 358 · Islamabad High Court

This case was about an educational institution called the Open International University for Complimentary Medicine, claiming to be based in Sri Lanka, which challenged its inclusion on a list of illegal or fake universities published by Pakistan's Higher Education Commission (HEC). The petition was filed by someone claiming to be its Vice Chancellor in Pakistan, who asked the Islamabad High Court to remove the university's name from the list and stop HEC from taking action against it.

The court examined HEC's powers under the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, and found that HEC has broad authority to collect and publish information about educational institutions, both within Pakistan and abroad, especially when such institutions solicit admissions from Pakistani students. The court noted that the petitioner failed to provide credible proof that the university actually existed, was a genuine degree-awarding institution, or that the person filing the petition had authority to do so. It also noted inconsistencies, such as a recognition letter referring to a differently named institution.

The court ruled that HEC acted within its lawful authority in publishing the list after conducting inquiries. However, it gave the university the option to approach HEC directly, or through Sri Lanka's regulatory authority, to prove the published information was incorrect, in which case HEC would be required to correct the list.

This case matters because it clarifies HEC's regulatory power to protect students from fraudulent or unrecognized institutions, including foreign ones operating in Pakistan.

PLJ 2017 Lahore 740 · Lahore High Court

This case was about a land dispute in Bahawalpur. Faiz Ahmed had made an agreement in 2006 to buy a piece of land from Muhammad Ahmed and Muhammad Younas, paying earnest money and later more, with possession handed over to him. However, the sellers refused to formally execute the sale and later, while the court case was still pending, sold the same land to a third person, Muhammad Afzal, through a registered sale deed. Faiz Ahmed sued for specific performance of the original agreement and asked the court to cancel the later sale to Afzal.

The trial court and the lower appellate court ruled in favour of Faiz Ahmed, and the sellers and Afzal challenged this in the Lahore High Court through second appeals.

The High Court dismissed the objection that evidence recorded through a commission was defective, holding that since neither party had raised this procedural issue earlier, they could not raise it now. More importantly, the court rejected Afzal's claim that he was an innocent buyer unaware of the earlier agreement. It held that ongoing litigation is treated as public notice, and anyone buying property should be careful to check whether it is already under dispute. Since the agreement and lawsuit existed before Afzal's purchase, he could not claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice.

This case reinforces an important property law principle: buyers must verify the legal status of land before purchasing, as pending litigation binds subsequent purchasers too.

PLJ 2018 Lahore 1042 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a woman, Surraya Bibi, who claimed that land she owned was taken from her through a fraudulent sale deed. She had leased the land to her brother, but alleged he manipulated the arrangement into a sale in favor of his own sons. She sued for cancellation of the sale deed, declaration of ownership, and possession. The trial court initially ruled in her favor, but after the case was sent back for more evidence, it was dismissed, and her appeal also failed. She then approached the Lahore High Court.

The High Court examined whether the sale deed met the legal requirements to be valid, particularly whether it was properly witnessed. Under the law of evidence, such documents involving financial transactions must be attested by at least two genuine marginal witnesses. The court found that one of the supposed witnesses had merely acted as an identifier of the illiterate seller, not as a proper attesting witness, which made the document legally defective.

The court ruled that even though lower courts had reached the same conclusion (a "concurrent finding"), it could still intervene because the earlier decisions were based on misreading and ignoring evidence, and violated clear legal requirements. It held that the sale deed was inadmissible and wrongly relied upon, and ruled in favor of Surraya Bibi.

This case matters because it reinforces that courts can overturn even consistent lower-court rulings when there are serious legal errors, and it clarifies that proper witnessing of property documents is essential for their validity.

PLJ 2017 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a husband-wife dispute over dowry articles and maintenance payments in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court. The wife and her children had sued for recovery of dowry items given at marriage and for unpaid maintenance, claiming the husband had thrown them out and kept the dowry goods. The husband denied mistreating her and claimed he had already divorced her in 2008.

The trial court had dismissed the dowry claim for lack of proof but awarded modest monthly maintenance to the wife and children. Both sides appealed, the wife wanting more dowry items and maintenance, the husband wanting the amounts reduced or the claim dismissed entirely because of the divorce.

The High Court found that the trial court had wrongly rejected the dowry claim. It held that witness testimony about the dowry items was unrebutted and should have been accepted, and that simply because 16 years had passed did not mean the goods had become worthless without actual evidence to that effect. The court ordered the proven dowry articles returned to the wife.

On maintenance, the court clarified an important principle: a divorce only becomes legally effective, for maintenance purposes, from the date the husband formally states it in court, not from an earlier claimed date. The wife remained entitled to maintenance up to that point, plus three months of iddat (waiting period) expenses afterward. The appeal was accepted accordingly, correcting how both dowry and maintenance claims had been assessed.

MLD 2001), · Not specified

This case involves a dispute between a husband and wife over dower (mehr), dowry articles, maintenance, and restitution of conjugal rights. The wife had filed suits to recover unpaid dower (cash, a house, and gold ornaments) along with dowry articles her parents had given, and maintenance, after alleging she was beaten and thrown out of her husband's house. The husband separately sued for restitution of conjugal rights. The Family Court ruled in the wife's favor, granting her claims and dismissing the husband's suit. On appeal, the Additional District Judge partially overturned this decision, reducing some of what the wife was awarded. Both parties then challenged that appellate decision through separate writ petitions before the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which were heard together.

The High Court examined Islamic law concepts of prompt dower (payable immediately upon marriage) and deferred dower (payable later, upon events like divorce), explaining that dower is a wife's vested right upon marriage. The Court found that the appellate judge had modified the well-reasoned trial court judgment without properly examining the evidence, including entries in the marriage contract (nikah nama) that supported the wife's claims regarding gold ornaments and dowry articles. The Court also viewed the husband's restitution suit skeptically, suggesting it was an attempt to deprive the wife of her rightful claims, especially since he had not paid the dower he had committed to.

This judgment matters because it reinforces that wives' entitlement to dower and dowry articles must

PLJ 2018 SC 548 · Lahore High Court

This Supreme Court case involved a doctor, Dr. Samina Matloob, who was charged after a new-born baby died during delivery, allegedly due to her negligence. An FIR was registered against her and two others under Section 322/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (offences relating to causing death without intent to kill). She sought pre-arrest bail, which was refused by the lower court and the Lahore High Court, so she approached the Supreme Court.

Her lawyer argued there was no real evidence of negligence, that the complaint was filed two months after the incident, and that under Section 29 of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010, such medical negligence matters should fall under the Commission's jurisdiction rather than being investigated or prosecuted under ordinary criminal law. The state's prosecutor did not contest these points.

The Supreme Court noted that the two-month delay in reporting the case, combined with the police's failure to exhume the baby's body to gather medical evidence, meant crucial evidence was lost. It also agreed that such matters, involving a registered healthcare facility, should be handled by the Healthcare Commission rather than ordinary criminal courts. Since the investigation itself had also cleared the petitioner, the Court confirmed her pre-arrest bail, converting her petition into an appeal and allowing it.

The case highlights how delays and poor investigation can undermine prosecutions, and clarifies that medical negligence cases involving registered healthcare providers may fall outside normal criminal law under special legislation.

PLJ 2018 Islamabad 28 · Sindh High Court

This case involved newly appointed Civil Judges-cum-Judicial Magistrates in Islamabad who challenged a requirement that they pass a departmental examination before their services could be confirmed. The judges had been appointed in September 2012, but nearly three years later, in 2015, the Islamabad High Court amended its service rules and adopted Punjab's examination regulations, applying them retrospectively to these officers. The petitioners argued this was unfair and unlawful because no such exam requirement existed when they were appointed, they had never been given the mandatory prior training, the examination committee was improperly constituted with only two judges instead of the required three, an outside examiner wrongly both set and graded the papers, and the exam schedule crammed four attempts into ten months instead of the two years allowed under the rules. They also claimed discrimination, since similarly placed judges in other provinces (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Balochistan) had this examination requirement waived, and other Islamabad judicial officers were not required to sit similar tests.

The court examined the relevant service rules and emphasized that completing training and passing the prescribed departmental examination is mandatory before confirmation, and that rules must be interpreted harmoniously and sensibly according to their plain meaning. This judgment matters because it clarifies how procedural rules governing judicial officers' confirmation must be properly and fairly applied, protecting judges from arbitrary or retrospective changes to their service conditions.

PLD 2008 SC 673). Paragraph 9 of the said report is reproduced herei · Lahore High Court

This case involved Park View Enclave (Private) Limited, a company developing a housing scheme called Park View City in Zone-IV of Islamabad, on land it had purchased for the project. The Capital Development Authority (CDA) had approved the layout plan in 2013 and later issued a No Objection Certificate (NOC) in 2014 allowing development, subject to several conditions, including following the approved layout and transferring land for roads, parks, and public buildings to CDA free of charge.

CDA later cancelled the NOC, finding that the petitioner had failed to comply with the conditions attached to it. The company challenged this cancellation in the Lahore High Court, asking that the cancellation be declared illegal and the NOC restored.

The court dismissed the petition. It found that despite repeated warnings from CDA to stop unauthorized construction, the petitioner continued development work in violation of the approved terms, essentially taking a calculated risk. The court held that such conduct did not entitle the petitioner to relief under the High Court's discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. It also noted that compliance with CDA's NOC requirements could not be excused merely because of the scheme's size or the financial stakes involved, and that courts could not validate construction carried out while the NOC was cancelled.

The judgment reinforces that developers in Islamabad must strictly follow CDA regulations and warnings, and that courts will not reward parties who proceed with construction despite clear notice that they are acting outside legal approval.

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case concerned a custody dispute between a divorced couple over their minor son, Ibrahim Khan, who holds British nationality as he was born in the United Kingdom to both parents. The mother had earlier been given custody by the Family Court, but the appellate court ruled that once the child reached age seven, custody should pass to the father, following the traditional rule that mothers' custody rights (hizanat) end at that age for boys. When the father later sought custody under this ruling, courts eventually ordered the child handed over to him, which the mother challenged before the Peshawar High Court.

The High Court noted that the father actually lived in the UK with his parents, and the custody application had instead been filed through an attorney unrelated to the family. The judges found this arrangement unacceptable, stating that handing a child's custody to an attorney is not recognized under either English law or Islamic law. They also found that the mother's financial situation and character were not in question, and that minor school attendance issues during one term did not prove neglect, especially since the child was doing well in a good school afterward.

The court emphasized that the child's welfare, not rigid application of personal law, must be the deciding factor in custody cases. Noting the child's own preference to stay with his mother, the High Court ruled in the mother's favor, overturning the lower courts' decisions. This case highlights that courts can look beyond technical legal rules to protect a child's actual best interests.

PLJ 2001 SC 291 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a dispute over land that had been sold using a power of attorney. The petitioner, Abdul Rahim, had given an irrevocable general power of attorney to Mukhtar Ahmad, who then used it to sell the land to other people. Abdul Rahim later filed a lawsuit claiming the power of attorney itself was invalid, and therefore the sale made under it should also be cancelled.

The trial court initially ruled in his favor, but the first appellate court overturned that decision after re-examining the evidence, finding that the power of attorney had genuinely been given in exchange for Rs. 20,000, which Abdul Rahim had admitted receiving. The High Court upheld this reversal, and Abdul Rahim then asked the Supreme Court for permission to appeal further.

The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. It noted that the sale deeds executed by the attorney were for an amount close to the consideration already paid for the power of attorney, suggesting the transaction was genuine and that Abdul Rahim had effectively sold the land through this arrangement because he needed money. The Court also rejected the argument that a witness's testimony should be disregarded simply because he was related to a party, holding that relationship alone does not discredit a witness if the testimony is otherwise credible and disinterested.

This case matters because it confirms that an irrevocable power of attorney given for real consideration can validly support a subsequent sale, and that courts will not disturb consistent factual findings of lower courts unless there is clear misreading of evidence.

PLJ 2012 SC 180 · Islamabad High Court

This case was decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, with Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on the bench, arising from a dispute under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001. A shop in Islamabad's F-6/1 Farooqia Market had been let out, and the landlords filed an ejectment case against the petitioner for defaulting on rent. The petitioner denied being a tenant and argued, first, that the Rent Controller had no authority to hear the case because the ejectment application was filed in January 2003, before the government's July 2004 notification formally extended the Ordinance to that area, and second, that he was not actually in possession of the shop, which he said was occupied by someone else.

The Rent Controller, and later the appellate court and the Islamabad High Court, all ruled against the petitioner, ordering his ejectment. The Supreme Court upheld these decisions. It held that rules about jurisdiction and procedure can apply retrospectively, so the Rent Contro

PLJ 2009 · Sindh High Court

This case was decided by the Sindh High Court and involved a company, Sunley Developers, suing Mumair Associates over a housing scheme called Gulshan-e-Rumi in Karachi. Sunley claimed it had signed an agreement in 1998 to buy land for 950 residential plots, paid a large sum of money, and was given possession, but the defendant failed to obtain necessary approvals, complete development work such as roads and boundary walls, and honor the agreement. Sunley sued for specific performance of the contract, declaration, and injunction. The defendant asked the court to reject the plaint outright, arguing the suit was time-barred and that the plaintiff had no valid cause of action.

The court explained that when deciding whether to reject a plaint, it must assume the plaint's contents are true and can only reject it if the plaint itself clearly shows the claim is barred by law, such as limitation. Here, the court found the agreement, despite being called an "agreement to sell," was actually a complete transfer of the land with full power of attorney given to the plaintiff to sell plots itself. Since all the obligations complained about were actually duties of the plaintiff, not the defendant, there was no real grievance against the defendant. The court also noted the agreement failed to clearly identify the land's lease details. As a result, the court allowed the application and rejected the plaint. The case highlights how courts closely examine the actual wording and substance of an agreement, not just its title, when deciding whether a lawsuit can proceed.

PLJ 1999 Peshawar 57 (DB) · Peshawar High Court

This case is about a student, Raza Hassan, who applied for admission to the first year MBBS program at Khyber Medical College, Peshawar, for the 1997-98 session. He applied under both the regular merit category and the self-finance category before the official deadline, took the required entry test, and passed it. Only the interview stage remained.

However, after the deadline had passed and the entry test results were already out, the government changed the admission rules through a letter from the Health Department, allowing children of doctors who had missed the original deadline to compete for self-finance seats as well. This reduced the number of available seats and resulted in some candidates with lower merit than the petitioner getting admission, while he was left out.

The Peshawar High Court examined whether this late change in policy was valid. It found that the change was not properly made through an official notification, as required when altering rules in the admission prospectus, but was instead communicated through an informal letter. Since the petitioner had already fulfilled all requirements before the deadline, the Court held that he had earned a vested right to be considered fairly.

The Court ruled in his favor, directing that he be admitted to the first year MBBS class, without disturbing the admissions already granted to other students. The case highlights the importance of due process and fairness in changing admission rules after students have already met existing requirements.

PLJ 2011 SC 889 · Lahore High Court

This case was about a land dispute involving allegations of fraud. Ghulam Muhammad claimed that someone forged a general power of attorney in his name, and that a person calling himself his attorney, Basharat Ali, used this fake document to sell his land without his knowledge or consent. Based on this, several sale transactions and mutations (official land transfer records) followed over the years. Ghulam Muhammad sued to cancel these transactions and recover possession of his land.

The trial court and first appellate court ruled that the sale was indeed fraudulent, since the defendants could not produce the power of attorney document itself, failed to produce Basharat Ali as a witness, and failed to call any witnesses who had seen the document signed. However, these courts still dismissed the suit on the technical ground that it had been filed too late, beyond the legal time limit for such cases. The High Court disagreed and ruled in favor of the original owner's heirs.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal. It held that when a document (like the power of attorney) is proven to never have been validly executed in the first place, it is void from the very beginning, not merely questionable. Such void documents and all transactions based on them have no legal existence at all. Therefore, the stricter three-year time limit for cancelling documents does not apply; instead, a longer limitation period applies to void transactions. This matters because it protects people from losing property rights due to forged documents, even if they discover the fraud years later.

PLJ 1992 SC 94 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a contractor who had done repair and construction work for the Punjab government. After a dispute over a stopped payment cheque, he sued the government for "rendition of accounts," asking the court to make the government disclose records showing what was owed to him. Because the government did not appear in court, the trial judge passed an ex-parte preliminary decree in the contractor's favor, appointed an accountant to examine the records, and later issued a final decree awarding him a specific sum based on that report.

The government then appealed to the High Court, which overturned both the preliminary and final decrees, ruling that since the relationship between the parties was contractual rather than fiduciary, the government was never obligated to "render accounts," and the contractor should have simply sued for a specific amount.

The Supreme Court restored the contractor's decree. It held that the trial judge did have jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the government's absence from the original proceedings amounted to waiving its right to object to that jurisdiction. More importantly, since the government never appealed the preliminary decree within the legal time limit (as required under Section 97 of the Civil Procedure Code), it could not later attack that decree indirectly by appealing only the final decree. Allowing this would let parties bypass limitation laws. The case clarifies the limits of a civil judge's authority in ex-parte suits and reinforces that procedural deadlines for challenging decrees must be respected.

PLJ 2015 Peshawar 55 (DB) · Peshawar High Court

This is a decision by the Peshawar High Court on a constitutional petition challenging an order of the Senior Member Board of Revenue (SMBR), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Background: A land dispute involved applications for partition and for recovery of produce. The petitioners had initially been proceeded against ex-parte, and when they sought to have those orders set aside, their request failed at lower revenue forums. The Senior Member Board of Revenue then combined both related cases and decided them together in one judgment in the petitioners' favor, sending the matter back for fresh proceedings. Later, on a review petition filed by the other side, the same forum reversed course, ruling that combining the two cases into one judgment had been a mistake, and ordered them to be heard separately again.

The High Court found this review order legally flawed. It held that courts and even quasi-judicial bodies like the Board of Revenue must decide cases with proper reasoning, not arbitrarily, so that the losing party understands the basis of the decision. The Court also ruled there was no legal bar to deciding two related revision petitions through a single consolidated judgment, especially since they involved the same parties, property, and the common issue of setting aside ex-parte orders. It further clarified that review is not the same as appeal, and a review forum cannot simply re-hear a case on its merits using review as a backdoor appeal.

The petition was allowed, and the earlier consolidated judgment was restored. This case reinforces the principle that reasoned decisions are essential to fair justice, and that review powers are lim

PLJ 2014 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved Murad Gul, who was booked under narcotics law after police allegedly caught him with 650 grams of chars (hashish) in Peshawar. He threw away a shopping bag containing the drugs and fled when a police patrol stopped him, according to the FIR.

Gul asked the Peshawar High Court to quash the FIR against him, arguing that the complainant had acted out of malicious intent and that there was nothing connecting him to the crime, and that he had no prior criminal history.

The High Court dismissed his petition. It explained that its special inherent power to quash cases (under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code) is meant only for extraordinary situations, not as a routine alternative to a full trial. The court noted that police had already completed their investigation and filed a formal charge sheet, and the case was already before a trial court. It held that allegations of bad faith by police cannot be used to shut down a case before the prosecution gets a chance to present its evidence, since deciding whether evidence is reliable is the trial court's job, not the High Court's. The judge pointed out that Gul still had the option to seek acquittal during the trial itself if the evidence turned out to be insufficient.

This case illustrates how Pakistani courts are generally reluctant to stop criminal trials early, preserving that power only for truly exceptional circumstances.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court

This case involved Muhammad Zafran, a former Warder at Central Jail Rawalpindi, who was dismissed from service after being implicated in a narcotics smuggling case. He was initially dismissed under one law, the Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. He appealed, and the tribunal earlier ordered reinstatement with a fresh, proper inquiry. However, during the new proceedings, the authorities switched to a different law, the PEEDA Act, 2006, and dismissed him again.

The Punjab Service Tribunal found several problems with this fresh dismissal. First, switching between different laws partway through the process was improper, following established Supreme Court precedent. Second, the inquiry officer never gave Zafran a chance to cross-examine the witnesses against him, making it an incomplete and unfair inquiry. Most importantly, the criminal court had already acquitted Zafran of the narcotics charges, and this acquittal was never challenged or overturned by the prosecution, so it was final.

The Tribunal held that once a civil servant is acquitted by a competent criminal court, the department cannot lawfully refuse to reinstate him. The authorities had ignored this acquittal while rejecting his appeals.

As a result, the Tribunal set aside all the dismissal orders and ordered Zafran's full reinstatement with all back benefits. This case reinforces an important protection for government employees: a criminal acquittal generally entitles them to get their job back.

PLJ 2010 FSC 14 · Federal Shariat Court

This case involved a man, Zafar Iqbal, who was convicted under the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 for falsely accusing his ex-wife, Mst. Zareena Bibi, of adultery. The accusation arose during family court proceedings over maintenance and dower, where he suggested their infant daughter was illegitimate and sought a DNA test. He later withdrew that application and continued paying maintenance, which the wife took as acceptance of paternity. She filed a private complaint accusing him of qazf (false accusation of unchastity), both through his court filings and alleged statements made outside court premises. The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment plus a fine.

On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court examined the Islamic concept of Tauba (repentance), explaining that the Quran strongly encourages repentance and that seeking forgiveness erases the sinful effects of past wrongdoing. The appellant had tendered an open apology in court, had withdrawn his earlier accusing application years before, and had continued supporting his daughter without further incident for five years. The trial court itself had not believed the adultery allegations were true. Considering these factors and Quranic teachings on repentance in cases of false accusation, Justice Syed Afzal Haider accepted the appellant's apology and disposed of the appeal accordingly.

This case matters because it shows how Islamic principles of repentance and forgiveness can influence sentencing and case resolution in

PLJ 2014 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a Pakistani citizen, Riaz Ahmad, who had worked as an auto mechanic in Doha, Qatar since 1995, returning home once a year to see his family. In September 2012, when he arrived in Pakistan, authorities stopped him at the airport because his name had been placed on the Exit Control List, which prevents people from leaving the country. His passport was taken and he was investigated by intelligence agencies, but nothing incriminating was found against him; a local army-constituted committee even issued a character certificate in his favor. Despite this, his name remained on the list, his passport was not returned, and his repeated appeals went unanswered. The government claimed his name was added based on an intelligence recommendation alleging involvement in terrorist activity during a military operation in Swat, but provided no evidence or formal charges.

The Islamabad High Court ruled in his favor, holding that the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right that cannot be taken away without due process. Since no trial had been held and the petitioner had not been cleared either, keeping him in limbo indefinitely was unlawful. The court ordered his name removed from the Exit Control List and his passport returned immediately.

This case matters because it reinforces that government authorities cannot restrict citizens' fundamental rights, like freedom of movement, based on vague or unproven allegations, and must act fairly and within a reasonable time.

PLJ 2013 AJ&K 184 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case from the Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court deals with what happens when a person who stood surety (guarantor) for an accused fails to produce that accused in court.

An accused facing trial for minor offences absconded and went abroad after someone (the respondent) had furnished a surety bond of Rs. 50,000 guaranteeing his appearance. When the accused could not be produced for nearly two years, the trial Magistrate forfeited the entire surety amount. On appeal, the Sessions Judge reduced the forfeited amount to Rs. 30,000. The surety's relative who had originally sought full forfeiture then challenged this reduction before the High Court, arguing the full amount should be confiscated since the surety had been given ample time and failed to comply.

The High Court upheld the Sessions Judge's reduced order. It explained that when forfeiting a surety bond under Section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code, courts must strike a balance between being too harsh and too lenient. Noting that the accused had since surrendered and appeared before the court, and that the reduced amount had already been deposited in the government treasury, the Court found the Sessions Judge's order fair and just. It dismissed the petition seeking restoration of the full forfeiture.

This case matters because it illustrates how courts weigh fairness and proportionality when sureties fail to produce an accused, rather than automatically imposing the harshest penalty.

PLJ 2008 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute over the inheritance of Syed Hassan Asghar Taqvi, a police officer (SIP) who was killed in a terrorist attack in 2004. His mother and his wife both claimed shares in his estate, including his service benefits, death compensation, and salary that would have been paid until he turned 60.

The mother argued that the wife should be excluded from inheritance because the deceased had allegedly divorced her before his death, with the divorce supposedly taking effect by the time he died. She relied on affidavits from two witnesses claiming to have witnessed the divorce.

The trial court had already ruled that under Shia law, the widow and children were not excluded from inheritance, and that the mother was entitled to a one-sixth share while the rest went to the widow and children. The trial court also ordered the police department to pay salary arrears and continuing pension to the widow, deposit death compensation and other dues with a court official for distribution, and invest the minor children's shares until they came of age or married.

On appeal, the Sindh High Court rejected the mother's divorce claim as fake, pointing out the suspicious fact that the witness affidavits were dated the very day of the alleged divorce, which made no logical sense. The court upheld the trial court's order as legally sound, confirming the shares under Shia inheritance law and the entitlement of the widow and children to the deceased's benefits. The appeal was dismissed.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case is from the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dealing with whether a criminal case could be registered by police over an allegedly forged document that had been used as evidence in an earlier civil lawsuit.

The background: Rashid Javed had sued Aamir Shahzad for recovery of money, relying on a document called an "Iqrarnama" (agreement) dated 2006. The civil court found this document to be forged and dismissed the suit. The complainant, Aamir Shahzad, then got an FIR (police case) registered against Rashid Javed and others for fraud and forgery under the Pakistan Penal Code. Javed challenged this FIR, arguing that under Section 195(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, only the court before which the forged document was produced could authorize such prosecution - not the police directly.

The High Court disagreed and dismissed the petitions. It held that Section 195(1)(c) only restricts courts from taking cognizance of such offences without proper authorization; it does not stop the police from registering an FIR and investigating. More importantly, since the forgery was allegedly committed in 2006 - before the lawsuit was even filed in 2009 - this legal restriction didn't apply at all, because the restriction only covers forgery committed during or in relation to ongoing court proceedings, not before them.

This ruling clarifies that victims of document fraud can approach police directly for an FIR when the forgery predates any court case, without needing special court permission first.

PLJ 2010 · Lahore High Court

This case was about a woman, Mst. Zainab, who was denied her rightful share of inheritance from her father, Muhammad Ramzan. When her father died, a mutation (an official land revenue record change) was sanctioned in 1918 giving the entire property only to her brother, Allah Wasaya, leaving her out entirely. Her brother later gifted parts of this land to his own sons. Zainab, who was a pardah nashin (secluded) woman unfamiliar with legal and property matters, eventually sued through her son acting as her attorney, seeking a declaration that she was entitled to her Islamic (sharai) share of the inheritance. The defendants argued her claim was time-barred and that a local custom called pagwanda justified excluding daughters from inheritance.

The Lahore High Court ruled in Zainab's favor. It found no evidence proving the custom of pagwanda actually existed in that area, so it could not be used to deny her inheritance rights. The court also held that a mutation is not itself a document of title, inheritance automatically vests in heirs the moment someone dies, and such vesting does not depend on revenue authorities' actions. Since the original mutation was obtained through fraud and concealment, it was void from the start, meaning no limitation period could block her claim. The court ordered a fresh mutation be sanctioned giving Zainab her proper Islamic share. This case matters because it reinforces that daughters cannot be deprived of their lawful inheritance through fraudulent or unproven customary claims, and that technical limitation rules should not

PLJ 1987 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case from the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court involved a dispute over a small piece of land in village Hardo-Ochi. Ghulam Muhammad claimed he had been in possession of the land for over 40 years in his own right as owner, not as a caretaker for anyone else. Muhammad

PLJ 2012 · Peshawar High Court

This case was heard by the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench, concerning a long-running property dispute originating from a 1972 civil suit. Hussain Bakhsh had obtained a decree in 1972 against Abdul Majid, who appeared in that case through a general power of attorney holder. Based on this decree, Bakhsh became the owner of the disputed land. Decades later, in 1992, Abdul Majid's legal heirs filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, claiming the original 1972 decree was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation because, they alleged, no one had actually appointed the attorney who appeared on Abdul Majid's behalf.

The trial court initially dismissed this challenge twice, but an appellate court eventually set aside the old decree and allowed the heirs to contest the suit, prompting Bakhsh's heirs to file this writ petition.

The High Court examined whether the attorney's power of attorney had been properly proven. It held that under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, anyone relying on a power of attorney must produce the attesting witnesses to prove it was validly executed—this is a mandatory legal requirement. Since this had not been done, the attorney's authority to represent Abdul Majid in 1972 was never properly established.

The court also addressed the long delay, clarifying that the limitation period for challenging a decree based on misrepresentation begins from the date the affected party discovers the fraud, not from the date of

PLJ 2001 Lahore 472 · Lahore High Court

I need the full text of this judgment to write an accurate summary. The text provided appears to be cut off before the court's full reasoning and final verdict details are given, but based on what is available, I can still provide a summary of the key legal points covered.

This case involved a wife, Dr. Sabira Sultana, who sued her husband for recovery of her dower (mehr) after he deserted her and contracted a second marriage without her knowledge or consent. Her dower had been fixed at fifty thousand pounds sterling, described as deferred, plus a house in Karachi. The Family Court at Rawalpindi initially ruled in her favor, but an Additional District Judge overturned that decision on appeal, prompting her to challenge that reversal before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court ruled in the wife's favor, restoring the original decree. It held that when a husband remarries without his first wife's consent and without proper permission from the Arbitration Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, he becomes immediately liable to pay her entire dower, whether classified as prompt or deferred. The court explained that the prompt/deferred distinction is a social custom, not an Islamic requirement, and cannot be used to deny a wife her dower before divorce if her husband violates the law by remarrying without consent. The court also found that the husband's attorney, who testified on his behalf, could not rebut the wife's sworn testimony about consent, since that was a personal matter only the husband himself could address.

This case matters because it clarifies that women's dower rights cannot be circumvented through

PLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Kar.) 119 (DB) · Not specified

This case involved a Toyota Land Cruiser Jeep that had been registered with the Motor Vehicle Registration Authority in Karachi back in 1996. In 2005, customs officials intercepted the vehicle and seized it, alleging it was smuggled because one of the documents produced by its owner, a photocopy of a Bill of Entry, did not actually match the vehicle when customs checked their records. The vehicle was confiscated, though the owner was given the option to pay a redemption fine plus duties and taxes to get it back. The case went through multiple rounds of appeals, including to the Supreme Court, which sent it back to the Customs Appellate Tribunal for a fresh decision. The Tribunal again ruled against the vehicle owner, prompting this reference to the High Court.

The High Court ruled in favor of the applicant (the vehicle owner). It found that the registration authority had already verified the vehicle's registration as genuine, and the customs authority had never properly checked whether the registration itself was lawful or whether the documents were fake. Since the owner had produced several genuine-looking documents, including the original registration book and proof of duty payment, the burden of proof shifted to the customs authority to prove the vehicle was smuggled, under Section 187 of the Customs Act. The Tribunal had ignored this and relied on guesswork instead of evidence.

This case matters because it reinforces that once a vehicle owner provides reasonable documentation, authorities bear the responsibility of proving smuggling with solid evidence, not assumptions.

PLJ 2009 SC 1146 · Islamabad High Court

This case concerns Qazf, the Islamic law offence of falsely accusing someone of adultery (zina) without producing the required evidence. The Pakistan Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court heard a petition from a husband, Haji Bakhtawar Said Muhammad, challenging a Federal Shariat Court decision against him.

After divorcing his wife, Dur-e-Shahwar Begum, the husband allegedly told her relatives and notables who came to arrange reconciliation that she was of bad character and that their three children were illegitimate, the result of adultery. He repeated similar allegations in written statements filed in separate maintenance and dower-recovery court cases. His wife filed a criminal complaint accusing him of Qazf under Pakistan's Offence of Qazf Ordinance, 1979.

The husband argued that since she was his wife, any such accusation should instead fall under separate legal rules for spouses (li'an), not ordinary Qazf, and that his later statements were merely repetitions of an earlier claim. The Court rejected this argument, holding that by the time he made these accusations, the couple was already divorced, so they were no longer husband and wife. This meant the special spousal provision did not apply, and his conduct squarely fell under the general Qazf provisions (Sections 6 and 7), since he was accusing a woman who was no longer his wife of adultery without proof.

The Court upheld the Federal Shariat Court's order directing that formal Qazf charges be framed and the case proceed to trial.

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 686 · Peshawar High Court

This case concerns a bail application filed by Muhammad Imran, who was accused of issuing a dishonoured cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code. According to the complainant, the accused owed him Rs. 1,250,000 and had issued a cheque for that amount, which bounced because there was insufficient money in the account. Lower courts had already rejected the accused's bail requests, prompting this petition before the Peshawar High Court.

The petitioner argued he was a government servant whose job could be jeopardized, that there was no written proof of the loan, and that the offence did not fall under the strictest category of crimes where bail is normally denied. The State and the complainant opposed bail, pointing out that the accused admitted owning the bank account, had gone into hiding after the cheque bounced, and had not genuinely denied issuing it.

The High Court dismissed the bail application. It held that even though the offence wasn't in the category where bail is automatically barred, that alone doesn't guarantee bail—each case must be judged on its own facts. The judge emphasized that dishonoured cheques are a growing problem eroding public trust, and that issuing worthless cheques amounts to a kind of "financial murder" of another person. The court ordered the trial to be completed within four months, clarifying that its remarks were preliminary and shouldn't influence the actual trial.

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 994 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a bail application filed by Khawaja Mateen Yousaf before the Lahore High Court. He had been arrested under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with issuing a cheque that is dishonoured when the person had no intention of honouring it or insufficient funds in the account. The complainant alleged that he had given the petitioner over Rs. 64 lakh for business purposes, and while some amount was returned along with several cheques, one cheque worth Rs. 300,000 bounced.

The petitioner argued that this was essentially a business dispute between partners rather than a criminal matter, that he had no prior convictions, that investigation was complete, and that he had already secured bail in six similar cases filed by other business associates of the complainant.

The court agreed to grant bail. It relied on established legal principles: where a genuine business relationship is admitted between parties, bail should generally not be refused. It also noted that since the offence carries a maximum punishment of three years, it does not fall under the serious offences where bail is restricted, meaning bail is the normal rule rather than the exception. Considering the petitioner's clean record, completed investigation, and the business nature of the dispute, the court granted him bail upon furnishing bonds and a surety. This case illustrates how courts distinguish genuine business disputes from criminal fraud in cheque dishonour cases.

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 672 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man named Manzoor Ahmad who was accused under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with dishonoured cheques issued dishonestly. The complainant alleged that Manzoor had borrowed over 34 lakh rupees and issued a cheque as repayment, but the cheque bounced when presented at the bank. Manzoor was arrested and had been in custody since February 2013. He sought post-arrest bail, arguing that the cheque was actually issued as a guarantee for business dealings rather than for a loan, and that it had been misused. His lawyer also pointed out that the offence did not fall under the category of crimes where bail is normally restricted, and that he was no longer needed for further investigation.

The state opposed bail, arguing that the issuance and dishonouring of the cheque were not disputed, the offence was complete, and the amount involved was too large to justify leniency.

The Lahore High Court agreed that the amount was somewhat excessive but noted that this alone did not matter, since the offence did not fall within the restricted category of crimes under the bail law. Since the petitioner was no longer needed for investigation, keeping him in jail indefinitely would serve no purpose. The court granted bail, requiring him to furnish bonds and a surety. This case matters because it confirms that a large cheque amount does not automatically disqualify someone from bail in dishonoured cheque cases.

PLJ 2012 SC 419 · Sindh High Court

This case concerns employees who originally worked for the government's Telephone and Telegraph Department, which was later converted into Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and eventually privatized into Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL). Three employees had disputes with PTCL over matters like pensions, promotions, and a voluntary separation scheme. One of them had already won a case before the Service Tribunal, but PTCL did not implement that ruling.

When the employees went to the Sindh High Court seeking enforcement of their rights, the High Court dismissed their petitions, reasoning that PTCL's employment rules were not "statutory rules" and therefore courts had no jurisdiction to intervene under Article 199 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that under the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation (Reorganization) Act, 1996, employees who were transferred from the government corporation to the new company retained protection for their existing terms and conditions of service, which could not be changed to their disadvantage by either the company or the Federal Government. Because this protection stemmed directly from the law, the Court ruled these employees' terms of service were indeed governed by statutory rules. However, employees who joined PTCL after the transition did not have this same protection, since their employment was contractual.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and sent the case back for proper implementation of the employees' rights, reinforcing that transferred government employees retain legal protections even after privatization.

PLJ 2013 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved pensioners who had worked for Pakistan's Telephone and Telegraph Department before it was reorganized into Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation/PTCL. Their pension rights had been protected by the Pakistan Telecommunication Act 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, which guaranteed that their service terms, including pensionary benefits, could not be altered. The dispute arose when authorities issued notifications and letters restricting pension increases and medical allowances, splitting pensioners into different categories with different increase percentages, instead of granting increases uniformly as the Government had done in the past. The pensioners argued this violated their protected rights and the relevant pension fund rules, which stated that pension increases should match whatever the Federal Government granted its own employees.

The Islamabad High Court agreed with the pensioners. It held that the terms and conditions of these employees, including pension benefits, were guaranteed by the Federal Government under the 1996 Act, and neither PTCL nor the Board of Trustees managing the pension fund could unilaterally alter or reduce these benefits without the employees' consent. The Court ruled that the notifications reducing or restricting pension increases were issued illegally, were inequitable, and violated the 1996 Act. It also clarified that draft rules could be challenged in the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction, and that pensioners, as beneficiaries, could properly approach the High Court for relief. The petitions were accepted, protecting the pens

PLJ 2013 SC (AJ&K) 58 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case concerned a dispute over an allegedly fake marriage (jactitation of marriage), where one party, who lived in England, sued to have a marriage between the appellants declared forged and fraudulent, and sought an order preventing one defendant from claiming the other as his wife.

The appellants challenged the case on several technical grounds: that certain photostat (photocopied) documents, including a divorce deed and certificates, had been wrongly relied upon despite not being properly proven in court; that the suit was filed in the wrong location since the plaintiff lived abroad; that the lawsuit was filed before the power of attorney authorizing it was even signed; and that only a wife, not a husband, is legally allowed to bring such a suit.

The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir rejected these objections. It held that photocopied documents cannot be relied upon as evidence unless properly proven, and the people who attested them had not testified in court. It ruled that minor procedural issues, like the plaint being signed by a lawyer rather than the plaintiff personally, do not invalidate a case unless the law specifically says so. Importantly, the court clarified that a suit for jactitation of marriage is not limited to wives alone; husbands, wives, or even third parties can file such suits, and Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

This judgment is significant because it clarifies who can legally challenge a disputed marriage and confirms that courts should focus on substantive justice rather than rejecting cases over technical defects.

PLJ 1990 SC 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment deals with the problem of bonded labour at brick kilns, where workers became trapped in cycles of debt owed to kiln owners. The case reached the Court through a telegram alleging that labourers were being held against their will and forced to work off loans (peshgis) advanced by owners, sometimes through intermediaries called Jamadars/Jamadarnis who controlled payments on workers' behalf.

The Court ruled that the old peshgi system, where owners gave large advances that trapped workers in debt, must end going forward. Only small advances (not exceeding seven days' wages) could be given under fair, agreed terms. The Jamadar/Jamadarni middleman system was abolished entirely, requiring direct dealings between owners and workers. Past unpaid loans remained legally recoverable, but only through courts and legal process, never through coercion or police force. Smaller emergency loans given for events like weddings or funerals were to be treated as forgiven if workers voluntarily returned to work. Workers were given freedom to leave or change employers, with protection from forced retention. The Court also clarified its own broad powers under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to issue whatever orders are necessary to enforce fundamental rights, including acting on information like telegrams.

This case matters because it addressed exploitative labour practices affecting vulnerable workers, using constitutional fundamental rights protections to curb forced labour while balancing legitimate debt recovery through lawful means rather than coercion.

PLJ 1991 Lahore 345 · Lahore High Court

This case was about a university teacher, Ihsanullah Bajwa, who was denied an overseas scholarship under the Central Overseas Training Scheme, even though his department head had initially recommended him as the top candidate over a colleague, respondent No. 6. The university later reversed this recommendation and put the colleague forward instead. After an earlier court challenge succeeded on procedural grounds (he had not been given a hearing), the matter was reconsidered by a committee, which again rejected him. He then filed this constitutional petition challenging that decision.

The authorities argued the petition could not be heard because a scholarship is discretionary, not a legal right, and that the petitioner was ineligible since he had already received a scholarship before. The Lahore High Court rejected these objections. It held that a person does not need a strict legal right to approach the court under Article 199; it is enough that he has been deprived of a benefit through a public authority's failure to follow its own rules. The court also found that the official criteria only barred candidates who had received a scholarship within the last three years, and since more than three years had passed since the petitioner's earlier scholarship, he was wrongly excluded. Since his merit score was higher than the other candidate's, the court ruled the decision was arbitrary and violated the constitutional guarantees of equal treatment, and accepted the petition.

PLJ 2012 Tax Cases ( · Islamabad High Court

This case concerns a man named Muhammad Jamal who was outside Pakistan when a criminal case (FIR) was registered against him by Customs authorities in Karachi, alleging offences under the Customs Act, Sales Tax Act, and Income Tax Ordinance relating to tax and customs violations. Fearing arrest upon his return to Pakistan, he approached the High Court seeking what is called protective bail, essentially a short-term legal safeguard allowing him to travel back into the country and present himself before the trial court without being arrested immediately on arrival.

The court, without examining the actual merits of the criminal allegations against him, granted this protective bail for a limited period of 15 days. During this time, he was required to surrender before the trial court that would actually handle his case. The bail was conditional on him providing a solvent surety of one million rupees along with a personal bond of the same amount, to the satisfaction of the court. The judges made clear that this was a one-time concession: if he failed to surrender within the 15-day window, he would forfeit the surety money, and no extension would be granted regardless of circumstances.

This type of ruling matters because it illustrates how courts balance an individual's right to return home safely with the state's interest in ensuring accused persons face trial, using financial guarantees and strict deadlines rather than ruling on guilt or innocence at this stage.

PLJ 2007 Lahore 1012 · Lahore High Court

This case explains the rules for when a divorce (talaq) legally takes effect under Pakistan's Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.

A husband pronounced talaq against his wife and sent the required notice to the Chairman of the local Arbitration Council, as mandated by Section 7 of the Ordinance. Before the 90-day waiting period expired, however, the husband changed his mind, telling the Chairman he had only pronounced the talaq due to a misunderstanding, and formally withdrew it. The couple reconciled and resumed living together. Despite this, under pressure from the wife's family, the Chairman later issued an order declaring the talaq effective anyway, even though his own earlier record showed the husband had revoked it in time.

The husband challenged this order in the Lahore High Court. The court examined Section 7, which states that a talaq does not become effective until 90 days after notice is given to the Chairman, and that it can be revoked before that period ends. Since the husband had clearly revoked the talaq within the 90-day window, and the Chairman's own order acknowledged this, the court held that declaring the talaq effective afterward was illegal and contradictory.

The court set aside the Chairman's order, ruling it had no lawful authority. This case clarifies that a talaq can be validly cancelled within the 90-day period, and once revoked, it cannot later be treated as effective.

· Federal Shariat Court

This case was decided by the Federal Shariat Court, which has the power to review laws and rules to check whether they conform to Islamic teachings. The issue concerned Rule 84 of the Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978, which restricted prisoners' ability to issue cheques, including requiring permission from a District Co-ordination Officer for any cheque amount exceeding Rs. 5,000.

The court examined this rule in light of numerous verses of the Holy Qur'an and held that it violated Islamic injunctions. It reasoned that every person, including a prisoner, has the right to use his lawful income and is religiously obligated to support his wife and children. No prison regulation can take away this responsibility. The court said that while authorities could keep a prisoner's chequebook in safe custody and have prison officials countersign cheques to confirm authenticity, the strict permission requirement for larger amounts was an unnecessary and unjustified barrier, contrary to the Islamic principles of easing hardship (Usar and Yusar) and ensuring a person's right to lawful earning (Rizk-e-Halal). It clarified that prisoners whose money was linked to offences like theft or fraud would not get this concession.

As a result, the court declared Rule 84 would cease to have effect from 1 December 2009, giving authorities time to amend or remove it. This case matters because it shows how courts in Pakistan can strike down administrative rules that unduly burden fundamental rights, even for prisoners, by testing them against Islamic law.

· Not specified

Nicola Phillips worked as an assistant to Max Clifford, the publicist. She sued Glenn Mulcaire, a private investigator who had pleaded guilty to phone-hacking offences, alleging he unlawfully intercepted her voicemail messages, which contained private and commercially confidential information about her clients. As part of the case, a court ordered Mulcaire to disclose information about how the interceptions happened. Mulcaire refused, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination, since answering could expose him to further criminal prosecution for conspiracy.

Phillips argued that a specific law, section 72 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, removed this privilege in cases involving intellectual property rights, because the confidential information at issue counted as technical or commercial information under that law's definition of intellectual property. The lower courts agreed with Phillips, ordering Mulcaire to disclose the information.

The Supreme Court had to decide two things: whether this kind of private and confidential information actually fell within the law's definition of intellectual property, and whether any resulting criminal prosecution would count as a related offence exempt from protection.

This case matters because it addresses how far people can be forced to hand over information in civil lawsuits even if doing so might incriminate them criminally, particularly in the context of the wider phone-hacking scandal involving tabloid journalism in the UK.

PLJ 2007 Karachi 237 · Sindh High Court

This case was about a house in Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi, registered in the name of Wilayat Hussain, who died in 1993. His grandchildren and daughter-in-law (the plaintiffs) sued for partition of the property, arguing it formed part of his estate and should be divided among his legal heirs.

The relatives of his other son, Anwar (the defendants), argued that although the house was registered in Wilayat Hussain's name, he was only the "ostensible" owner, while the real owner was Anwar, who had paid most of the purchase price and funded the construction. They claimed Wilayat Hussain had verbally given up his rights in the property in Anwar's favor.

The Sindh High Court rejected this argument. It held that under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, any transfer of immovable property worth more than Rs. 100 must be done through a registered document. Since there was no registered transfer or relinquishment deed, the mere fact that Anwar contributed money, or that Wilayat Hussain made statements acknowledging this, could not legally make Anwar the owner. The court also explained the legal concept of "benami" transactions and found that Wilayat Hussain was the true owner, not a benamidar.

Since the property could not practically be divided among the heirs according to their shares, the court ordered it to be sold through public auction by the Official Assignee, with proceeds distributed among the rightful heirs. The case clarifies that informal arrangements or financial contributions cannot override registered ownership, and courts may order sale inst

PLJ 2011 SC 889 · Lahore High Court

This case concerned a dispute over land in Pakistan where the original owner, Ghulam Muhammad, claimed that a sale deed and related land mutations were the product of fraud. He alleged he never appointed one Basharat Ali as his general attorney, yet Basharat Ali had purportedly sold his land on his behalf starting in 1972. The buyers argued the lawsuit was filed too late, beyond the three-year limitation period that normally applies to suits seeking cancellation of documents.

The trial court and first appellate court dismissed the suit on limitation grounds, even though they found in the owner's favor on the merits, concluding the power of attorney was never proven to be genuine. The High Court reversed this, and the Supreme Court upheld that reversal.

The Supreme Court explained that when a document like a power of attorney is never validly executed, everything built upon it legally does not exist at all, it is void from the start, not merely voidable. Such void transactions are not subject to the short three-year limitation period under Article 91 for cancelling documents. Instead, they fall under Articles 142 or 144, which deal differently with possession and void transactions. Since the defendants never produced the power of attorney or its witnesses, the court treated the entire chain of sales as void. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the original owner's suit was not time-barred.

PLJ 1998 Karachi 233 [Admiralty Jurisdiction] · Sindh High Court

This case was heard by the Sindh High Court under its admiralty jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Aslo Marines Limited, sued the vessel M.T. Magda and its owners for over Rs. 13 lakh in damages, claiming that cargo shipped on the vessel between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Karachi was short-landed and delivered late, causing financial loss due to price increases in the market.

The key legal issue was whether the plaintiff, who was merely the charterer of the vessel (not the owner, consignee, or assignee of the bill of lading), had the right to bring such a claim under the court's admiralty jurisdiction. This depended on Section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, which specifically limits such claims to owners, consignees, or assignees of a bill of lading.

The court found that the plaintiff did not fall into any of these categories, being only a charterer under a charter-party agreement. Relying on precedent and the specific wording of the 1861 Act—which continues to govern admiralty jurisdiction in Pakistan despite later reforms in English law—the judge ruled that charterers have no standing to sue under this provision.

As a result, the suit was dismissed as not maintainable. The case is significant because it clarifies the limits of who can bring cargo damage claims in Pakistani admiralty courts, confirming that charterers, unlike owners or consignees, cannot use this specific legal route for such claims.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 396 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a property dispute between family members. A woman, Asghari Begum, had leased her agricultural land to her brother, Abdul Haq, for several years. When the lease ended and she sought to renew it, she discovered that her brother claimed she had earlier given him a general power of attorney, which he then used to gift the land to his own son. Asghari Begum denied ever executing this power of attorney, calling it fraudulent, and sued to have it, the gift deed, and related land records cancelled.

The trial court and the first appellate court both ruled in her favor, cancelling the documents. The brother and his relatives challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing that the power of attorney was validly signed and registered, with witnesses present when she put her thumb impression on it, and that registered documents carry a presumption of truth.

The High Court found that the lower courts had failed to properly examine the central issue, whether the power of attorney was genuine. Despite this being framed as a specific issue in the case, no real discussion or independent findings had been made on it. Because of this gap, the High Court set aside the appellate court's decision and sent the case back for a fresh decision, suggesting that the authenticity of the woman's thumb impression on the document be properly compared and verified. This case highlights how courts must thoroughly examine disputed signatures or thumb impressions before deciding property rights based on them.

PLJ 2011 Cr.C. (Lahore) 833 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This is a bail case from the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench. The petitioner, Ashiq Muhammad, was in custody over an FIR lodged by his ex-wife, who alleged that he and eight others abducted her daughter and handed her over to accomplices, who then arranged her forced marriage, during which another man allegedly committed rape under the guise of a nikah ceremony.

The petitioner's lawyer argued that the real issue was a long-running family dispute between the petitioner and his divorced wife, not a genuine abduction. He pointed out contradictions: the daughter herself had earlier approached a Justice of Peace for protection from harassment, naming her mother (the complainant) as the main person to be restrained, not the petitioner. At that time, she was living with her father, the petitioner, and had never denied or challenged the marriage arranged by him.

The court found that the daughter's own conduct and statements contradicted the abduction and rape narrative in the FIR, and that the case required further investigation. Since the marriage itself was admitted and never disputed by the daughter, the judge found sufficient grounds for bail.

The court granted bail, ordering the petitioner's release upon furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 50,000 with one surety, pending further inquiry into the conflicting claims.

PLJ 2000 SC 547 [Appellate Jurisdiction] · Lahore High Court

This Supreme Court judgment arose from appeals challenging decisions of the Lahore High Court, which had struck down the Punjab Undesirable Co-operative Societies (Dissolution) Ordinance, 1992. The Ordinance allowed the Punjab government to dissolve co-operative societies it considered "undesirable," particularly those operating like unregulated financial institutions taking deposits from the public. Several affected co-operative societies had challenged the law, and the High Court agreed it was unconstitutional, finding it violated citizens' fundamental rights, lacked clear guidelines, amounted to a "legislative judgment" condemning specific societies without trial, and breached the constitutional separation of powers (trichotomy) between legislature, executive and judiciary.

The Supreme Court disagreed with most of this reasoning. It held that the Ordinance did provide adequate safeguards, since affected societies could seek redress before a co-operative judge and then through writ petitions in the High Court—satisfying requirements of due process even without a prior hearing. The Court also held that the existence of other laws like the Co-operative Societies Act and Banking Companies Ordinance did not prevent the legislature from enacting this special law, and that the Ordinance did not declare anyone guilty of an offence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgments and upheld the Ordinance's validity, except confirming that one specific section (Section 22) was indeed unconstitutional. This case clarifies limits on separation-of-powers challenges

PLJ 2012 Lahore 326 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a dispute over agricultural land in Okara. The land owner had filed a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, alleging that the people farming his land under a lease agreement refused to vacate and had illegally taken possession after their lease period ended. While that complaint was pending, the parties reached a compromise before the Additional Sessions Judge, extending the lease until 30 June 2011 with payment through post-dated cheques, and the complaint was formally disposed of.

Later, after the lease period ended, one of the cheques was dishonoured. The land owner then filed a fresh application before the same judge, who ordered the original occupants to hand back possession, backed by police assistance. The occupants challenged this order in the High Court.

The High Court ruled that once the original complaint was disposed of through compromise, the judge became "functus officio," meaning he no longer had any jurisdiction over the matter. Since no case under the Illegal Dispossession Act was still pending, the judge had no legal power to pass a fresh order restoring possession based on an alleged breach of the compromise. The Act contains no provision allowing such restoration after a case is already closed. The court therefore declared the order illegal and without jurisdiction, and allowed the petition.

This case clarifies that courts cannot reopen settled disputes to enforce compromise terms unless specific legal authority exists for it.

PLJ 2002 · Not specified

This case involved railway police employees who had been served with a charge sheet and show-cause notices accusing them of misconduct and inefficiency, specifically alleged embezzlement of case property for which they had also been arrested and faced criminal proceedings. The employees went to the Lahore High Court asking it to stop the departmental disciplinary proceedings, arguing that since a criminal case on the same facts was already pending in court, the department should wait for the criminal case to conclude before taking any departmental action against them. They also claimed the department was acting with bad intent to remove them from service.

The court rejected this argument and dismissed the petition. It held that a writ petition is not maintainable against a mere charge sheet, since no final adverse order had yet been passed against the employees. It further ruled that departmental and criminal proceedings serve different purposes and can run simultaneously: criminal courts examine whether a crime was committed under the Criminal Procedure Code, while departmental authorities assess whether an employee is guilty of misconduct under service rules. There is no legal bar preventing both processes from proceeding in parallel. The court said the proper course for the employees was to respond to the charge sheet and raise their defenses before the departmental authority itself, not to approach the High Court prematurely.

This judgment reinforces an important principle in Pakistani administrative law: employees cannot bypass internal disciplinary procedures by rushing to court before any final decision is made, and pending criminal cases do not automatically suspend an employer's right to conduct disciplinary proceedings.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 149 (DB) · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a dispute between the Income Tax Department (appellant) and four employees who had been promoted on an acting-charge basis to Inspector posts after passing a departmental promotion exam in 2004. The employees complained that, unlike colleagues in other zones who received the salary of the higher post they were officiating on, they were being paid only according to their original lower grade. They filed a writ petition seeking promotion and the corresponding salary.

The single judge of the Lahore High Court disposed of their petition based on a consent order, agreed to by lawyers for both sides, directing that the employees be paid according to the pay scale of the acting post they were working on, and that their promotion case be decided following a relevant Supreme Court precedent.

The department later tried to appeal this consent order. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, holding that once both parties agree to a settlement in court, they give up their right to challenge it later through appeal, as established under Order 23 Rule 3 and Section 96(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. The court also rejected the argument that the order violated constitutional provisions on service tribunals, noting the real issue was discriminatory salary treatment, not improper promotion by the court.

This judgment reinforces the principle that consent orders are final and binding, discouraging parties from going back on agreements they voluntarily made in court.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 308 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a family land dispute from Pasroor. The petitioners sued claiming ownership rights over property that had been gifted by their relative to his daughters through a mutation in 1987. During the trial, the petitioners were repeatedly given chances—eleven in total—to produce evidence, but on 18.7.2008 their evidence was again absent, so the trial court closed evidence and dismissed the suit under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The petitioners appealed, but filed it late, well beyond the thirty-day limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act. They asked the appellate court to excuse the delay, citing confusion over the next hearing date caused by court staff, but the appellate court rejected this explanation and dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

The High Court, hearing the petitioners' further challenge, upheld both lower court decisions. It calculated the limitation period precisely, found the appeal was filed months too late, and ruled that the explanation offered did not amount to sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The court also clarified that its special revisional powers could only be used where a lower court had wrongly assumed, refused, or exercised jurisdiction illegally or with serious irregularity—conditions not met here.

The petition was dismissed, meaning the original dismissal of the suit stood. The case highlights how strictly limitation periods for appeals are enforced, and that mere administrative confusion is often insufficient to excuse delay.

PLJ 2001 Lahore 36 (DB) · Lahore High Court

This case involved a private limited company that published newspapers and was in a tax dispute with the Income Tax Commissioner over several assessment years (1977-78 to 1986-87). The tax authorities had disallowed the company's claimed expenses for employee gratuity payments, as well as certain administrative expenses like telephone, travel, and entertainment costs that were certified by the company's directors.

The Lahore High Court addressed four legal questions referred by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. On the gratuity issue, the court ruled in favor of the company, holding that gratuity amounts calculated and set aside each year are a legitimate deductible business expense, even though actual payment to employees depends on a future event and had not yet become due. This followed an earlier Supreme Court ruling on the same principle.

However, on the question of whether expenses verified only by company directors should automatically be treated as valid business expenses, the court ruled against the company. It held that any expense must meet two legal tests: it must have actually been incurred, and it must have been incurred wholly for business purposes. Mere certification by a director does not satisfy these requirements.

This judgment matters because it clarifies two important tax principles: companies can claim gratuity provisions as deductible expenses even before actual payment, but they cannot escape proper documentation requirements for other expenses simply by having a director sign off on them.

PLJ 2008 SC 1059 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case concerns a dispute over agricultural land where the respondent, Nazir Ahmed, had filed a civil suit claiming a right of pre-emption to purchase land that Muhammad Aslam had acquired. During the trial, the plaintiff repeatedly failed to produce his evidence due to various delays, including judges being transferred and adjournment requests. Eventually the trial court invoked Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code to close the plaintiff's evidence and dismissed the suit with costs. On appeal, the Additional District Judge set aside this dismissal and sent the case back for a fresh decision, and the Lahore High Court upheld that decision. Muhammad Aslam then challenged this before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, clarifying an important legal point: when a law says a court must proceed to decide a matter forthwith, this does not mean the court must immediately dismiss the suit. It only means the court should proceed without further adjournment to take the next appropriate step. In this case, since the plaintiff himself was present in court on the relevant date, the trial judge should have called him to testify directly instead of dismissing the entire suit. This ruling matters because it protects litigants from losing their case outright due to procedural technicalities when alternative, fairer options were available to the court.

PLJ 2007 Peshawar 6 (DB) · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a husband, Chan Zeb, who had earlier obtained an ex-parte decree from a Family Court in Haripur for restitution of conjugal rights, meaning the court had ordered his wife to return to the marriage. His wife, Mst. Khalida Shaheen, later filed a separate suit seeking recovery of her dower (money or property owed to her under the marriage contract). The husband challenged this separate suit, arguing that under the Family Courts Act, 1964, all disputes between spouses, including claims like dower, should have been raised together in the same case as the restitution suit, not filed separately.

The Peshawar High Court rejected this argument. It clarified that the law only requires that claims for restitution of conjugal rights and dissolution of marriage be combined and decided together, so that one spouse cannot block the other by filing separate competing suits on those two specific issues. However, other matters such as dower, dowry, maintenance, and recovery of a wife's personal property are not required to be combined with those suits and can be filed and decided independently in separate proceedings.

The court held that the law is meant to help spouses get justice quickly, not create hurdles. Since there was no legal bar to filing a separate dower suit, the petition was dismissed. This ruling clarifies which family-related claims must be joined together in family court litigation and which can proceed separately.

PLJ 2010 Cr.C. (Lahore) 752 (DB) · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case was heard by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, on appeal from a trial court decision in Chakwal where Kazim Hussain Shah had been convicted of murdering four people, Ghulam Sakeena, Misbah Batool, Khadim Hussain, and Bareen Fatima, and sentenced to death on each count, plus a separate conviction for house-trespass. Two other men initially accused in the same incident had already been acquitted at trial after police found no evidence linking them to the crime and no recoveries were made from them.

The prosecution's case against the appellant rested heavily on recovered crime-scene evidence, including spent cartridges, and a positive report from the Forensic Science Laboratory supposedly linking a recovered pistol to the shootings. The High Court examined this evidence and found it unreliable, choosing to reject the forensic report rather than accept it, noting that such technical reports are not automatically binding on a court. The judges reasoned that since two co-accused on the same evidence had already been acquitted, and there was no strong independent corroboration tying the appellant specifically to the killings, it would be wrong to uphold a death sentence based on weak proof.

The court ultimately set aside the conviction and death sentence, granting the appellant the same benefit of doubt extended to the acquitted co-accused. This case is significant because it confirms that courts are not obligated to accept forensic or scientific reports at face value and must still weigh them against the overall strength and consistency of the evidence before convicting someone, especially in cap

PLJ 2008 SC 414 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved Arshad Mahmood, who was convicted under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possession of charas (hashish) and sentenced to life imprisonment with a heavy fine. Police had raided his house in Islamabad in 2000 based on secret tip-off information, without first obtaining a search warrant from a magistrate, and recovered over 21 kilograms of charas from the courtyard. His wife, who was present at the time, was arrested on the spot but later acquitted, while the appellant himself was said to have fled before police arrived.

The Supreme Court examined whether such warrantless raids on private homes violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which protects the dignity and privacy of citizens. The Court held that police and similar agencies do not have unlimited power to search a person's home without satisfying legal requirements, even when a magistrate accompanies the raiding party. The presence of a magistrate does not excuse police from the mandatory legal duty to obtain a search warrant when there was time and opportunity to do so.

The Court also found no proof that the house was in the appellant's exclusive possession, and noted the inconsistency of acquitting the wife while convicting the husband based on the same recovery. As a result, the conviction and sentence were set aside.

This judgment is important because it reinforces that constitutional protections of privacy limit police search powers, and that procedural shortcuts cannot override an individual's fundamental rights.

PLJ 2024 SC 921 · Lahore High Court

This case involved Malik Ahmad Usman Nawaz, a candidate for a Punjab Assembly seat (PP-254, Bahawalpur), whose nomination papers were rejected ahead of the 2024 general elections. The Returning Officer rejected his papers claiming his signature on the nomination form did not match the one on his CNIC. On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal upheld the rejection but for a different reason—that he was a proclaimed offender in a criminal case and thus a fugitive from law. The Lahore High Court later dismissed his petition, agreeing with the Tribunal's reasoning. The matter reached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court found both grounds for rejection flawed. First, the alleged signature mismatch was not legally sufficient grounds for rejection, since the law only allows rejection for mismatched signatures of a proposer or seconder, not the candidate himself, and in any case the mismatch was not shown to be "material." Second, the petitioner had already obtained protective pre-arrest bail, undermining the claim that his status as a proclaimed offender barred him from contesting. The Court also relied on an earlier ruling clarifying that being a proclaimed offender in one case does not affect a person's separate civil right to contest elections, unless the Constitution or election law specifically says so.

The Supreme Court set aside the lower rulings, ordered his nomination accepted, and directed the Election Commission to include his name and symbol on the ballot for the scheduled election. This case clarifies the lim

PLJ 2015 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a man named Khanzado, who was tried in absentia (in his absence, since he was declared an absconder) by an Anti-Terrorism Court in Jacobabad. He had been accused, along with others, of kidnapping a six-year-old boy for ransom, under charges including Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code and anti-terrorism laws. At the end of the trial, all accused, including Khanzado, were acquitted of the main kidnapping-related charges due to lack of evidence. However, the trial court separately convicted Khanzado under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which deals with absconding from trial, sentencing him to five years in prison and ordering forfeiture of his property.

Khanzado appealed to the Sindh High Court, arguing that this conviction was unlawful since he was never even formally charged with the Section 21-L offence, no evidence was presented on it, and he was punished without a hearing. The government's lawyer agreed with this argument.

The High Court found serious legal flaws: no charge had been framed for Section 21-L, no evidence was recorded on it, and the trial court gave no reasoning before convicting him. This violated his constitutional rights to be heard and treated fairly under Articles 9 and 10(1) of the Constitution. Since he had already been acquitted of the main charges, the court set aside his conviction entirely, ruling that a retrial was unnecessary.

PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 83 · Lahore High Court

This judgment from the Lahore High Court addresses a key legal question: whether the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) falls under the term "police authorities" as used in Section 22-A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether that affects where people can seek relief against FIA actions.

The case arose when the National Bank of Pakistan and one of its officers challenged an FIA inquiry into alleged illegal loan issuance and money laundering. They asked the High Court to order the FIA to drop the inquiry and to stop allegedly harassing bank employees, arguing no proper legal procedure was followed.

The court focused first on whether the petition was even maintainable, given that Section 22-A(6) allows an "ex-officio Justice of Peace" (a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge) to issue directions to police authorities about non-registration of cases, improper transfer of investigations, or excesses committed during investigations. The court held that FIA officials, who exercise the same powers as provincial police under the law, do qualify as "police authorities" under this provision. Therefore, aggrieved persons can approach a Justice of Peace for complaints against FIA conduct, just as they could against provincial police.

Since this alternate remedy existed and was adequate, the court ruled that the writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was not maintainable, and dismissed it accordingly. This matters because it clarifies that people aggrieved by FIA investigations have a quicker, more accessible local remedy before resorting to the High

PLJ 2012 SC (AJ&K) 26 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case was about who should have custody of two young children after their mother died. The children's maternal grandmother applied for custody, arguing that since the father had remarried, the children's welfare would be better served living with her rather than with a stepmother. The father opposed this, saying that as the natural guardian he was entitled to custody, that he had enrolled the children in a good English-medium school, and that they had been living with him for over four years since their mother's death.

Both the trial court and the Shariat Court had already ruled in favor of the father, and the grandmother appealed further. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir upheld these earlier decisions and dismissed her appeal.

The court explained that the central issue in custody matters is always the welfare of the minor, which includes moral, spiritual, and material well-being. Judges must weigh factors such as kinship, character and capacity of the proposed guardian, home environment, and the age, sex, and religion of the child. Importantly, the court found that the children were old enough and intelligent enough to express a meaningful preference, and that their views should not be lightly ignored. Given that the father was financially stable and could provide better education, while the elderly grandmother was herself dependent on relatives and might struggle to raise the children, the court ruled that custody should remain with the father.

PLJ 2017 Lahore 115 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case was about who should have custody of two young children, a girl and a boy, after their parents' marriage broke down. The children's grandmother had applied for custody, arguing that the mother had remarried a man outside the family and the father was in prison over unpaid maintenance. The family courts had sided with the grandmother, removing the children from their mother's custody mainly because the mother had remarried.

The Lahore High Court overturned these decisions. It held that the mother remarrying a stranger, by itself, is not automatically a valid reason to deny her custody of her children. The court also clarified an important legal point: the usual order of preference for custody (mother, then mother's mother, then other relatives) only applies when the father is deceased or absent, not while the real father is alive and capable of claiming custody. Since the father never actually came forward to seek custody or support his own mother's claim, the grandmother's petition was essentially filed on her own initiative, which the court found insufficient grounds for taking children away from their mother.

The court also noted the children had never actually lived with the grandmother, so there was no bond to protect, while the father had failed to pay maintenance for his children.

Ultimately, the court ruled that the children's welfare was best served by remaining with their mother, restoring her custody rights. This case reinforces that remarriage alone does not disqualify a mother from custody under Pakistani law.

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1058 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a father, Shabbir Hussain, accused under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code of committing rape against his own minor daughter. The complaint was filed by the girl herself, alleging the assault occurred while she was alone at home. The accused sought post-arrest bail, arguing he had been falsely implicated due to a family dispute: he claimed the real issue was that the girl had developed an inappropriate relationship with a relative's son, and to protect that young man, the girl's grandmother and aunt orchestrated a false case against him.

The Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, examined the record and found several reasons to doubt the prosecution's version. The medical evidence did not clearly support the victim's account, and chemical examination results were still pending. The father had seven children living in the same house, making it seem improbable he would commit such an act in their presence. Notably, the victim had refused to meet her own mother and preferred staying with her grandmother and aunt, the very relatives suspected of pressuring her to make the allegation. The court noted that a young, poorly educated girl could easily be influenced by relatives.

Given these contradictions, the court ruled the matter required further inquiry rather than definite guilt, and granted bail since the accused had already been detained for six months. The court also ordered police protection for the victim and directed an independent inquiry into the allegations.

PLJ 2004 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a custody dispute over two young children after their father died. The mother had left the matrimonial home due to strained relations with her husband before his death by suicide. After his death, she attended the funeral but was later made to leave the household without her children, who remained with the paternal family. She approached the Guardian Judge seeking custody under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, and also asked for interim (temporary) custody while the main case was pending. The trial court granted her interim custody, and this was upheld on appeal. The paternal side then challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing there was no urgent need to change custody and that they were better off financially.

The High Court dismissed the challenge. It held that a Guardian Judge does not need to show urgency before granting interim custody under Section 12 of the Act; the law should be interpreted liberally, and the judge has broad parental jurisdiction to act in the child's interest at any time. The paramount consideration is always the welfare of the minor, taking into account factors like age and sex. The court emphasized that young children need their mother's love and care, especially since she had not remarried, and that a mother's bond cannot be substituted by a grandmother's care. It also ruled that interim custody arrangements should not be disturbed without compelling reasons. The court directed the main custody case to be decided quickly, within one month.

PLJ 2021 Lahore 605 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a father who filed a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court seeking custody of his young son, roughly one and a half years old, after the child's mother passed away. Following the mother's death, the child had been living with his maternal grandmother. The father approached the court under the habeas corpus-type jurisdiction (Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 199 of the Constitution), seeking to have the child removed from the grandmother's custody and handed over to him.

The court held that under Islamic law (Mohammadan Law), after the death of a child's real mother, the maternal grandmother has a preferential right to custody (hizanat) of young children. Since the child was already settled with his grandmother and had not been recently or wrongfully taken from anyone's custody, this was not a case of urgent "snatching" that would justify the High Court stepping in to change custody immediately. The judge noted that disturbing the child's current, stable living arrangement would harm his normal life.

The court therefore declined to interfere and allowed the child to remain with his maternal grandmother. However, it clarified that the father is not without recourse: he can file a proper guardianship petition before the relevant family court to seek interim or permanent custody through the normal legal process, rather than through this emergency constitutional remedy. This case reinforces the principle that such emergency powers are reserved for urgent custody disputes, not for settling long-term custody questions, which belong before specialized guardian courts.

PLJ 2024 Cr.C. (Note) 240 · Federal Shariat Court

This case involved Abdul Moeen, who was convicted by a trial court in Dir Upper for a 1999 incident in which he and several co-accused allegedly broke into a house armed with firearms and abducted a woman, Mst. Naiba, to force her into marriage. When she resisted, she was shot and injured in both arms. The appellant absconded for over 21 years before being arrested in 2020 and tried. He was convicted under multiple sections of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Offence of Zina Ordinance, receiving various prison sentences and fines.

On appeal before the Federal Shariat Court, his lawyer argued that some witness statements used against him had been "transposed" (carried over) from earlier related trials of his co-accused without their supporting documents being formally re-exhibited, so they should not be relied upon.

The Federal Shariat Court rejected this argument. It held that once a statement is properly recorded and exhibited in one trial, those exhibits become part of that statement and do not need to be separately re-exhibited when transposed into a co-accused's later trial, provided the legal conditions under Section 512 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order are met. The court found the victim's testimony credible and well-supported by eyewitnesses, noting that medical evidence only serves a supporting role rather than being essential on its own. The conviction was upheld, reinforcing how courts handle evidence transposed from earlier related trials.

PLJ 2020 · Balochistan High Court

This case involved the National Accountability Bureau's attempt to reopen a corruption investigation against Abdul Hakeem, a General Manager at Pakistan State Oil, and other officials, long after it had been officially closed. NAB had investigated the respondents in 2002, found no evidence against them, and formally closed the case with court approval in 2005. Years later, in 2009, NAB sought permission to reinvestigate the same matter. That request went through a lengthy legal back-and-forth, eventually landing back before the Accountability Court, which rejected NAB's application in 2019. NAB then challenged that rejection before the Balochistan High Court.

The High Court dismissed NAB's petition, upholding the trial court's refusal to allow reinvestigation. The court explained that while re-investigation is legally possible even after a case is closed, it can only happen if genuinely new evidence has emerged that was not available earlier. Courts should not simply rubber-stamp an investigator's request; they must be satisfied there are valid reasons. In this case, the same allegations had also been examined through four separate administrative inquiries by the Customs Department, and the respondents were cleared each time. Given that 17 years had passed with no fresh evidence presented, the court found that continuing to pursue the respondents would be unfair and amount to misuse of the legal process.

This ruling matters because it sets a check on investigative agencies like NAB, preventing indefinite harassment of individuals through repeated investigations without solid new justification, reinforcing fairness and finality in legal proceed

PLJ 2023 Cr.C. (Note) 125 · Lahore High Court

This case involved Muhammad Naeem-ul-Haq, who was convicted by a trial court for posing as an unauthorized overseas employment promoter. He had taken Rs. 700,000 from a complainant, promising to send the complainant's son to America for employment, but failed to deliver on this promise. He was convicted under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, receiving four years' imprisonment under Section 17 and another four years under Section 22 (running concurrently), along with fines and compensation to the complainant.

Naeem-ul-Haq appealed to the Lahore High Court, but his lawyer did not contest the conviction itself-only asked for a reduced sentence, citing that this was his first offense and he had already served over a year in custody. The complainant's lawyer did not object to this request.

The High Court upheld the conviction, finding the prosecution's evidence credible and consistent. However, it agreed to reduce the sentence to time already served, while keeping the fine and default sentence intact. The appellant was given one month to pay the fine.

This case illustrates how courts balance punishment with rehabilitation, particularly for first-time offenders. The judgment emphasizes that criminal justice aims not just to punish, but to allow individuals the chance to reform, provided this doesn't undermine the seriousness of the offense or society's interests.

PLJ 2016 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case comes from the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, and deals with a murder trial. A prosecution witness, Manzoor Ahmad, had testified under oath that it was co-accused Riaz who fired the shots that killed the victim. Weeks later, the witness filed an application claiming this was a clerical mistake and that he actually meant to name Ejaz, the petitioner, as the shooter. The trial judge allowed the witness to be re-examined and change his testimony, and then refused the defence lawyer's request for time to challenge this decision, forcing the defence to cross-examine immediately without that opportunity.

Ejaz challenged this in the High Court. The Court ruled in his favour, holding that the law governing evidence (Article 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984) only allows a witness to be re-examined to explain something raised in cross-examination, or to address a genuinely new matter with court permission. It does not allow a witness to go back and effectively change or "correct" testimony to fix a problem in the prosecution's case. The Court also stressed that criminal trials must follow fair procedure, especially in serious cases where an accused may face the death penalty, and that an accused must get a meaningful chance to defend himself before being convicted.

As a result, the trial court's order allowing the re-examination was cancelled, along with everything that followed from it. This case matters because it reinforces that procedural fairness and safeguards for the accused cannot be bypassed even to accommodate a complainant's shifting evidence.

PLJ 2018 · Lahore High Court

This case is about who can get court protection and appointed as a manager for the property of a mentally disordered person under Pakistan's Mental Health Ordinance, 2001.

The petitioners, whose mother was allegedly suffering from a mental disorder and living abroad, sought to be appointed managers of her property. Before approaching the Court of Protection, the law required them to first get written consent from the Advocate General, Punjab. That consent was refused because the mother did not reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the relevant Court of Protection, and neither she nor the petitioners appeared before the Advocate General's office in person. The petitioners argued that the Advocate General's consent was merely a clerical formality and that he had wrongly taken over powers belonging only to the Court of Protection, especially since the mother could not travel to Pakistan.

The Lahore High Court disagreed. It held that the Advocate General's consent is a substantive, meaningful check, not a rubber stamp. Its purpose is to confirm that there genuinely is a mentally disordered person, that the person and the relatives seeking guardianship live within the court's jurisdiction, and that the application is genuine. The court reasoned that since the Court of Protection must continuously supervise the person's care and property, both the disordered person and the manager must reside within its jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, meaning the refusal of consent stood.

PLJ 2018 · Lahore High Court

This case was about whether tax authorities could suspend a business's sales tax registration without giving it prior notice or a chance to be heard. The petitioner, a lubricants company, challenged Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, which allowed the Commissioner to suspend a registered person's tax registration immediately, without notice, based on suspicions like fake invoices, tax evasion, or fraud, pending further inquiry.

The Lahore High Court ruled that this part of Rule 12 was unconstitutional. The court held that suspending a business's registration effectively stops it from operating, which infringes on the constitutional right to conduct lawful trade or business (Article 18) and violates the right to a fair trial and due process (Article 10-A). Since the allegations involved serious, almost criminal-type accusations like fraud and evasion, the affected person deserved an opportunity to be heard before such a drastic action was taken, not just afterward. The court also found that an administrative rule cannot go beyond what the main law (the Sales Tax Act) actually permits, and that natural justice principles require fairness whenever a decision could seriously affect someone's rights or livelihood.

As a result, the court struck down the part of Rule 12 allowing suspension without prior notice, ruling that tax authorities must give notice and a hearing before suspending anyone's sales tax registration. This decision reinforces that due process protections apply even in tax administration and businesses cannot be punished before being heard.

PLJ 2016 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 14 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a husband, Tahir Hanif, appealing against a family court decision that ordered him to pay his wife, Saira Kosar, outstanding dower (mehr) and monthly maintenance. The couple had married with a dower amount of Rs. 5,00,000 fixed in the nikahnama. The wife claimed the full amount was still owed, while the husband argued he had already paid Rs. 3,00,000 worth of gold ornaments at the time of rukhsati, and that the remaining balance was "deferred dower," payable only if the marriage ended through death or divorce, not simply on demand.

The trial court had ruled in the wife's favor, ordering payment of Rs. 4,50,000 in dower plus Rs. 3,000 monthly maintenance. The husband appealed, arguing the trial court misread the evidence, especially regarding the gold ornament receipt and the nature of the deferred dower clause in the nikahnama.

The High Court examined how dower terms are recorded in the standard nikahnama form, noting the difference between "prompt" (mu'ajjal) and "deferred" (ghair-mu'ajjal) dower. It clarified that deferred dower becomes payable immediately whenever the wife demands it after marriage consummation, not just upon death or divorce, unless a specific condition says otherwise. Since the husband failed to prove his claims about the gold ornaments and had not clearly denied his promise to pay within a year, the court upheld the trial court's decision, reinforcing that deferred dower is gener

PLJ 2015 · Peshawar High Court

This case concerns a dispute over which Family Court had the legal authority to hear a custody and visitation case involving a married couple and their infant son. The husband, an army officer, filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights and sought visitation of his son before the Family Court in Mardan. The wife, who lived and worked in Quetta with the child, challenged this, arguing the Mardan court had no territorial jurisdiction over the matter since she and the child resided in Quetta. Lower courts repeatedly rejected her objections, treating related orders as interlocutory and not appealable, and her defense in the case was eventually struck off.

The Peshawar High Court examined the Family Courts Act, 1964 and its rules, which say a family court's jurisdiction depends on where the cause of action arose, where the parties reside or last resided together, or, in marriage dissolution/dower cases, where the wife resides. Relying on these provisions and a Supreme Court precedent, the High Court held that for custody and guardianship disputes, jurisdiction lies with the family court where the wife resides. Since the wife and child lived in Quetta, the Mardan court lacked proper territorial jurisdiction over the custody matter.

This case matters because it clarifies that in child custody disputes, the location of the mother (and child) determines which family court can hear the case, protecting against forum misuse by the other spouse.

· Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case concerns a dispute over the recovery of dower (money owed to a wife under Islamic marriage law) that was filed in a Family Court twenty-three years after the husband's death.

Mst. Sakina married Allah Wassaya in 1980. The husband's family claimed he divorced her in December 1981, with the divorce becoming effective in March 1982, and that he died in October 1982. Decades later, in 2005, Mst. Sakina filed a suit for recovery of her dower. The Family Court ruled in her favor, and this decision was upheld on appeal by the Additional District Judge. The husband's heirs then challenged both rulings before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court examined the Limitation Act, 1908, which sets a three-year deadline for filing dower claims, starting either from when payment is demanded and refused, or from when the marriage ends through death or divorce. Based on the evidence, the marriage had ended either in March 1982 (divorce) or October 1982 (death). Either way, the three-year limitation period expired by 1985, decades before Sakina filed her suit.

The court held that both lower courts had failed in their basic duty to first check whether the suit was time-barred before proceeding to decide it on merits. Since the suit was clearly filed too late, the judgments of both lower courts were declared invalid and without jurisdiction. The petition was allowed, and the earlier decisions were set aside. This case underscores that courts must address limitation issues before examining a case's substance.

PLJ 2014 Lahore 340 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a dispute over whether a divorce (talaq) had legally taken effect before a husband's death, which determined whether his widow retained her status as a wife and heir, or whether the father of the deceased could claim property as if she were divorced.

The deceased husband allegedly sent a notice of talaq to his wife on 14 June 2011. He died just six days later, on 20 June 2011, from a cardiac arrest. His father then petitioned the court to compel the local administrator to issue a formal divorce certificate, arguing that under the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, the 90-day waiting period should still run its course and the talaq should be treated as effective. The wife argued the notice was fabricated and backdated, pointing out that it was purportedly signed in August, weeks after the husband had already died.

The court found serious doubts about the authenticity of the notice, given the impossible dating. But more importantly, it ruled that even assuming the notice was genuine, a talaq only becomes final after 90 days, during which the husband retains the right to revoke it. Since the husband died within that period, the divorce never became effective. The court suspected the father was attempting to manipulate the process to seize the deceased's property, especially since the couple had four minor daughters. The petition was dismissed, affirming the widow's status as a lawful widow and heir.

PLJ 2013 SC (AJ&K) 261 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case concerns a custody dispute over a young boy between his father, Attique Ahmed, and his mother, Adla Noreen, who had been divorced. The father filed a case in the Family Court seeking custody, but both the Family Court and the Shariat Court ruled against him, allowing the child to remain with his mother. He then appealed to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the father's appeal. It noted that the child, about three and a half years old, had lived with his mother since birth, while the father had been living abroad and had remarried. The court relied on Islamic legal principles, citing precedent that under Muslim law, custody of a young son may remain with the mother until he reaches seven years of age, unless there is clear evidence that this would harm the child's welfare. The court emphasized that the paramount consideration in custody cases is the welfare of the minor, taking into account the child's age, sex, and personal law, rather than automatically favoring either parent.

This judgment reaffirms an important principle in family law: young children, especially those who have been with their mother since birth, are generally best served by remaining in her care during early childhood, absent compelling reasons otherwise. It highlights how courts balance religious legal traditions with the overriding duty to protect a child's best interests.

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 948 (DB) · Lahore High Court

This case involved two men, Umar Draz and Muhammad Nawaz, who were convicted by a trial court of murdering Gulbaz and sentenced to death. The prosecution's story was that Umar Draz called the victim away from a gathering, and later the complainant and a witness found both accused strangling him with a noose in the dark, after which the accused fled.

On appeal, the Lahore High Court found the case full of doubts. The alleged motive, that the victim had an illicit relationship with one appellant's mother, was based only on hearsay, as the complainant admitted he only "learnt" of this from an unnamed person who was never produced as a witness. The court also noted the mother was an elderly woman, much older than the victim, making the motive implausible. Additionally, one appellant was sixty-seven years old, yet supposedly outran younger witnesses who claimed to catch him in the act. No weapons or incriminating evidence were recovered from the accused. The court concluded the murder likely happened unwitnessed at night, and the accused were implicated merely on suspicion because the body was found near their home.

Applying the principle that even a single reasonable doubt is enough to benefit the accused, the court acquitted both men, setting aside their conviction and death sentences. The judgment highlights how courts must guard against convictions based on weak motive evidence, hearsay, and implausible circumstances, especially in capital cases.

PLJ 2018 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 23 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case is about a wife accused of attacking her husband and seeking anticipatory (pre-arrest) bail in a criminal case. The husband alleged that his wife cut off his penis with a sharp weapon while he slept, motivated by a marital dispute. Police registered charges under sections of the Pakistan Penal Code dealing with causing hurt. The accused was initially granted pre-arrest bail by a lower court, but this was later withdrawn. She then filed a revision petition before the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court challenging that withdrawal, arguing the case was fabricated, inconsistent, and malicious, and also citing poor mental and physical health.

The High Court explained key legal principles: at the bail stage, courts should not conduct a deep examination of evidence; pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy that must be used cautiously, especially in serious offences carrying heavy punishment; and a good ground for bail after arrest does not automatically justify bail before arrest. The court also noted that bail on medical grounds can be granted only if the illness is serious enough that proper treatment isn't possible in custody.

In this case, the accused had already received the extra time she requested for treatment, failed to appear in court even when summoned, and avoided appearing in person during the hearing. Because of this conduct, the court refused her pre-arrest bail and dismissed her petition, reinforcing that pre-arrest bail is a limited remedy not meant for routine use or to avoid accountability.

PLJ 2018 SC 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case involved a petition by Mst. Sughran Bibi, whose son Mohsin Ali was killed in what police described as an encounter. After the police version of events led to an FIR being registered, investigation completed, and a formal challan (charge sheet) submitted to the trial court, the mother filed her own private complaint giving a different account of how her son died, naming different circumstances around the police action. She then sought registration of a separate, second FIR based on her version of the incident. The Supreme Court examined a recurring legal question: can multiple FIRs be registered for different versions of the same occurrence, or must a new version be handled differently under the law.

The Court ruled that only one FIR can exist for a single incident involving a cognizable offence. Any alternate account of the same occurrence, given later, should ordinarily be recorded as a statement during investigation, not as a fresh FIR. However, a separate FIR becomes permissible if the new version concerns a genuinely different occurrence, a different set of accused persons, or discloses a distinct cognizable offence.

Since an FIR already existed, investigation had concluded, a challan was filed, and the petitioner's private complaint was already being tried in court, the Supreme Court held that registering a second FIR for her version of the same incident was not legally justified. The petition was dismissed. This judgment clarifies how Pakistani courts should handle competing narratives of the same crime, ensuring consistency in the FIR system while still protecting victims through alternative legal remedies like private complaints.

PLJ 2012 · Balochistan High Court

This case involves an appeal against a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Abdul Jabbar was caught driving a vehicle containing 170 kilograms of charas hidden in secret compartments, and a trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine. He appealed to the Balochistan High Court.

The key issue was how the evidence was handled. Initially, only small samples from 10 of the 140 recovered packets were sent for chemical testing. Later, after the prosecution's witnesses had already testified at trial, the investigating officer sent additional samples from all the remaining packets for testing without getting the trial court's permission first. The appellant's lawyer argued this was procedurally improper, and the state's own counsel admitted the investigator had no authority to send samples for testing after the case had already gone before the court.

The High Court agreed that this was a problem. It held that when the law requires something to be done in a specific way, that procedure must be followed exactly, and no shortcuts are allowed. Because the second chemical report was obtained improperly, the court ruled it inadmissible as evidence. However, the court also clarified an important principle: police are not legally barred from reinvestigating a case multiple times or filing a fresh charge-sheet based on new investigation. Despite finding the second report inadmissible, the court ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction based on other valid evidence.

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case comes from the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, and deals with a dispute over property partition. The respondents had filed a suit to divide property they jointly owned with the petitioner, Zubaida Begum, who was named as a co-sharer in the case. She did not appear in court, and proceedings went ahead without her (ex-parte) starting in 1998. A preliminary decree was issued in 2004, which protected her share of the property. However, it was only in 2010, about 12 years after being declared ex-parte, that she filed an application asking the court to set aside those ex-parte proceedings, claiming she never received proper notice.

Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected her application because it was filed far too late. She then approached the High Court through a civil revision petition, also asking for condonation of a short delay in filing that revision, which the court allowed in the interest of justice.

On the main issue, however, the High Court ruled against her. It noted that her share in the property had already been protected in the preliminary decree, and since the property could not be physically divided, an auction had been ordered with her entitled to receive her share of the proceeds. Given the enormous 12-year delay in challenging the ex-parte order, the court held that the lower courts were right to dismiss her case as time-barred. The revision petition was therefore dismissed, reinforcing that legal challenges must be made within a reasonable time, even when rights are otherwise valid.

PLJ 2013 · Sindh High Court

This case concerned a dispute between a landlord and a shopkeeper over a rented shop in Sukkur. The landlord, Muhammad Rafi, claimed the petitioner was his tenant under a written rent agreement and sought eviction, partly to use the shop himself for his own business. The tenant, Muhammad Aslam, denied any landlord-tenant relationship with Rafi, claiming instead that he was a tenant of the Municipal Corporation on municipal land, with his own separate lease and rent arrangement with that authority. He argued the rent agreement produced by Rafi was fake. The Rent Controller ruled against the tenant, and the Appellate Court upheld that decision, though with some modification favorable to the tenant regarding his municipal allotment. The tenant then challenged this before the Sindh High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.

The High Court dismissed the petition. It held that its constitutional jurisdiction is narrow: it cannot re-examine factual findings or act as a substitute for an appeal or revision, which are not available in such rent matters beyond the first appeal. The Court can only intervene if the lower courts acted without jurisdiction or their findings were legally perverse. Since the tenant had not challenged the appellate court's modified order and no jurisdictional error was shown, the Court upheld the eviction order.

This case matters because it clarifies the limited scope of High Court review in rent disputes, preventing such petitions from becoming backdoor appeals.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case is about a bail application in a cheque-dishonour case from Muzaffargarh, Punjab. The petitioner, Muhammad Nawaz, was accused under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with issuing a cheque that bounces due to dishonest intentions. The complainant alleged that Nawaz issued a cheque for Rs. 700,000 that was dishonoured when presented to the bank. Nawaz had been arrested and was in custody, and he applied to the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) for post-arrest bail.

His lawyer argued that the cheque was given only as a business guarantee, that the FIR (police complaint) was filed nine months after the cheque was dishonoured without any explanation for the delay, that the maximum punishment for this offence is three years, and that police no longer needed him for investigation.

The court agreed with these arguments. It noted that the offence did not fall under the "prohibitory clause" of the bail law (which restricts bail for more serious crimes), and that the long unexplained delay in lodging the FIR raised doubts. Relying on earlier Supreme Court and High Court precedents, the judge granted bail, requiring Nawaz to submit a bond of Rs. 50,000 with a surety.

This case illustrates how courts weigh delay in reporting a crime and the severity of potential punishment when deciding bail requests.

PLJ 2014 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a dispute over whether a family court or a civil court had the authority to decide a marriage case. A woman had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, claiming to be the wife of the petitioner. In his written response, the petitioner denied that any marriage existed between them and argued that since there was no valid marriage to dissolve, the Family Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case at all - he claimed such a dispute should go to a civil court instead.

The Family Court rejected this objection and proceeded with the case, prompting the petitioner to challenge that decision before the Islamabad High Court.

The High Court ruled against the petitioner. It explained that when one spouse denies the existence of a marriage, this is legally called "jactitation of marriage," and Pakistani law specifically places such disputes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, not the civil courts. The court distinguished this situation from cases the petitioner cited, which involved disputes over inheritance where a third party (not one of the spouses themselves) questioned whether a marriage had existed. In those situations, civil courts were appropriate because the people disputing the marriage weren't the spouses themselves.

Since this case was a direct disagreement between two people claiming to be spouses, the Family Court was the correct venue. The petition was dismissed, meaning the case would continue in the Family Court as originally decided.

PLJ 2015 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved Pir Muhammad Azam, who was facing accountability proceedings before the National Accountability Bureau on corruption-related charges. His first bail request had already been rejected by the Peshawar High Court in an earlier case. He then approached the court again, this time seeking bail purely on medical grounds, pointing out that in a separate but related criminal case, the same court had already granted him bail because of his serious health condition.

Medical reports showed that the petitioner suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), with severe breathing difficulty requiring urgent treatment, ideally in an intensive care unit. A prison medical officer's report confirmed that the jail hospital lacked the specialized facilities and equipment needed to properly treat his condition, despite repeated hospital referrals.

The National Accountability Bureau opposed bail, arguing the jail could provide adequate care, but could not dispute that the petitioner had already been released on bail on identical medical grounds in another case.

The High Court held that once it is established that an illness cannot be properly treated inside jail and requires specialized care, the accused is entitled to bail regardless of the seriousness of the alleged offence. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the court ruled that gravity of illness can outweigh gravity of the charges, and granted bail on medical grounds, noting prosecution could later seek cancellation if the petitioner's health improved.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved four petitioners—Nazir Ahmad and three others—who were accused of forcibly entering a complainant's house armed with weapons and injuring him and a woman, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code relating to causing hurt, house-trespass, assault, and rioting. They had already been granted temporary pre-arrest bail and were now asking the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) to make that bail permanent.

The court confirmed their bail. Several factors influenced this decision. First, there was an unexplained two-day delay in filing the police report (FIR), which raised doubts about the complainant's account. Second, the investigating officer himself found that the location of the alleged incident actually belonged to the accused's family, and that the real event was just a minor quarrel between women of the two families—not the serious attack described in the FIR. Third, the two sides were relatives with an ongoing civil property dispute, suggesting a possible motive for false accusations. The investigating officer also confirmed that the accused had cooperated with the investigation, which was complete, and that their continued custody was unnecessary. Additionally, the petitioners had no prior criminal record, and the charges did not fall under the most serious category of offenses that normally bar bail.

This case illustrates how courts scrutinize delays in reporting crimes, investigative findings, and family disputes when deciding whether bail should be granted, especially where malicious prosecution is suspected.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case from the Lahore High Court concerns a bail application filed by Bakht Nawaz, who was accused in a robbery-murder case. According to the original police report (FIR), two unknown armed men on a motorbike tried to rob the complainant and his companions after they withdrew cash from a bank. When the deceased, Irshad Hussain, resisted the robbery attempt, he was shot and killed.

Bakht Nawaz was not named in the original FIR. He was implicated later, nearly nine months after the incident, when the complainant gave a supplementary statement accusing him of being a facilitator or abettor. After his arrest, police investigated and actually found him innocent, recommending his discharge from the case. However, the local magistrate disagreed and kept him in custody.

The High Court noted several weaknesses in the case against him: no identification parade was conducted, the FIR mentioned only two unknown attackers while the later application suddenly named five accused including Nawaz, and his alleged role was limited to conspiracy rather than the actual shooting. The court found the prosecution had not gathered sufficient evidence linking him to the crime and that his guilt required further investigation.

Based on this, the court granted him post-arrest bail, requiring bail bonds of Rs. 100,000. The judgment clarifies these findings are preliminary and won't affect the actual trial, illustrating how courts grant bail when evidence against an accused appears weak or incomplete at this stage.

PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case from the Islamabad High Court involved a dispute between a tenant, Nadeem Asghar, and his landlords over rented commercial premises in F-7 Markaz, Islamabad. The landlords had filed an ejectment petition seeking to evict the tenant on several grounds, including non-payment of rent, personal need, subletting, property damage, and expiry of the lease. The Rent Controller initially ordered eviction based on default in rent payment and the landlord's personal need. On appeal, the Additional District Judge overturned the default finding but upheld the eviction on the ground of personal need, since the landlord, a doctor, wanted the premises to build a hospital for himself and his daughter, also a doctor. The tenant then challenged both decisions through this writ petition, arguing the landlords had not clearly specified how the space he occupied was needed, especially since another portion of the building was already vacant.

The High Court upheld the eviction, ruling that it is a landlord's legal right to reclaim property for genuine personal need, and courts should not interfere with that prerogative when the need is shown to be bona fide. However, the court clarified an important safeguard: if the tenant is evicted but the landlord does not actually use the premises for the stated purpose, the tenant can apply to the Rent Controller under Section 17(6) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance to be reinstated. This decision reinforces landlords' rights while protecting tenants from misuse of eviction orders.

PLJ 2005 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a petitioner, a retired Brigadier, who filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court asking for registration of a criminal case (FIR) against several respondents. He alleged that his signature and that of another individual on an agreement to sell property in a Defence Housing Authority area had been forged, claiming the respondents had digitally copied his signature using computer scanning technology.

To resolve the dispute, the High Court itself took an unusual investigative step: it directed the respondents to appear in court with the original agreement to sell and the General Power of Attorney, which was an admitted document bearing genuine signatures and thumb impressions. The court then collected fresh specimen signatures and thumb impressions from the petitioner and the other individual in the presence of both parties, and sent all the material to the handwriting expert at the Federal Investigation Agency for comparison.

The expert's report concluded that the thumb impressions and signatures on the disputed agreement matched the specimen samples, based on ten identified points of similarity. Given this positive scientific finding contradicting the forgery claim, the court held there was no merit in the petition and declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction to order an FIR. The petition was dismissed, though the petitioner was left free to pursue other legal remedies such as a civil suit. The case illustrates how courts can use forensic evidence to test factual claims even in constitutional writ proceedings.

PLJ 2013 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved Rimsha Masih, a young Christian girl accused of blasphemy in Islamabad in 2012 after being seen carrying a bag containing burnt pages, which a complainant alleged were pages from the Holy Quran. An FIR was registered against her under Section 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, which criminalizes defiling the Quran. She petitioned the Islamabad High Court to have the FIR quashed.

During investigation, it emerged that the material she was carrying was actually a partially burnt Namaz (prayer) book, not Quranic pages, and there was no witness who actually saw her burning anything. One of the prosecution's own witnesses, a cleric named Qari Muhammad Khalid Chishti, was found to have planted fake evidence and was himself later charged. Medical and investigative reports showed the girl was a minor, uneducated, with a mental age below her actual age, and essentially unaware of religious teachings in either Islam or Christianity.

The court found no evidence of criminal intent (mens rea), which is necessary for a blasphemy conviction, and noted apparent ulterior motives behind the complaint, possibly linked to tensions aimed at pushing the local Christian community out of the area. The judge ruled that forcing her through a trial would amount to abuse of the judicial process and quashed the FIR entirely.

This case mattered because it highlighted how blasphemy accusations in Pakistan could be fabricated or misused against religious minorities, and it affirmed the High Court's power to int

PLJ 1998 Cr. C. ( · Peshawar High Court

In this case, the Peshawar High Court dealt with a man named Haji Umar Khan who had originally filed a police report (FIR) accusing certain people of murdering his relative with firearms. The case went to trial, but when Umar Khan was called to testify under oath, he suddenly reversed himself, claiming he had never actually witnessed the murder and had not voluntarily lodged the FIR. He suggested he had been pressured by police and by the complainant's brother to sign a false report.

The trial court did not believe this reversal. It found that Umar Khan had indeed filed the original report of his own accord and signed it correctly, and that his later denial under oath was false. He was convicted of perjury under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment plus a fine of Rs. 10,000.

Umar Khan appealed the conviction, while the deceased's brother separately sought a harsher sentence. The Peshawar High Court reviewed the trial record and upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's reasoning sound and not arbitrary. The High Court emphasized that lying under oath in court is a serious offense, since it can destroy an innocent person's reputation or freedom by falsely implicating them in a crime. Such conduct, the court said, deserves no leniency.

This case matters because it reinforces that witnesses who contradict their own sworn statements without credible justification can be prosecuted and punished for perjury, protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings.

PLD 1955 Lah. 256; · Sindh High Court

This is a 2011 Supreme Court of Pakistan decision in a railway accident case, where the heirs of persons killed in railway accidents sued for compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The High Court of Sindh had ruled in favour of the victims' families, and the Railways appealed, arguing that the deceased themselves were partly to blame (contributory negligence) and so compensation should be denied or reduced.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Railways' appeals. It held that railways cannot escape liability for accidents caused by their own failure to maintain safety measures, such as keeping crossing gates closed, simply by claiming the victim should have been more careful. The defence of contributory negligence only applies if the railway proves it had taken all proper safety precautions and the victim deliberately bypassed them, for example by climbing a fence or opening a closed gate. Since the gate was admittedly open at the time of the accident, the fault lay with the Railways, which is also vicariously liable for its employees' negligence.

The judges further explained that tort law exists both to compensate victims' families and to deter negligent behaviour by institutions, and that delayed justice undermines its purpose. The court also discussed guidelines for estimating a deceased person's likely working life for compensation purposes, and noted that exemplary damages could be considered in cases of serious negligence.

PLJ 1996 · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court dealt with the question of who is responsible for ensuring an accused person shows up in court. The accused, Sher Afzal, had been charged in a case registered under the Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance and was granted bail by a magistrate. The complainant, Noor Muhammad, later asked the Sessions Court to cancel that bail, apparently because the accused was not appearing. The Additional Sessions Judge refused to cancel the bail, reasoning partly that the complainant had failed to point out or help locate the accused, who belonged to a different area.

The High Court found this reasoning flawed. It held that it is never the complainant's job to secure the attendance of an accused person in a criminal case. That responsibility lies with the State, and specifically the police, who must trace and produce the accused when summoned. The court also noted that when an accused cannot be found, the proper legal tool is to proceed against the sureties who guaranteed his appearance, not to blame the complainant.

Because the Sessions Court had wrongly placed this burden on the complainant and never even issued notice to the sureties, the High Court set aside its earlier order and sent the bail-cancellation matter back for a fresh decision on its actual merits. This judgment is significant because it clarifies that complainants should not be penalized for the State's failure to produce an accused, reinforcing that police and sureties bear that responsibility.

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court dealt with a family dispute over inheritance shares under Islamic law. The petitioners claimed they were descendants of a woman named Zeenat Bibi, daughter of the late Syed Rasan, and that they were entitled to their rightful shares in his estate (legacy). However, the entire property had been wrongly transferred into the names of Syed Rasan's two sons, cutting out the daughters' descendants from their inheritance.

The trial court had initially ruled in favor of the petitioners, but an appellate court reversed that decision and dismissed their case. The petitioners then brought this revision petition to the High Court.

The High Court held that under Sharia law, rightful heirs cannot be denied their due inheritance shares once their blood relationship to the common ancestor is established. It clarified that the petitioners' mother was entitled to a 1/6 share in Syed Rasan's estate, and each petitioner (as her children) was entitled to a 1/12 share. The court also addressed inheritance from another deceased relative, Mst. Zain Noora, directing how her share should be distributed among her nieces and other heirs.

Ultimately, the court found no legal error in the appellate court's judgment and dismissed the revision petition. This case highlights how Pakistani courts apply Islamic inheritance principles to ensure legal heirs, including women and their descendants, are not deprived of their rightful shares through improper property transfers.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over land in Narowal after the death of Din Muhammad, the original owner. A mutation (record of land transfer) dated 12 April 1995 showed that Din Muhammad had orally sold his land to Muhammad Asghar shortly before his death. After Din Muhammad died, his legal heirs filed a lawsuit claiming he was mentally unwell at the time and lacked the capacity to make such a transaction, and that the sale was fraudulent and without real payment.

Both the trial court and the first appellate court ruled against the person claiming to have bought the land, finding that the deceased was mentally disordered and that the sale was not genuinely proven. The buyer then approached the Lahore High Court, also asking for permission to bring new witnesses (two local lumberdars) to prove the deceased had identified himself as the person making the sale.

The High Court refused to allow this late additional evidence, holding that such evidence is meant to help the court reach a fair decision, not to let a losing party fix gaps in their original case long after the opportunity had passed. Since the buyer failed to produce solid proof of payment or of the deceased's free consent, and since two lower courts had already agreed on the facts, the High Court upheld their decisions and dismissed the case, confirming the land rightfully belonged to the deceased's heirs.

PLJ 2014 SC 124 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a long-running family inheritance dispute from what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. When a man named Sarfraz died in 1931, local custom at the time excluded his daughters from inheriting, leaving his land only to his two sons. One son, Muhammad Afzal, died in 1935 without children, and his share was passed entirely to his brother Muhammad Nawaz under the same custom, again excluding Afzal's sisters, including Mst. Ayesha. Decades later, in 1993, Ayesha sued, arguing that by the time her brother Afzal died, the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935 had replaced customary law with Islamic inheritance law, meaning she was entitled to a 1/3rd share of his estate as a legal heir. Over the years, Nawaz and his heirs had sold parts of the inherited land to outside parties, complicating her claim. The trial court dismissed her suit as filed too late, but the appellate court and later the High Court partly ruled in her favor.

The Supreme Court held that once a Muslim dies, his heirs automatically become co-sharers in his estate, and one co-sharer cannot deny another their rightful share. Since Ayesha had been wrongfully excluded, her case fell within the law's exception for delayed claims. The Court ruled she was entitled to her 1/3rd share, but land already sold to outsiders by Nawaz's side would be adjusted against his own share, not hers. This decision reaff

PLJ 2003 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a family inheritance dispute that hinged on an unusual question: what religious sect did the deceased landowner belong to at the time of his death?

A man named Shukar died in 1941, leaving land that was initially given to his widow as a life estate. Later, under personal law reforms, this life estate ended and revenue authorities transferred the property to his widow and two daughters, after determining that Shukar was Shia by faith (which affects how inheritance shares are calculated under Muslim law). Distant relatives of Shukar, who stood to inherit a share only if he was Sunni, challenged this in civil court, claiming he was actually Sunni.

The trial court agreed that Shukar was Shia and ruled against the distant relatives, but the first appellate court reversed this, saying there wasn't enough proof of his sect and that evidence from earlier mutation proceedings shouldn't have been considered.

The High Court restored the trial court's decision. It held that documentary proof of someone's religious sect isn't required, and that people can change their sect during their lifetime. Crucially, a relative who himself stood to gain by claiming Shukar was Sunni had earlier testified, against his own interest, that Shukar was Shia. The court found this kind of admission highly credible. It also ruled that evidence from mutation proceedings could properly be considered by civil courts, reinstating the widow and daughters' full inheritance rights.

PLD 2009 SC 879), · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case concerns a Christian citizen's constitutional challenge over divorce rights under Pakistani law. In 1981, during a non-democratic era, a military regime's Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance deleted Section 7 of the Divorce Act, 1869, which had allowed courts to grant divorce relief to Christians based on principles similar to those in UK divorce law. After this deletion, Christians in Pakistan were left only with the limited divorce grounds listed in Section 10 of the Act, such as adultery combined with other specific faults, making divorce very difficult for Christian couples compared to the broader relief previously available.

The petitioner argued this repeal violated fundamental rights guaranteed to religious minorities under the Constitution, including equality, dignity, and protection of minority interests, and that it was done without any democratic deliberation or consultation with the Christian community.

The Chief Justice clarified that the court was not examining or ruling on biblical or canonical Christian teachings, but purely reviewing whether a State law (the 1981 Ordinance) was constitutional. The judgment traces how divorce law has evolved globally, including the "no-fault" divorce movement recognizing irretrievable breakdown of marriage as sufficient grounds, reflecting changing understanding of marriage and family relationships.

This matters because it addresses the legal rights of Pakistan's Christian minority to obtain divorce fairly, scrutinizing whether laws imposed during military rule unjustly restricted minority rights without

PLJ 2008 SC 969 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute over a no-confidence (recall) motion against the Zila Nazim (district mayor) of Sukkur under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 2001. Two council members had issued a recall notice against the Zila Nazim, alleging he was acting against public interest. When the council meeting was convened to consider the motion, it had to be adjourned because there was no quorum present. The Zila Nazim argued that since the law did not require a quorum for such a meeting, the adjournment meant the recall motion should be treated as automatically considered and rejected, which would have let him keep his position without further challenge. The High Court of Sindh had rejected this argument, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. It ruled that a recall motion must actually be put to a vote as required by Section 24(3) and (4) of the Ordinance; if a meeting is adjourned without voting, the motion remains pending rather than being deemed rejected. The Court also held that internal council bye-laws cannot override the clear requirements of the Ordinance, and that courts should generally avoid interfering in the internal business of elected local bodies unless there is a genuine legal violation.

This decision mattered because it clarified the correct legal procedure for handling no-confidence motions against local government heads, ensuring that recall motions are properly voted on rather than dismissed on technical grounds, thereby protecting the democratic process of accountability within local councils.

PLJ 1990 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This Supreme Court judgment, reported as PLJ 1990 SC 543, dealt with a dispute over the registration of the Islamabad Stock Exchange under the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. Applicants had sought registration of a new stock exchange, but their application was effectively refused, partly through an order attributed to a Minister of State. The High Court had earlier found that the Minister's order was vitiated by malafide (bad faith), even though the Minister had not been formally made a party to the case, relying instead on principles of natural justice.

The Supreme Court majority disagreed with this approach. It held that Article 248 of the Constitution, which protects the President, Governors and Ministers from being personally blamed for acts done in their official capacity, cannot be bypassed simply by invoking natural justice. Courts cannot record adverse findings of personal bad faith against a Minister unless he has been properly impleaded as a party or has appeared as a witness. However, the Court still found the refusal of registration unlawful because the statutory procedure was not followed properly—no hearing was given, no reasons were recorded, and the decision was not communicated correctly, violating mandatory requirements of the law.

The Court dismissed the appeals, upheld that the registration process must be reconsidered afresh, and ordered adverse remarks against the former Minister to be removed from the judgment. The case is important for clarifying the limits of constitutional immunity for public officeholders and the right to a fair hearing in administrative decisions.

Urdu translation not yet generated for this case.

PLJ 2014 Peshawar 26 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a property dispute from Mardan district. The plaintiffs claimed ownership of agricultural land, arguing their title stemmed from a 1926 compromise decree in an old pre-emption lawsuit, which they said was later confirmed through a 1964 agreement. The trial court and the first appellate court both ruled in the plaintiffs' favor, relying heavily on the age of these documents, treating them as presumptively genuine under the thirty-year-old document rule in the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (Pakistan's evidence law).

The Peshawar High Court overturned these decisions. It held that merely because a document is old does not automatically make it reliable or true. Courts must also examine whether the document actually came from proper custody and whether it was genuinely signed by the person it claims to be from. More importantly, the court pointed out that the lower courts failed to actually read and understand what the documents said. The 1926 decree was from a pre-emption suit that was dismissed by compromise—it did not establish ownership or title at all. The 1964 agreement contradicted the 1926 decree and was not even a public document, so it couldn't automatically enjoy the same presumption of genuineness.

The High Court found the plaintiffs' suit was actually time-barred and essentially a retaliatory lawsuit. It set aside both lower court decisions, ruling they were legally and factually unsustainable. This case highlights that courts cannot blindly apply presumptions of correctness to old documents without examining their actual content and context.

PLJ 2014 · Sindh High Court

This case from the Sindh High Court dealt with a husband's challenge to an ex-parte khula (wife-initiated divorce) decree granted by a Family Court in favor of his wife.

The wife had filed for dissolution of marriage, stating the Nikah was unregistered, that her Haq Mehr (dower, fixed at two tolas of gold) was never paid, and that her husband mistreated and eventually expelled her. The husband did not appear in court despite being summoned through multiple means, including newspaper publication, so the Family Court granted the divorce in his absence. The husband later challenged this in the High Court, claiming the Nikahnama was actually registered, that he was condemned unheard, and that the law required restoration of dower before khula could be granted.

The High Court dismissed the husband's petition. It held that the law requiring return of Haq Mehr applies only when the wife herself offers to surrender it in exchange for an expedited khula decree. Since the wife's dower was never paid to her in the first place, there was nothing to restore, and no violation occurred. The court also noted that the husband already had a pending application before the Family Court to set aside the ex-parte decree under the Family Court Rules, making the High Court petition premature and not maintainable. Any dispute about property allegedly transferred to the wife would have to be resolved separately in civil court.

This ruling clarifies that dower restoration rules protect husbands only when wives voluntarily give up already-received dower for quick khula, not in every khula case.

PLJ 2013 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a husband, Muhammad Shiraz, who had filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife, while the wife had filed her own suit seeking maintenance and enforcement of certain conditions written into their Nikah Nama (marriage contract), specifically clauses 17 and 20, which dealt with gold ornaments and a lump sum payment of Rs. 50,000 in case of desertion by the wife.

The Family Court had granted the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal rights, while also awarding the wife and daughter maintenance, but had refused her claims for the gold ornaments and the Rs. 50,000 payment. On appeal, the Additional District Judge reversed this partly and awarded her the gold ornaments and the money. The husband challenged this before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court held that since the wife had deserted the husband and a decree for restitution of conjugal rights existed in the husband's favor, the contractual condition triggering payment upon "desertion" could not be enforced against him. It also ruled that such a condition in the Nikah Nama did not qualify as an "actionable claim" under the Transfer of Property Act. However, the Court held that since the wife still legally carried the husband's name as his wife, she remained entitled to basic maintenance as an acknowledgment of that status.

The petition was therefore partly allowed, setting aside the ornaments and Rs. 50,000 award, while upholding the maintenance granted to the wife.

PLJ 2003 Lahore 628 (DB) · Lahore High Court

This Lahore High Court judgment dealt with dozens of customs appeals (87 cases decided together) concerning vehicles that had been seized by anti-smuggling authorities because no customs duty had been paid on them. The vehicle owners had applied to pay the required duties and fines to get their vehicles released, but Customs officials refused, citing a government notification (SRO 1374/1998) that barred such release for certain vehicles after a specified cut-off date. A lower appellate tribunal had sided with the owners, ordering the vehicles released on payment of fine and duty. The Customs Department challenged this before the High Court.

The High Court ruled in favor of Customs. It held that since the vehicles exceeded Rs. 50,000 in value and no duty had been paid, they qualified as smuggled goods under the law. While Section 181 of the Customs Act normally allows owners the option to pay a fine instead of losing their goods, this right is subject to exceptions that the Board of Revenue can specify—meaning certain goods can be excluded from that option altogether. The tribunal had ignored this restriction. The court also rejected the claim that a buyer was protected as an innocent purchaser, since there was no proof of a genuine purchase, and the burden of proving good faith lay on the possessor, which was not met.

As a result, the High Court set aside the order releasing the vehicles and restored their confiscation. The judgment matters because it clarifies that authorities' power to allow fines instead of confiscation is not absolute and can be restricted by official regulations.

PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a man, Wajid Hussain, who married two sisters in a way that violated Islamic marriage rules. He had married the elder sister, Shahida Parveen, in April 2010, then claimed to have divorced her in June 2010. Just 40 days later -still within the woman's mandatory waiting period (iddat) after divorce, during which a divorce is not yet legally final- he married her younger sister, Adeela Bibi. Adeela's father filed a police complaint (FIR) alleging his daughter had been enticed away for an improper purpose, and the couple approached the Islamabad High Court asking for the FIR to be thrown out, claiming their marriage was consensual and valid.

The court examined Islamic law and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, noting that a divorce (talaq) only becomes effective after the 90-day waiting period ends, not immediately when pronounced. Since the second marriage happened before the first divorce was finalized, the man was effectively married to both sisters simultaneously, which Islamic law strictly forbids. The court found this conduct contrary to social and religious norms and noted that other criminal offences beyond the one mentioned in the FIR might apply.

The court refused to use its special constitutional powers to cancel the FIR, ruling that the normal criminal justice process should continue instead. The petition was dismissed, meaning the case would proceed through regular trial.

PLJ 2013 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a dispute over which court or tribunal had authority to hear labour-related complaints filed by bank employees against the Bank of Punjab. The employees had originally taken their grievances about unfair labour practices to the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The bank argued that after Pakistan's 18th Constitutional Amendment abolished the "concurrent legislative list," labour and trade union matters became a provincial subject, meaning such cases should be transferred to provincial labour courts and tribunals under the Punjab Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2010, rather than being heard by the NIRC, a federal body.

The NIRC had rejected the bank's request to transfer the cases, reasoning that it could still handle matters of a national, industry-wide character and that the law under which it was created had been constitutionally protected (saved) despite the amendment. However, a single judge of the High Court sided with the bank and ordered the cases transferred to the provinces. The employees then appealed this decision.

The Islamabad High Court's two-judge appellate bench ruled in favor of the employees, restoring the NIRC's jurisdiction. It held that the NIRC could continue handling cases involving unions or disputes spanning more than one province, that the 2008 law creating the NIRC was constitutionally protected as an existing law, and that newer federal legislation (the 2011 Industrial Relations Ordinance) applied retrospectively, reinforcing the NIRC's authority. This clarified which forum workers should use for cross-provincial labour

PLJ 2013 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute between the Engro Fertilizers Employees Union and the company's management, heard before the National Industrial Relations Commission in Karachi. The union, acting as the certified bargaining agent, had submitted a charter of demands to management seeking better terms for workers. Management formed a negotiating team and talks began, but no settlement was reached after several months. The union claimed that during a company meeting, the Chief Executive pressured workers to withdraw their demands and threatened retrenchment (layoffs), which the union argued amounted to illegal "unfair labour practice." Management denied any wrongdoing, explaining that the meeting was called to inform employees about serious financial troubles caused by prolonged gas and electricity shortages, which had cost the company billions of rupees. They said negotiations were ongoing in good faith, with further meetings already scheduled, and that no threats or unfair practices had occurred.

The Commission found that since bilateral negotiations were still actively underway when the union filed its petition, there was no valid reason to go to the Commission at that stage. Under the law, if talks fail, the next step is conciliation, and only after that fails can other action be taken, such as

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 769 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man named Sajjad Haider who was accused of issuing a dishonoured cheque worth Rs. 300,000 to a complainant, an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code. He was arrested and sought bail from the Lahore High Court after his arrest, known as post-arrest bail.

The prosecution argued that he had defrauded the complainant of a large sum and that he had previously been named in two other similar cheque-dishonour cases, so he should not get bail. The defence argued that the cheque was issued only as security for a business arrangement, that there was a 13-day delay in filing the police complaint, and that he had no prior convictions.

The court noted that offences under Section 489-F do not fall within the "prohibitory clause" of Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a legal category of serious offences where bail is normally refused. For offences outside this category, bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Since the petitioner had never actually been convicted in his earlier cases, mere involvement in similar cases wasn't enough to deny him bail. The court also noted he could not be kept in jail indefinitely while his trial remained unfinished. Bail was therefore granted. This case reinforces the principle that for less serious offences, courts should favour granting bail unless exceptional circumstances justify refusal.

PLJ 2013 Lahore 606 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case deals with whether a bank can file a criminal complaint when a customer's cheque, given as repayment for a loan, bounces.

A bank had given a loan to a person who issued a cheque to repay it. When the cheque was dishonoured, the bank approached a magistrate (Ex-officio Justice of Peace) asking for a criminal case to be registered against the customer under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with dishonestly issued cheques. The magistrate ordered police to proceed with the matter. The customer challenged this order in the Lahore High Court.

The petitioner argued that since the cheque related to a bank loan, the matter fell under the special law governing banks and financial institutions, the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which requires such disputes to go through a specialized Banking Court, not ordinary criminal courts or police.

The High Court agreed. It held that the Ordinance is a special law that overrides the general criminal law (PPC) for matters between banks and their customers, even though Section 489-F was added to the PPC after the Ordinance. The court ruled that only a Banking Court has jurisdiction over such matters, and banks cannot bypass this by invoking general criminal law through the police. The petition was allowed, meaning the criminal proceedings could not continue.

This matters because it clarifies that banks must pursue loan-related cheque disputes through specialized banking courts rather than ordinary criminal prosecution, protecting borrowers from improper criminal c

PLJ 2011 SC 614 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a group of appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) whose services were terminated, or who were denied benefits under a Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) the company had introduced. Many of these employees had approached various High Courts (Sindh, Peshawar, Lahore) using constitutional petitions, and those courts had ruled in favor of the employees, ordering reinstatement or other relief.

PTCL challenged these High Court rulings before the Supreme Court, arguing that writ jurisdiction should not apply to it in such employment disputes.

The Supreme Court examined whether PTCL, since partly privatized (with the government still holding a majority 62% share), remained a "person" performing functions connected with government affairs, making it subject to High Courts' constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. It held that since the government still owned majority shares, PTCL remained amenable to such jurisdiction. However, since PTCL had no statutory service rules, the ordinary "master and servant" principle applied, meaning contract employees had no vested legal right to reinstatement or regularization after their contracts ended. Employees whose contracts expired could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction to compel continued employment, though as "workmen" they were entitled to one month's notice or salary instead.

The Supreme Court therefore set aside the High Court judgments favoring the employees and allowed PTCL's appeals, clarifying the limits of job security for cont

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. ( · Lahore High Court

This case is about two people, Aamir, a 12-year-old student, and his father Nazir, who were detained by police in Nankana Sahib without proper legal procedure. Police had raided their home seeking a proclaimed offender, Nazir's other son, and in the process took away the boy, his father, two women, and two cows. The women were released, but Aamir and Nazir were held in illegal custody for days without their arrest being recorded or being produced before any court, as required by law.

The Lahore High Court sent a bailiff to recover them. Medical examination showed clear signs of brutal torture. The court found that although Aamir was technically named in an FIR, both detentions were illegal since proper procedures were ignored. Importantly, Nazir himself was not even accused of any crime; he was held merely to pressure information about his absconding son, which the court said was unacceptable because no one can be punished or tortured for a relative's alleged crimes.

The court ordered both detainees released, converted the habeas corpus petition into a bail matter for Aamir, and awarded compensation to be paid by the responsible police officers for illegal detention and torture. It also directed the Inspector General of Police to take disciplinary action against the officers involved under relevant police accountability rules, emphasizing that illegal detention and torture violate fundamental constitutional rights and international human rights standards.

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case comes from the Peshawar High Court and deals with a property dispute under pre-emption law, which allows certain people (like neighbors or co-owners) to claim the right to buy property before an outside buyer, provided they follow strict legal procedures after learning of the sale.

Two brothers, Gul Muhammad and Niaz Muhammad, sued to claim pre-emption rights over land that had been sold to Mosam Khan and Faiz-ur-Rehman. They argued the actual sale price was much higher than what was recorded in the registered deed. Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled in their favor, so the buyers challenged these decisions before the High Court.

The High Court overturned the lower courts' rulings and dismissed the pre-emption suit entirely. The judge found that the brothers had failed to properly disclose crucial details required by law: specifically, they did not mention the time and place where they made their initial claim of pre-emption (talb-e-muwathibat), nor did they disclose how they learned of the sale, nor did they specify the dates of the formal notice (talb-e-ishhad) sent to the buyers. The brothers also gave different, unexplained dates for when they each learned of the sale.

The court held that these procedural requirements are not mere technicalities but essential conditions for a pre-emption claim to succeed. Missing or vague details on these points are fatal to such a suit, meaning the case must fail regardless of other merits. This ruling reinforces that pre-emption claimants must be precise and transparent about how and when they asser

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved an appeal against a conviction under Pakistan's Arms Ordinance, 1965. The appellant, Naik Amanullah Khan, had been found by police patrolling an area in Karak carrying two Kalashnikov rifles with ammunition, without any valid license. He was arrested on the spot, and the weapons were seized and documented. He was later convicted by a trial court and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine, though because he was young and a first-time offender, the court showed leniency and placed him on probation instead of requiring him to serve time in custody.

He appealed to the Peshawar High Court, arguing the conviction was flawed. The High Court reviewed the testimony of the police officers involved, including the officer who made the arrest, a witness to the seizure, and the investigating officer who obtained an expert report confirming the weapons. The court found their testimony consistent, credible, and unshaken by cross-examination, with no evidence of bias or personal grudge against the appellant. It reaffirmed the legal principle that police officers are valid witnesses just like ordinary citizens, and their evidence shouldn't be dismissed simply because they work for the police.

The court concluded this was a case of sudden, on-the-spot arrest rather than a pre-planned raid based on prior tip-off, and that the prosecution had proven its case convincingly. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and probation.

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. ( · Lahore High Court

This case involved Malik Khalid Hussain, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine under Pakistan's narcotics law after police allegedly recovered 80 kilograms of poppy straw (narcotics) from a house following a raid based on secret tip-off information. According to the prosecution, police spotted the appellant and a co-accused, who fled when the raiding party arrived, leaving behind two bags of poppy straw.

On appeal, the defense argued that all witnesses were police officials, that police had entered the house without a magistrate's permission, that no identification parade was held since the appellant was unknown to police beforehand, and that no evidence linked the house to the appellant.

The Lahore High Court rejected these arguments and upheld the conviction. The court held that police witnesses are just as credible as any other public witnesses, citing Supreme Court precedent. It found the two police witnesses' testimony consistent and credible, with no major contradictions. The court also noted that ordinary members of the public are often reluctant to testify in such cases out of fear of retaliation from accused persons, which explained the absence of independent witnesses. Since the defense could not show any enmity motivating the police to falsely implicate the appellant with such a large quantity of narcotics, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and life sentence. This case matters because it reinforces that police testimony alone, if credible and consistent, can sustain a narcotics conviction.

· Not specified

This Supreme Court decision concerns extradition cases where parents facing extradition have young children in the UK. One case involved an Italian warrant against two British parents convicted of drug trafficking, with children aged 11, 8 and 3. The other involved Polish warrants against a mother accused of dishonesty offences, with children aged 21, 17, 13, 8 and 3. No one disputed that removing these parents, as primary carers, would seriously harm the children.

The central legal question was how much weight courts must give to children's rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to family life) when deciding whether to extradite a parent. The court had to reconcile its earlier ruling in Norris, which held that extradition should only be blocked where the human rights consequences are "exceptionally serious," with a later case called ZH (Tanzania), which emphasized that children's best interests must be a primary consideration in decisions affecting them.

The judgment reviews the Norris precedent in detail, noting that extradition carries strong public interest weight, and only exceptionally compelling circumstances—potentially including serious harm to dependent family members—can outweigh it. The excerpt ends before the court's final conclusions, but the case matters because it shapes how UK courts balance international extradition obligations against the welfare of children whose parents are extradited, affecting many future extradition decisions involving families.

PLJ 2009 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 17 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a husband, Muhammad Javaid, who was appealing against two ex-parte court decisions against him involving his wife, Mst. Zarria Begum. She had filed two cases, one seeking recovery of dower money and another seeking dissolution of the marriage. When the husband did not respond, the Family Court decided both cases against him without his participation and issued decrees on 24.11.2005.

The husband later tried to appeal these decisions, but he filed his appeals on 5.1.2006, well after the deadline. Under the AJ&K Family Courts Act, 1993, and related procedural rules, appeals against Family Court decisions must be filed within 30 days, though time spent obtaining certified copies of the judgment can be excluded from that count.

The husband argued he was not at fault because of delays in receiving copies of the decisions. However, the court calculated that even after deducting the two days he spent obtaining copies, his appeals were still filed nine days too late.

The AJ&K High Court, relying on an earlier Supreme Court interpretation of what counts as time "requisite for obtaining copies," ruled that the appeals were filed well beyond the permitted period. As a result, the court dismissed both appeals as time-barred, without even examining the merits of the husband's case.

This case is significant because it reinforces strict adherence to limitation periods in family law appeals, showing that even valid grievances cannot be heard if procedural deadlines are missed.

PLD 1994 SC 162, 2003 SCMR 686, 2004 SCMR 1719, 2006 SCMR 1410, 2008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case is about a dispute over land pre-emption rights in Punjab. The respondent, Ayaz Mehmood, claimed a right to purchase land that had been sold to the petitioner, Muhammad Sadiq, by exercising his pre-emption right as a co-sharer in the property. Under pre-emption law, a person with a prior claim to land (such as a co-owner) can step in and buy it on the same terms when it is sold to someone else, provided they follow strict legal formalities, including promptly declaring intent (talab-e-muwathibat) and sending a formal notice (talab-e-ishhad) to the buyer.

The trial court dismissed the suit, citing contradictions in witness statements. However, the appellate court reversed this, finding that the respondent had properly completed the legal requirements, including sending the notice by registered post, which the petitioner never specifically denied receiving.

The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision. It ruled that since the petitioner never swore under oath that he did not receive the notice, and no postal record showed refusal of delivery, the notice was legally presumed to have reached him. The Court also held that minor, trivial contradictions in witness testimony should not be used to defeat genuine property rights. Finding no legal error in the High Court's earlier handling of the matter, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's revision.

This case reinforces how pre-emption claims are evaluated, emphasizing that unchallenged evidence of notice delivery is sufficient and that courts should not dismiss val

YLR 1194), “Haji Hassan Ali Vs Haji Abdullah and another” (PLJ 2006 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case is about a property pre-emption suit, which under Pakistani law allows certain people, such as co-owners, to claim the right to buy property before an outside purchaser's sale is finalized, provided strict legal procedures are followed.

Mst. Zahida Perveen sued to take possession of land through pre-emption, claiming she was a co-owner with first right to purchase it, and that the recorded sale price was fraudulently inflated to defeat her claim. Pakistani pre-emption law requires two formal steps: an immediate declaration of intent to pre-empt upon learning of the sale (Talb-e-Muwathibat), and a formal notice to the buyer (Talb-e-Ishhad). The trial court and the appellate court both dismissed her suit, finding these requirements were not properly proven.

The key issues before the High Court were whether failing to produce the informant (the person who told her about the sale) was fatal to her case, and whether other witnesses could substitute for that testimony. The petitioner's own father-in-law testified on her behalf, but she herself never appeared as a witness, and the informant, her brother, was never called despite being the best source of evidence. The respondent argued her statement only showed she "decided" to pre-empt rather than making an immediate, unequivocal demand as required by law, and noted problems with how the Talb-e-Ishhad notice was handled and proven.

This judgment matters because it reinforces how strictly courts enforce the technical requirements of pre-emption claims, including who must testify and how quickly and clearly the right must be

PLJ 2012 Karachi 41 (DB) · Sindh High Court

This case was about a man who filed a civil suit for damages after being wrongly prosecuted and later acquitted. Unable to afford court fees, he applied to sue as a "pauper" (an exemption allowing poor litigants to file without paying court fees upfront). This application was rejected by the courts, including on revision. He then asked the trial court for more time to pay the required court fee instead, which was granted, and his suit was admitted for hearing.

The opposing party later argued that once his pauper application was rejected, his case no longer had a valid "cause of action" and the suit should be thrown out. The trial court disagreed, but a revisional court sided with the opposing party and rejected the plaint entirely.

The Sindh High Court overturned this, ruling that the rejection of a pauper application and the existence of a cause of action are two completely separate legal issues. Being refused fee exemption does not erase someone's underlying right to sue; it simply means they must pay the court fee like any other litigant. Since the petitioner was given time to pay the fee and did so, his suit was properly before the court. The High Court held the revisional court had misunderstood the law and sent the case back for proper proceedings.

The ruling matters because it protects poor litigants' access to justice, clarifying that fee disputes should not be used to wrongly kill genuine legal claims.

PLJ 2011 Lahore 585 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case is about a property dispute between two families claiming to be heirs of Ahmad Ali, a man who died in the 1940s without children. His land passed to his widow, Mst. Hajran Bibi, as a limited owner under customary law. After customary law was abolished, officials transferred the land back to Ahmad Ali's side of the family rather than to the widow's heirs, on the basis that Ahmad Ali was Shia by faith. Under Shia inheritance law, a childless widow does not inherit her husband's immovable property (land), though she may get a share of movable property and household goods. The widow's relatives argued that Muslims in undivided India should be presumed Sunni Hanfi by default and that the claim was filed too late. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed that decision and ruled in favor of Ahmad Ali's relatives. The High Court, in this revision petition, upheld the appellate court's ruling, confirming that since Ahmad Ali was Shia and died without children, his widow had no right to inherit his land, and the land rightly reverted to his blood relatives after her death. This case matters because it shows how a person's religious sect can significantly affect inheritance rights for surviving spouses under Pakistani law, particularly regarding childless widows.

PLJ 1998 Cr. C (Quetta) 1119 DB · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case is about contempt of court proceedings brought against the Editor-in-Chief of a daily newspaper, Lashkar, after it published a news headline on 28 November 1997 that the court found to be false, scandalous, and damaging to the reputation of judges and the judiciary as a whole. The Chief Justice initially flagged the offending headline, and a single judge of the High Court took up the matter, eventually finding the editor guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1976, and sentencing him to six months' imprisonment plus a fine.

The editor appealed to a larger bench, explaining that he had been away in Rawalpindi when the item was published, that he immediately sacked the Chief News Editor responsible once he learned of it, and that he had tendered an unconditional and sincere apology without contesting the case or hiring a lawyer.

The appellate bench upheld the finding of guilt, agreeing that the publication did amount to contempt. However, considering his genuine remorse and unconditional apology, the court reduced his punishment, ruling that the time he had already spent in custody was enough to satisfy justice. He was ordered released, subject to paying the fine.

The case matters because it shows how courts balance protecting judicial dignity from scandalous reporting with recognizing genuine remorse and apology as grounds for leniency in sentencing.

PLJ 2012 SC 174 · Islamabad High Court

This case involves a government employee, Syed Tahir Abbas Shah, who worked for the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and had a service-related grievance. He filed a constitutional petition in the Islamabad High Court seeking relief, but that court dismissed his petition, ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the matter and that he should instead approach the Federal Service Tribunal.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It traced through a series of earlier rulings dealing with the question of which forum, the High Court or the Service Tribunal, has jurisdiction over grievances of employees working in corporations connected to the federal government. The key principle that emerged is that if an employee's service conditions are governed by statutory rules, the High Court can hear their case under its constitutional jurisdiction. If, however, the employee's terms are governed only by contract or internal regulations rather than statutory rules, the ordinary master-servant principle applies and a different remedy is required.

The Supreme Court noted that in a related case involving OGDCL employees, it had already been held that OGDCL employees are governed by statutory rules, meaning the High Court, not the Service Tribunal, has jurisdiction over their grievances. Based on this, the Supreme Court found that the High Court's earlier dismissal was wrong, granted leave to appeal, and sent the case back to the Islamabad High Court to decide the petitioner's grievance on its actual merits rather than rejecting it on jurisdictional grounds.

CLC  1145     LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE · Not specified

This case was about a father, Zaheer Ahmad, who was ordered by the Family Court to pay monthly maintenance for a minor child, a decision upheld by the Appellate Court. The father challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing he should not have to pay because the child was illegitimate. His reasoning was that the child was born on 7 November 2004, about eleven months and five days after his wife had already left him in desertion on 2 December 2003, implying the child could not be his.

The High Court rejected this argument and dismissed the petition. It held that questions of a child's legitimacy carry serious, far-reaching consequences and must not be decided lightly or merely on a husband's accusations. A child born within a lawful marriage is presumed legitimate, and this presumption is strong under Islamic law, summarized in the principle that "the child follows the bed." Mere denial by the father, without strict and credible proof to the contrary, is not enough to displace this presumption. The court also noted that the father had never pursued the proper legal procedure of Li'an (the formal process for a husband to disown a child by oath) in a competent court.

Since there was no solid evidence proving illegitimacy, the court upheld the lower courts' rulings, affirming the child was legitimate and entitled to maintenance from the father. This case reinforces how strongly Pakistani law protects children's legitimacy and maintenance rights.

PLJ 2022 Lahore (Note) 83 · Lahore High Court

This case involved the National Bank of Pakistan and one of its officers, who were being investigated by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) over allegations of illegally issuing loans and money laundering. The bank went to the Lahore High Court asking it to use its constitutional writ jurisdiction (Article 199) to stop or quash the FIA inquiry, claiming the agency was exceeding its authority and harassing its employees.

Before examining the merits, the court had to decide whether the petition was even allowed to be filed directly in the High Court, given that the law provides another remedy: under Section 22-A(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a person who feels wronged by "police authorities" (such as through non-registration of a case, unfair transfer of investigation, or excess of power) can complain to an "ex-officio justice of peace," usually a Sessions Judge.

The key legal question was whether the FIA counts as a "police authority" under this section. The court held that it does, since FIA officers are given the same powers, duties, and status as provincial police officers under the law that created the agency. Therefore, people with complaints against the FIA can and should go to the justice of peace first, rather than directly to the High Court.

Since this alternate remedy existed, the court ruled the writ petition was not maintainable and dismissed it, directing the bank to pursue its complaint through the justice of peace instead. This decision clarifies that FIA actions are subject to the same local judicial oversight mechanism as regular police, rather than requiring direct High Court intervention.

PLJ 2020 Islamabad 113 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a custody dispute over an eight-year-old boy, Waliyaan, following the breakdown of his parents' marriage. His mother had moved to the UK for higher education, originally with the father's agreement that she could take Waliyaan with her, provided his visa was approved. However, the boy's visa application was rejected, so he stayed in Pakistan with his maternal grandparents while his mother went abroad alone. The couple later divorced. The father then sought custody, while the mother and her parents fought to retain guardianship and custody.

The Family Court and the Appellate Court both ruled in favor of the father, granting him custody, while setting up a visitation schedule for the maternal grandparents and allowing the mother custody whenever she visited Pakistan. The mother and her parents challenged these decisions before the Islamabad High Court.

The High Court upheld the custody award to the father, reasoning that since the child could not join his mother in the UK, awarding custody to the father was not improper, especially as there was no finding that he was unfit to care for his son. However, the Court objected to one part of the lower court's ruling, that barred the mother from ever seeking permanent custody if she returned to Pakistan. The High Court struck down this restriction, holding that any future custody claim must be decided afresh based on the child's best interests at that time. The petition was therefore partly allowed.

PLJ 2024 Tr.C. (Services) 89 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a government employee, Wali Muhammad, who worked on a contractual basis at the Prime Minister's Literacy Commission starting in 1996. His job was eventually regularized in 2018, but only with effect from 2013, giving him about four years of regular service before he retired in 2017 upon reaching retirement age. When he applied for pension, he was denied because the rules required a minimum of ten years of regularized service to qualify, and he argued his earlier years of contractual work should count toward that total.

The Federal Service Tribunal rejected his appeal. It explained that government office memorandums from 2013 and 2014, along with the Civil Service Regulations, clearly state that contractual service does not count toward the ten-year minimum needed to become eligible for pension. The Tribunal relied on Supreme Court precedents which established that while contractual service can be used to calculate the amount of pension once someone is already eligible, it cannot be combined with regular service just to meet the eligibility threshold in the first place. A special provision in the regulations that deals with counting temporary service was found not to override this requirement.

This ruling matters because it clarifies that many government employees who spent years on contract before being regularized cannot use that contractual time to make up for a shortfall in the ten years of permanent service required for pension eligibility, even if their total years of work exceed ten.

PLJ 2024 Cr.C. (Note) 227 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case is about a double murder appeal from Dera Ghazi Khan. Ghulam Akbar was convicted by a trial court of killing his relatives' parents (Naseer Muhammad and Musarrat Wazeer) and sentenced to death on two counts, after the complainant alleged a family dispute over marriages had turned violent. Three co-accused were acquitted. Akbar appealed his conviction and death sentence, while the case also went before the High Court as a Murder Reference, which is required whenever a trial court imposes a death sentence.

The Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) examined the evidence, including eyewitness testimony from the complainant and his brother, medical evidence, and a forensic report. It found the eyewitness accounts credible and consistent, supported by medical evidence, and rejected the defense's claim that the real culprits had been substituted. However, the court noted that the prosecution had only produced a photocopy of the forensic report, not the original, making it inadmissible evidence.

The court upheld Akbar's conviction for murder but decided his case did not warrant the death penalty, citing certain mitigating ("extenuating") circumstances in his favor. It reduced his sentence from death to life imprisonment, applying the principle that doubt or weaknesses in a case can benefit an accused specifically on the question of sentence, even where conviction itself stands.

PLJ 2006 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a husband and wife whose marriage ended in divorce, which was later revoked after they agreed to reconcile. As part of that reconciliation, the wife claimed, the husband signed an agreement raising her dower amount from Rs. 500 to Rs. 100,000 and promising monthly maintenance for her and their son. When the husband later failed to pay, the wife sued for the dower and maintenance. The Family Court ruled in her favor, and her husband's subsequent appeal was also dismissed. He then challenged these decisions before the Lahore High Court, arguing that the agreement enhancing the dower was forged.

The High Court rejected his petition. It noted that the wife had produced the written agreement and witnesses to support it, and that handwriting comparisons by the lower courts found his signatures on the agreement matched his admitted signature elsewhere. The husband never sought expert verification to challenge this despite having opportunities to do so, which the court viewed as suspicious. Importantly, the court held that under Islamic law, a husband can voluntarily increase the dower amount at any time during the marriage, not just at the time of the nikah.

The ruling matters because it confirms that dower agreements made after marriage are legally enforceable, and courts will uphold a wife's right to such enhanced amounts when properly proven, protecting women from husbands who later try to deny commitments made to preserve the marriage.

PLJ 2001 Lahore · Lahore High Court

This case involved a company, Kasur Oil Mills, that had taken a complaint to the Wafaqi Mohtasib (a federal ombudsman set up under a 1983 presidential order) seeking redress for its grievance. The Mohtasib initially dismissed the complaint, but after the company filed a review petition, the Mohtasib reversed course and ruled in its favor. The opposing party then challenged this reversal before the President of Pakistan, who accepted their representation and set aside the Mohtasib's revised decision. The company then went to the Lahore High Court, arguing that the President's order lacked proper reasoning and had been passed without giving it a personal hearing.

The High Court rejected these arguments and dismissed the petition. It held that the Wafaqi Mohtasib never had the legal power to review its own earlier decisions in the first place, since the governing law contained no provision allowing this. The court explained that the power of review is not a mere procedural matter but a question of jurisdiction, and such power must be expressly granted by law before it can be used. Since no such power existed, the President was right to set aside the Mohtasib's review order, and this itself counted as a valid reason. The court also held that the President was not legally required to grant a personal hearing in such appeals.

This ruling reinforces the principle that administrative bodies cannot assume powers, like reviewing their own decisions, unless explicitly authorized by statute.

PLJ 2003 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a Pakistan Railways employee, Said Muhammad, who joined as a Pointsman in 1969 and was gradually promoted over the years, eventually reaching the post of Guard Gr-1 in 1994 after completing a required training course. He retired in 1997 with his retirement benefits sanctioned. However, after his retirement, Railways authorities launched an inquiry into several Guards' matriculation certificates, which was a prerequisite qualification for that post. Said Muhammad allegedly could not produce his original certificate, and in March 1998, seven months after his retirement, the department reverted him to his earlier, lower post, which would reduce his pension benefits.

Said Muhammad complained to the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), who ruled in his favor, holding he was entitled to full pension based on the higher post he held at retirement. Railways then challenged this decision in the Peshawar High Court.

The High Court dismissed the Railways' petition. It found that an employee cannot be reverted to a lower post after retirement, that Railways had failed to use the proper legal remedy of appealing to the President as required by law, and that another employee in a similar situation had been treated differently, meaning Said Muhammad faced discrimination. The court also noted Railways' negligence in not checking his service record earlier. It upheld the Ombudsman's authority to intervene in cases of maladministration, even for railway employees, and refused to interfere with that decision.

PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 108 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a dispute over inherited agricultural land in Mandi Bahauddin district. Rasoolan Bibi, a daughter, filed a suit claiming her 1/7th Sharia inheritance share from her deceased father Khushi Muhammad's estate. She alleged that a 1972 gift mutation transferring the entire property to her brothers was fraudulent, obtained in connivance with revenue officials while her father was elderly, illiterate, and of unsound mind, effectively cutting out the daughters from their rightful inheritance. Both the trial court and the appellate court had dismissed her suit, accepting the brothers' claim that their father had freely gifted them the land.

The Lahore High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, overturned these concurrent findings. It found that the brothers, who were beneficiaries of the alleged gift, failed to produce the witnesses who had attested the oral gift transaction or the revenue officials who recorded the gift mutation. Under Islamic law, a valid gift requires a clear offer, acceptance, and actual delivery of possession, and under evidence law, such oral transactions and mutations must be proven through proper witnesses. Since this mandatory requirement was not fulfilled, the Court held that the gift mutation was not validly proven and appeared to be a device to defraud the daughter of her legal inheritance share. The Court therefore set aside the lower courts' judgments, reinforcing that daughters' inheritance rights cannot be bypassed through unproven, fraudulent

PLJ 2016 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a civil judge who was removed from service after a surprise inspection found 356 of his case files incomplete. In 226 of these files, judgments or orders had been dictated and typed but never signed by him. In another roughly 50 files, no judgment or order existed at all. Despite this, he had issued succession and guardianship certificates and robkars (court orders) to release criminal offenders based on these unsigned or non-existent judgments. A departmental inquiry was held, and he was ultimately dismissed from judicial service. He appealed to the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, arguing the punishment was too harsh given his otherwise clean record, that no litigant had actually been harmed, and that staff failures (an inefficient stenographer) were partly to blame for missing orders.

The Tribunal rejected these arguments. It held that there is no legal concept of an oral or unsigned judgment being valid or enforceable, and that issuing certificates and release orders without proper signed judgments was a serious illegality, not a mere technical lapse. It found the judge had effectively invented his own improper procedure for granting relief without legal authority to do so. Given the sensitive and important nature of judicial work, the Tribunal ruled that such inefficiency and dereliction of duty deserved an especially strict standard, higher than for ordinary government employees. It upheld the removal from service as a proportionate penalty, dismissing the appeal.

PLJ 2014 Lahore 1054 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a dispute over inheritance rights following the death of Syed Gulzar Hussain Shah. Mst. Asghar Bibi and another petitioner filed a suit claiming a share in his property through partition, but the respondents argued she was not entitled to inherit because Gulzar Hussain Shah had divorced her back in 1971, meaning she was no longer his wife when he died. Both the trial court and the appellate court had ruled against her on this point, finding that she had indeed been divorced, based on a written divorce deed (talaqnama) supported by witness testimony, including an admission from her own relative that she had been divorced.

On revision before the Lahore High Court, her lawyer argued the divorce was invalid because it was never formally reported to the local Union Council as required under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The court rejected this argument, holding that Islamic law does not require any specific procedure for pronouncing divorce - it can be oral or written, and a written divorce becomes irrevocable. Failure to send the required notice to the Union Council does not undo a divorce that has actually taken place, since requiring such notice to invalidate a divorce would conflict with Islamic principles.

The court also noted that the evidence strongly supported the divorce and that she had never properly denied it in her own testimony. The revision was dismissed, confirming she could not inherit as a wife.

PLJ 2006 SC 888 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a dispute over the regularization of a government school teacher's employment status. Mrs. Zakia Latif had been appointed as a Senior English Teacher on an ad hoc basis in 1989 at an Islamabad Model School. Although she was later selected for a regular position, a government ban on appointments meant she continued working on an ad hoc basis. In 1994, the Federal Government introduced a policy to regularize ad hoc employees hired between 1981 and 1990, sorting them into two categories. The Ministry of Education reviewed her case and placed her in Category 1, the more favorable category for regularization. However, the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) overruled this and placed her in a different category, which led to her being denied regularization.

Mrs. Latif challenged this before the Lahore High Court, which ruled in her favor, directing that she be treated according to the category assigned by the Ministry of Education. The FPSC then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, refusing the FPSC leave to appeal. It reasoned that since the regularization policy was made by the Government, and the Ministry of Education was a part of that same Government, the Ministry was better positioned to decide which category its own employees belonged to. The FPSC had failed to justify its authority to override the Ministry's categorization.

This case is important because it clarifies that when implementing government policies affecting employees of a specific ministry, that ministry's assessment of its own staff should generally be respected over an external body's contrary classification.

PLJ 2006 Lahore 442 (DB) · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a dispute over a petrol pump and CNG station site in Islamabad. The appellant had leased the plot from the Capital Development Authority's Staff Welfare Organization for thirty years starting in 1973, building the facility at his own expense. When the lease neared expiry, the authority offered only a five-year extension at a much higher rent, which the appellant did not outright refuse but instead asked for a full thirty-year renewal, similar to what the Authority itself enjoyed under its own arrangement. Without properly resolving this, officials dispossessed him and sealed his premises, despite an earlier court undertaking that he would not be removed except through due legal process.

The Lahore High Court held that this dispossession was illegal because it violated mandatory requirements of prior notice and fair procedure. The court emphasized that public authorities must act justly, fairly, and without arbitrariness, and that courts can intervene under Article 199 of the Constitution when such fairness is breached, even in matters touching contracts, if public functionaries act unreasonably or with mala fide intent.

The court found the rejection of the appellant's extension request arrogant and improper, especially since the authority had granted itself similar long-term benefits. It ordered that possession be restored to the appellant and directed that his lease be extended for thirty years, applying principles of equity and fairness.

This case matters because it reinforces that government bodies cannot bypass fair procedure or act arbitrarily against citizens, even in contractual or quasi-contractual relationships.

PLJ 2018 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a police department employee who had originally been appointed as a Cook in 1999 on a family-support quota, following his father's death during service. In 2004, after applying for recruitment, he was appointed as a Driver Constable by the CCPO, Lahore, and served in that role for over a decade with a clean record.

In 2016, the CCPO withdrew his 2004 appointment order, claiming it was illegal because changing his cadre from Cook to Driver Constable violated rules, citing a Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment that had nullified out-of-turn and ante-dated promotions (often linked to gallantry awards).

The Punjab Service Tribunal disagreed. It held that the Supreme Court's ruling specifically addressed out-of-turn or ante-dated promotions and cases of officials transferred or deputed outside their proper cadre - not straightforward appointments like this one. Since the appellant was never promoted out of turn, nor was his case about deputation or transfer, the Supreme Court judgment did not apply to him. The Tribunal found that the department had wrongly relied on and misapplied that precedent to cancel a legitimate appointment made 12 years earlier.

As a result, the Tribunal set aside the 2016 withdrawal order and restored the appellant to his position as Driver Constable. This case matters because it shows courts scrutinizing whether government departments are correctly applying higher court rulings, protecting employees from having legitimate, long-standing appointments overturned based on precedents that don't actually fit their situation

PLJ 2018 SC 66 · Islamabad High Court

This case was about tenants in Islamabad who were ordered to vacate rented properties because their tenancy periods had expired. The landlords used this expiry as the ground for eviction under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, and the lower courts, including the Islamabad High Court, agreed and ordered eviction. The tenants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that even after the tenancy period ended, they remained "tenants" in the legal sense and could only be evicted on the specific grounds listed in Section 17 of the Ordinance (like non-payment of rent, subletting, or personal need of the landlord) — not simply because the lease term had ended.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that Section 6 of the Ordinance clearly states that a tenancy is no longer valid once its term expires. Reading this together with Section 17, the Court ruled that continuing to occupy the property after the tenancy period ends, without the landlord's written consent, amounts to a violation of the tenancy terms — which is itself a valid ground for eviction under Section 17. The Court rejected the argument that this made Section 6 redundant, saying such an interpretation would instead ignore it entirely and let tenants occupy property indefinitely despite having no legal right to do so.

The appeals were dismissed, meaning the eviction orders stood. The decision clarifies that landlords in Islamabad can seek eviction simply because a tenancy agreement's term has expired, without needing to prove another separate ground.

· Not specified

This case involved a wife who had filed a family court suit against her husband seeking dissolution of marriage, dower, maintenance, dowry articles, and a sum of money. The Family Court partially ruled in her favor, granting dissolution of marriage through khula (in lieu of unpaid dower) along with maintenance during the iddat period, but rejected her claims for dowry articles and Rs. 50,000 she said she had given her husband. Her appeal against this partial decision was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, prompting her to file a writ petition before the Peshawar High Court.

The High Court also dismissed her petition. It found that she had failed to provide convincing evidence for her remaining claims. Regarding the dowry articles, she only submitted a typed list prepared on the day she filed the suit, with no receipts or supporting witnesses to verify it was genuine. Regarding the Rs. 50,000, she could not show any evidence of when or where she gave this money to her husband. The court held that mere unsubstantiated statements are not sufficient proof in law.

Since both lower courts had reached the same conclusions based on proper evaluation of evidence, and no legal error was found, the High Court held there was no basis to interfere. This case illustrates that in family law disputes, claims for dowry items or money must be backed by solid, verifiable evidence such as receipts or witness testimony, not just personal assertions or self-prepared lists.

CLC 1383). Learned counsel for the appellants prayed for the impugne · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a landlord-tenant dispute in Islamabad. The landlords (Respondents 2-5) and tenants (the appellants, Ch. Naseer Ahmed and his wife) had co-owned a plot of land, part of which was leased under a 2006 agreement for ten years. When the lease expired, the landlords filed for the tenants' eviction before the Rent Controller under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001. The tenants tried to block these proceedings by invoking an arbitration clause in the lease agreement, applying under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to have the eviction case stayed and sent to arbitration instead.

The Rent Controller rejected this request, and a single judge of the Islamabad High Court upheld that decision. The tenants then appealed to a two-judge bench (Intra Court Appeal).

The High Court dismissed the appeal. It ruled that although parties are generally free to agree to arbitration for contractual disputes, when a special law like the Rent Restriction Ordinance specifically governs an area—here, tenant eviction—that special law takes priority over general arbitration agreements. Eviction matters must go through the Rent Controller, not arbitration, even if the lease contains an arbitration clause. The court upheld the earlier rulings, confirming that the Rent Controller alone had jurisdiction over the eviction case.

This judgment matters because it clarifies that arbitration clauses cannot be used to escape specialized legal processes designed to protect

PLJ 2015 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 23 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a woman, Farzana Siddique, who was caught in a legal dispute after marrying a man of her own choice. A complaint was filed against her, her husband, and others, leading to an FIR (police case) under laws dealing with abduction-related offences. The complainant alleged wrongdoing, but the woman insisted she was an adult who married by her own free will, and she had already given a statement to this effect before a civil judge.

She approached the Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court asking that the FIR be quashed, arguing the case was false and that the registration of the complaint was delayed and unexplained.

The High Court explained that its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code exist to prevent misuse of the courts and to ensure justice, even without waiting for the trial court to decide the matter through other legal routes like Sections 249-A or 265-K. These powers should be used sparingly, but are appropriate when continuing a case would amount to unnecessary harassment.

The judge found that since the woman clearly and voluntarily confirmed her marriage, and Islamic law considers the free consent of an adult, sane couple sufficient for a valid marriage, no criminal offence was actually established. The court therefore quashed the FIR, emphasizing that such cases must be judged on their own specific facts, and distinguishing this case from another precedent where similar relief had been denied by the Supreme Court.

PLJ 2011 Peshawar 257 · Peshawar High Court

This case was about a dispute over a man's parentage recorded in government revenue records. The respondent, Abdul Hameed, filed a suit asking the court to correct his father's name in official land records, claiming his father was actually Mehr Khan, though records showed the name as Qutab Khan. The defendant, Abdul Latif, contested this, denying the respondent was Mehr Khan's son at all, effectively disputing his legitimacy and inheritance claims.

The trial court dismissed the suit, but on appeal, the District Judge sent the case back for retrial, directing that the plaintiff be allowed to amend his plaint, bring in all of Mehr Khan's legal heirs as parties, and properly raise the issue of legitimacy so the real dispute could be fully examined with evidence.

The defendant challenged this remand order before the Peshawar High Court, arguing it was improper under the civil procedure rules governing remands. The High Court disagreed and upheld the remand. It ruled that appellate courts have broad powers under the Civil Procedure Code - not just to remand cases on narrow technical grounds, but also to use their inherent powers and general authority (similar to a trial court's own powers) to ensure cases are properly pleaded and all necessary parties and issues are before the court, so that real disputes like legitimacy and parentage are fully and fairly decided rather than dismissed on technicalities. The petition was dismissed.

This matters because it confirms that appellate courts can intervene flexibly to ensure substantive justice, especially in sensit

PLJ 2016 SC 108 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case concerns a murder trial where the person who filed the original police complaint (FIR) also filed a separate private complaint containing the same allegations against the same accused persons. The trial court decided to hold a joint, single trial covering both cases together, rather than trying the private complaint first and keeping the police case on hold, which is the procedure normally recommended by courts.

The accused were acquitted by the trial court, and the High Court upheld that acquittal. The complainant then approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the acquittal should be overturned because the trial court had wrongly combined the two cases instead of trying the complaint case first.

The Supreme Court agreed that the law generally requires the complaint case to be tried first when the same complainant brings both an FIR and a private complaint on identical allegations against the same accused. However, it held that a procedural irregularity like this does not automatically invalidate a verdict. Under Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a conviction or acquittal cannot be reversed merely because of an error in the mode of trial unless it actually caused a failure of justice. Since the petitioner never objected to the joint trial at any stage, and since the evidence against the accused (last-seen evidence, motive, and an alleged extra-judicial confession) was weak regardless of how the trial was conducted, the Court found no failure of justice had occurred. The petition was dismissed, and the acquittal stood. The case clarifies that procedural irregularities only matter if they genuinely affect the fairness of the outcome.

PLJ 2015 · Islamabad High Court

This case, decided by the Islamabad High Court, dealt with a wave of petitions filed by employees of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and similar organizations, who were asking the court to step in and resolve disputes over their terms and conditions of service, such as disciplinary actions and service grievances. Since these employees were not civil servants, they could not approach the Federal Service Tribunal and had no other effective forum, so they were forced to invoke the High Court's extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.

The court held that employers, including government-controlled bodies like CDA, owe a legal "duty of care" to their employees, similar to duties recognized between doctors and patients or lawyers and clients. This duty requires employers to protect employees from harm and to provide fair, affordable, and quick ways to resolve workplace disputes. Failing to provide such mechanisms, the court said, breaches this duty of care and violates employees' fundamental rights, particularly the right to access justice, which is tied to the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution.

The court noted that forcing employees to seek relief only through High Court litigation is neither affordable nor accessible, especially for lower-grade staff. It directed the government and its organizations to justify why they haven't created independent, affordable, and impartial tribunals for employees, and praised CDA's steps toward establishing such a grievance-redressal forum, calling it a move in the right direction.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court

This case involved landowners (encroachers) in Faisalabad who had been occupying land since 1947 and built construction on it in 1995. When revenue authorities earlier tried to demolish their construction, the petitioners went to court, and in 1997 the Lahore High Court directed the Collector to decide their claim in accordance with law. That order was never complied with. Instead, in 2009, the Deputy District Officer (Revenue) issued an order under the Colonization of Government Land Act, 1912, directing officials to forcibly retake the land and seize crops, trees, or building material without compensation and without giving the petitioners any notice or hearing.

The petitioners challenged this order, and the Lahore High Court ruled in their favor. The court held that even people who are encroachers or trespassers still have a constitutional right under Article 4 of the Constitution to be treated in accordance with law. Article 4 was described as Pakistan's "due process clause," guaranteeing fairness, natural justice, transparency, and the right to be heard before any action harmful to a person's property is taken. Since the 2009 order was passed without notice, without a hearing, and without complying with the earlier court directive, it violated Article 4 and could not stand.

The judgment matters because it reaffirms that government authorities cannot take action against anyone's life, liberty, or property—even against illegal occupants—without following fair legal procedure, reinforcing due process as a core constitutional protection for everyone in Pakistan.

PLJ 1990 Lahore 572 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a legal dispute about malicious prosecution and whether victims can claim damages when a false police report, not an actual court case, causes them harm.

In 1961, a man named Alamgir filed a false police report accusing Syed Ghayyur Hussain Shah, Muhammad Shafique, and another person of abducting someone as part of a murder conspiracy. Police investigated and found the allegations baseless, and the case was eventually cancelled by a magistrate. The accused men then sued for damages, claiming the false report damaged their reputations and caused them financial and emotional harm. A trial court awarded them damages, but on appeal, this decision was overturned on the technical ground that since the matter never actually went to a court trial (it was resolved at the police investigation stage), a claim for malicious prosecution could not succeed.

The Lahore High Court disagreed. It ruled that the right to sue for malicious prosecution does not depend on whether a formal court case was filed—being falsely implicated in a police investigation is enough, and may even be a stronger basis for a claim. The Court held that anyone who proves malicious action without reasonable cause, which ends in their favor and causes real damage to person, property, or reputation, deserves compensation—whether the proceedings were in a police station or a courtroom.

The Court also ruled that such claims survive the death of the accused person, allowing their heirs to claim damages, departing from older English common law doctrine. This judgment is significant because it expanded protections against false accusations and reinforced constitutional guarantees (Articles

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a long-running property dispute. Muhammad Younas had filed a suit against Shabbir Hussain for possession of property through specific performance of a 1998 sale agreement. When Hussain failed to appear in court, he was proceeded against ex-parte in 2000. His application to have that ex-parte order set aside was rejected, and so was his subsequent appeal. He then filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging those rulings, but crucially, he never obtained any order from the High Court pausing or suspending the trial court proceedings. While his writ petition was still pending, the trial court went ahead, recorded evidence, and issued a decree against him. Instead of appealing that decree, he wrongly filed another application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code to have the decree set aside, which was also dismissed.

The High Court ruled against Hussain, holding that since he had been properly served with court notices, an application under Order IX Rule 13 was not the correct legal remedy for challenging the decree itself—he should have filed a regular appeal instead. The court also noted that Hussain had secretly sold the disputed property through a registered deed without informing the trial court, indicating an intent to delay proceedings and mislead the court. The petition was dismissed. This case clarifies that ex-parte orders and ex-parte decrees are separate legal matters requiring separate remedies, and that pending higher court petitions don't automatically pause lower court proceedings unless a stay is explicitly granted.

PLJ 2014 · Balochistan High Court

This case arose from a business dispute between Dalda Foods and a distributor, Agha Arshad, over an agreement dated May 2007. The distributor sued for specific performance of the agreement and recovery of over sixty lakh rupees, and also sought an interim injunction to restrain the company from acting against him while the case was pending. The trial court granted this temporary restraining order. The company and another respondent then applied under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, asking the court to stay the suit and refer the dispute to an arbitrator as per the agreement's arbitration clause. They also appealed the injunction order to the High Court.

The Balochistan High Court dismissed the appeal. It held that courts retain the power to grant interim injunctions even when a request has been made to refer a dispute to arbitration, because arbitrators have no power to issue such injunctions and ordinary civil procedure rules do not apply to arbitration proceedings. Simply filing an application to stay proceedings and go to arbitration does not stop the trial court from deciding an injunction request. The court also noted that since the injunction order was only temporary and not yet finally decided, the company could raise its objections before the trial court, which should resolve the matter under the normal injunction rules.

This case clarifies that seeking arbitration does not block courts from granting urgent interim protection to parties during litigation.

PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a dispute between a tenant, M/s. King Clothing, and the landlords of a shop in Islamabad's Blue Area. The lease had expired in 2005, and the landlords filed an eviction case before the Rent Controller. The tenant was ordered to deposit monthly rent during the proceedings. The Rent Controller ultimately allowed the eviction, finding that the landlords had proven their case, including their genuine personal need for the property. The tenant appealed, but the Additional District Judge upheld this decision. The tenant then approached the Islamabad High Court through a constitutional petition, arguing that the lower courts had wrongly evaluated the evidence.

The High Court dismissed the petition. It noted that the tenant had failed to comply with earlier court orders to deposit rent, repeatedly delaying the case and attempting to cover up this default through procedural maneuvers. The Court emphasized that parties seeking relief under its constitutional jurisdiction must come with clean hands, and that it would not allow litigants to misuse court proceedings to gain unfair advantage. On the merits, the Court found that the landlords had successfully proven the key issues, including their bona fide need for the shop, and that the tenant's evidence had gone largely unchallenged in cross-examination—meaning the unchallenged testimony effectively counted as an admission of facts.

The Court ordered the tenant to pay all outstanding rent by a set deadline, after which one month would be allowed to vacate the premises. This case highlights how courts assess conduct

PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved Adnan Qureshi, who worked for the Capital Development Authority (CDA) in Islamabad. His father had been allotted a government flat, and after his father retired in 2010, Adnan continued living there, arguing he was entitled to the same accommodation both as his father's successor and as a CDA employee in his own right.

When CDA refused to formally allot him the flat, he sued and asked the court for a temporary injunction to stop eviction while the case proceeded. Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to grant this injunction, so he brought the matter to the Islamabad High Court.

The High Court examined the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002, which allow a government servant's family to retain official housing for only six months after retirement, and only once. Since Adnan's father retired in April 2010 and Adnan was only formally regularized as an employee in January 2012, he had overstayed the six-month grace period and had become, in the eyes of the rules, a "trespasser." The court also found that merely being employed on a daily-wage or work-charge basis did not automatically make him a "Federal Government Servant" entitled to housing under these rules.

The court dismissed his revision petition, upholding the lower courts' refusal of injunction. The judgment clarifies that housing entitlement linked to a

PLJ 2012 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a dispute between two doctors at a government hospital in D.I. Khan. Dr. Khalid Aziz Baloch, the Medical Superintendent, filed a police report (FIR) against Dr. Misal Khan and two others, accusing them of threatening him, forcing their way into the hospital's administration block, breaking a lock, damaging property, and stealing official documents. The background was a bitter rivalry between the two doctors over who should hold the post of Medical Superintendent, after Dr. Misal Khan was transferred out and had even challenged that transfer before a service tribunal, which had issued a status quo order in his favor.

Dr. Misal Khan and the other accused asked the Peshawar High Court to quash the FIR, arguing there was no real evidence against them and that the complaint was motivated by the ongoing transfer dispute rather than any genuine crime.

The court agreed. It noted that the complainant's accusation relied entirely on a phone call from a colleague, Dr. Rafiqullah, whose statement was never even recorded by police. Additionally, the supposedly stolen official documents were never recovered from the accused. The court held that since there was no credible evidence to support the prosecution's case, continuing the trial would be pointless because it would inevitably end in acquittal. It therefore quashed the FIR entirely.

This case illustrates an important principle: courts can stop criminal proceedings early, before trial, if it's clear from the record that there's no real evidence and the case is bound to fail, saving time and preventing misu

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a dispute over customs enforcement in Peshawar. A Customs Intelligence Officer challenged an order by a Special Judge who had granted pre-arrest bail to a businessman, Hasanat Akhtar, and also ordered the release of 250 metric tons of RBD Palm Olein (a type of edible oil) from a bonded warehouse, where it had apparently been seized by customs authorities.

The officer initially filed a petition asking the High Court to quash the Special Judge's order using its inherent powers. When the respondent's lawyer objected that this was the wrong legal route, the petition was converted into a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, which allows the High Court to strike down orders passed without lawful authority.

However, the respondent again objected, pointing out that under Section 185-F of the Customs Act, 1969, anyone unhappy with a Special Judge's order must appeal to the Special Appellate Court, not come to the High Court through a writ petition. The High Court agreed this was the correct procedure and that the petitioner had used the wrong forum.

Additionally, the court noted that since the goods had already been released to the respondent, even if the original order was wrongful, there was nothing meaningful the court could do at this late stage.

The petition was dismissed, reinforcing that customs-related disputes have a specific appellate route that must be followed rather than bypassing it through writ petitions.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved Zia Mohyuddin, who received a scholarship from the Higher Education Commission (HEC) to study for a Master's degree in South Korea. Under his agreement with HEC, he was required to work in Pakistan for two years after completing his studies, or repay the money spent on his education. After finishing his Master's, he could not find a job through HEC, so he accepted a PhD scholarship from a South Korean university. When he tried to fly back to Korea, he was stopped at the airport, arrested, and jailed by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) because HEC had placed his name on a watch list, effectively barring him from leaving the country.

The Lahore High Court ruled this action unlawful. It found that neither HEC nor FIA had any legal authority to place him on the watch list or Exit Control List, since the official rules only allow such listing for serious matters like smuggling, terrorism, or human trafficking - not for contract disputes with HEC. The court also held that a person cannot be put on such a list without first being given notice and a chance to be heard, and that any order restricting someone's travel must be properly communicated, not kept secret. Even if the petitioner had breached his agreement, HEC's only remedy was to sue him for money, not to have him detained or stopped from traveling. The court ordered his name removed from the list and allowed him to travel freely.

This case matters because it protects citizens' fundamental right to travel from being misused to settle civil or contractual disputes.

PLJ 2010 · Sindh High Court

This case concerns Mian Munir Ahmed, whose name had been placed on Pakistan's Exit Control List by the Ministry of Interior, preventing him from leaving the country. He challenged this before the Sindh High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, arguing it violated his fundamental right to freedom of movement.

The government had listed him based on a recommendation from the FIA and State Bank because he was considered a loan defaulter, and because several civil and criminal cases were pending against him related to a company, Central Cotton Mills Limited, where he had been a director. His lawyer pointed out that most of these 25 cases had already been disposed of, only a handful remained pending, and the State Bank itself had not recommended including him in a later, revised list.

The court found two key problems with how the government acted. First, the notification placing him on the list gave no reasons at all, meaning he was never given a chance to respond or defend himself before action was taken against him. Second, the court reaffirmed settled legal principle that merely having pending civil or criminal cases is not sufficient grounds to restrict someone's constitutional right to travel.

While the court acknowledged the government does have legal authority under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 to restrict travel, it ruled this power cannot be used arbitrarily or without fair hearing. The court allowed the petition, permitting Ahmed to travel freely. The case matters because it reinforces that travel restrictions require due process and genuine justification, not blanket assumptions tied to unresolved litig

· Sindh High Court

This case was about a dispute between a landlord and a tenant over a shop in Karachi. The tenant, Symphony (Pvt.) Ltd., was renting office/shop space that had originally belonged to a company called Print Off Printers and Publishers (Pvt.) Limited. After that company was dissolved, a person named Rab Nawaz sold the property to Fazal Karim through a registered sale deed. Fazal Karim then sought to evict Symphony for non-payment of rent. Symphony argued that the sale to Fazal Karim was fraudulent, since Rab Nawaz allegedly had no authority to sell the dissolved company's property, and claimed the eviction case was premature since the ownership question was already being contested in a separate civil suit.

Both the Rent Controller and the appellate court ruled in favor of the landlord, ordering eviction for default in rent. The Sindh High Court upheld these decisions. It held that questions about fraud or the validity of a registered sale deed cannot be decided in rent eviction proceedings - such disputes must be resolved through a proper civil suit. Since no one else was claiming ownership of the property, and the sale deed remained valid and unchallenged by any rival claimant, the landlord was entitled to collect rent and proceed with eviction. The court found no illegality in the lower courts' concurrent findings and dismissed the tenant's petition.

This case matters because it clarifies that rent courts deal only with landlord-tenant relationships and rent defaults, not complex property ownership disputes, which

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a challenge to accountability proceedings against directors of a private company (Classic Knit Wear) who had been accused under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 of "willful default" for failing to repay a loan of over Rs. 32 million taken from Pak Libya Holding Company for a garment project. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) had filed a reference against them, and a trial court had refused to acquit them when they sought dismissal of the charges.

The petitioners argued that the legal procedure for initiating such cases had not been properly followed. Under the law and a Supreme Court ruling, two separate notices were required before prosecution for willful default could begin: first a 30-day notice from the financial institution, and then a separate 7-day notice from the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. The High Court found that these mandatory notice requirements had not been properly fulfilled in this case.

The court ruled that failing to follow this notice procedure made the entire case against the petitioners legally void from the start, and that this defect could not be fixed later. As a result, the court quashed the NAB reference and all related proceedings against the accused.

This case matters because it reinforces that procedural safeguards protecting the accused in accountability cases must be strictly followed, and shows that failure to do so can invalidate an entire prosecution, regardless of the underlying allegations.

PLD 1992 SC · Sindh High Court

This case involved a property dispute over land in Jacobabad. A man named Muhammad Siddique claimed ownership of the disputed property, saying he bought it from one Ghulam Sarwar, who in turn had purchased it from Sri Chand. The original plaintiff in the suit argued that the property actually fell within a Katchi Abadi (an informal settlement area), and wanted to add Ghulam Sarwar, Sri Chand, and revenue officials as additional defendants so the court could properly determine the true status and ownership of the land.

The trial court initially refused to allow these new parties to be added, especially since the plaintiff's evidence had already been recorded. However, the District Judge overturned that decision in revision, allowing the new defendants to be joined. Siddique challenged this before the High Court, arguing the request came too late.

The High Court disagreed. It held that under Order I, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, courts have wide discretion to add necessary parties at any stage of a case, and there is no fixed limitation period for doing so. Since the trial had not yet concluded, adding these parties was appropriate to fairly resolve the real dispute about who owned the land. The petition was dismissed.

This case matters because it confirms that Pakistani courts can add important parties to a lawsuit at any point before final judgment, ensuring disputes are resolved on their true merits rather than being blocked by technical delays.

PLD 2004 Lahore 395 and 2009 MLD 33, which .rulings were distinguish · Lahore High Court

This case was about a custody dispute over a young boy named Bilal Ahmad following his father's death. After the father died, the boy's mother, Mst. Asima, lived with her in-laws but was later forced out of the house, while the paternal grandmother retained custody of the child. The mother went to court multiple times to recover custody, initially under the Criminal Procedure Code and later under the Guardians and Wards Act. Lower courts had ruled against her partly based on the five-year-old child's own statement that he preferred living with his grandmother. However, on appeal, the District Judge reversed this and ordered the child be returned to his mother. The grandmother then challenged that decision before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court dismissed the grandmother's petition and upheld the mother's right to custody. The judge personally interviewed the child and found he had been influenced to say negative things about his mother, which she considered psychologically harmful. The court emphasized that under Islamic law, a mother's right to custody takes precedence over a paternal grandmother's, and that a child's welfare, including emotional and mental wellbeing, must guide custody decisions. The court also noted the mother's sacrifices and continued efforts to regain her son.

This case matters because it reinforces that courts must prioritize a child's overall welfare, including emotional health, and affirms the mother's preferential right to custody under Islamic law.

PLD 2003 SC 668; Khalid Saigol v. The State PLD 1962 SC 495; Ahmad · Lahore High Court

This case is about a man named Sardar Muhammad Naseem, accused of corruption-related offences involving fraudulent stamp paper refund vouchers during his time at a District Commissioner's office. He was being tried under the National Accountability Ordinance and had been in custody since January 2001, meaning the trial had dragged on for about five years, with 222 adjournments, 141 of which were requested by the prosecution itself.

He asked the Lahore High Court for bail, arguing that the prolonged delay violated the law's own requirement that NAB trials be completed within 30 days, and that such extreme delay was unfair and contrary to justice.

The High Court agreed that justice delayed is justice denied. It noted that while serious crimes may require longer trials, this should not become an endless process, and that both the courts and NAB prosecutors are obligated to ensure speedy, efficient, and honest trials. The court questioned whether NAB prosecutors were adequately following the law's timeline requirements and said authorities needed to take corrective measures, or public confidence in anti-corruption efforts would suffer.

Since the trial showed no sign of ending soon and the defence had not yet even presented its witnesses, the court granted the petitioner interim bail, requiring a bail bond of one million rupees with a surety, regular court appearances, and surrender of his passport.

This case highlights the right to a timely trial and accountability for excessive delays in NAB cases.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case is about whether an accused person facing criminal trial can get permanent exemption from appearing in court after leaving Pakistan for a job abroad, without prior court permission.

Tasawar Rasheed was facing trial in two criminal cases before a magistrate in Chakwal. While the cases were pending, he left for employment in Dubai without obtaining the court's permission, and only then applied for exemption from personal appearance under Section 540-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The trial court rejected his applications because he had gone abroad without permission, and the Additional Sessions Judge upheld this decision on revision. He then challenged these orders before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court dismissed his petitions. It held that an accused cannot simply file an application for exemption and treat it as automatically granted; he must wait for the court to actually approve it before leaving. Courts should not mechanically grant such exemptions, but must consider whether they would still be able to enforce the accused's personal attendance later if needed. The judgment emphasized that an accused released on bail cannot be allowed to act unilaterally in ways that make it impossible for courts to control his movements.

This case matters because it clarifies that the privilege of bail and exemption from appearance comes with responsibility, and courts must protect their authority to ensure accused persons remain accountable during trial, preserving public confidence in the justice system.

PLD 1963 S.C. 203) it · Balochistan High Court

This case was a petition filed before the Balochistan High Court by Saifuddin against the Quetta Chamber of Commerce and others, challenging the way the Chamber's Executive Committee had been constituted and its office-bearers elected for the 1981-82 term. The petitioner had also filed a representation under the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961, which the government-appointed Director (respondent No. 3) failed to decide. He asked the court to declare the election and the Director's inaction unlawful, and to order fresh, lawful constitution of the committee.

The court dismissed the petition. It held that the petitioner was not an "aggrieved person" entitled to seek such relief, since he had never objected to the election process, the candidates, or the composition of the electoral college at the time the election was actually held. The court also noted that disputed questions of fact are not suitable for resolution under constitutional writ jurisdiction, that an alternative remedy existed (an Arbitration Tribunal, which other members had already approached), and that the petitioner had failed to include all the affected office-bearers and committee members as parties, meaning any adverse ruling would unfairly bind people who had no chance to be heard.

The judgment is significant because it reinforces key limits on writ jurisdiction: courts will not grant relief like quo warranto or mandamus merely on request, disputed facts must go through proper tribunals with evidence, and all necessary parties must be included before a decision can be made against them.

PLJ 2013 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a civil dispute where the losing party in a lower court appeal tried to introduce additional evidence, including witnesses and documents like a nikah nama (marriage certificate) and certified challan forms, after the trial had concluded. The appellate court had dismissed their applications, partly on the grounds that the material was submitted too late and partly without even deciding on one of the applications. The petitioners challenged this dismissal before the High Court.

The High Court examined two main issues: an application under Order XIV, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, asking for additional legal issues to be framed to help resolve the dispute, and an application under Order XLI, Rule 27, seeking permission to submit additional evidence at the appellate stage.

The Court upheld the dismissal of the request for framing additional issues, finding no jurisdictional error there. However, it ruled that the appellate court was wrong to reject the request to produce additional documents merely because of delay. The judgment clarified that late filing alone, without evidence of bad faith, is not enough reason to refuse important evidence, especially when it could help the court reach a fair decision. It also noted that one application about producing witnesses had never actually been decided and sent that back for proper consideration.

This ruling matters because it reinforces that courts should prioritize deciding cases on their true merits rather than rejecting evidence on technical or procedural grounds alone.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case was decided by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, concerning a property dispute that hinged on which Islamic school of law applied to the inheritance of a deceased man's estate. Ahmad Ali died about six months after marrying Mst. Hajran Bibi, leaving no children. His land was recorded in his widow's name as a limited owner. After she later remarried and eventually died, her relatives claimed her inherited share passed to them. However, Ahmad Ali's own relatives (the respondents) argued that he was a Shia Muslim and that, under Shia law, a childless widow cannot inherit any share in her husband's immovable property, only a share in movable property and household items. They sought to have the mutations (land record entries) favoring the widow and her heirs declared void, so the land would revert to Ahmad Ali's rightful heirs.

The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the appellate court reversed that decision and ruled in favor of Ahmad Ali's relatives. The High Court, after reviewing Shia legal scholarship on inheritance, upheld the appellate court's decision, confirming that since Ahmad Ali was Shia and died without children, his widow had no legal right to inherit his land. The revision petition was dismissed.

This case matters because it clarifies how religious personal law—specifically Shia inheritance rules—can override customary land practices in determining property rights after death, especially regarding childless widows.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute between a wife, Mehwish Gillani, and her husband over dower (Haq Mehr) and maintenance. She had filed a family court suit in Multan for recovery of these amounts. Her husband separately filed a civil suit in Islamabad challenging certain entries in their Nikah Nama (marriage contract), though he did not deny the marriage itself. When that civil suit was dismissed and then appealed, the Family Court judge in Multan used the pending appeal as a reason to stay the wife's dower claim, even though the Lahore High Court had earlier directed him to decide the whole case within two months without being distracted by side issues.

The Lahore High Court found this improper. It held that family court cases, especially those involving maintenance and dower, must be decided quickly and cannot be stalled simply because a related civil suit is ongoing elsewhere, since civil litigation can drag on for years while family law matters are meant to be resolved within six months under the Family Courts Act. The Court also emphasized that family court judges are subject to its supervisory authority and cannot bypass clear directions by citing orders from another High Court.

This ruling matters because it reinforces that family courts cannot indefinitely delay cases, particularly those protecting women's rights to dower and maintenance, by letting unrelated civil disputes dictate their pace.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over an old agreement to sell a house in Multan, which several heirs (the petitioners) were trying to enforce through a lawsuit for specific performance. One of the plaintiffs, Mst. Shehnaz Nizami, lived abroad in America and tried to authorize lawyers to act on her behalf by signing a Wakalatnama (lawyer's authorization) and a special power of attorney, both of which she signed before a Notary Public in Michigan, USA.

The trial court rejected the plaint because no valid power of attorney was filed for her within the given time, and the appellate court upheld this, also ruling that since all plaintiffs had jointly paid the sale price as one transaction, the case could not proceed if even one plaintiff's participation was legally defective.

The Lahore High Court agreed with the lower courts. It held that simply having a document notarized abroad does not make it valid for court purposes unless the notary or another witness actually confirms the identity of the person signing. Since nothing on the documents showed that the Notary Public had verified that the signer was indeed Mst. Shehnaz Nizami, the documents could not be treated as proper authorization under the law.

This judgment is significant because it clarifies that notarization alone, especially from abroad, is not enough to authorize legal representation in Pakistani courts—proper identification of the signer is essential. The revision petition was dismissed.

PLJ 2013 · Sindh High Court

This case was heard by the National Industrial Relations Commission in Karachi, involving an employee, Shah Faisal Baig Niazi, who worked at Nestle Pakistan. He claimed that although he was officially designated as an officer, he actually performed clerical work and should be treated as a "workman" under labour law. He alleged that the company harassed him because of his efforts for workers' welfare, eventually suspending him verbally and later issuing a show-cause notice accusing him of misappropriating company cash, followed by a disciplinary inquiry. He filed a petition claiming this was an unfair labour practice and sought protection from dismissal.

Nestle responded that the employee was hired in a management role, earned a salary well above worker-level pay, and did not qualify as a "workman." They also pointed out he had a history of misconduct, including a prior confession to inappropriate behavior at work, and had admitted in writing to misappropriating Rs. 103,000, which he later repaid. The company argued this was a legitimate disciplinary matter, not an unfair labour practice.

The Commission agreed with Nestle. It found no actual evidence of unfair labour practice, noted the employee had admitted to misusing company funds, and ruled that issuing a show-cause notice and starting a disciplinary inquiry are normal management actions, not unfair labour practices. The petition was dismissed.

This case matters because it clarifies that legitimate disciplinary action by employers cannot be blocked simply by labeling it an unfair labour practice, especially when there's no real

PLJ 2013 · Sindh High Court

Pharmatec Pakistan, a pharmaceutical manufacturer with offices in Karachi, Multan, Rawalpindi and Peshawar, went to the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) seeking relief against a workers' union, the Pharmatec Workers Welfare Union, which was certified as a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) in Sindh province only.

The company argued that since it operates across multiple provinces, only an industry-wise trade union registered at the federal level should represent its workers, not a provincially registered union. It also accused the union and its officials of harassment, making unreasonable demands, filing repeated complaints to pressure management, and trying to force withdrawal of a show-cause notice issued against one union official accused of making false allegations to police. The company said this amounted to unfair labour practices and sought orders restraining the union from coercive tactics, including strike threats, while a disciplinary inquiry proceeded.

The NIRC member examined the union's charter of demands and found it reflected a negative, confrontational attitude rather than reasonable, practical requests. The Commission held that while any CBA has the right to raise demands, those demands must be reasonable and feasible. It found the balance of convenience favored the company, which would suffer irreparable harm without protection, and concluded the company had established a case of unfair labour practice by the union. This case highlights how labour tribunals weigh employer rights against union demands and scrutinize whether union conduct crosses into coercion.

PLJ 2013 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a bank employee, Rao Mazhar Ali Khan, who worked at Habib Bank Limited and also held a position as president of a workers union. The bank issued him a show-cause notice alleging that he had taken illegal gratification (bribes) in exchange for promising jobs at the bank to two individuals. Investigation showed that two complainants had transferred two million rupees into a bank account belonging to the employee's wife, supposedly in return for being helped into bank jobs. The employee denied wrongdoing, claiming his wife's account was independent of him and that the disciplinary action was actually retaliation for his union activities and participation in a labor referendum, amounting to unfair labor practice. He asked the National Industrial Relations Commission to stop the bank from taking any action against him.

The Commission examined the matter and found that the employee failed to explain why such a large sum of money had been transferred into his wife's account. It held that disciplinary action taken by an employer for suspected misconduct, such as taking bribes, is a normal managerial function and cannot automatically be treated as unfair labor practice just because the employee holds a union position. Since the employee did not establish a strong preliminary case, the Commission refused to grant a stay order protecting him from the bank's disciplinary proceedings.

This decision matters because it clarifies that labor law protections against unfair practices do not shield employees from legitimate disciplinary action, especially when there are credible allegations of financial misconduct like extorting money for jobs.

PLJ 2013 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case was about whether a government employee who holds an Islamabad domicile could apply for a Professor of Pathology post advertised for Punjab domicile holders. The petitioner, Dr. Mobina Ehsan, had worked in Punjab's health department for over 21 years, rising from Woman Medical Officer to Associate Professor, all while holding an Islamabad domicile that had never been questioned before. When she applied for the Professor position, the Punjab Public Service Commission rejected her application because a policy decision excluded Islamabad (a federal territory since 2000) domicile holders from Punjab government posts. She argued this was discriminatory, that the policy shouldn't apply retroactively to employees already in service before 2000, and that the rejection came after she had already been permitted to sit the exam once.

The Lahore High Court examined the relevant civil service rules, which state that the only real disqualification for appointment is lack of Pakistani citizenship, and that candidates must meet prescribed educational qualifications. The court noted that choosing or changing one's domicile is a personal right, and that if the government wants to reserve vacancies for Punjab domicile holders, this does not violate the constitutional rights of residents of the federal territory, since governments are permitted to set such criteria under the law.

This judgment matters because it clarifies that domicile-based reservations in provincial government recruitment are legally permissible and do not automatically amount to unconstitutional discrimination, even against long-serving employees.

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 988 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man accused of issuing a dishonored cheque, an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which carries a maximum punishment of three years imprisonment. He had already been denied bail twice before, once withdrawn and once dismissed on merits, with the court at that time directing the trial court to finish the case within one month since most of the evidence had already been recorded.

More than four months passed and the trial still was not concluded. Instead of wrapping up, the prosecution filed a late application asking to call a bank officer as a new witness, a move the court saw as an attempt to drag out the proceedings rather than genuinely advance the case. Meanwhile, the petitioner, a retired army colonel, had already spent about 24 months in jail, despite the maximum possible sentence being only three years. The dispute itself stemmed from a joint business arrangement and payment disagreement between the parties.

The Lahore High Court held that since there was no realistic prospect of the trial concluding soon, and the accused had already served a period approaching the maximum sentence while merely awaiting trial, continuing his detention was unjustified. Emphasizing that personal liberty is a precious right that cannot be curtailed indefinitely, the court granted him post-arrest bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds and a surety. This case highlights how courts can intervene when prolonged pretrial detention becomes disproportionate to the possible punishment.

PLJ 2000 · Peshawar High Court

This case was about a property dispute under pre-emption law, which gives certain people (like neighbors or co-owners) the first right to buy land when it is sold. The buyers (petitioners) had purchased land, and Murtaza Khan, who claimed a pre-emption right, sued for possession of that land. To succeed in a pre-emption case, the claimant must follow specific legal steps: immediately declaring intention to exercise the right upon learning of the sale (talb-i-muwathibat), followed by formally confirming that intention through a witnessed notice (talb-i-ishhad).

The trial court dismissed the suit, ruling that the plaintiff had not properly fulfilled these requirements. However, the appellate court reversed this decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiff, allowing him to take possession of the land by paying the original sale price. The buyers then challenged this reversal before the Peshawar High Court.

The buyers argued that the plaint did not specify the exact date, time, and place when the plaintiff learned of the sale, and that this omission should have resulted in dismissal. The High Court rejected this argument, relying on Supreme Court precedents which clarified that pleadings only need to state material facts, not detailed evidence like witness names or exact timings. Since the plaintiff had substantially complied with the legal requirements for the two-step demand process, the court upheld the appellate court's decision favoring the pre-emptor.

This case clarifies what level of detail is legally required in pre-emption suits, making it harder for technical objections alone to defeat

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case dealt with what happens when a person stands surety (guarantor) for an accused person's bail, and the accused then absconds instead of showing up for trial.

Atta Muhammad had signed a bail bond worth Rs. 200,000 to guarantee that an accused man named Alamgir, facing a murder charge, would appear for his trial. Alamgir instead fled and was declared a proclaimed offender. The trial court forfeited the full bail bond amount and ordered recovery proceedings against Atta Muhammad, including issuing a non-bailable arrest warrant against him and arranging for his property to be auctioned to recover the money.

Atta Muhammad challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing he was elderly, unwell, and had only stood surety out of kindness, with no financial motive, and had tried his best to locate the absconding accused.

The High Court agreed that demanding the full Rs. 200,000 was too harsh given that the surety had acted out of benevolence rather than self-interest. It partially accepted his petition and reduced the penalty from Rs. 200,000 to Rs. 30,000, to be paid within two weeks, failing which it could be recovered through coercive measures.

This case matters because it shows courts can exercise discretion and compassion when penalizing sureties, rather than mechanically enforcing the full bond amount, especially considering the surety's intentions and personal circumstances.

PLJ 2013 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case from the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court dealt with a challenge to a government notification that reserved MBBS medical college seats for certain categories, including overseas Kashmiris and children of doctors. A group of petitioners argued that this reservation created a privileged class, discriminated against ordinary citizens, and violated constitutional guarantees of equality before the law under the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974.

The respondents countered that the petitioners themselves had applied for and secured seats under the general district-wise quota, and had not shown that they personally suffered any loss or deprivation of rights due to the reserved quotas for doctors' children and overseas Kashmiris. They argued the petition was essentially academic and that courts do not entertain such petitions unless the person challenging a law is genuinely affected by it.

The court agreed with the respondents. It held that to invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction, a petitioner must be an "aggrieved person" with a real, tangible interest at stake. Since the petitioners had not shown how they were personally harmed, and had not even sought to amend their petition to include those who might be affected, the court could not grant relief without hearing the students who had actually been admitted under the challenged notification.

The petition was therefore dismissed, though the court directed the government to review the notification and give it proper legal backing. The case reinforces the important legal principle that courts generally only intervene when a petitioner has a direct stake in the outcome.

PLJ 2004 SC 566 · Lahore High Court

This case involved Naseer Ahmad, who was convicted under Pakistan's narcotics control law for possessing and trafficking a large quantity of heroin (28 kg) and sentenced to death by a Special Judge of the Anti-Narcotics Force. His appeal to the Lahore High Court was dismissed, and he then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court.

The case began when a Filipino woman was arrested at Islamabad Airport with heroin, which she said she bought from the petitioner. This led authorities to other gang members, one of whom directed officials to raid the petitioner's house, where the heroin was recovered hidden inside steel rollers packed in cartons.

The petitioner argued that the narcotics were never produced in court, that his confession wasn't properly recorded, and that the law requiring independent witnesses during searches was violated. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, noting the drugs had been lawfully destroyed by court order after trial, the confession met legal requirements, and police witnesses could be relied upon just like any other witnesses since their testimony withstood cross-examination.

The Court held that the combined evidence—eyewitness accounts, circumstantial evidence, and the confession—proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the petitioner was the ringleader of the smuggling operation. The petition was dismissed, and the conviction and death sentence were upheld. The judgment reinforces how courts weigh evidence, witness credibility, and procedural technicalities in serious narcotics cases.

PLJ 2008 SC 1001 · Peshawar High Court

This Supreme Court case concerned a judge who, while serving as Additional District Judge in Upper Dir, gave away prohibited-bore weapons that had been confiscated as case property during trials. Instead of following proper legal procedures for disposing of such arms, he handed them out free of cost to various private individuals, including his own brother, and even kept one weapon for himself. He also released two confiscated vehicles through "superdari" (custody orders), one to a lawyer and one to himself. After police flagged the irregular releases, the High Court investigated, found his explanations unsatisfactory, and ultimately removed him from judicial service. A service tribunal upheld this removal, leading to this appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the relevant arms rules and found that while there were procedures for disposing of confiscated weapons and even giving limited cash rewards to informants or those assisting in arrests, there was no legal provision allowing a judge to simply award seized weapons to private persons of his choosing. His actions were therefore illegal and beyond his authority.

However, considering his long service record and the hardship already suffered from being out of work for years, the Court showed leniency on the punishment itself. It converted his removal from service into compulsory retirement instead, while still affirming that his conduct was indeed unlawful and warranted serious disciplinary action.

PLJ 2012 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a custody dispute between divorced parents over their young daughter. The father had remarried and sought custody rights, while the mother, a doctor, had retained physical custody of the child since birth. Lower courts had ruled that the mother keep custody, but restricted her from taking the child outside the court's jurisdiction without permission, while granting the father generous visitation rights including alternate weekends, Eid holidays, and vacation time.

The mother then got a job offer in Dubai and petitioned the Sindh High Court to allow her to take her daughter abroad. She offered to return to Pakistan monthly so the father could maintain contact, and offered to provide guarantees ensuring compliance.

The High Court sided with the mother. It reasoned that just as a father cannot be expected to give up his career to retain custody, a mother should not be forced to sacrifice her professional opportunities either. Since the father had not challenged the mother's right to custody itself, and the courts below had already found her a fit custodian, the High Court held she could take the child to Dubai. To protect the father's visitation rights, the court required the mother to furnish a bond of one million rupees with a surety, which would act as a financial deterrent against her denying the father access to the child.

This case is significant because it establishes that working mothers have the right to custody of their children even while pursuing careers abroad, balancing a parent's professional freedom with safeguards protecting the other parent's visitation rights.

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court

This case arose from a house-arson incident in Mandi Bahauddin district in 2004, where the complainant, Ghulam Qadir, alleged that several accused persons had set fire to the roof and door of his room. After police investigation, the accused were charged under arson and rioting provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code. During trial, all the accused confessed their guilt. The trial magistrate, instead of sentencing them, released them on probation for one year under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960, requiring them to furnish surety bonds and report to a probation officer.

The complainant challenged this decision, first through a revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge, and then through a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court. His revision was dismissed because it was filed more than a year late, after the accused had already completed their probation period, and after they had endured seven years of trial.

The High Court upheld both lower court orders. It held that the offence in question did not fall under the exceptions listed in Section 5(1)(a) of the Probation Ordinance, meaning the trial court was legally authorized to grant probation instead of imprisonment. Finding no legal flaw in the proceedings, and noting the long delay and hardship already suffered by the accused, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling there was no valid ground for it to intervene.

PLJ 2008 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a woman, Mst. Samina Nawaz, who was caught in a dispute between two conflicting marriages. She claimed she had married a man named Shehzad Afzal of her own free will, but her mother insisted she was validly married to another man, Muhammad Azam, and accused Shehzad Afzal of abducting her. While the matter was investigated, the court had ordered her placed in a women's shelter (darul-aman) pending verification of the two marriage documents, including handwriting analysis of her signatures. She later filed a case asking to be released from the shelter.

The Lahore High Court held that since the police inquiry and handwriting verification process had been completed, there was no further justification for keeping her confined. As an adult Muslim woman capable of making her own decisions, she could not be forced to stay in the shelter, nor compelled to live with either her mother or her alleged second husband against her wishes. The court ruled that only the Family Court, where she had filed a suit to annul the disputed marriage, could ultimately decide which nikah was genuine, following established Supreme Court precedent that such determinations belong to Family Courts.

The judgment matters because it reinforces that adult women have a constitutional right to personal liberty and cannot be detained indefinitely by courts or relatives simply because of unresolved marital disputes, while still ensuring the underlying legal question gets resolved through proper judicial process.

PLD 1992 SC 646)], but the same was upheld. · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case, popularly known as the Asghar Khan Case, arose from a 1996 petition by Air Marshal (Retd.) Muhammad Asghar Khan alleging that in 1990, senior military and intelligence officials, including then-Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg and ISI chief Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani, distributed large sums of money to politicians and political parties to influence the general elections and undermine a particular government. The money was allegedly channeled through Habib Bank/Mehran Bank via businessman Yunus Habib, with lists of recipients later surfacing through affidavits, letters, and statements from those involved, including a disclosure made on the floor of the National Assembly.

The Supreme Court examined extensive evidence, including affidavits, bank records, and testimonies, and found that an "Election Cell" had indeed been set up in the President's Secretariat and that funds were distributed to specific politicians and groups, with key respondents effectively admitting their roles despite some contradictions and denials. The Court held that neither the President nor army/intelligence officials had any constitutional authority to interfere in politics or manipulate elections, and that officers are not obligated to follow illegal orders.

This judgment matters because it formally established, through the country's highest court, that the military and intelligence establishment had unlawfully manipulated a national election by funding politicians, reinforcing the principle that the armed forces and presidency must remain politically neutral under Pakistan's Constitution.

PLJ 2010 Karachi 132 · Sindh High Court

This case is about a dispute between brothers over a plot of land in Karachi. The plaintiff claimed he had paid for a plot allotted in his brother's name (a "benami" arrangement, where one person holds property in trust for another), and that his brother had acknowledged this through a gift declaration and other documents. While the plaintiff was posted abroad for his job, his brother allegedly acted dishonestly, got the plot transferred to a third party using forged documents, and the property changed hands multiple times through the city development authority.

The plaintiff sued for declaration of ownership and cancellation of the wrongful transfer. A single judge of the Sindh High Court dismissed the suit, ruling it was filed too late under Article 91 of the Limitation Act, which allows only three years to challenge a document.

On appeal, a two-judge bench disagreed. They held that Article 91 didn't apply here since the plaintiff wasn't simply challenging a document but asserting his ownership against someone holding property in trust (a benamidar). The correct limitation period was six years under Article 120, running from when the plaintiff discovered his brother's hostile claim to ownership. Calculating from the relevant dates, the suit was filed within time.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal was overturned, and the plot was ordered to be registered in the plaintiff's name. The case clarifies that disputes between real owners and benamidars get a longer six-year limitation period, not the shorter three-year period for cancelling documents.

PLJ 2009 Peshawar 211 · Peshawar High Court

This case was about a dispute over ownership of a shop in Dera Ismail Khan. Haji Nawab Khan claimed that although the shop was registered in the name of Shaizullah Khan following a 1974 court decree, it was actually a "benami" transaction, meaning the real owner was Nawab Khan himself, with Shaizullah Khan holding title only on paper. Nawab Khan said he had been in continuous possession, ran his business there, paid taxes and utility bills in his name, and spent heavily rebuilding the shop. When Shaizullah Khan later refused to transfer formal ownership, Nawab Khan sued for a declaration that he was the true owner. Both the trial court and the appellate court had dismissed his suit, finding against him.

The Peshawar High Court examined the evidence produced by both sides and found that the lower courts had failed to properly consider important evidence presented by Nawab Khan, including testimony about long possession, construction of the building, tax records, and mediation proceedings between the parties. The court reaffirmed the legal principle that while the person alleging a benami transaction must initially prove it, the burden can shift to the other side once key elements are established. Since this evidence had not been properly weighed, the onus of proof was wrongly placed. The High Court therefore remanded the case for fresh consideration. This decision matters because it clarifies how courts must handle burden of proof in benami property disputes, ensuring all relevant evidence is properly evaluated before deciding ownership claims.

· Islamabad High Court

This case is about a government-owned house in Islamabad that became the subject of a dispute between two claimants. The petitioner had obtained an allotment order for the house and got a court direction to take possession. Later, it emerged that the house had earlier been allotted to a government servant who retired, and his son had applied for the house to be allotted to him under rules that allow eligible family members, such as a spouse or children, living with a retiring government employee to get that same accommodation allotted in their name. The Ministry of Housing and Works later issued a fresh allotment order in favour of the son, cancelling earlier orders including the one favouring the petitioner. The High Court then recalled its earlier judgment and restored the case for fresh hearing. The petitioner challenged this before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined how the Estate Office allotted government houses generally and found serious problems: allotments were often made on the basis of favoritism or ministerial discretion rather than following the official waiting list system meant to ensure fairness. The Court held that an employee's accrued right under the General Waiting List cannot be arbitrarily overridden by the government, and any relaxation of rules must have recorded, justifiable reasons.

This case matters because it reinforces transparency and rule of law in the allotment of government housing, protecting eligible family members' rights and curbing discretionary, favoritism-based decisions by officials.

PLJ 2009 FSC 237 · Federal Shariat Court

This case involved a private complaint filed by a father, Nazar Hussain, alleging that his minor daughter Tasleem Mai was abducted by Safdar Hussain and Bilal with the intent of committing Zina (unlawful sexual intercourse) under Pakistan's Hudood laws. After police investigation, one accused, Bilal, was found not involved, while the other, Safdar Hussain, was tried for the offence. The trial court ultimately acquitted both accused, noting that the alleged victim herself retracted her earlier statement during re-examination, saying it had been made under coercion and that no Zina had occurred. The court also noted a five-month delay in registering the FIR and found the medical evidence inconclusive, with other inconsistencies undermining the prosecution's case.

The complainant then sought special leave to appeal the acquittal before the Federal Shariat Court. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that an appeal against acquittal can only succeed if there is clear evidence of misreading or disregard of material evidence leading to a miscarriage of justice. Since the complainant's petition failed to challenge key findings of the trial court-particularly the victim's retracted statement-and showed no such error, the acquittal was upheld.

The case illustrates how delays in registering an FIR, inconsistent evidence, and retraction of statements by a complainant can weaken a prosecution's case, and reaffirms the principle that appellate courts are cautious about overturning acquittals without strong justification.

PLJ 2004 Lahore 1538 [Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi] · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a dispute over pre-emption, a legal right allowing certain people (like co-sharers in land) to buy property that has been sold to someone else, by stepping into the buyer's shoes. Waris Khan filed a suit claiming he had a superior right to pre-empt the purchase of land by Muhammad Iqbal, arguing the actual sale price was lower than recorded and that he would suffer loss if denied the land. Waris Khan died during the proceedings, and his legal heirs continued the case.

To win a pre-emption suit, a plaintiff generally needed to prove he made the required legal demands (talbs) and, under the law as it stood at the time, also prove he would suffer genuine loss or need (zarar and zaroorat) without the land. The trial court and first appellate court both ruled that while the demands were technically made, there was no evidence proving loss or need, so the suit was dismissed.

The High Court agreed. It found that witnesses proved the demands were properly made, but no one testified about loss or need, including the deceased's own son, who took the witness stand but stayed silent on this point. The petitioners argued that statements in the original plaint and notice should count as evidence under a rule allowing dead persons' statements made in the ordinary course of business. The court rejected this, holding that filing a lawsuit or legal notice is not a business activity under that law, and pleadings alone are not evidence. The revision petition was dismissed.

PLJ 2011 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 80 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case concerned a man named Muhammad Ibrar who had been in jail for about eight years awaiting trial over a land dispute that turned violent in 2002, resulting in three deaths and several injuries. Ibrar was accused of attacking one injured person, Ghulam Rasool, as part of a group assault, though he was not accused of killing anyone directly. He had repeatedly sought bail over the years, including before the trial court, the Shariat Court, and the Supreme Court, but was refused each time.

He filed this fresh bail application after more time passed and trial delays continued, arguing that a co-accused, Muhammad Javaid, who faced more serious allegations including directly killing someone, had already been granted bail by the Supreme Court. Ibrar argued that if a more seriously implicated co-accused got bail, he deserved the same treatment, especially given the lengthy delay in his trial and incomplete recording of evidence.

The Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court accepted the principle that long, unexplained delays in trial can justify bail, and importantly, that when several accused face similar allegations and evidence, they should be treated consistently - so if one is released on bail, others in a similar position should not be denied the same relief.

This judgment matters because it reinforces two important bail principles in Pakistani law: that indefinite pretrial detention without trial completion is unjust, and that courts must apply consistent standards when multiple accused persons share similar circumstances.

PLJ 2010 Cr.C. (Lahore) 860 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man accused of contracting a second marriage with a woman while her earlier marriage was allegedly still valid. He was initially charged under sections of the Pakistan Penal Code dealing with cheating, forgery, and impersonation (419, 420, 468, 471), based on an FIR registered against him. A magistrate had granted him post-arrest bail, but an Additional Sessions Judge later recalled that bail, partly citing concerns about a date discrepancy in the bail order.

The petitioner challenged this cancellation before the Lahore High Court. His lawyer argued that the marriage was properly recorded, not secret, that the woman's earlier marriage had already been dissolved by the time of the FIR, and that co-accused in the same case had already been granted bail, so he deserved the same treatment under the "rule of consistency." The state's own prosecutor agreed that the serious offenses alleged did not actually apply to the facts, and at most a lesser offense (bigamy-related, under section 495) was relevant.

The High Court found that the Additional Sessions Judge had acted beyond his authority in cancelling the bail, especially over a mere clerical date error that had already been corrected. It also held that since co-accused had been granted bail, consistency required the same relief for this petitioner. The court set aside the cancellation order and confirmed the petitioner's pre-arrest bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds. The case highlights that courts must apply the rule of consistency even in pre-arrest bail matters, and bail should not be cancelled

PLJ 2011 SC 262 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This Supreme Court case arose from a family dispute in which a woman had filed a suit seeking maintenance for her daughter and recovery of dowry articles worth over Rs. 3,17,000 from her husband. The husband did not appear in person before the Family Court but instead filed his written statement through his brother, acting as his special attorney. The Additional District Judge ruled against the husband, holding that since he had not personally filed the written statement, his defense could not be considered and the suit should be treated as uncontested. The Lahore High Court upheld this view.

The Supreme Court disagreed with this strict approach. It noted that there is no absolute legal requirement that a party must personally appear or file documents in court; an attorney can validly act on behalf of a principal in civil proceedings unless the law specifically requires otherwise. The Court pointed out this was also inconsistent with an earlier High Court ruling on the same issue.

While disposing of the appeal, the Supreme Court directed that the lower courts' reasoning - that a case must fail simply because the written statement was filed by an attorney rather than the party personally - should not be treated as a precedent in future cases. The parties also reached a settlement, with the husband's brother agreeing to pay the dowry amount in installments. This ruling clarifies that litigants are not automatically penalized for using authorized representatives in court filings.

PLJ 2010 SC 891 · Peshawar High Court

This case arose from a marriage dispute. A wife filed suits in the Family Court seeking possession of half a house, dowry articles, gold ornaments, and maintenance from her husband. When the husband failed to appear despite being served notice (his lawyer initially appeared then stopped attending), the Family Court passed ex-parte decrees against him based on the wife's evidence. The husband later sought to have these decrees set aside, claiming he was never properly served, but his applications were dismissed as both time-barred and lacking merit. His subsequent appeals and constitutional petitions to the High Court were also dismissed, leading him to approach the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent decisions of all lower courts. It clarified several important legal points: Family Courts can regulate their own procedures flexibly, are not strictly bound by the Civil Procedure Code but may apply its principles, and a Family Court has jurisdiction wherever the wife resides. Crucially, the Court held that the Nikahnama (marriage contract) is a public document carrying a legal presumption of authenticity, since it is verified by the Nikah Registrar, who qualifies as a public officer. Without evidence rebutting this presumption, the document stands as valid proof.

The judgment matters because it reinforces the evidentiary weight of Nikahnamas in family disputes and confirms that constitutional petitions cannot be used to re-examine factual findings already settled by lower courts.

PLJ 1996( Karachi) 156 · Sindh High Court

This case concerns a dispute between a landlord, Mrs. Tahira Qureshi, and her tenant, Bashir Ahmad Munir, who was running a motor workshop in rented shops in Karachi. The landlord sought his eviction, mainly on the ground that she genuinely needed the premises for her own use, to expand a boutique business and set up a display centre and tailoring workspace.

The tenant resisted, raising several arguments. He claimed the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction because the landlord had wrongly described him as a "caretaker/trespasser" in her legal notice, implying there was no real landlord-tenant relationship. He also argued her claimed need was not genuine, questioning her occupation and business experience, and said the area was unsuitable for a boutique since it was surrounded by motor workshops.

The Sindh High Court rejected all these objections. It found that the tenant himself had admitted being a tenant in his reply notice, written statement, and cross-examination, so the Rent Controller did have jurisdiction. It held minor inconsistencies in the landlord's evidence about her occupation did not undermine her case, and that everyone is free to pursue a business of their choosing regardless of prior experience. The court also noted evidence that the area actually had many tailoring shops and boutiques, contradicting the tenant's claims.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the eviction order, reaffirming that genuine personal need of a landlord, once reasonably established, justifies eviction under rent laws.

PLJ 2011 Lahore 790 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case is about a wife's claims for maintenance and dower from her husband after their marriage broke down. She had filed a suit asking for monthly maintenance, recovery of her unpaid dower (three tola gold, valued at Rs. 30,000 in the marriage contract), and dowry articles. The Family Court had dismissed her maintenance claim but granted her the dower. The District Judge upheld this on appeal. She then challenged these decisions in the High Court.

The courts below had found she could not prove her husband deserted her, so she was denied maintenance. However, the High Court pointed out that since her dower had not been paid, and filing her lawsuit itself counted as a formal demand for that unpaid dower, Islamic law entitles a wife to refuse to live with her husband and still receive maintenance until the dower is actually paid. Relying on this principle and past case law, the judge ruled she was entitled to maintenance of Rs. 1,000 per month from the date she filed her suit until her dower was paid, especially since the husband never disclosed his income and was working in Saudi Arabia.

The court also ruled that if dower is paid in cash instead of gold, its value should be calculated based on gold prices at the time the suit was filed, not at the time of the marriage. This judgment matters because it clarifies that unpaid dower gives a wife the right to maintenance, protecting women's financial rights during marital disputes.

PLJ 2009 Lahore 870 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a wife and her two children who sued her husband for unpaid maintenance, dower (haq mehar), and dowry articles. The family court awarded maintenance and partial dowry articles but refused the dower claim, reasoning it was deferred dower, payable only when the marriage ended through death or divorce. On appeal, the Additional District Judge upheld the maintenance and dowry awards but granted the wife Rs. 50,000 as dower, though it left unresolved her claim to ten bighas of agricultural land that was also part of the dower.

The wife then challenged both decisions before the Lahore High Court, seeking a higher amount. The High Court upheld the maintenance and dowry article awards as fair and well-reasoned. On the dower issue, it agreed with the wife's lawyer that under Section 6(5)(a) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, a husband who remarries without permission from the Arbitration Council becomes immediately liable to pay the entire dower, whether prompt or deferred, to his existing wife. Since the husband had remarried without such permission, he owed the full dower immediately, not just upon divorce or death. The Rs. 50,000 award was confirmed, but since the lower appellate court hadn't ruled on the land portion of the dower, the case was sent back to that court to decide that specific issue. This case clarifies that unauthorized second marriages trigger immediate full dower payment obligations.

PLJ 2009 Lahore 780 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involves a husband challenging a family court decision that ordered him to return dowry articles worth Rs. 2,00,000 to his former wife.

The wife had filed a suit after her marriage broke down within a month, alleging mistreatment and false adultery accusations. She sought dissolution of marriage, maintenance, and recovery of dowry items she brought to the marriage. The Family Court ruled in her favor on the dowry claim, and this was upheld on appeal.

The husband then approached the Lahore High Court, arguing that the lower courts had made errors, including failing to properly consider that the suit's stated value was lower than the amount awarded, and that some evidence was allegedly forged.

The High Court rejected these arguments. It examined the evidence and found no errors or jurisdictional problems in the lower courts' decisions. Importantly, the court clarified a legal point: under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, suits involving dowry articles are exempt from court fees that would normally apply under the Court Fees Act. This is because "dowry" cases fall within a special category of matters family courts handle, and the law specifically exempts such suits from court fee requirements, even when a monetary amount is claimed as an alternative to returning physical items.

The petition was dismissed, and the husband was ordered to pay Rs. 5,000 in costs to his former wife. This ruling reinforces that dowry recovery suits enjoy special fee exemptions, making it easier and less costly for women to reclaim dowry articles through family courts.

PLJ 2012 SC (AJ&K) 21 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case from the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Supreme Court dealt with a land dispute over shamilat-deh (village common) land in Kotli district. The plaintiffs, who owned shares in the village land, sued for declaration and possession, claiming certain defendants were illegally occupying and constructing a house on land identified as theirs. They sought a status quo order to stop construction while the case proceeded.

The trial court initially froze construction but then lifted that order after learning the defendants had become co-sharers in the shamilat-deh land themselves, having obtained a gift-deed from other co-owners during the lawsuit. The District Judge upheld this, but the High Court later reinstated the status quo order, reasoning that every member of the village's proprietary body has a stake in every part of the shamilat-deh land.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court and ruled in favor of the appellants (the house-builders). It held that once someone becomes a co-sharer in shamilat-deh land, they cannot be dispossessed or barred from using their share simply through a civil suit for possession; this can only happen through a formal partition process. The court also found that the balance of convenience favored the appellants, especially since they had already invested heavily in construction and offered to demolish the house at their own cost if they ultimately lost the case.

This ruling matters because it protects co-owners of shared village land from being arbitrarily evicted without proper legal partition proceedings, reinforcing due process in property disputes involving common land.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 335 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court involved a long-running land pre-emption dispute, originally filed in 1975, where the plaintiffs claimed a superior right to buy land that had been sold to others. The case had already been through one remand after an earlier appeal, and the trial court eventually decreed in favor of the plaintiffs partly based on a disputed "compromise statement" allegedly made by one defendant, which another defendant had refused to thumb-mark, making it legally doubtful. The first appellate court partly overturned this, ruling against two of the defendants but upholding the decree against the one who had made the disputed statement.

The High Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their superior right of pre-emption at the three legally required stages (time of sale, filing of suit, and decree), since neither the plaintiffs nor their witnesses gave proper affirmative evidence. It also ruled that the lower courts were wrong to rely on the disputed compromise statement, since it was never properly proved and was contested during the proceedings.

Importantly, the court held that since the petitioners had a statutory right of second appeal available to them (based on the value of the suit at the time of filing), they could not instead file a civil revision. A civil revision is only permitted when no right of appeal exists. Because of this, the civil revision was dismissed as not competent, reinforcing a key procedural principle in civil litigation.

PLJ 2011 Cr.C. (Lahore) 217 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a man named Nausher Ali, who was accused, along with two co-accused, of fatally assaulting Murid Hussain. The FIR alleged he fired a gunshot that hit the deceased in the buttocks. He had earlier been denied bail by a lower court and approached the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) seeking bail after arrest.

The key issue was that his two co-accused, who faced similar allegations, had already been granted bail by the same High Court in earlier separate orders. One of those co-accused, Muhammad Ali, was accused of causing an identical type of injury to the same part of the deceased's body. The only real difference between his case and the petitioner's was that a weapon was recovered from the petitioner, while nothing was recovered from the co-accused who got bail. The court also noted that the FIR was lodged 11 days after the incident, and the victim died 60 days later from gangrene, raising questions about the directness of the cause of death.

Given these similarities and unresolved questions, the court held that the case required "further inquiry," a standard under the law that allows bail when guilt isn't clearly established. Applying the principle of consistency - that similarly placed co-accused should be treated alike - the court granted bail to the petitioner too, subject to bail bonds and sureties. This case illustrates how courts maintain fairness by treating similarly situated accused persons consistently in bail matters.

PLJ 2011 SC 40 · Lahore High Court

This case is about whether bail should have been granted to a murder accused, and what weight courts should give to a police investigation finding someone innocent and to the defense of alibi.

The accused, Shoukar Ilahi, was named in an FIR for shooting a man dead during a dispute over sand-lifting from land. He initially got pre-arrest bail but absconded when proceedings continued, and his bail was later dismissed. After a co-accused was granted bail by the High Court on the ground that police investigation had cleared him, the petitioner also surrendered, claimed police had similarly declared him innocent based on an alibi defense (supported by around 60 affidavits), and got bail from the trial court by following that precedent. The complainant challenged this, and the High Court cancelled the bail. The accused then approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding cancellation of bail. It held that a police finding of innocence during investigation is not binding on courts and cannot by itself justify bail. It also found the alibi defense suspicious since it was never raised when the accused first sought pre-arrest bail, and ruled that such a defense, resting on numerous witnesses, needs proper trial testing through cross-examination rather than being decided at the bail stage.

This case clarifies that bail decisions must be based on independent judicial assessment of evidence, not merely on police opinions, and that alibi claims require full trial scrutiny.

PLJ 2024 Cr.C. 553 · Lahore High Court

This case involved five men—Asif alias Asad, Irshad, Muhammad Riaz, Shaukat Ali, and Jamshaid Ahmad—who were convicted by a trial court in Gujranwala for rioting while armed with deadly weapons, a crime under Section 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The case arose from a 2011 incident in which a group allegedly waylaid two brothers over a prior quarrel, resulting in one brother being shot dead by a co-accused who later became a proclaimed offender (fled from justice). The appellants were accused of being part of the armed group but had not fired the fatal shot or caused any injuries themselves.

The Lahore High Court overturned their convictions. It noted that several other co-accused, facing identical allegations, had already been acquitted by the trial court, and under settled legal principles, when the same role is attributed to multiple people and one is acquitted, the others cannot be convicted unless there is strong independent corroboration. The court also found that forensic reports about recovered weapons didn't actually link the appellants to the crime, and that the prosecution failed to prove the "common object" required to establish rioting under the law.

This judgment reinforces an important consistency principle in criminal law: courts must treat similarly situated co-accused equally, and convictions cannot stand on weak or inconsistent evidence when others accused of the same conduct have already been cleared.

PLJ 2018 SC 504 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute between Gerry's International, a Pakistani company, and Aeroflot Russian International Airlines. In 1993 the two signed an agreement making Gerry's a sales agent for Aeroflot tickets in Pakistan. Aeroflot cancelled the agreement in 1994, leading to competing lawsuits. Aeroflot also sued Gerry's for over Rs. 97 million allegedly owed under the agreement. Both disputes were sent to arbitration as per the agreement's terms, and in 1997 an arbitration panel ruled in Aeroflot's favor, awarding it over Rs. 35 million. Courts upheld this award. Aeroflot then sought to have Gerry's company wound up (dissolved) for failing to pay the decreed amount.

The Supreme Court addressed two main issues: whether courts can overturn an arbitration award by re-examining the evidence, and whether Aeroflot's registration status as a foreign company in Pakistan affected the validity of its claims. The Court held that courts cannot act as an appellate body over arbitrators, reassessing evidence or substituting their own judgment for the arbitrator's — they can only intervene for clear errors on the face of the award or misconduct in proceedings. The Court also found that any delay in Aeroflot's company registration was a curable defect under the Companies Ordinance, not one that invalidated its legal claims.

This judgment reinforces the principle that arbitration awards deserve finality and limited judicial interference, which matters for busines

PLJ 2021 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court involved a bail application by a young man named Rehman, who was accused of attempting to rape a minor girl, Tayyaba, under Sections 376 and 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code. He had already been arrested and was seeking post-arrest bail.

The court examined the facts and found several weaknesses in the prosecution's case. First, there was no medico-legal certificate showing any signs of violence on the alleged victim's body, which would typically support an allegation of this nature. Second, the court questioned the credibility of the story itself, noting it seemed unlikely that a teenage boy, unarmed, could escape from inside a room in the presence of the girl's father and mother. Additionally, the defense presented evidence of an ongoing civil property dispute between the grandmother of the victim and the mother of the accused, suggesting a possible motive for a false complaint. This fact was not denied by the complainant's lawyer.

Based on these doubts and gaps in evidence, the judge ruled that the case required further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt rather than being clear-cut. Under the law, such cases qualify for bail. The court granted Rehman bail, requiring him to post bonds worth Rs. 100,000 with a surety. This case illustrates how courts assess the strength of evidence and context, like personal disputes, before deciding on bail in serious criminal allegations.

PLJ 2006 · Sindh High Court

This case from the Sindh High Court dealt with how family courts should handle divorce suits filed by wives seeking "khula" (dissolution of marriage at the wife's initiative). The legal question was about what happens when pre-trial conciliation between husband and wife fails in such cases, particularly regarding the law requiring courts to decide the issue of dower (mahr).

The court clarified that under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, once pre-trial efforts fail, if the issue of dower payment is not disputed between the parties, the court should immediately pass a decree dissolving the marriage. If dower is disputed, the wife must deposit the dower amount in court before such a decree can be passed, with the dispute resolved later through evidence. If she cannot deposit it and dower remains disputed, no divorce decree can be issued until evidence is recorded.

Importantly, the court held that a wife seeking khula only needs to return or remit the dower amount — she is not required to return other gifts given to her by the husband before or after the marriage. This was supported by Islamic scholarly texts and referenced legislation on bridal gifts and dowry articles.

This judgment matters because it protects women from being wrongly pressured to return wedding gifts when seeking divorce, while also setting clear procedural rules for how family courts must process khula cases quickly and fairly.

PLJ 2023 Peshawar 94 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a dispute over the inherited property of the late Alam Khan. Some female heirs filed a civil suit before a Civil Judge in Mardan seeking declaration, partition, and recovery of profits from their share. While that suit was still pending, they also filed a separate complaint before the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ombudsman (Women's Property Rights) under a 2019 law meant to protect women's property rights, asking for their share to be separated. The Ombudsman ordered that the entire disputed property be attached and sealed until the complaint was decided. The other heirs, who were already contesting the civil suit, challenged this sealing order, arguing it was illegal and deprived them of income from the property.

The Peshawar High Court examined whether the Ombudsman had the authority to order such attachment and sealing while a civil court was already handling the same property dispute. The Court held that sealing property is not supported by law, and that attachment must follow proper procedures under the Civil Procedure Code. It ruled that once a matter is already pending before a competent civil court, the Ombudsman should generally step back, since proceeding otherwise could conflict with the constitutional separation of powers between the judiciary and executive bodies like the Ombudsman. The sealing order was set aside, though the earlier attachment order was allowed to continue. The case clarifies the limits of the Ombudsman's powers when courts are already seized of the same dispute.

PLJ 2017 SC 558 · Sindh High Court

This case concerns a dispute between the Sindh Revenue Board and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) over whether the Sindh government could charge sales tax on services CAA provides at airports, such as facilities for airlines and passengers. CAA challenged this tax in the Sindh High Court, which ruled in its favour and struck down the provincial tax as unconstitutional. The Sindh Revenue Board then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal. It held that CAA performs functions that fall under subjects reserved exclusively for the federal government under the Constitution's Federal Legislative List, such as aviation, airports, and related regulatory matters. Although CAA charges fees for facilities like airport services, this does not transform its constitutionally mandated functions into "services" that a province can tax. The Court explained that CAA is structurally and financially controlled by the Federal Government: its governing board is dominated by federal appointees, its accounts are audited by the Auditor-General, its funds come largely from federal grants and loans, and it cannot even be wound up except by federal order. Allowing provinces to tax such federal functions would let them reach into other exclusively federal domains too, like railways, highways, or passports, which the Constitution does not permit. The ruling reinforces the boundary between federal and provincial taxing powers in Pakistan's federal system.

PLJ 2018 Lahore 646 (FB) · Lahore High Court

This case involved City School Private Limited challenging a Punjab government law that limited how much private schools could increase their tuition fees each year, capping the raise at 5 percent (later increased to 8 percent) and applying it in some instances retrospectively. The school argued this restriction violated its constitutional rights to conduct business and trade freely under Article 18 of the Constitution.

A full bench of the Lahore High Court rejected the challenge and upheld the fee-capping law. The court reasoned that the right to run a business or profession under Article 18 is not absolute and can be reasonably regulated by law, especially when such regulation serves public interest. It noted that private schools have always operated under a licensing and registration system, and that fee regulation has historically been part of that framework even before the challenged amendment. The court also emphasized that education is closely tied to the right to life and dignity, and after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, education became an independent fundamental right under Article 25-A. Given this, the state has a legitimate interest in preventing commercialization and profiteering in education by regulating fee increases.

This judgment matters because it affirms the government's authority to regulate private school fees in the public interest, balancing business freedoms against the fundamental right to accessible, affordable education for children.

PLJ 2018 Islamabad 166 · Islamabad High Court

The Islamabad High Court decided a petition challenging how the Chairman of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) had been appointed. The Federal Government had nominated the Mayor of the Islamabad Metropolitan Corporation as an ex-officio member of the CDA Board, and then, through a separate notification, directed him to additionally perform the duties of Chairman on a part-time basis.

The petitioner argued this arrangement was illegal because the CDA Ordinance, 1960 requires the Chairman and members to be formally appointed for fixed terms (five years for the Chairman, four years for members), following specific qualifications and disqualification criteria set out in the law. Simply nominating an elected Mayor as an "ex-officio" member and then assigning him additional charge of the Chairman's role did not meet these legal requirements.

The court agreed, holding that the appointments violated Sections 6 and 8 of the CDA Ordinance. It ruled that positions of Chairman and member of the CDA Board are "public offices," meaning the court could examine their legality through a quo warranto petition. The notifications were declared illegal, ultra vires, and without lawful authority.

This case matters because it reinforces that senior public appointments must strictly follow statutory procedures—fixed tenure, proper qualifications, and absence of conflicts of interest—rather than being filled through informal administrative arrangements, even temporarily. The petition was allowed.

PLD 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case was about a dispute over elections for the managing committee of the Islamabad Farming Cooperative Housing Society. Several groups of petitioners challenged different aspects of the election process in four separate petitions heard together by the Islamabad High Court.

The core dispute was whether the Registrar of Cooperative Societies had the legal authority to scrap the entire election process. One petitioner argued the Registrar had no power to do this on his own initiative, since neither the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 nor the election rules explicitly granted such suo moto authority. Other petitioners raised separate issues, including whether nomination papers were properly scrutinized, whether certain candidates were valid members of the society, and whether the election schedule was issued by the proper authority.

The court found that the election schedule had been issued solely by the Election Commissioner rather than by the full three-member Election Commission as required by the rules, making it unlawful. It also found that the Election Commission failed to prepare and notify a list of eligible voters within the required ten-day period, a serious irregularity. The court held that the Registrar did have authority under Section 64-A of the Act to examine the legality of the election process and was within his rights to scrap it. The court ordered fresh elections to be held within 45 days, with compliance reported back to the court. This case matters because it clarifies regulators' oversight powers over cooperative society elections and reinforces that procedural rules must be strictly followed.

PLJ 2014 Peshawar 142 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a family property dispute in Kohat. A woman, Respondent No. 1, had filed a lawsuit claiming her share of an ancestral house inherited from her father, which was also to be divided among her sister and brother, Sahib Gul. The trial court and the appellate court both ruled in her favor, granting her share of the property.

Years later, Zubaida, who was Sahib Gul's ex-wife (and the mother of the other contesting parties in the case), tried to overturn this final judgment. She filed an application claiming the decision was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, arguing that part of the house had been given to her as dower (a mandatory payment owed to a wife under Islamic marriage law) by her ex-husband Sahib Gul, and that she should have been included as a party since she was a co-owner.

The lower appellate court rejected her application, and she challenged that rejection before the Peshawar High Court. The High Court dismissed her petition too. It found no evidence of fraud, noted that she had waited 22 years after her 1991 divorce to raise this claim, and concluded she was only brought in after the other family members lost their case. Importantly, the court clarified that even if she was owed dower, she could only claim it from her ex-husband Sahib Gul's own share of the property, not from his sister's separate inherited share.

PLJ 2014 Cr.C. (Karachi) 327 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a habeas corpus petition filed by a husband asking the court to recover his wife, Mst. Shaista, whom he claimed was being wrongfully confined by her brothers. He said he had married her with family consent, was later pressured by his own parents to divorce her, signed a divorce paper under duress but never actually pronounced the divorce, and later obtained religious opinions supporting that such a forced divorce was invalid. The wife's brothers disputed this, claiming the husband had validly divorced her and that he was now harassing the family.

The Sindh High Court held that it could not, in a habeas corpus proceeding, determine whether the divorce was legally valid or effective, since that required separate legal proceedings. Instead, the court focused on the woman's own wishes. Since she was an adult, mentally competent woman ("sui juris"), the court ruled she could not be forced to live with her brothers, her husband, or in a shelter home (Darul Aman) against her will. Citing earlier Supreme Court precedents, including the Rinkle Kumari case, the judgment emphasized that a major woman has full legal capacity to decide her own future, and Article 9 of the Constitution guarantees personal liberty, meaning no one can be detained without consent. The court ordered her release to live wherever she chose, with police protection if needed. The case reinforces that courts must respect an adult woman's autonomy over disputes about marriage, custody, or shelter.

PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 730 (DB · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case concerns Muhammad Hussain, who was arrested in July 2015 under narcotics laws after police allegedly recovered 10.5 kilograms of opium from a jeep he was travelling in, with a co-accused allegedly carrying a similar quantity. He was charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, an offence that normally carries strict restrictions on bail.

He had already applied for bail once before and been refused on merits. This time, he sought bail on a different basis: that his trial was taking far too long through no fault of his own. Court records showed that from March 2016 to October 2017, prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to appear, even after the court issued arrest warrants to compel their attendance. The prosecution then filed an application that the court suspected was simply meant to drag the case out further.

The Lahore High Court held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, and that this principle applies especially strongly in special courts like those handling narcotics cases, where prolonged delays can effectively punish an undertrial prisoner without conviction. The court criticized the trial judge for failing to actively manage the case and for leaving the prisoner's fate to chance. Since there was no realistic prospect of the trial concluding soon, and the delay was not the petitioner's fault, the High Court granted him bail. The case reinforces that unreasonable delay in trial, not just the nature of the charge, can be valid grounds for bail.

PLJ 2018 SC 95 · Lahore High Court

This Supreme Court order dealt with a dispute over whether an appeal by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) against Hashwani Hotels was filed too late. The case originated from a suit by Hashwani Hotels seeking declaration, possession, and specific performance relating to a lease, which the trial court dismissed but the Islamabad High Court later decided in the hotel's favour. CDA appealed to the Supreme Court. Hashwani Hotels then asked for the appeal to be dismissed, arguing that under the Supreme Court Rules, an appeal must be filed along with a certified copy of both the judgment and the decree, and since CDA only attached the decree-sheet weeks later, the appeal was effectively 44 days late.

CDA argued that the decree-sheet simply did not exist yet when they filed their appeal, since the High Court had not prepared it immediately after the judgment, and the delay was not their fault.

The Supreme Court examined when a decree actually comes into existence and found there was no clear record of when the decree-sheet was finalized by the High Court. Since this date was unclear and not caused by the appellants, the Court held the appeal could not be confidently said to be time-barred, and even if it were, the delay deserved to be condoned. The application to dismiss the appeal was therefore rejected. The case matters because it clarifies how limitation periods are calculated when procedural delays in preparing court documents are not the fault of the appealing party.

PLD 2016 Supreme Court 613), · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case involved a family dispute over maintenance allowance and recovery of gold ornaments. A wife and her two minor children had filed a suit against the husband, claiming monthly maintenance and the return of gold ornaments allegedly taken from her. The Family Court at Depalpur partly granted the claim, awarding maintenance only to the two children but rejecting the wife's personal claims. On appeal, the Additional District Judge overturned this entirely, ruling that the Depalpur court had no jurisdiction to hear the case in the first place, since evidence showed the wife was actually residing with her parents in Lahore, not Depalpur as claimed in the suit. The appellate court dismissed the whole suit, though it allowed the family to refile in the correct court.

The wife then challenged this dismissal before the Lahore High Court through a constitutional petition, arguing that she did reside in Depalpur and that court had jurisdiction.

The High Court examined the law on jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1964, noting that a person can be deemed to reside at more than one place if they have both a permanent and temporary residence, and that even a short period of residence can establish jurisdiction for a wife's convenience. This principle is important because family law cases often hinge on where the wife or family actually lives, and the ruling reinforces that such jurisdictional rules are meant to protect the convenience of wives seeking maintenance.

PLJ 2011 [Lahore] 32) (DB) · Lahore High Court

Rashid Ameer, a constable in Islamabad Police since 2007, wanted to apply for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) in the Counter Terrorism Force. The advertised age limit was 25 years, and he was over-aged by about four years. He asked the Inspector General of Police for age relaxation, citing rules allowing relaxation for government employees with continuous service and for children of civil servants who died during service (his father, a DSP in Sindh Police, had died while in service). The IG Police rejected his request, saying the Establishment Division's relaxation rules did not apply to Islamabad Police, and that allowing relaxation would disrupt the recruitment process which was already underway.

The Lahore High Court disagreed. It examined the Establishment Division's 1993 Rules on relaxation of upper age limits and a later 2010 office memorandum clarifying that government employees with two years of continuous service get a 10-year age relaxation, while general relaxation of 5 years applies to all citizens. The court found these rules did apply to Islamabad Police and that the petitioner, who was 29 at the time and had about 10 years of service, qualified for relaxation. It held that he could not be denied this right which had already accrued to him. The court allowed the petition, meaning his application for age relaxation should be accepted.

PLJ 2016 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a petitioner whose cousin and father had been arrested in two narcotics cases registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, allegedly after drugs were planted on them due to a bribery dispute with police. The petitioner asked the Lahore High Court to direct the City Police Officer, Multan, to decide his application seeking a change of the police investigation into these cases, claiming the original probe was unfair.

By the time the matter reached court, however, the police challan (charge sheet) had already been submitted to the trial court, charges had been framed against the accused, and the trial was actively underway. The District Standing Board had also already reviewed the matter and disposed of the petitioner's application.

The High Court examined Article 18-A of the Punjab Police Order (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013, which allows transfer of investigation to a different officer under certain procedures. However, relying on a Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that requesting a change of investigating officer at such a late stage—after the challan was filed and trial had begun—was not legally sustainable.

The petition was therefore dismissed. The case clarifies that requests to change investigators under police law must generally be made early, before trial proceedings have advanced, and courts will not disturb an ongoing trial to revisit the investigation stage.

PLJ 2016 AJ&K 19 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case from the Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court dealt with a long-running property dispute and an important legal question about deadlines for challenging court decrees obtained through fraud.

The background: a woman obtained a compromise decree for land, which she later gifted to her minor son. Some other claimants, who said the land actually belonged to them, challenged the compromise decree, first through a regular lawsuit alleging fraud, which was rejected by the trial court and upheld on appeal as being legally barred. They then tried a different legal route, filing an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (a special, faster remedy for cancelling decrees obtained by fraud). The original decree-holders argued this new application was filed too late and that the claimants, having already lost their earlier suit, had no standing to try again.

The High Court held that since the claimants were never made parties to the original compromise decree, they were legal strangers entitled to use the Section 12(2) remedy. It clarified that no specific limitation period is fixed by law for such applications, but Article 181 of the Limitation Act (a three-year general limitation) would apply, counted from when the party learned of the decree. The Court also explained when delay can be excused under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act - only if the wrong forum was chosen carefully and in good faith, not through gross negligence. This ruling clarifies how fraud-based challenges to decrees and limitation rules interact.

PLJ 2011 Cr.C. (Lahore) 941 · Lahore High Court

This case involved Mst. Kausar Bibi, who was convicted by a trial court for causing a fatal injury that led to the death of Muhammad Amin, her husband. She was sentenced to pay Diyat (compensation) to the victim's heirs and also received fourteen years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution's case relied on her own confession, recovery of the body and weapon from her house, and medical evidence showing death from a blunt-weapon head injury. She appealed her conviction and sentence to the Lahore High Court.

The High Court examined the evidence and found that while the exact circumstances didn't conclusively prove she committed murder as originally charged, the evidence did support that she was involved in concealing the body of the deceased, an offence under Section 201 of the Penal Code. Importantly, the trial court had never formally charged her with this specific offence. The High Court ruled that appellate courts have the power, under various provisions including Section 561-A and related Criminal Procedure Code sections, to convict and sentence a person for an offence even if it wasn't separately charged at trial, as long as the evidence supports it and no injustice results. The court modified her conviction to Section 201 PPC and reduced her sentence to time already served.

This case matters because it clarifies that appellate courts can amend or add charges based on trial evidence, and that minor procedural gaps like non-framing of a charge don't automatically invalidate a conviction.

PLJ 2015 · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court dealt with a dispute between a man claiming to be a landlord and another he wanted evicted for allegedly defaulting on rent. The landlord filed for eviction under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, but the tenant denied that any landlord-tenant relationship existed between them at all.

The Rent Controller initially sided with the tenant and dismissed the eviction petition, finding no proof of a tenancy relationship. However, an appellate court reversed this, relying heavily on a decision from an informal mediation body called a Musalehati Committee, where the tenant was said to have admitted he was indeed a tenant.

The High Court disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. It found that the landlord's witnesses could not produce any rent receipts, utility bills, or even a tenancy agreement, nor could they recall specific details of alleged rent payments. The Court also noted that no one from the mediation committee was called to testify about what actually happened there, so the claim that the tenant admitted tenancy remained unproven.

The Court emphasized an important legal principle: owning a property does not automatically make someone a "landlord" in the legal sense, and the real issue in eviction cases is whether a landlord-tenant relationship exists, not who holds title to the property. Since this relationship wasn't proven, the High Court restored the original ruling dismissing the eviction case.

PLJ 1996 Cr. C. (Karachi) 1371 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute over an alleged land sale deal between the appellant and the respondents. The appellant claimed he had entered into agreements to purchase agricultural land and paid large sums of money in cash, totaling over Rs. 28 lakhs, to Respondent No. 1, who was acting on behalf of himself, his mother, and his sister. When the deal allegedly fell through, the appellant filed a criminal complaint. The trial Magistrate, using powers under Section 249-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, acquitted the respondents before completing the full trial, finding the complaint groundless. The appellant challenged this acquittal in the Sindh High Court.

The High Court rejected the appeal. It held that an application under Section 249-A can be decided at any stage of proceedings, not only after all witnesses have testified, so long as both sides are given a hearing and the magistrate records clear reasons. The court found the appellant had been given full opportunity to argue his case, that his supporting documents (receipts) appeared forged or tampered with, that his witnesses gave hearsay or interested testimony, and that he had concealed a related civil suit. The court also noted that long, unexplained delay in filing a criminal complaint weakens its credibility.

This ruling clarifies that magistrates can dismiss weak criminal complaints early, provided fairness is maintained, preventing misuse of criminal courts to pressure parties in what are essentially civil disputes.

PLJ 2013 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a man on trial under narcotics laws before the Special Judge, Anti-Narcotics Force, Multan. During the trial, when two prosecution witnesses, including the investigating officer, appeared to give evidence, the accused's chosen lawyer was unavailable because he was engaged in another murder case. Instead of granting an adjournment, the trial court immediately appointed a different lawyer at state expense, who cross-examined the witnesses the same day without ever consulting the accused or studying the case file. When the accused later asked the court to recall these witnesses so his own lawyer could properly cross-examine them, the trial court refused.

The Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) found this unacceptable. It held that under Article 10(1) of the Constitution, every arrested or detained person has the right to a lawyer of their own choice, and under the newly added Article 10A, everyone is entitled to a fair trial and due process. The court also noted that Section 340(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code guarantees an accused the right to be defended by counsel. A court cannot force a different lawyer onto an accused who has already chosen one, since genuine representation is central to a fair trial.

The High Court allowed the petition, directing that the witnesses be re-summoned for proper cross-examination by counsel of the accused's choice, as a final opportunity. This judgment reinforces that the right to counsel of one's own choice is a core part of fair trial guarantees in Pakistan's justice system.

PLJ 2014 SC 835 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a long-running land dispute over property in Nodeh Bala, Pakistan. The appellants (descendants of Qudratullah) claimed ownership based on a 1938 sale deed through which their father bought land from Mst. Marjan, plus a 1944 mutation recorded in his favor. However, Mst. Marjan had earlier, in 1939, filed a separate suit for possession of the same land, and in 1940 obtained an ex-parte decree (a ruling made without the other side appearing) granting her possession, since Qudratullah had been proceeded against ex-parte and failed to contest.

The core legal question was whether this 1940 possession decree remained valid and binding, given that the sale deed itself was never directly challenged in that earlier suit, and whether the appellants could still rely on the sale deed to claim ownership.

The Supreme Court held that an ex-parte decree is just as legally valid and binding as a contested one, differing only in the methods available to challenge it. Since the appellants never took direct legal action to set aside the 1940 decree, it became final and binding on them. The Court further explained that in suits for possession under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, a declaration of entitlement to possession inherently includes a declaration of title. Therefore, even though the sale deed wasn't explicitly challenged, the possession decree effectively overrode it, rendering the sale deed legally ineffective. The appeal was dismissed.

PLJ 2011 FSC 155 · Federal Shariat Court

This case concerns an appeal by Muhammad Younis, who was convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge in Pakpattan Sharif for abducting and repeatedly raping a woman, Mst. Maryam Bibi. He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus fines under Pakistan's Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, with multiple sentences running concurrently. Two co-accused were acquitted at trial, and one died during proceedings.

Maryam Bibi had filed a private complaint alleging she was abducted at gunpoint from her home, drugged, and held captive for about a month, during which she was repeatedly sexually assaulted. She said the motive was a grudge over an electricity connection dispute between her father and the accused.

The Federal Shariat Court's judgment focuses on a key legal principle rather than just the facts of the assault: that under Section 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a trial court's written judgment must clearly state the specific points it had to decide, and must give reasons for its decisions on each point. The court emphasized that a proper judgment must show that the trial judge carefully examined the evidence, considered the arguments of both sides, and applied independent judicial reasoning before convicting someone—rather than simply announcing a verdict.

This matters because it reinforces a fundamental safeguard in criminal trials: convictions, especially serious ones carrying life imprisonment, cannot be sustained unless the trial court's reasoning is transparent, evid

PLJ 2005 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case was about a landlord-tenant dispute between Al-Hadeed Enterprises, a partnership firm, and Allied Bank of Pakistan, which was renting commercial shops and a basement in Islamabad to run a bank branch. When the lease expired, the landlord sought a higher rent, but after the bank did not agree, the landlord filed for eviction, claiming it needed the property for personal use and that the bank had defaulted on paying an enhanced rent. Both the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge ruled in favor of the landlord and ordered the bank to vacate the premises.

The bank challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing that the lower courts had misread the evidence, that the landlord's real motive was to extract a higher rent rather than genuine personal need, that no proper notice of rent increase had been served to establish default, and that the eviction petition was invalid because it was filed by an unregistered partnership firm, which is barred under the Partnership Act.

The High Court agreed with the bank. It found that the claim of personal need was actually a pretext to force a steep rent hike, and that no notice of rent enhancement had been given, so no default could be proven. It also held that an unregistered firm cannot legally file an eviction case. The court therefore reversed the eviction order, protecting tenants from eviction based on improperly proven claims and procedural defects.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a murder FIR lodged against several accused, including Muhammad Asghar, who was alleged to have instigated and abetted the killing of a man and his wife. After the police investigation, the trial court took up the case, framed charges against some accused, and the complainant testified, naming the petitioner as the instigator. Due to a clerical or typographical slip, the petitioner's name was accidentally left out of an earlier summoning order, though it was later included and he was eventually charged along with the others.

The petitioner approached the Lahore High Court asking it to quash the proceedings against him, arguing that he had never been properly summoned and that no clear charge had been framed against him, so the case should be dropped.

The High Court refused to quash the FIR or the proceedings. It held that once a challan (police report) has been submitted and the trial court has taken cognizance of the case, the High Court should not interfere using its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, relying on a Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the court said the petitioner could seek relief by applying to the trial court itself for premature acquittal under Section 265-K of the Cr.P.C.

This case matters because it reinforces the principle that once a criminal trial is underway in the trial court, higher courts should generally not intervene to quash cases; such matters should be resolved within the trial process itself.

PLJ 2013 Tax Cases ( · Islamabad High Court

This case concerns a dispute over imported goods (described as Polypropylene) where customs authorities had allegedly mis-declared the goods' value and quality, and imposed a fine in lieu of confiscation based on rates set out in a government regulation, S.R.O. 499(I)/2009. The importer, Global International, challenged this regulation before the Sindh High Court, arguing that the Federal Board of Revenue did not have the legal authority to fix such fines, since the relevant provision of the Customs Act (Section 32) had been excluded from Section 15 after an amendment made through the Finance Act, 2011. The importer wanted the regulation struck down and the goods released.

During the hearing, the petitioner's lawyer conceded that the regulation had actually been issued before the 2011 amendment, at a time when the FBR did have the power to set such fines. So the original challenge could not succeed. Instead, the lawyer asked for an alternative relief, arguing that after the 2011 amendment, the regulation's provisions had become ineffective and should not be applied going forward.

Since the importer already had an appeal pending before the Collector of Customs (Appeals) against the original order, the court did not decide this new legal argument itself. Instead, by agreement between both sides, the court disposed of the petition and directed the importer to raise this specific legal argument before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), who was instructed to consider it and decide the appeal on merits within a reasonable time.

PLJ 2006 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court's Bahawalpur Bench dealt with a writ petition filed by a young woman, Mst. Tahira Kausar, who had married a man of her own choice against her father's wishes. Her father, a police official, had lodged a criminal case against her under the Hudood laws, and she asked the court to quash it to protect her marriage. While hearing this petition, the court became concerned about the conduct of an advocate, Mr. Riaz Hanif Rahi, who was representing her father. The judge found that instead of following proper legal procedures to seek transfer of the case to another bench, the advocate behaved in a disrespectful, aggressive, and intimidating manner in court, tried to dictate proceedings, referenced a prior unrelated order to pressure the judge into recusing himself, and generally attempted to overawe the court rather than make legitimate legal arguments.

The judge issued a detailed order describing the kinds of advocate misconduct that undermine judicial independence, including threats, disrespect, and manipulation of proceedings. The court held that such behavior potentially amounted to contempt of court. As a result, a show-cause notice was ordered to be issued to the advocate, requiring him to explain his conduct and why contempt proceedings should not be formally initiated against him under Article 204 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2004.

This case matters because it highlights the judiciary's effort to safeguard courtroom dignity and ensure lawyers do not use intimidation or improper tactics

PLJ 2013 FSC 25 · Federal Shariat Court

This case involved a woman convicted by a trial court in Layyah for the offence of Qazf, which means falsely accusing someone of unlawful sexual intercourse (zina). The trial court sentenced her under Section 11 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 to two years rigorous imprisonment, 40 stripes of whipping, and a fine of Rs. 50,000 as compensation to the complainant, with six months imprisonment in default of payment.

On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court found a fundamental legal flaw: Section 11, under which she was convicted, had actually been removed from the law back in 2006, before the alleged incident, the complaint, and the trial court's judgment ever took place. The correct provision in force was the amended Section 7, which only prescribes a punishment of 80 stripes for Qazf, with no provision for imprisonment, fine, or compensation. The court also noted that whipping as a tazir (discretionary) punishment, as opposed to whipping as hadd, had been abolished altogether since 1996.

Because the trial court convicted and sentenced her under a law provision that no longer existed, the entire judgment was declared to be without jurisdiction. The Federal Shariat Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the woman honourably, releasing her from her bail obligations. This case highlights the importance of courts applying the correct, currently valid law rather than outdated or repealed provisions.

PLJ 2013 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a bank customer who was accused of issuing a dishonoured cheque for repayment of a loan. The bank reported the matter to police, who registered an FIR under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, a provision dealing with dishonestly issuing a cheque that bounces. The customer approached the Islamabad High Court asking for the FIR to be cancelled, arguing that since the dispute arose from a bank loan, it should be handled under a special law, the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, rather than through ordinary criminal proceedings.

The court agreed with the customer. It noted that the complainant was a financial institution and the cheque in question related to repayment of a loan facility, a routine banking matter. The judge held that the 2001 Ordinance is a special law that specifically covers situations where a cheque issued for loan repayment is dishonoured, and it provides its own penalties and procedure, including filing a complaint before a Banking Court. Because this special law overrides the general criminal law, the bank could not use Section 489-F of the Penal Code against the customer. Doing so was ruled an abuse of court process. The FIR was therefore quashed.

This judgment matters because it clarifies that banks and financial institutions must pursue loan-related cheque disputes through banking courts under the specific ordinance, not by lodging criminal FIRs against borrowers.

PLJ 2014 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a contempt of court petition filed against the Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society (now Defence Housing Authority) and its alleged Secretary, Col. (R) Ghulam Jafar. The petitioner, Amjad Ikram, claimed that the society and its secretary had defied court orders dated 11.11.2002 and 14.11.2002, which required maintaining status quo, by refusing to unlock the gate of a school as directed. He sought punitive action against the respondents for disobeying the court.

During proceedings, the housing society itself was removed from the case since it was a juristic entity, leaving only the individual named as Secretary, Ghulam Jafar, to respond. He denied ever holding that position or disobeying any court order. To verify the facts, the court had sent a bailiff to inspect the site, and also summoned the local police officer (SHO) for a statement.

The court found that none of the key evidence, the bailiff's report, the police daily diary entry, or the SHO's statement, actually named Ghulam Jafar as the person who obstructed the court's orders. Instead, they identified two different individuals, a Major and another Colonel, as responsible.

Since there was no evidence directly implicating Ghulam Jafar, the Lahore High Court held that the petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case of contempt against him and dismissed the application. The case highlights that contempt charges require clear, specific evidence linking the accused person to the alleged violation.

PLJ 2011 SC 798 · Islamabad High Court

This case was about the appointment of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Pakistan's top anti-corruption body. The petitioners challenged the appointment, arguing it violated the Constitution and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.

The Supreme Court found that the law requires the President to appoint the NAB Chairman only after genuine consultation with the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, aimed at building consensus rather than just going through the motions. In this case, no such consultation had taken place before the Chairman was reappointed on 9 February 2011, making the appointment unlawful.

The Court also ruled that the law's requirement of a "non-extendable" four-year term means a person can only ever be appointed once to that office. Even a fresh appointment made before completing an earlier term would not get around this restriction, since allowing that would let an incumbent's term be artificially cut short and renewed, defeating the law's purpose of limiting tenure.

The Court further held that such petitions, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, were a matter of public importance because the NAB Chairman's decisions affect thousands of people through inquiries, arrests and trials. It also noted that the Chief Justice of Pakistan could appropriately play a role in resolving disagreements over such appointments, given the Chief Justice's constitutional role as guardian of citizens' rights.

The ruling reinforced safeguards ensuring transparent, consultative, and legally compliant appointments to powerful public offices.

PLJ 2014 Peshawar 19 · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a dispute over government land. A person (the respondent) had filed a civil suit for possession and a permanent injunction against the provincial Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others over certain property. The government defendants initially appeared through a representative but later failed to attend, leading the trial court to proceed ex-parte and pass a decree against them. The government later sought to have this ex-parte decree set aside, but both the trial court and the appellate court rejected that request, so the government approached the Peshawar High Court.

The High Court found serious problems with how the case had been handled. There was no proper proof on record that summons had actually been served on the government officials for the hearing date in question. The written statement in the case had been filed by a lawyer acting as a "special government pleader," but he had not been properly authorized by the government to represent it, since the government had never even been formally made a party to the suit and no official sanction had been given for its defense. The court also held that trial judges have a duty to add necessary parties like the government to a case, and that ex-parte proceedings conducted on a date not actually fixed for hearing are void from the start.

Because of these defects, the High Court set aside the lower courts' decisions and allowed the revision petition, emphasizing that such fundamental procedural failures cannot be cured by technical objections like limitation periods.

PLJ 2014 · Sindh High Court

This case involves a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, filed against Habib Bank Ltd and others by two plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed their prosecution had been malicious, and they sought compensation after being acquitted. However, the law sets a strict one-year time limit for filing such suits, counted from the date of acquittal. The trial court had dismissed the suit as time-barred, since it appeared to have been filed more than a year after the plaintiffs were acquitted.

The plaintiffs later asked the Sindh High Court to recall and review that dismissal, arguing that the court had overlooked an important legal protection: Section 4 of the Limitation Act. This provision allows a suit to be validly filed on the very first day a court reopens after being closed, if the limitation period expired during the closure. The plaintiffs argued their suit was filed on the first working day after summer court vacations, meaning it was not actually late.

The Court agreed. It held that Section 4 does not extend the limitation period, but it does protect suits filed on the first reopening day when the deadline fell during vacation. Since this point had been missed earlier, the dismissal judgment and decree were recalled and reviewed.

This case matters because it clarifies that litigants who file on the first day courts reopen after a vacation should not be unfairly penalized for court closures beyond their control.

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case concerns a wife, Mst. Aamna Abdullah, who filed a family court suit against her husband seeking dissolution of marriage, dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. When reconciliation efforts failed, the Family Court in Multan granted her a divorce on the basis of khula (a wife-initiated divorce) but ordered her to return the dower she had received, Rs. 500 and five tolas of gold, as required under the law when a marriage ends in khula. This decree was passed on 31.1.2007.

The wife did not challenge this order for four years. In 2010, she finally filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court, arguing that the order to return the dower was illegal since her husband had never specifically asked for it back, and that her delay in approaching the court should be excused because of bad legal advice and illness.

The High Court rejected her petition primarily on the ground of laches, meaning excessive, unexplained delay. It held that constitutional jurisdiction is an equitable remedy, and a party who sleeps on their rights for four years without adequate justification cannot expect relief. The court found her delay amounted to negligence and dismissed the petition without deciding the merits of her dower argument.

This case is a reminder that even valid legal grievances can be lost if not pursued promptly, since courts exercising constitutional/equitable jurisdiction expect timely action.

PLJ 2011 · Sindh High Court

This case concerns a petitioner, Hidayatullah, who was hired in 1996 on a "daily waged contract basis" by Telecom Foundation, a project linked to Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL). His appointment letter did not specify any fixed contract period, though it referred to separate terms and conditions supposedly agreed and signed by him. His employment was terminated shortly after, in December 1996. Many years later, after the government passed the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 to restore jobs to certain workers removed during earlier political periods, he filed a petition seeking reinstatement and back benefits under this law.

PTCL argued the case wasn't valid in court because PTCL's rules aren't government-backed (statutory), and that the petitioner had waited too long (delay, or "laches") to file his claim. The Sindh High Court rejected both objections: since the petitioner was asserting rights created by the 2010 Act itself—not just internal company rules—the petition was allowed, and since this right only came into existence in 2009-2010, there was no unreasonable delay.

On the merits, since PTCL could not produce any document proving a fixed contract term, and the petitioner denied signing one, the court held he qualified for reinstatement under Section 4(a) of the Act. The court ordered his reinstatement within two weeks, along with the benefits the law provides. This case clarifies how courts apply the Sacked Employees Act to contract workers lacking clear contract terms.

PLJ 2009 SC 272 · Balochistan High Court

This Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment deals with a landlord-tenant dispute from Quetta. The landlord, Malik Muhammad Qasim, had sought eviction of his tenants, Ghulam Siddique and another, from a shop and house, citing rent default, personal need, and subletting. The Rent Controller ordered the tenants' eviction in 2007. The tenants appealed to the Balochistan High Court, but their appeal was dismissed because it was filed late, and the High Court refused to excuse (condone) the delay.

The tenants then approached the Supreme Court, arguing that their late appeal should have been excused and the case decided on its merits rather than being thrown out on a technicality. They suggested the delay was not really their fault.

The Supreme Court disagreed and refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court emphasized an important principle: litigants cannot simply hire a lawyer and then walk away from responsibility for their own case. Even if a lawyer fails to keep a client updated, that negligence does not automatically excuse delays, especially once the opposing party has gained valuable rights through the passage of time. It is the litigant's own duty to stay informed about what is happening with their case in court.

This ruling matters because it reinforces that clients, not just their lawyers, bear responsibility for diligently pursuing legal proceedings, and that missed deadlines can have serious, irreversible consequences. The tenants were given nine months to vacate the premises.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a dispute over an unpaid loan documented through a pro-note, where the lender filed a special summary suit for recovery of Rs. 100,000 under Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code, a procedure used for quick recovery of money on negotiable instruments like promissory notes.

The trial court initially allowed the borrower to defend the suit, but only on condition that he submit a surety bond for the amount claimed by a set deadline. The borrower failed to file his written statement or provide the surety bond, so the court proceeded against him ex-parte, meaning without his participation. He later tried to get this ex-parte order set aside but did not pursue that application diligently either, and it was dismissed for non-appearance. The trial court then recorded the lender's evidence alone and ruled in his favor, decreeing the suit.

The borrower appealed to the Lahore High Court, arguing he was never properly heard and that the judgment unfairly relied only on the lender's evidence. The High Court rejected this appeal, noting that the borrower had never complied with the original condition to furnish a surety bond and had been consistently negligent throughout the proceedings. Finding no legal or jurisdictional flaw in the trial court's decision, the High Court dismissed the appeal outright.

The case illustrates that courts will not reward parties who ignore procedural requirements and conditions attached to their right to defend a case, especially in summary suits designed for speedy resolution of debt claims.

CLC 1145 · Not specified

This case is about a dispute over whether a father had to pay maintenance (financial support) for a child he claimed was not his own.

The father, Zaheer Ahmad, had been ordered by a Family Court, and then by an Appellate Court, to pay monthly maintenance for a minor child. He challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing that the child could not be his because the child was born on 7 November 2004, while his wife had allegedly been living separately from him since 2 December 2003 - meaning the child was born about eleven months and five days after the couple separated. He therefore claimed the child was illegitimate and that he should not be responsible for maintaining him.

The High Court rejected this argument. It held that questions of a child's legitimacy are extremely serious and must not be decided lightly, based merely on a husband's denial or accusation. Under Islamic law, a child born within a lawful marriage is presumed legitimate - "the child follows the bed" - and courts always lean towards upholding legitimacy unless there is strong, convincing evidence to the contrary. The father had provided no real proof of illegitimacy, and importantly, he had never gone to the appropriate court to invoke "Li'an" (the specific legal procedure for disowning paternity).

As a result, the court upheld the lower courts' decisions, confirmed the child as legitimate, and ordered the father to continue paying maintenance. The case is significant because it reinforces strong legal protection for children's legitimacy and rights to support, placing a heavy burden on anyone trying to deny paternity.

· Not specified

This case involved teachers working at Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Inter-Colleges who wanted to be legally recognized as civil servants, which would entitle them to the pay, benefits, and job protections that civil servants receive from the government.

The teachers had taken their claim to a Service Tribunal, which rejected it. They then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined how these PAF colleges actually operated under the Air Force Manual governing such institutions. It found that these colleges, though originally set up to educate PAF personnel's children and later opened to the public, functioned as independent, self-financing institutions. They were run by Managing Committees that included PAF officers and parent representatives, but these committees - not the Air Force or federal government - had full power to hire, promote, and dismiss staff. The colleges received no public funding and each was treated as a separate employer with no transfers of staff between institutions. The Manual's rules were administrative guidelines, not government law, and teachers had signed undertakings to follow them.

Based on this, the Court concluded these colleges were essentially private institutions, not part of the Air Force or federal government, despite having military officers involved in oversight. The relationship between teachers and the colleges was an ordinary employer-employee one, not government service. Since their jobs weren't civil posts, the teachers didn't qualify as civil servants, and their case didn't belong before the Service Tribunal in the first place. The Supreme Court dismissed their appeals, meaning they lost their claim to civil servant status and its associated ben

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. (Lahore) 987 (DB) · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case, decided by the Lahore High Court's Rawalpindi Bench in 2009, involved Muhammad Sarfraz, who had been convicted by a trial court of murdering his nephew (his sister's son, Mumtaz Khan) and attempting to murder two other nephews during an argument over a money dispute. The trial court had sentenced him to death for murder, along with separate additional sentences for the attempted murders and various injuries caused to the surviving victims. The High Court was reviewing both his appeal and the mandatory reference for confirmation of the death sentence.

The High Court upheld his conviction for murder but refused to confirm the death penalty, converting it instead to life imprisonment. The judges found several mitigating factors: there was no prior enmity between the appellant and his nephews, who were in fact on cordial terms with him; the shooting occurred as a sudden, unexplained emotional outburst during a friendly conversation about an old business debt; and the record did not clarify what specifically triggered the violence. The court also held that since all the injuries occurred during a single continuous incident, the appellant could not be separately punished for each injury - only the most serious one counted.

This judgment matters because it illustrates how Pakistani courts weigh mitigating circumstances - such as the absence of premeditation, family relationship, and sudden provocation - when deciding whether a death sentence is truly warranted, even after a murder conviction is confirmed.

· Not specified

This Supreme Court of Pakistan order concerns a suo motu case the Chief Justice initiated after allegations surfaced that businessman Malik Riaz Hussain had financial dealings with Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar, son of the then Chief Justice, and that this may have been used to try to influence judicial proceedings. The matter gained attention after senior journalists from GEO TV, including Hamid Mir, Kamran Khan, and Mir Ibrahim Rehman, submitted statements and documents to the Court describing their interactions with Malik Riaz, in which he reportedly accused Dr. Arsalan of financial wrongdoing while repeatedly referencing the Chief Justice.

During the hearing, the Court examined the corporate structure of Bahria Town, learning that Malik Riaz officially held no shares and had resigned as chairman, with ownership having shifted to his wife and son. The Court directed Bahria Town's company secretary to produce the joint venture agreement with Bahria Foundation and related litigation records. Lawyers for both Dr. Arsalan and Malik Riaz, along with the Attorney General, requested a larger bench be formed given the case's sensitivity, though the Attorney General also argued the case should be treated like any ordinary matter.

The judges clarified their goal was not to conduct a trial but to uncover the truth given the matter's extraordinary public attention, since unresolved allegations risked damaging the Court's constitutional and moral authority. This case matters because it directly touched

PLD 1990 SC 596) and Ismail vs. Fida Ali and Syyed Iqbal Shabbir (PL · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case concerns a property dispute where the plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of a contract. The trial court had ordered the plaintiff to deposit the remaining sale consideration with the court as a condition for an interim stay order, but the plaintiff repeatedly failed to do so despite multiple opportunities. Just before a scheduled hearing where the defendant sought to have the stay vacated, the plaintiff suddenly applied to withdraw the suit, with permission to file a fresh one, citing vague "legal defects" in the plaint. The trial court granted this withdrawal the same day, without issuing any notice to the defendant and without giving proper reasons.

The defendant challenged this before the Lahore High Court, arguing that by the time of withdrawal, certain rights had already accrued to him through the earlier court orders, and that the trial court should have given him a hearing before allowing the plaintiff to escape the suit and start over.

The High Court agreed. It held that once rights had accrued to a defendant during litigation, the court could not simply allow withdrawal and permission for a fresh suit without notifying the other side and recording proper reasons. The order was found to be vague, lacking specifics about the alleged defects, and issued without a hearing—violating principles of natural justice. The court set aside the withdrawal order and revived the original suit.

This case matters because it clarifies that withdrawal of a suit isn't a mere formality when the other party's rights are already affected—courts must ensure fairness and transparency before granting such permissions.

PLJ 1998 Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a husband suing his wife, asking the court to declare that he was the real owner of a house and plot registered in her name, claiming she held it only as a "benamidar" (a nominal owner holding property on behalf of someone else who actually paid for it).

The couple married in 1956. The husband claimed that in 1967-68 he sold an earlier house he owned, used the proceeds plus his savings to buy the disputed plot and build a house on it, but registered it in his wife's name out of mutual trust. He later remarried, and when relations with his wife deteriorated and she refused to let him move back into the house, he sued her for ownership, possession, and related relief in 1989.

The wife denied this, saying she bought the property herself using her own earnings as a teacher and later a bank employee, along with loans she had taken out.

The court explained that in benami cases, the person claiming ownership must prove it, based on factors like who actually paid for the property, who held the original title documents, who possessed the property, and what motive existed for structuring it as benami. The husband failed to produce evidence supporting his claims, while the wife showed she had sufficient income and means to purchase the property herself. The court also found the suit was filed too late, well beyond the six-year limitation period. The suit was dismissed with costs.

PLJ 2012 Quetta 19 · Balochistan High Court

The case was about a land dispute in District Killa Abdullah, where several people filed a suit claiming ownership and possession of specific plots of land, saying revenue records had wrongly listed the land in the names of other people (the respondents) during a settlement carried out in 1963-64. The respondents argued that this new suit should not be allowed to proceed because the same land and the same ownership questions were already being litigated in an earlier case between largely the same parties, including a partition suit pending before revenue authorities.

A trial court initially rejected the plaint, but an appellate court sent the case back for a full trial. The High Court then stepped in during an earlier revision petition and set aside that remand order. In the present revision, the Balochistan High Court examined whether the suit could still continue, given that the core issues had already been decided in the earlier civil suit and in a related revision petition.

The Court held that the suit was barred under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which prevents courts from re-deciding matters that have already been conclusively settled between the same parties in earlier litigation. Since this legal objection can be raised and decided at any stage, and since the earlier case had already resolved the same issues, the present suit had become pointless. The petition was dismissed.

This case illustrates how Pakistani courts use Section 11 CPC to prevent repeated litigation over issues already judicially settled, promoting finality and preventing wastage of court time.

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. (Quetta) 1215 (DB) · Balochistan High Court

This case involved an appeal against a death sentence handed down for murder. The complainant, Ali Gul, had been shot and later died, naming his brother-in-law and two others, including the appellant Mumtaz, as his attackers. He claimed the motive was a family dispute: his sister had left her husband, one of the accused, and was living with her brothers. At trial, eyewitnesses testified that Mumtaz actually fired shots at the deceased, but the deceased's own dying declaration, recorded by police in the presence of a doctor, did not say Mumtaz had done anything violent or was even carrying a weapon.

The Balochistan High Court found this contradiction crucial. Since the dying declaration and the eyewitness accounts told different stories about Mumtaz's role, the court could not safely rely on either piece of evidence to convict him. The judges also noted a well-known pattern in such cases: relatives are sometimes falsely implicated alongside the real culprit, especially where family tensions already exist. Given the strained relations between the families over the marital dispute, the court could not rule out that the absconding brother-in-law alone committed the murder, with others wrongly added to the case.

Because the prosecution failed to prove the charge against Mumtaz beyond reasonable doubt, the court set aside his conviction and death sentence, acquitting him. The case highlights how inconsistent evidence, especially between a dying declaration and witness testimony, can entitle an accused to acquittal.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 111 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case involved a dispute over jointly owned agricultural land in village Bhaun, District Chakwal. Ghulam Haider, whose legal heirs later became the respondents, claimed that the jointly held land had been formally partitioned between him and the other co-owners (predecessors of the petitioners), that a specific share of over six kanals had been allotted to him, and that he had been in possession until the petitioners illegally dispossessed him. He sued for recovery of possession.

The trial court dismissed his suit, finding no proof of partition or possession. On appeal, the District Judge reversed this and ruled in favor of the respondents. The petitioners then challenged that appellate decision before the Lahore High Court through a civil revision.

The High Court examined the evidence and found it lacking. The respondents could not produce the actual partition order, revenue records showing delivery of possession, or supporting documents proving the claimed division of land. The mutation entries relied upon were not properly signed or countersigned by competent revenue authorities, and one key document even contradicted the respondents' own claims about ownership shares.

The court ruled that mere unverified entries in revenue registers carry no legal weight without proper authentication. Since the respondents failed to prove partition or transfer of possession, the High Court set aside the appellate court's decision and restored the trial court's original dismissal of the suit. This case underscores that claims of property partition must be backed by properly authenticated official documents, not just informal or unverified revenue entries.

PLJ 2012 Lahore 264 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a long-running land dispute between the legal heirs of two deceased men, Muhammad Tufail and Nazir Hussain, over agricultural land in Nankana Sahib district. Tufail had claimed ownership of land through a 1975 sale deed from a man named Murad, arguing certain revenue entries made in favor of the opposing party were illegal and done without notice to him. Both the trial court and the first appellate court rejected his claim and dismissed his suit.

Tufail then filed a civil revision petition in the Lahore High Court, which was initially dismissed in 2003. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which sent the case back, directing the High Court to specifically rule on his pending application to introduce additional evidence (under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code) before deciding the revision again.

On reconsideration, the High Court held that while courts do have power to admit additional evidence at later stages, including during revision, if doing so is essential for justice, the documents Tufail wanted to introduce were not relevant to the actual land dispute, and he had failed to explain why he didn't produce them earlier when he had the opportunity during the appeal. Since the lower courts' factual findings were well-reasoned and based on proper evidence, the court declined to disturb them and dismissed the revision petition.

This case clarifies when courts can allow additional evidence late in litigation and confirms that such evidence must be both relevant and justified by genuine necessity, not just convenience.

PLJ 2010 Peshawar 97 (DB) · Peshawar High Court

This case involved a husband and wife whose marriage ended in dissolution through khula (a wife's right to end her marriage), granted by a Family Court. The trial court had ordered dissolution of the marriage, return of dowry articles, and maintenance for the wife during her iddat period, but did not award her the dower amount since the marriage ended through khula.

The wife appealed, and the appellate court reversed course, awarding her the dower amount of Rs. 150,000 along with maintenance. The husband then challenged this appellate decision before the Peshawar High Court, arguing that a khula-based dissolution cannot be appealed, and that by awarding dower, the appellate court was effectively overturning the khula itself.

The High Court agreed with the husband. It held that no appeal lies against a judgment dissolving a marriage, whether based on cruelty or khula. Since the question of dower was closely tied to the basis of the khula, the appellate court could not grant dower without indirectly interfering with the dissolution itself. The High Court ruled that the appellate court had wrongly acted like a religious judge (qazi) rather than staying within its proper appellate role, and that its order granting dower was without jurisdiction.

The High Court therefore set aside the dower award but upheld the maintenance allowance. This case clarifies an important principle in Pakistani family law: decisions dissolving marriages via khula are final and cannot be appealed, even indirectly through related financial claims.

PLJ 1990 Lahore 497 (DB) · Lahore High Court

This case involved a property partition dispute among the legal heirs of the late Sher Mohammad Dar in Lahore. The plaintiffs, his granddaughters, sought a one-third share of family property that their deceased father would have inherited. During trial, after several adjournments, neither the plaintiffs nor their lawyer appeared on the scheduled hearing date to present evidence. As a result, the trial court closed their evidence and dismissed the entire suit for lack of proof, without specifying which procedural rule justified this harsh step.

The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the dismissal was wrongly made under a rule that didn't apply to their situation, and that the trial court had acted too harshly given the circumstances, including confusion over whether they and their witnesses were actually present but simply not called into the courtroom.

The Lahore High Court examined two possible legal provisions: Order XVII Rule 3, which allows a court to decide a case on existing evidence when a party fails to do something it was specifically given time to do, and Order XVII Rule 2, which deals with simple non-appearance. The court ruled that Rule 3 did not apply here because the strict conditions for its use were not met. Instead, this was essentially a case of default of appearance, properly falling under Rule 2. Since dismissal for mere non-appearance should allow the losing party a chance to apply for restoration, the court set aside the dismissal and ordered the suit restored for proper hearing. This clarifies when courts can decide cases outright versus allowing parties a second chance.

PLJ 2010 SC 1 · Islamabad High Court

This case was decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and thirteen other judges) in response to petitions filed by the Sindh High Court Bar Association and others challenging the Proclamation of Emergency imposed by General Pervez Musharraf on 3 November 2007.

On that date, Musharraf, then Chief of Army Staff, had suspended the Constitution, issued a Provisional Constitution Order, dismissed judges who refused to take a new oath under his Oath of Office Order, and made other sweeping changes affecting the judiciary, including altering judges' pensions and court structures. These actions were preceded by a letter from the Prime Minister to the President describing concerns about terrorism, militancy and alleged judicial interference with executive functions.

The Court held that this letter did not constitute constitutional advice under Article 48, was not addressed to the Army Chief, and gave no authority for imposing emergency rule or removing judges. It found that neither the President nor the Army Chief had any constitutional power to proclaim emergency, suspend the Constitution, or dismiss judges in this manner. Doing so violated constitutional protections for judicial independence and tenure under Articles 2A and 209.

The judgment matters because it declared the 2007 emergency and all related actions unconstitutional, reaffirming that no individual, however powerful, can override the Constitution or judiciary without lawful authority.

· Not specified

This case involved a dispute between Habib Bank Limited and a customer who had taken an auto lease finance facility to buy a Honda City car. When the customer defaulted on his monthly installments, the bank repossessed the vehicle under a clause in the lease agreement that allowed it to do so. The customer then filed a suit before the Banking Court seeking rendition of accounts and return of the vehicle, claiming he had paid most of the loan and only a small amount remained outstanding.

The Banking Court ordered the bank to return the vehicle to the customer, relying on a letter in which the customer had asked the bank to waive early settlement charges. The bank challenged this order in the Lahore High Court, arguing that the Banking Court had misread the letter, which actually only refused to waive the settlement charges and did not confirm how much the customer had paid or still owed.

The High Court agreed with the bank. It found that the customer's claim about owing only a small amount was not supported by the case record and had not even been raised in his original suit. Since the bank had validly repossessed the vehicle under the lease agreement due to default, the Banking Court's order returning the vehicle was set aside. The case was sent back to the Banking Court to be decided properly and promptly, within one month.

This case highlights how courts scrutinize evidence carefully before overturning a lender's contractual right to repossess property upon default.

PLJ 2009 Lahore 316 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case involved a criminal complaint arising from a property dispute. Khadim Hussain and others were accused of trespassing on a field, damaging crops, and stealing fertilizer and wheat, leading to an FIR being registered against them in 1997. The accused argued that the land was theirs and that a related civil suit over ownership and possession was still pending between the parties. Based on this, a magistrate had adjourned the criminal case indefinitely to wait for the outcome of the civil litigation, without deciding the accused's application for acquittal under Section 249-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. An Additional Sessions Judge later set aside that order and directed the trial to proceed, prompting the accused to challenge this decision before the High Court.

The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that criminal cases cannot be put on hold simply because a related civil case is ongoing. The court explained that civil and criminal proceedings are separate in nature and must be decided independently, based on the evidence presented in each. The accused could still present ownership documents as part of their defense during the criminal trial, but this did not justify stalling the criminal proceedings altogether.

However, the court noted that the magistrate had never actually decided the accused's acquittal application on its merits, and the sessions judge had overlooked this. So while the criminal trial was allowed to resume, the trial court was directed to first decide the pending acquittal application before moving forward. This case clarifies that pending civil disputes cannot be used as grounds to indefinitely delay criminal trials.

PLJ 2002 SC 120 · Lahore High Court

This Supreme Court case dealt with how Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - performance evaluations - should be written for judges in the subordinate judiciary of Punjab. The Lahore High Court had appealed against a decision of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which had ruled in favor of a judicial officer, K.M. Sohel, regarding adverse remarks entered in his ACRs.

The key questions were whether adverse remarks recorded after the government's prescribed time limit for writing ACRs become invalid, and whether judicial officers must be given a personal hearing before adverse remarks against them are finalized.

The Supreme Court held that the time frame set out in government instructions for writing ACRs is only directory, not mandatory, meaning missing the deadline does not automatically invalidate the report. The court reasoned that evaluating a judge's work is different from evaluating other government employees, since a judge's performance is reflected mainly through judgments that take time to be reviewed by higher courts. Because of this, a longer and more careful process is justified when assessing judicial officers.

The court also explained that judicial independence means not just freedom to decide cases without fear or favor, but also maintaining high standards of conduct and integrity. It suggested that High Courts, as independent institutions, could frame their own

PLJ 2012 SC 316 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a challenge by newspaper publishers to the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, which regulates wages and conditions for both working journalists and other newspaper employees. The petitioners argued the law was unconstitutional, claiming it unfairly grouped different categories of employees together, violated the right to equal treatment under Article 25, and denied due process under Article 10-A because it provided no right of appeal against decisions of the Wage Board, which sets employee wages.

The Supreme Court rejected these challenges. It held that working journalists and non-journalist newspaper employees work closely together toward common goals, so treating them alike under one law was a reasonable classification, not discrimination. The newspaper industry was also found distinct from other media like radio and television, justifying separate legislation. On the appeal issue, the Court explained that the Wage Board performs a legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function—it sets general wage rules for an entire industry rather than deciding individual disputes between opposing parties. Since no individual right was being adjudicated, the absence of a right of appeal did not violate due process; affected parties could instead challenge Wage Board decisions through writ petitions if the Board acted unreasonably.

The judgment matters because it upholds protections for newspaper employees' wages and clarifies when due process requires a right of appeal, distinguishing legislative rule-making from adversarial judicial decision-making.

· Not specified

This case involved medical students challenging the University of Health Sciences Ordinance, 2002, which required medical colleges to affiliate with the newly created University of Health Sciences instead of the University of the Punjab. Only four students out of roughly 6000 affected challenged the law, and none of the medical colleges themselves objected.

The students argued that the Ordinance conflicted with the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962, violated their fundamental rights to equality under the Constitution, operated unfairly by exempting two colleges from affiliation, and defeated their legitimate expectation of being examined by the University of the Punjab as before.

The Supreme Court rejected all these arguments and refused to grant leave to appeal against the High Court's earlier judgment. It held that the Ordinance was a valid law and not unconstitutional. The exemption given to two colleges was temporary, using the phrase "for the time being," so it did not amount to permanent discrimination. The Vice-Chancellor's letter was simply informational and did not conflict with the law. Students had no vested right to stay affiliated with Punjab University, since college prospectuses always reserved the government's right to change rules. Importantly, the Court noted students would still get the same MBBS degree, and the new university existed to raise educational standards and was duly recognized by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council.

This case matters because it confirmed the government's authority to restructure medical education oversight without violating students' rights.

PLJ 2024 Cr.C. 943 · Lahore High Court

This case was heard by the Lahore High Court, which decided an appeal and revision petition arising from a murder conviction. The victims had died in an unseen occurrence, meaning no one directly witnessed the killing, so the prosecution relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including witnesses who claimed to have seen the accused near the scene (called "Wajtakar" evidence) and recovered items allegedly belonging to the deceased.

The court found serious flaws in this evidence. The witnesses who claimed to have seen the accused could not properly establish their own presence at the relevant time and place, their account of events was vague, and the investigating officer failed to verify their claims through phone records or travel tickets. Other witnesses were "chance witnesses" whose presence at the scene was never justified. The identification of recovered articles, including mobile phones, was not properly conducted before a Magistrate as required by law, making the recovery evidence unreliable. There was also no medical evidence of rape, contrary to allegations.

The court explained that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain linking the crime directly to the accused, and any gap destroys its value. It also clarified the legal procedures police must follow when sending evidence to forensic labs under the Police Rules and the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act, emphasizing that police, not forensic experts, bear responsibility for maintaining evidence custody.

Since the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused, highlighting how weak investigation and impro

PLJ 2023 Lahore 912 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a custody dispute between divorced parents over their young daughter, Hareem Fatima. The father, a Pakistan Army Colonel, had initially won custody from the Guardian Court in Mianwali, partly because the child herself expressed a preference to live with him. The mother, a doctor, appealed, and the Additional District Judge reversed that decision, awarding her custody instead while giving the father a visitation schedule. The father then challenged this reversal before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court upheld the mother's custody, dismissing the father's petition. The judge reasoned that while the child's preference and her bond with her father were genuine and noteworthy, a child's stated preference alone cannot be the sole basis for custody decisions, especially when the mother has not remarried and has no competing family obligations besides raising the child. The court emphasized that a girl between ages 10 and 15 undergoes significant biological and emotional changes during which she especially needs her biological mother, rather than a father, stepmother, or grandmother. It also noted the mother's professional stability as a doctor made her well-suited to provide care.

The case matters because it reinforces that in custody disputes, courts must weigh the holistic welfare of the child, particularly daughters at sensitive developmental stages, rather than relying solely on a child's expressed preference, and affirms that a mother's remarriage status—not her career—is the key factor weighed against her custodial rights.

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a long-running property dispute in which a family contested a gift of land made through a mutation (land record entry). During the trial, the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to produce their evidence despite being given eleven opportunities. When their evidence still wasn't presented on 18 July 2008, the trial court closed the evidence and dismissed their suit. The plaintiffs then appealed, but filed that appeal late, also asking the court to excuse the delay.

The key issue before the High Court was whether the appeal was filed within the legal time limit, and if not, whether there was sufficient reason to excuse the delay. The law required an appeal to be filed within thirty days of the judgment, which meant the deadline fell during the summer court vacations. The court held that even allowing for the vacation period, the plaintiffs should have filed their appeal on 1 September 2008, the day courts reopened — but they did not file until 31 October 2008, far too late. The court also rejected their excuse of confusion over hearing dates as unconvincing.

Because the appeal was hopelessly delayed with no valid justification, the High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the lower courts' decisions. The case clarifies how limitation periods are calculated when deadlines fall within court vacations, confirming that vacation benefits only extend the deadline to the day courts reopen, not further.

PLJ 2024 Lahore 302 · Lahore High Court

This case involved two connected land disputes over property in Raiwind, Lahore, both seeking specific performance of agreements to sell. During the proceedings, the petitioner produced an agreement to sell as evidence, but questions arose about the authenticity of the stamp paper used in that document.

The respondents wanted to summon the Record Keeper of the Treasury Office along with official records about that stamp paper, to verify whether it was genuine. However, they had not included this witness in their original list of witnesses, which under the Civil Procedure Code must normally be filed within seven days of the court framing the issues in a case. A trial court judge refused to allow this evidence because no "sufficient cause" was shown for the delay. On appeal, the Additional District Judge reversed that decision and allowed the record to be produced.

The petitioner challenged this reversal before the Lahore High Court, arguing that the rule requiring timely filing of witness lists is strict, and that the respondents could not bypass it, especially since the petitioner himself had earlier been denied a similar request.

The High Court dismissed the petition and upheld the decision to allow the treasury record. It reasoned that the document was already mentioned in the respondents' list of reliance, so there was no real surprise to the petitioner, and allowing this evidence served the broader goal of finding the truth and ensuring complete justice between the parties. The court found no legal error in the lower court's decision.

PLJ 2018 · Balochistan High Court

This case involved candidates who had applied for positions as Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate and Qazi (BPS-18) in Balochistan, following a 2014 advertisement. The petitioners argued that their appointments should have followed the Government of Balochistan Recruitment Policy of 1991, which they claimed required zonal (district-based) allocation of posts, rather than being decided purely on merit. One petitioner also complained that candidates ranked lower than him on the merit list had been selected ahead of him.

The Balochistan High Court rejected these arguments. It explained that Article 27 of the Constitution bars discrimination in public appointments based on things like race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth, but allows authorities the option, not an obligation, to reserve posts for certain areas to ensure fair representation. Since this reservation is discretionary, no candidate has an automatic right to demand a zonal quota system.

On the merit list complaint, the court found that although the petitioner ranked higher in the written exam, he scored lower marks overall after the interview, which placed him further down the list.

The court held that the Judicial Selection Board, composed of three High Court judges, is best positioned to judge candidates' abilities, and its decisions should not be overturned unless there is bad faith or the assessment has nothing to do with the candidate's actual competence. Both petitions were dismissed.

PLJ 2018 SC 391 [Original Jurisdiction] · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case, decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, dealt with a police encounter in which the petitioner's son, Mohsin Ali, was killed by local police. An FIR had already been registered about that incident, the police had completed their investigation, and a challan (police report) had been submitted to the trial court. The petitioner, Mst. Sughran Bibi, also filed a private complaint giving her own version of events, and that complaint had led to accused persons being summoned, with the trial already underway. She wanted the police to register a separate, second FIR based on her account of the same incident.

The Supreme Court refused this request and dismissed the petition. It held that only one FIR can exist for a single incident. If someone comes forward with a different version of the very same occurrence, that version should be recorded as a statement under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code during investigation, or pursued through a private complaint, not treated as a fresh FIR. A second FIR can only be registered if the new version concerns a genuinely different occurrence or reveals a separate cognizable offence altogether.

This judgment matters because it clarifies the law on multiple FIRs for the same incident, preventing confusion, duplication, and potential misuse of the FIR process, while still protecting victims' rights through investigation procedures and private complaints.

PLJ 2018 Islamabad 316 · Islamabad High Court

This case before the Islamabad High Court dealt with petitions concerning the status and treatment of Qadianis (Ahmadis) under Pakistani law, particularly regarding the Election Act, 2017. The petitioners argued that amendments made to election laws in 2017 had, whether by mistake or design, dropped certain provisions from the earlier General Elections Order, 2002, that dealt specifically with determining a candidate's religion and the status of the Qadiani/Lahori group as non-Muslims. They sought restoration of these provisions, access to NADRA data on people who had changed their religious declaration to Qadianism, and an independent judicial inquiry into how the relevant declaration clause had been altered.

The Court held that the omission of these specific provisions from the new Election Act effectively diluted the constitutional declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslims, which Pakistan's Constitution firmly establishes through the Second Amendment. The judge ruled that subordinate legislation, such as an ordinary Act of Parliament, cannot be used to weaken or get around a constitutional provision. The Court directed the government to amend the Election Act to restore the necessary safeguards, keep separate NADRA records of religious conversions, and ensure electoral laws conform to the constitutional definition of who qualifies as Muslim.

This judgment matters because it reinforces the constitutional distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, specifically concerning Qadianis, and insists that election and citizenship laws must align with this constitutional framework rather than

PLJ 2018 Islamabad 302 · Islamabad High Court

The case involved a police constable, Rashid Ameer, who applied for a promotion-related post of Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) in the Counter Terrorism Force of Islamabad Police. The advertised age limit was 25 years, and he was over-age by about four years. He sought relaxation in the upper age limit, citing rules made by the Establishment Division in 1993 and a later office memorandum that allowed extra years of age relaxation for government employees with continuous service, and additional relaxation for children of civil servants who died during service (his father, a DSP, had died while in service). The Inspector General of Police rejected his request, arguing that the Establishment Division's rules did not apply to Islamabad Police and that allowing relaxation would disrupt the completed recruitment process.

The Islamabad High Court disagreed. It held that the 1993 rules and the related office memorandum clearly entitled serving government employees with at least two years of continuous service to a 10-year age relaxation, and this benefit could not be denied to the petitioner. The court found that the authorities had failed to properly apply these rules and ruled in favor of the petitioner, allowing his writ petition.

This case matters because it reinforces that government employees have a legally protected right to age relaxation benefits under established rules, and administrative authorities cannot arbitrarily deny such entitlements by claiming non-applicability without proper justification.

MLD 1711), wherein it has been held that: · Not specified

This case concerns a woman, Mst. Shayan Afzal, who had been given the right to divorce her husband under Column 18 of their marriage contract (Nikahnama). She exercised this right in 2013 by sending talaq notices and applied to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council in Islamabad for a certificate confirming the divorce had taken effect. The husband never appeared despite repeated notices, and reconciliation attempts failed. Before the certificate was issued, however, Shayan died in the UK in 2015. Her father then asked the Arbitration Council to issue the divorce certificate in her name, but his application was dismissed. He challenged this dismissal in the Islamabad High Court.

The court ruled in the father's favor. It held that once a wife has been validly delegated the right of divorce, she can exercise it without needing anyone's permission, and the Arbitration Council has no authority to refuse or withhold the certificate once reconciliation fails and 90 days have passed. The court clarified an important legal principle: if the person who pronounced talaq dies before the 90-day period ends, the divorce does not take effect; but if they die after the 90 days have passed, the Council is legally bound to issue the certificate confirming the divorce was effective.

This judgment matters because it clarifies the rights of women who hold delegated divorce power and limits the discretion of Arbitration Councils to delay or deny recognition of valid divorces, reinforcing procedural fairness under the Constitution.

PLJ 2017 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case was an appeal against convictions for kidnapping for ransom under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act. Five people - Muhammad Javed, Raheem Zada alias Gul Khan, Abdul Hameed, Mst. Tabassam alias Robina, and Nawaz Khan - had been sentenced to life imprisonment by an Anti-Terrorism Court in Multan for allegedly abducting a young man, Usman Ahmad, and demanding one crore rupees in ransom from his father. The complainant also filed a separate petition asking the court to enhance the punishment to the death penalty.

On appeal, the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) found the prosecution's case riddled with doubts. No witness had actually seen the victim with the accused. The prosecution could not even establish where the abduction took place, giving conflicting locations. The person who allegedly negotiated the ransom over the phone was never identified, and the victim could only vaguely describe his place of confinement as a "mud room," without further detail.

The court applied the well-established legal principle that in criminal cases, the burden of proof never shifts from the prosecution, and if even one reasonable doubt exists about an accused person's guilt, that benefit of doubt must go to the accused as a matter of right, not mercy. Finding multiple such doubts here, the court ruled the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and allowed the appeals, overturning the convictions. This case reinforces how courts safe

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case concerns a dispute over the police investigation of a murder arising from a shooting incident at a hotel in Murree, which also involved anti-terrorism charges. After the initial police investigation, one accused was arrested and sent for trial while two others were cleared. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the complainant sought a change of investigation, and a new team found the two previously cleared men guilty. Those two accused then challenged this finding, leading to a Provincial Standing Board recommending yet another re-investigation, which the Inspector General of Police approved. The original complainant then challenged this second change of investigation in the Lahore High Court, arguing that once a challan (police report) had already been submitted to the trial court, the investigation could not legally be reopened, and alleging that the repeated changes favored the influential accused party.

The court dismissed the petition. It held that under Article 18(6) of the Police Order, 2002, a duly constituted board has the legal power to recommend re-investigation, and this power is not barred merely because a challan has already been filed. The court emphasized that an investigating officer's job is only to gather evidence, not to decide guilt or innocence, leaving that determination to the magistrate or trial court. It also noted the complainant could pursue a private complaint as an alternative remedy.

This ruling matters because it clarifies that police investigations can be reopened even after formal charges are filed, provided proper institutional procedures are followed, balancing thorough fact-finding against concerns about delay or misuse.

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a landlord-tenant dispute that had already been fully decided through the courts. A Rent Tribunal in Sargodha had ordered the eviction of a tenant in 2010. The tenant appealed repeatedly, losing at every stage, including before the Lahore High Court and eventually withdrawing an appeal before the Supreme Court. This meant the eviction order had become final.

Afterward, the tenant filed a fresh civil suit claiming ownership of the property and got a temporary status quo order from a civil judge. Using this, he asked the court executing the eviction order to pause the eviction proceedings, arguing that an ownership dispute was pending. When this request was denied, he challenged that denial before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court dismissed his petition. It explained that the legal rule allowing execution to be paused while another suit is pending (Order XXI Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code) only applies when someone is executing a civil court decree, not an eviction order from a Rent Tribunal, which operates on a different legal basis concerning landlord-tenant relationships. The court also noted that the tenant had concealed the existence of the final eviction order in his new ownership suit, which was dishonest and disqualified him from equitable relief.

This case reaffirms that final eviction orders by Rent Tribunals cannot be stalled through unrelated ownership suits, and that courts will not assist litigants who conceal important facts.

PLJ 2013 SC 13 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)

This case was about a landlord-tenant dispute under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, which deals with eviction and rent matters for properties in cantonment areas. The Lahore High Court had earlier dismissed the tenants' appeal against an eviction order, but also directed them to pay rent from August 2001 until they vacated the premises, at Rs. 5,000 per month, before handing over possession.

The tenants challenged this part of the order before the Supreme Court, arguing that while a Rent Controller does have the authority to order eviction when the landlord-tenant relationship itself is disputed, no provision of the 1963 Act actually gives the Rent Controller or any higher court the power to also order payment of specific rent arrears as a condition for vacating the property. The landlord's side argued that such an order was permissible when there was no real dispute about the amount of rent owed.

The Supreme Court examined the Act and could not find any provision supporting the power to impose such a rent-payment condition, and the landlord's lawyer could not point to any legal provision or precedent either. As a result, the Court partly allowed the appeal, removing the condition requiring payment of rent arrears before vacating the premises. However, it clarified that the landlord could still separately claim any unpaid rent through proper legal proceedings. This case matters because it clarifies the limits of a Rent Controller's powers under the cantonment rent law.

PLJ 2010 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 1 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a dispute over whether a woman, Parveen Naz, was validly married to a man named Ch. Maqbool Ahmad. Parveen Naz filed a suit seeking a declaration that no marriage existed between her and Maqbool Ahmad (called a suit for jactitation of marriage), claiming she had never married him and that the nikahnama presented was fake. She said she had earlier divorced her first husband and had since married another man, Imran Jadoon, of her own free will. Maqbool Ahmad denied this, insisting they had married in Karachi in 2003, lived together, and that she later left him without a divorce and remarried unlawfully. He filed his own suit seeking restitution of conjugal rights, meaning he wanted the court to order her to return to the marriage.

The Family Court in Muzaffarabad had dismissed the wife's suit for lack of proof and ruled in favor of the husband, ordering restitution of conjugal rights. She appealed this decision to the Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court.

The High Court examined the evidence from both sides, including nikahnamas, witness testimony, and related court documents, and upheld the Family Court's decision. It held that even though the original nikahnama or its attesting witnesses were not produced, this did not weaken the husband's case given the overall evidence. The court also clarified that the absence of witnesses at a nikah ceremony makes a marriage irregular, not void, and a marriage performed before at

PLJ 2015 · Lahore High Court (Multan Bench)

This case comes from the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, and concerns a petitioner named Ghulam Qadir who sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under the Pakistan Penal Code for offences related to theft and dishonestly receiving stolen property (cattle allegedly taken forcibly from a complainant). He was initially accused of robbery, but that charge was later dropped during investigation and replaced with lesser theft-related offences.

The court noted several important factors in deciding the case. First, there was an unexplained nine-month delay in filing the police report (FIR), which cast doubt on the prosecution's version of events. Second, the allegation that the petitioner had abetted the crime was not backed by any independent evidence. Third, the offences he was ultimately charged with did not fall under the more serious category of crimes that automatically restrict bail. The investigation was complete, the formal charges (challan) had been submitted to the trial court, but the trial itself had not yet begun. The petitioner also had no prior criminal record.

Given these circumstances, the judge ruled that keeping the petitioner in jail indefinitely served no real purpose and granted him bail, requiring him to post bail bonds and a surety. The judgment highlights how delays in reporting crimes and weak evidence can influence bail decisions, and that bail can be granted even in non-bailable offences when the case requires further inquiry.

PLJ 2011 Karachi 120 (DB) · Sindh High Court

This case was about a family dispute over inheritance after the death of Haji Muhammad Zakir. His heirs filed an "administration suit" to determine and distribute his estate among them. One of the heirs, Ghazala Zakir, claimed that a particular property in North Nazimabad, Karachi had been gifted to her by her father before his death, so it was no longer part of his estate and should not be examined in the administration suit. Another heir, Muhammad Zahid, argued that since the property dispute was between the heirs themselves, its validity could and should be decided within the administration suit.

The trial judge had ruled that such gifts, especially where no registered document was challenged, generally fell outside the scope of an administration suit. On appeal, the Sindh High Court disagreed with this rigid approach. The appellate judges held that the real test is not whether the transfer was through a registered document, but whether deciding the issue would disturb the relative shares of the heirs. If resolving the dispute would upset the balance between heirs or give one of them an unfair advantage, then it falls within the scope of an administration suit and can be decided there.

Because of this, the court set aside the earlier decree and sent the case back to the trial court for fresh consideration. The judgment is significant because it clarifies how far administration suits can go in deciding disputed property claims among family members.

PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court

This case involved a dispute between a tenant, Muhammad Younas, and his landlord, Rana Muhammad Zahid, over a shop and basement in Blue Area, Islamabad. The landlord had sought the tenant's eviction after their lease agreement expired, claiming he needed the premises for his own personal use and also alleging rent default. The Rent Controller initially rejected the landlord's eviction request, but on appeal, the Additional District Judge sided with the landlord and ordered the tenant to vacate within two months. The tenant then challenged this decision before the Islamabad High Court.

By the time the matter reached the High Court, the rent default allegation was no longer being pursued, so the only issue was whether the landlord's claim of personal bona fide need was genuine. The tenant argued that the landlord had never clearly explained why he needed the shop. However, the court found that during cross-examination, the landlord had revealed he intended to start a vegetable business after returning from Saudi Arabia, which was sufficient to establish genuine need, even though it wasn't spelled out in the original application.

The court dismissed the tenant's petition, upholding the eviction order. It clarified that courts exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction generally don't disturb factual findings of lower courts unless there's clear misreading of evidence or legal error. The court also noted that if the landlord's claimed use later proves false, the tenant could pursue separate legal remedies for that violation.

PLJ 2011 · Peshawar High Court

This case from the Peshawar High Court dealt with a long-running dispute over a private criminal complaint. The petitioner, Mir Qasim Khan, had accused the respondents of using a forged special power of attorney to drag him into a fabricated civil lawsuit. The complaint bounced between a Magistrate, a Sessions Judge, and an Additional Sessions Judge multiple times, with disagreements over which criminal sections applied and which court had jurisdiction, particularly regarding forgery under Section 467 PPC, which must be tried by a Sessions Court.

Eventually a Magistrate found the complaint maintainable and ruled that the forgery allegations did fall under Section 467 PPC, sending the case for trial before the appropriate Sessions Court. The respondents challenged this, but the High Court examined its own inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, explaining that these powers allow it to make any order necessary to prevent abuse of court process or to secure justice, even without a formal application, and even on matters not directly raised by the parties.

The court also clarified that restrictions under Section 195(1)(c) of the Cr.P.C, which require special permission before prosecuting certain offences, do not apply to forgery under Section 467 PPC. Based on this reasoning, the court allowed the quashment petition, effectively permitting the criminal case to proceed. The judgment matters because it reinforces the High Court's broad inherent authority to ensure fair process and correct procedural errors in criminal cases.

PLD 1980 SC 298; Inayat Ullah v. Zahoor ud Din 1987 SCMR 1313; Muham · Islamabad High Court

This case is about a landlord-tenant dispute in Islamabad concerning eviction of a tenant from a shop-cum-flat. The landlady, Mst. Jahanzeba Begum, had filed an eviction petition claiming the tenant defaulted on rent payments, violated the lease agreement, and failed to pay increased rent as required under the tenancy agreement and law. Both the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge ruled in favor of the landlady and ordered the tenant to vacate.

The tenant challenged these orders before the Islamabad High Court. The Court found that the eviction orders were largely based on the tenant's failure to pay a Rs. 500 per day penalty for late rent payments, and on his failure to pay an automatic rent increase. The Court held that this penalty clause violated the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, which specifically prohibits such penalties, making that part of the agreement void from the start. The Court also found that the landlady had never issued a proper notice demanding the increased statutory rent, nor had she applied to strike off the tenant's defence, so she could not rely on that ground either.

As a result, the High Court set aside both lower rulings and dismissed the landlady's eviction petition. This case is significant because it clarifies that landlords cannot evict tenants based on contractual penalty clauses that conflict with rent laws, and that proper legal procedure must be followed before claiming rent increases as grounds for eviction.

PLJ 2010 Cr.C. ( · Lahore High Court

This case involves a complaint filed by Dr. Maqsood Hussain against 36 people, asking the court to convict them for qazf (false accusation of zina, or unlawful sexual intercourse, under Islamic criminal law) for allegedly spreading claims that he had committed zina-bil-jabr (rape). This stemmed from an earlier case where a woman, injured in the 2005 earthquake and being treated in Lahore, had accused Dr. Maqsood of assault, leading to an FIR against him. She later said media persons had pressured her into making the complaint and asked that it be withdrawn; the original case against the doctor was eventually cancelled.

When Dr. Maqsood later filed his qazf complaint, the Additional Sessions Judge handling it adjourned the case repeatedly, often without proper reason, and eventually issued arrest warrants against the accused persons without properly following the law. The High Court found that the trial judge had violated Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires a magistrate to examine a complainant under oath and record the statement properly before proceeding. This had not been done.

The High Court also found that, based on the complaint and the woman's own statement, no actual offence of qazf had been established against the accused. For these reasons, the court declared the lower court's proceedings and warrants illegal and quashed them.

This case highlights the importance of following proper procedure before issuing serious orders like arrest warrants, and clarifies that criminal accusations must be backed by clear evidence of an actual offence.

PLJ 2013 · Sindh High Court

This case concerns a civil suit filed by Kohinoor Tobacco Company against S.M. Idrees Allawala, seeking declaration, injunction, and delivery of title deeds. While the case was at the stage of the plaintiff presenting evidence, the plaintiff filed an application asking the court's permission to produce 28 additional documents that had not been submitted earlier, relying on Order XIII Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code along with Section 151.

The plaintiff explained that these documents were part of old records that had gotten mixed up with other papers and were only recently retrieved. The defendant opposed this, arguing the request was a delay tactic since years had passed since issues were framed and evidence had already begun, including testimony from official witnesses.

The Sindh High Court ruled in favor of allowing the documents to be produced. The judge explained that whether "good cause" exists for late production is not governed by rigid rules but depends on the facts of each case, left to the court's discretion. Importantly, mere delay in filing such an application is not, by itself, sufficient reason to refuse the documents. The purpose of the relevant procedural rule is to keep out forged or fabricated documents and ensure speedy trials, not to block genuine, relevant evidence. Since the authenticity of the documents was not seriously in doubt, the court allowed them to be produced, emphasizing that procedural rules should serve justice rather than obstruct it.

PLJ 2013 SC 834 · Lahore High Court

This case concerns a police constable, Tariq Mahmood, who was dismissed from service in 1992 after being implicated in a criminal case involving fraud and forgery charges. He was also briefly absent from duty around the same time. He filed a departmental appeal and later a revision petition, but the revision was kept pending for roughly 17 years while the related criminal case and a civil suit were decided. He was eventually acquitted of the criminal charges in 2010, and his revision petition was then allowed, meaning his dismissal was effectively reversed.

The dispute before the Supreme Court was whether he was entitled to back pay and benefits for the long period he was out of service, and whether the Punjab Service Tribunal had wrongly modified his punishment.

The Supreme Court held that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, so the department could not deny him benefits merely because of a pending criminal case. It ruled that reinstated employees are normally entitled to back benefits unless proven to have been gainfully employed elsewhere during that period. Since the long delay in deciding his revision petition was caused by the department, not by him, he could not be blamed for it. The Court directed a committee to calculate his entitlement, excluding only the short period of unexplained absence, and dismissed the department's appeal.

This case matters because it reinforces that civil servants should not suffer financially due to delays caused by the government's own administrative processes, and it clarifies principles on reinstatement and back-pay entitlements.

PLJ 1992 AJK 45 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a civil suit filed by Kashmir Steel Mills against electricity department officials, seeking a perpetual injunction. During the proceedings before the District Judge, Mirpur, the defendants failed to appear on a hearing date, so the court proceeded against them ex-parte, meaning the case continued without their side being heard, and the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence. The defendants later applied to have this ex-parte order set aside, but their application was dismissed for being improperly filed and lacking sufficient justification for their absence.

The AJK High Court examined the record and found serious problems with how the ex-parte order was made. It noted that the defendants were still in the process of being served summons and had not all been properly notified, and that the date in question was not actually a hearing date for the main suit but for a related application. The application to set aside the ex-parte order, though filed on time, was presented by an unauthorized clerk and lacked a supporting affidavit.

The Court also addressed whether the Superintending Engineer, who was not originally a party to the suit, could be added as a defendant. Relying on Order I Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, it held that he was a necessary party whose presence was required for the court to fully resolve the dispute, and directed him to apply to be impleaded.

Ultimately, the High Court found the ex-parte proceedings unwarranted and illegal, set them aside, and allowed the petition, emphasizing that lower courts and lawyers had mishand

PLJ 1987 · Lahore High Court

This case from the Lahore High Court dealt with a property dispute originating from a suit challenging a 1956 consent decree as fraudulent. The trial court ruled in favor of three plaintiffs jointly - Muhammad Umar, Mukhtaran Bibi, and Iqbal

PLJ 2013 Tax Cases ( · Not specified

This case involves Dewan Cement Limited, which challenged customs authorities' attempts to recover outstanding duty and taxes from the company. The customs department had issued a warrant of attachment to recover about Rs. 86.8 million in unpaid dues.

The company's dispute over this demand was already pending before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had earlier refused to stay the recovery and instead ordered the company to deposit the amount within 15 days via a bank guarantee. When the company failed to comply, it went to the High Court instead, which also ordered it to submit a bank guarantee for 50% of the demand. The company again failed to comply with this order too.

Rather than following either the Tribunal's or the Court's directions, the company filed yet another petition, this time also claiming it was entitled to sale proceeds from its own goods that customs had auctioned, asking for these to be refunded or adjusted against its tax liability.

The High Court found that the company had repeatedly ignored binding orders from both the Tribunal and the Court itself, seemingly to avoid paying its admitted tax liability altogether. It held that such conduct was dishonest and contemptuous, disqualifying the company from receiving any discretionary relief under the Court's constitutional jurisdiction. Since there was no valid stay order protecting the company and it had failed to honor the consent order, the Court dismissed the petition. This case underscores that courts will not reward parties who disregard prior judicial directions while seeking fresh relief.

PLJ 1998 Karachi 289 · Sindh High Court

This case involved a dispute over property, where the District Council Tharparkar had filed an appeal against a judgment involving Syed Muhammad Wali and the Government of Sindh. When the appeal reached the District Judge, the Government of Sindh, which had been a defendant in the original suit, was not made a party to the appeal. A preliminary objection was raised before the Sindh High Court arguing that this omission made the entire appeal legally defective and therefore the revision petition arising from it should be dismissed.

The High Court examined Order XLI, Rule 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows an appellate court to add a person as a respondent if that person was party to the original suit and is interested in the outcome of the appeal. The court noted that this rule does not specify any automatic penalty for failing to implead such a person, and that the matter is left to the court's discretion based on whether the omitted party is genuinely necessary and affected by the outcome.

The court found that the Government of Sindh had no real stake in the dispute, had not claimed ownership of the property, had never objected during nearly five years of proceedings, and had not appealed itself. The real contest was between the plaintiff and the other defendant. Since the Government was merely a formal party and not genuinely affected, the court held that its non-joinder did not invalidate the appeal, and the objection was rejected.

This case clarifies that not every missing party automatically defeats an appeal; courts must assess whether that party was truly necessary to the dispute.

PLJ 2014 Cr.C. ( · Sindh High Court

This case involved a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, filed by a husband who claimed his wife, Mst. Shaista, was being wrongfully confined by her brothers. He said he had married her, was pressured by his own family into signing divorce papers, but insisted he never actually pronounced the divorce, making it invalid under religious rulings he obtained. The brothers countered that a valid divorce had indeed taken place and been formally conveyed.

The Sindh High Court, however, found that it could not resolve the dispute over whether the divorce was valid within a habeas corpus proceeding, since that required separate legal determination. Instead, the court focused on what it could decide: the woman's personal liberty. Since Mst. Shaista was an adult (sui juris) capable of managing her own affairs, she could not be forced to live with her husband, her brothers, or be kept in a shelter home (Darul Aman) against her wishes. The court explained that under Islamic law, a woman cannot be compelled to live with her husband if she disagrees, and her husband's only recourse would be to file a separate suit for restitution of conjugal rights.

The court ultimately ordered that she be set free to live wherever she chose, emphasizing her constitutional right to liberty under Article 9. This case matters because it reinforces that adult women have the legal right to make their own choices about where and with whom they live, regardless of pressure from husbands or family members.

PLJ 2014 · Peshawar High Court

This case is about a wife who sued for dissolution of her marriage, dower, maintenance, and dowry articles, claiming her husband was cruel and infertile, and had hidden his infertility from her before marriage. The Family Court dissolved the marriage, reasoning that concealing infertility amounted to cruelty, and awarded her part of her dower and maintenance. On appeal, the Additional District Judge disagreed with that reasoning but still dissolved the marriage, changing the basis from cruelty to khula (a wife-initiated separation), while also granting her the dowry articles she sought. The matter eventually reached the Supreme Court, which sent it back to the Peshawar High Court for a fresh decision.

The High Court held that the wife herself admitted she knew about her husband's infertility before marriage, and she could not prove ongoing cruelty or that infertility was still an issue. Since infertility is not a recognized ground for divorce under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, and is simply a natural condition beyond human control, it could not justify dissolution on that basis. However, the court reaffirmed that even if a wife fails to prove the specific grounds she claims, she can still be granted separation through khula if she is unwilling to continue the marriage, since Islamic law does not compel spouses to remain in a marriage devoid of harmony.

This judgment matters because it clarifies that family courts can grant khula as a fallback remedy even when a wife's stated grounds for divorce (like cruelty or infertility) aren't pro

PLJ 2014 SC (AJ&K) 102 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case was an appeal before the AJ&K Supreme Court concerning a marital dispute. Shamaila Bibi had sought dissolution of her marriage from her husband Abdul Hafeez, along with recovery of dower, dowry, and maintenance, alleging cruelty, false accusations of bad character, physical mistreatment, and being thrown out of the house. The husband denied this, claiming the real dispute was over an unpaid loan his father owed her father, and he separately sued for restitution of conjugal rights.

The Family Court had earlier granted dissolution of marriage and ordered recovery of dower and dowry, while dismissing claims for maintenance and restitution of conjugal rights. On appeal, the Shariat Court partly modified this, upholding dissolution on grounds of cruelty and non-payment of dower, while maintaining the dowry recovery decree.

The husband further appealed, arguing there was no real evidence of cruelty and that inconsistencies in the wife's account undermined her claims. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that cruelty in matrimonial cases does not require physical injury - false allegations damaging a spouse's reputation and causing mental torture and loss of mutual trust also qualify as cruelty. The court upheld the dissolution of marriage, the recovery of deferred dower (since the husband failed to transfer the promised house), and the dowry recovery decree, since the wife proved these items remained with the husband.

This judgment matters because it affirms that mental and emotional harm, not just physical viol

PLJ 2007 · Lahore High Court

This case is about who has to pay maintenance for a child, and whether that child was legally legitimate. A wife left her husband's home and later gave birth to a son about eleven months after their separation. She filed a family court case seeking dissolution of marriage, return of her dowry items, and maintenance for herself and the child. The husband denied the child was his, claiming the timing proved the boy was illegitimate, and also disputed handing over some dowry items.

Both the trial court and the appellate family court ruled against the husband, granting dissolution of marriage, ordering return of dowry articles, and awarding maintenance to both the wife and child. The husband then challenged these decisions before the Lahore High Court.

The High Court upheld the lower courts' rulings. It explained that under Islamic law, a child born within two years of a marriage's dissolution is presumed legitimate, and a father cannot simply deny paternity to avoid paying maintenance—he must follow a strict legal procedure (called Liyan) before a competent court to formally disown a child, which the husband never did. The court also rejected his objections to the dowry articles, since he had not raised these issues properly earlier and the items were established to be in his possession.

The case matters because it reinforces that children's rights to maintenance and legitimacy are strongly protected by law, and fathers cannot evade responsibility through mere denial.

PLJ 2013 · Peshawar High Court

This case involves a dispute over the custody of a vehicle whose identity had been questioned by police. The petitioner, Iftekhar Ali, was driving a car that police stopped and seized because he could not produce valid ownership documents. An investigation revealed that the vehicle's chassis number appeared to have been tampered with, and its registration book was not genuine according to the registering authority. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner, though he was eventually acquitted of the criminal charges. However, the courts ordered the vehicle itself to be confiscated by the State rather than returned to him.

The petitioner claimed he was a genuine buyer who had purchased the car for nine lakh rupees and produced witnesses to support the sale. However, he could not produce the actual seller or the people who had prepared and witnessed the sale document, leaving key facts about the purchase unverified. Forensic reports from two laboratories confirmed the chassis number had been altered, and there was no valid transfer letter or original registration book in his name.

The Peshawar High Court held that given tampered vehicle identification, lack of genuine ownership documents, and absence of credible proof of purchase, the lower courts were right to refuse returning the vehicle and to confiscate it to the State. The petition to quash these decisions was dismissed. The case highlights that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a person to recover property suspected of being linked to fraud, especially when ownership documents cannot be authenticated.

PLJ 2013 Tax Cases ( · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case concerns an oil tanker that was seized in a customs case and later ordered confiscated and auctioned by the Special Judge Customs and Taxation in Karachi. The vehicle's owner challenged this order, arguing that Customs Courts do not have the legal authority to order confiscation and auction of seized goods. Instead, that power belongs to customs adjudicating authorities and the Customs Appellate Tribunal under specific provisions of the Customs Act, 1969.

The Sindh High Court agreed with the appellant. Relying on an earlier Supreme Court ruling, the judge explained that criminal proceedings before a Special Judge (to punish smuggling) and adjudication proceedings before customs officers (to decide whether goods should be confiscated) are separate and independent processes, even though they arise from the same law. The court found it was especially wrong for the Special Judge to order confiscation and auction when adjudication proceedings over the same vehicle were already pending before customs authorities and an appeal was pending before the Customs Appellate Tribunal.

The court therefore set aside the Special Judge's order regarding confiscation and auction of the vehicle. However, it did not order the vehicle released outright. Instead, it allowed the owner to apply for release of the vehicle to the proper authority, the customs adjudicating officer or the Appellate Tribunal, who were directed to decide the request within two weeks.

This case matters because it clarifies that courts handling customs criminal cases cannot bypass the specialized administrative process for deciding the f

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 484 · Lahore High Court

This case involves a man named Malik Irfan who was accused of issuing a dishonored cheque worth Rs. 200,000 under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, which deals with cheques issued dishonestly without sufficient funds. He was arrested and sought post-arrest bail from the Lahore High Court.

His lawyer argued that there was an unexplained delay of five months and ten days between the alleged incident and the filing of the FIR, that the dispute was essentially a civil financial matter rather than a criminal one, that he had no prior criminal record, and that since the police investigation was already complete, there was no need to keep him in custody.

The court agreed with these arguments. It noted the significant, unexplained delay in registering the FIR and found that the underlying dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It also pointed out that since the maximum punishment for this offense does not exceed three years, the case did not fall under the stricter bail provisions reserved for more serious crimes. Citing earlier Supreme Court precedent, the judge noted that for offenses not punishable by death, life imprisonment, or ten years in prison, granting bail should be the normal rule rather than the exception.

As a result, the court granted bail, requiring the petitioner to submit bail bonds of Rs. 50,000 with a surety. This case illustrates how delays in filing FIRs and the civil nature of financial disputes can be significant factors favoring bail in cheque dishonor cases.

PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1005 · Lahore High Court

This case involved Aslam Pervaiz, who was accused of issuing a dishonoured cheque worth Rs. 442,000 under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, a crime related to fraudulent cheques. The cheque had reportedly been issued as part of a land purchase deal, but the land was never actually transferred to him.

The complainant's side argued that the petitioner should be denied bail because he had around 25 similar cases against him, suggesting he was a habitual offender, and that the land had instead been transferred to another person named Qamar supposedly on the petitioner's instructions.

The Lahore High Court disagreed with denying bail on these grounds. It noted that having other pending cases does not automatically disqualify someone from bail if they otherwise qualify on merit, and the petitioner had no prior convictions. Importantly, the sale deed produced in court showed Qamar, not the petitioner, as the buyer, and police had never recorded any statement from Qamar confirming he acted on the petitioner's behalf. The court also pointed out that this type of offence does not fall under the restrictive "prohibitory clause" that normally makes bail harder to get, and that the matter required further inquiry before guilt could be established.

As a result, the court granted bail, requiring the petitioner to submit bail bonds of Rs. 100,000 with one surety. This case illustrates how courts assess bail based on concrete evidence rather than general allegations or an accused's reputation.

PLJ 2007 SC 910 · Peshawar High Court

This case was a service law dispute about what happens to a government employee's probation status when various administrative actions occur during that period.

Dr. Waqar-ur-Rehman Qureshi was appointed as a Lecturer and later provisionally appointed as Assistant Professor at Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad, subject to a two-year probation period. Under the applicable rules, if no confirmation letter was issued after two years, the probation would automatically be considered extended for one more year, after which he would become a regular employee. While still within this probation period, he was granted unpaid leave to work abroad in Saudi Arabia through the Overseas Employment Corporation, with the understanding that he would complete his remaining probation upon return. However, before his leave ended, the Chief Executive of the institution repatriated him back to his parent department without any hearing.

The Peshawar High Court ruled in his favor, and the Supreme Court upheld that decision, refusing the institution's request for leave to appeal. The Court held that probation periods can be suspended, postponed, or extended, and that the employee's repatriation was done unilaterally without giving him any opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and the service rules governing medical institutions.

This case matters because it confirms that employers cannot unilaterally terminate or alter an employee's service status during probation without following proper procedure and affording a fair hearing, reinforcing protections for employees even during probationary periods.

PLJ 2012 · Lahore High Court

This case involved a man, Muhammad Yar alias Allah Yar, accused of forcibly abducting a woman named Mst. Shazia Nasim for illicit purposes, along with stealing cash and gold ornaments, under charges including abduction and rape (Sections 380, 365-B, and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code). He sought bail while awaiting trial.

The Lahore High Court granted him post-arrest bail. The court reasoned that the complainant was not an eyewitness, and no one from the area came forward to confirm that the woman had resisted or that force was used during the alleged abduction. Since there was no evidence of restraint or resistance, the court held that the offence of abduction was not clearly established at this stage—suggesting the case looked more like elopement, especially since the woman had appeared before various courts admitting she had married the petitioner (Nikah). The court also noted a suspicious one-month delay in filing the police report, and that the Nikah reportedly took place before the FIR was lodged. A related case questioning the validity of the marriage was still pending, and a co-accused had already been granted bail and cleared during investigation.

This judgment matters because it reinforces a legal principle: for abduction charges to apply, there must be evidence of force or resistance by the alleged victim. Mere allegations, without supporting proof of coercion, may not meet the threshold required to deny bail, especially when conflicting narratives and procedural delays raise doubts about the prosecution's case.

PLJ 2009 Cr.C. ( · Lahore High Court

This case involved a habeas corpus petition filed by Azmat Bashir on behalf of his brother, Mazhar Bashir, who had been illegally detained by police. Mazhar was arrested from his home in Okara by a police sub-inspector, not because he had committed any crime, but because his two brothers were allegedly involved in criminal cases and one was absconding. He was held for 20 days without being produced before any court, was not named in any FIR, and his arrest was never officially recorded. Medical examination confirmed he had been physically tortured, apparently to force him to reveal his absconding brother's whereabouts.

The Lahore High Court, acting under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ordered the detenu's recovery through a court bailiff, who found him hidden at a police station. After hearing the police officers involved, who could not justify their actions, the court ordered Mazhar's immediate release. It ruled that no person can be punished or tortured for a crime committed by a relative, and that such treatment violates both the Constitution's guarantees of life and liberty and international human rights law.

The court awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 25,000 to be paid personally by the two police officers responsible, acknowledging that no sum could truly compensate for lost freedom and suffering. It also directed the Inspector General of Police Punjab to take disciplinary action against the officers, emphasizing that illegal detention and torture of innocent citizens cannot be tolerated.

PLJ 2011 · Lahore High Court

Here is a plain-language explainer.

This case involved a husband and wife whose marriage had broken down. The husband pronounced divorce (talaq) and sent notices about it, but there was confusion and dispute over where the wife actually lived, since she had moved between different addresses in Lahore after leaving the matrimonial home. The wife argued that the divorce notices were sent to the wrong Union Council, one that did not have jurisdiction over her actual residence, and that this made the divorce proceedings legally ineffective.

After earlier litigation clarified her correct address, the husband issued a fresh divorce notice to that address and informed the relevant Union Council, the wife, her brothers, and other parties. The wife still did not respond or appear before the arbitration council, and the case shows a pattern of her repeatedly challenging procedural technicalities to delay the divorce taking effect.

The Lahore High Court dismissed her petition, holding that the legal requirements under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance to notify the Union Council are directory, not mandatory, since no penalty exists for failing to follow them. Failure to serve notice correctly is merely an irregularity and does not invalidate a divorce that has already been properly pronounced and communicated.

This case matters because it clarifies that technical lapses in notifying authorities about a divorce cannot be used to block or delay a divorce that has already validly taken place, preventing parties from exploiting procedural loopholes to prolong marital disputes.

SCMR  1298     SUPREME-COURT-OF-UK · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case concerns a UK Supreme Court decision (Jones v Kaney) that was cited and reported in Pakistani legal citation (SCMR 1298). The case arose from a personal injury claim after a road traffic accident. The claimant's solicitors hired a consultant clinical psychologist to examine him and prepare an expert report for his compensation case. She initially diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder, but later signed a joint statement prepared by the opposing side's expert without reviewing or amending it properly. This joint statement undermined the claimant's case, suggesting he was being deceptive about his symptoms. As a result, the claimant was forced to settle his claim for far less money than he otherwise would have received.

The claimant then tried to sue his own expert witness for negligence, but she argued that expert witnesses are legally immune from being sued for how they perform in court proceedings. The court examined whether this traditional immunity should continue.

The court ruled that expert witnesses should no longer be immune from lawsuits for breach of duty related to their court participation. It reasoned that experts must testify honestly regardless of whether this helps or hurts their clients, and there is no real conflict between duties owed to the client and to the court. Removing immunity would not discourage honest experts, only penalize negligent ones. This ruling matters because it makes expert witnesses accountable for careless or negligent work, strengthening the integrity of expert evidence in legal proceedings. However, experts still retain protection from defamation claims.

CLC  1274     SUPREME-COURT-AZAD-KASHMIR · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court

This case involved a dispute between Allah Ditta and Muhammad Sharif over a suit for possession of property. The trial court and the first appellate court had both dismissed the suit. The matter then went to the High Court on second appeal, which sent the case back (remanded it) to the appellate court, directing it to decide the case afresh. The losing party challenged this remand before the Supreme Court of Azad Kashmir.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the case. It explained that under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Civil Procedure Code, an appellate court is legally required to properly discuss the evidence and record findings on each issue raised in a case. As a court of facts, the appellate court cannot simply give a short, bare-bones ruling without engaging with the evidence - unless deciding just one or two key issues is enough on its own to resolve the whole case.

In this particular case, the appellate court had only addressed the question of limitation but failed to decide whether the suit was barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the CPC (a rule about splitting claims), and had not even framed that issue properly. Since this unresolved issue was crucial to deciding the appeal, the appellate court's brief, incomplete judgment was inadequate.

This ruling matters because it reinforces that courts must give reasoned, issue-by-issue judgments, ensuring fairness and transparency, rather than deciding cases in a cursory or incomplete manner.

SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan

This case involved a police officer, an Assistant Sub-Inspector, who was dismissed from service in 1994 over a charge of being absent from duty. His appeal to the Service Tribunal was rejected. However, in 2005 the Chief Minister accepted his mercy petition and directed his reinstatement. The authorities implemented this directive, and the officer went on to complete required training, get his name entered into the promotion list, and was eventually promoted twice, first to Sub-Inspector and later to Inspector.

Two years after reinstatement, the government issued a show-cause notice claiming the reinstatement itself had been illegal, but later withdrew this notice while a court case challenging it was pending. Despite this, years later in 2002 the authorities dismissed the officer again, this time retroactively, treating his service as having ended back in 1994. The Service Tribunal ruled in his favor, and the government appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, upholding the officer's reinstatement. It held that dismissal cannot be made retrospective unless a law specifically allows it, and that a wrong cannot be corrected at any time, especially after someone has served diligently and earned promotions over many years. The Court also noted that once the government withdrew its show-cause notice, the matter was closed and could not be reopened without lawful justification. This case highlights protections against arbitrary retrospective punishment and the importance of finality in administrative decisions affecting employees' careers.

· Supreme Court of Pakistan

This judgment, from the Lahore High Court in 2009, deals with a dispute over inheritance in which an uncle tried to challenge the legitimacy of his deceased brother's children in order to claim their share of property.

The court found strong evidence against the uncle's claim. He had consistently referred to his deceased brother as the father of these children in his own court filings, from the trial court all the way up. He had also raised no objection to their paternity when the inheritance mutation was first recorded in their favor. There was no proof that the children were born after their mother's divorce or that she had engaged in adultery. Notably, the uncle even offered a deal: he would accept the children as legitimate if they gave up their inheritance rights, a stance the court found hypocritical and contrary to Islamic legal principles (Fiqa).

The court applied the Sunni school's presumption that a child born six months after marriage, or within two years of its dissolution, is presumed legitimate. The uncle had also failed to use the proper Islamic legal procedure (Liyan) of swearing before a Qazi to formally disown the children as illegitimate. Since the deceased father himself never denied or disowned these children during his lifetime, the court ruled they were legitimate and entitled to inherit his estate.

This case matters because it protects children's inheritance rights against opportunistic relatives and reaffirms established legal presumptions of legitimacy.

· Supreme Court of Pakistan

This judgment explains an important rule about how courts must decide whether to impose the death penalty in criminal cases. Under Section 235(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, after convicting an accused, the court must give them a genuine opportunity to be heard on what punishment should follow. The judgment clarifies that this is not a mere formality - courts must actively try to bring out any facts, circumstances, or evidence relevant to sentencing, even if the accused stays silent or simply denies guilt. This hearing requirement works together with Section 354(3), which requires courts to record "special reasons" when awarding a death sentence instead of a lesser punishment.

The case involved Ajay Pandit, a dentist who deceived people with promises of sending them abroad for better opportunities; some victims were murdered and others barely escaped. The trial court had given him a life sentence, but the matter came up for possible enhancement to death. The court found that the lower courts had merely recorded the accused's bare denial without making any real effort to explore factors that might weigh against a death sentence.

The ruling mat

PLJ 2010 SC 846 · Lahore High Court

This Supreme Court case involved a husband and wife, Ghulam Murtaza and Asia Bibi, who jointly purchased several properties during their marriage, some of which were later transferred into the wife's name. After the couple separated, the wife sued claiming ownership of the properties, while the husband filed competing suits arguing that his wife was merely a "benami," meaning she held the properties only in name while he was the true owner because he had paid for them. The trial court and first appellate court agreed with the husband, but the Lahore High Court reversed those decisions, finding the evidence had been misread. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's ruling.

The Court explained that a transaction is not automatically "benami" just because one person paid the money while property was registered in someone else's name. Key factors include the source of funds, who holds the title documents, who possesses and controls the property, and most importantly, the motive behind the arrangement. If a person deliberately places property in another's name intending genuinely to transfer ownership, it is not benami, even if that person provided the money. The Court found the husband failed to prove his wife was a benami titleholder, especially since she managed the properties and paid for one deed herself. The judgment matters because it clarifies that spouses cannot later claim sole ownership of jointly acquired property simply because a relationship breaks down, protecting the genuine intentions behind family property arrangements.