Case Highlights
Plain-language explainers of notable judgments, written after reading the full judgment text — not a substitute for the actual opinion, which you can always read in full via the link below each summary.
Illegal Selling of Auqaf Properties
PLJ 2014 SC 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
The Supreme Court took up this matter on its own initiative (suo motu) after concerns were raised about a land deal between the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETP Board) and the Defence Housing Authority (DHA). The ETP Board had originally agreed to exchange evacuee trust land with DHA in return for 33% of the resulting developed plots. But after the Board was reconstituted and a new chairman appointed, that deal was quietly revised down to just 25% - even though DHA's own offer had actually improved in the meantime. The Court found this reduction suspicious, noting it caused real financial loss to a charitable trust and appeared to reflect improper motives behind the Board's reconstitution. It ruled the revised 25% agreement unlawful, and gave DHA a choice: honor the original, better 33% terms within 30 days, or return the entire property. The case is a clear example of the Court using its suo motu power to step in and protect public/charitable assets from being quietly given away below their fair value.
Read the full judgment →Civil Court Cannot Be Rent Controller
PLJ 2015 Islamabad 187 · Islamabad High Court
This case addresses a common practical problem: what happens when a landlord and tenant end up fighting the same property dispute in two different forums at once - a regular civil suit and a separate rent case? Here, one side had filed a civil suit for specific performance based on a lease agreement, while the other side filed ejectment (eviction) cases over the same property. The petitioner asked the trial court to consolidate all these cases together to avoid contradictory rulings, but the request was denied. The Islamabad High Court held that this refusal was correct in principle: a Rent Controller and a Civil Court operate under different procedures and different laws (the Rent Ordinance vs. the Civil Procedure Code), so their cases generally shouldn't be merged just because they involve the same property. That said, the Court still allowed the petitioner's revision, finding room within the specific facts of this case to proceed differently. The core takeaway for practitioners: rent matters and civil suits are legally distinct tracks, even when they arise from the same underlying property dispute.
Read the full judgment →Bridal Gift is not returnable
PLJ 2010 Peshawar 16 (DB) · Peshawar High Court
**What was this case about?** A husband (Shah Nawaz) and wife (Suria Bibi) were in a legal dispute after their marriage broke down. The wife had sued for maintenance, dower (mahr), a share in property, and dissolution of marriage. She had received 10 tolas of gold ornaments and 5 kanals of land as dower under a deed signed at marriage. The trial court initially ordered the return of conjugal rights to the husband and awarded gold to the wife. On appeal, the Additional District Judge granted the wife a divorce through *Khula* (a wife-initiated divorce), on the condition that she give up her claim to the 5 kanals of land. However, the appellate court still allowed her to keep the 10 tolas of gold, treating it now as a "bridal gift" rather than dower. The husband challenged this in the Peshawar High Court, arguing that under the Bridal Gift Act, 1976, she wasn't entitled to keep the gold. **What did the court decide?** The High Court dismissed the husband's petition. It ruled that once a couple marries, signs the dower deed, and lives together as husband and wife, the husband is legally bound to give the promised gifts/dower — and the Bridal Gift Act's restrictions don't apply to cancel this obligation. **Why it matters:** This case clarifies that marital gifts or dower promised in a deed remain the wife's entitlement even after divorce, reinforcing protections for women's property rights within Islamic family law in Pakistan.
Read the full judgment →Court can appoint local commission suo moto
PLJ 2012 Lahore 67 · Lahore High Court
# Case Explainer: Appointment of Local Commission by Court **What was the dispute about?** This case arose from a property lawsuit in Minchanabad. Muhammad Saleem and others sued Abdul Khaliq and others for possession of land, claiming ownership. The defendants argued they owned the property through registered sale deeds. Since the dispute involved figuring out the exact location/boundaries (khata and killa numbers) of the property, the court needed technical help to clarify this. **What happened procedurally?** The trial court appointed a local commissioner (an Assistant Collector) to physically inspect and determine the correct plot numbers. However, this commissioner reported that demarcation wasn't possible because the property was in a populated urban area. Unsatisfied, the trial judge then asked a more senior revenue officer (the Deputy Collector) to handle the demarcation instead. The defendants objected, arguing this second appointment was improper, but their appeal to the Additional District Judge was rejected. They then challenged both orders before the High Court. **What did the High Court decide?** The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the lower courts' decisions. It clarified that under Order XXVI, Rules 9 and 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, a court has the authority to appoint a local commission **on its own initiative (suo moto)** — not just when a party requests it — whenever this would help clarify disputed facts. The court also found that the parties had been given proper notice and an opportunity to raise objections to the commissioner's
Read the full judgment →CPC and QSO are not applicable in family suits
PLJ 2011 Lahore 438 · Lahore High Court
**What was this case about?** A husband and wife were disputing dowry articles after their marriage broke down. The wife had filed a suit to recover dowry items (or their cash value) from her husband. The Family Court ruled largely in her favor, and this decision was upheld and even partly enhanced on appeal. The husband then challenged these decisions before the Lahore High Court, arguing about procedural issues—particularly whether certain documents and testimony (including a list of dowry items and statements given through his "special attorney") should have been considered as valid evidence. **What did the court decide?** The High Court dismissed the husband's objections. It clarified two important points: 1. Under family law, a husband can be represented by an attorney, and statements/written submissions made through that attorney are valid and can be considered by the court. 2. Ordinary civil procedure rules (the Code of Civil Procedure) and the standard law of evidence (Qanun-e-Shahadat) do **not** strictly apply in family court cases. Family Court judges have flexibility in how they handle evidence and procedure. Once a document is formally exhibited as evidence, it cannot later be "de-exhibited" or excluded on technical grounds. **Why does this matter?** This ruling reinforces that family courts operate with more flexible, simplified procedures than regular civil courts—prioritizing substantive justice over rigid technical rules. This makes it harder for parties to use procedural technicalities to delay or derail family disputes like dowry recovery cases, helping such cases be resolved more effic
Read the full judgment →Every muslim is sunni unless proved contrary
PLJ 2009 Lahore 958 · Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)
**What was this case about?** A woman, Mst. Sarwar Noor, claimed she was the sole heir to her deceased mother's land, arguing that because her mother was "Shia," a male relative (a collateral relative on her father's side) who would normally inherit under Sunni inheritance rules should be excluded. This claim mattered because Sunni and Shia inheritance rules differ, particularly regarding which relatives count as heirs. However, she had never raised this "Shia" argument during the earlier revenue proceedings (mutation disputes, appeals, and a revision petition)—she only brought it up when she filed a fresh civil suit. The male relative, meanwhile, argued the family was actually Sunni. **What did the court decide?** The Lahore High Court dismissed her case. It held that Pakistani law presumes every Muslim is Sunni unless proven otherwise. Since she was claiming her mother was Shia (the exception), the burden was on her to prove it. Her only evidence was that a "Shia Maulvi" led the funeral prayers—which the court found weak and insufficient, especially since the opposing side produced an equal number of witnesses supporting the Sunni claim. **Why does it matter?** This case establishes an important legal presumption in Pakistani inheritance law: courts will assume a Muslim is Sunni by default, and anyone claiming otherwise (to invoke different inheritance rules) must provide strong, convincing proof—not just minor circumstantial details like who performed a funeral prayer.
Read the full judgment →Importance of columns of Nikahnama
PLJ 2012 Lahore 372 · Lahore High Court
**What was this case about?** A husband and wife married in 2005, but the "rukhsati" (the ceremony where the wife moves to the husband's home to start married life) never took place, and the marriage was never consummated. The husband eventually divorced her in 2007. The Nikahnama (marriage contract) contained several important entries: dower of Rs. 300,000 already paid at the time of Nikah, additional items (gold ornaments and a house) promised at the time of rukhsati, and a special condition that if the husband ever divorced her or remarried, he would pay an extra Rs. 200,000. The wife sued for the dower, this extra Rs. 200,000, and maintenance allowance. **What did the courts decide?** The Family Court and appellate court found that since rukhsati never occurred, she wasn't entitled to the deferred items. Courts also ruled the Family Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the special Rs. 200,000 penalty clause, since this didn't count as "personal property" under the law governing what Family Courts can decide. However, she was awarded maintenance from the date of Nikah until divorce, since the husband—not her—had caused the delay in rukhsati. **Why it matters:** This case clarifies that not everything written in a Nikahnama can automatically be enforced by Family Courts—only matters falling within their specific legal jurisdiction. It also confirms that a wife is entitled to maintenance even without rukhsati if the delay was the husband's fault.
Read the full judgment →Ipxi-Dixit of Police is not binding on courts
PLJ 2011 Cr.C.(Lahore) 802 (DB) · Lahore High Court
**What was this case about?** Muhammad Tufail was arrested and charged under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following an FIR registered in October 2009 after police intercepted a car allegedly used to transport narcotics. He applied to the Lahore High Court seeking post-arrest bail. **What did the court find?** The court noted that no one was actually caught in the car when it was stopped, and no witness testified that Tufail was driving it. Nothing was recovered from his direct personal possession. Although the police investigating officer later claimed (in a case diary) that Tufail was driving the car and was linked to the main suspect, the court held that such police opinions are not automatically binding — this is a well-established principle in criminal law. The claim would need to be tested at trial. The court also pointed out that Tufail's co-accused, Muhammad Tariq, had already been granted bail by the same court in a similar situation, and there was nothing distinguishing Tufail's case from his. For consistency, similar accused persons should be treated similarly. **Why does it matter?** Considering Tufail had already spent months in custody and had no prior criminal record, the court granted him bail, subject to bail bonds of Rs. 500,000 with two sureties. The case reinforces two important legal principles: police statements/opinions alone don't bind courts, and courts should maintain consistency when treating co-accused in similar circumstances.
Read the full judgment →Judgement Related with State Bank Employees Pension Matters
PLJ 2012 SC 289 · Sindh High Court
This case is about employees of the State Bank of Pakistan who voluntarily left their jobs under a 1997 "Golden Handshake" scheme designed to reduce surplus staff. Under this scheme, employees who opted in received compensation equal to 50% commutation of their gross pension, as a full and final settlement — a special, one-time arrangement, not the regular pension system. About 1400 employees accepted this deal. Six years later, some of them went to court seeking additional pensionary benefits (a regular monthly pension) on top of what they'd already received, arguing they should get the same benefits as employees who retired normally after serving 25 years or reaching age 60. The High Court of Sindh ruled in their favor, ordering the Bank to pay pension benefits regardless of the scheme's terms. The State Bank appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the employees had voluntarily chosen the scheme, understood its terms in advance, and accepted a special one-time payout instead of regular pension. Since they hadn't completed 25 years of service, they weren't entitled to normal retirement pension. The Court also found the employees waited too long (six years) to complain, which barred their claim under the legal principle of "laches" (unreasonable delay defeats a claim). This case matters because it clarifies that voluntary settlement schemes are binding once accepted, and employees cannot later demand additional benefits beyond what was agreed, especially after long delays.
Read the full judgment →Muslim Family Law Ordinance is not applicable on non muslims
PLJ 2011 Lahore 645 · Lahore High Court
This case addressed whether Family Courts in Pakistan have jurisdiction to hear family disputes—like maintenance, dowry, and divorce—involving non-Muslims, specifically members of the Ahmadi community (whom Pakistan's Constitution classifies as non-Muslim). The petitioner, a husband being sued by his wife and others for maintenance, dower, dowry items, and divorce, argued that the Family Court had no jurisdiction because the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO), 1961 only applies to Muslims, and since Ahmadis are constitutionally non-Muslim, they should instead use their own religious "Dar-ul-Qaza" system rather than state Family Courts. The Lahore High Court rejected this argument. It held that the Family Courts Act, 1964 is "religion neutral" and was designed to handle personal law matters for people of all faiths, not just Muslims. The phrase "subject to the MFLO" in the Act only matters when there's an actual conflict between the two laws for Muslim litigants—it doesn't strip Family Courts of jurisdiction over non-Muslims. The MFLO itself explicitly applies only to Muslims. The court also noted that lack of a formally "codified" personal law (as with Ahmadi religious law) doesn't prevent Family Courts from hearing such cases. The petition was dismissed, confirming that Family Courts can handle family disputes of non-Muslims, including Ahmadis, ensuring access to formal justice reg
Read the full judgment →An old urban rent judgment
PLJ 1982 SC 127; 1982 CLC 772 &. PLD 1972 Kar. 778 ref. · Supreme Court of Pakistan
# Case Explainer: Muhammad Yaqub v. Master Muhammad Shafi **What was this case about?** This was a landlord-tenant dispute over a house in Quetta. Under rent law, once eviction proceedings begin, the Rent Controller can order a tenant to keep depositing rent regularly. If the tenant fails to pay on time, the landlord can ask the court to "strike off" (cancel) the tenant's defence, which effectively leads to eviction. Here, the tenant missed depositing rent for June 1980. The landlord found out and applied over a year later to have the tenant's defence struck off. The tenant argued that this long delay meant the landlord had "waived" (given up) his right to object, and separately claimed he was seriously ill when the delay occurred. **What did the court decide?** The court found the tenant had acted deceptively — depositing rent through court challans (receipts) without mentioning which month it was for, and even erasing/altering details to hide the missed payment. Because the landlord didn't know about the default earlier, he could not be said to have knowingly waived his right — waiver requires knowledge of a right and a deliberate decision to give it up. The illness excuse was also rejected as an afterthought, since it wasn't raised when the tenant first tendered the late rent. The court upheld the order striking off the tenant's defence and eviction. **Why does it matter?** The judgment clarifies that mere delay by a landlord in acting on a tenant's default does not amount to waiver unless the landlord kn
Read the full judgment →Power of a family court in khula cases
PLJ 2007 SC 91 · Peshawar High Court
This case involves a wife, Dr. Nosheen Qamar, who sued for dissolution of her marriage on grounds including cruelty, non-payment of maintenance, and her husband taking a second wife without her consent. She also claimed dower (money and property promised to her at marriage) worth Rs. 200,000 plus gold ornaments and a house share. The trial court dissolved the marriage but didn't clearly state whether it was granting a "khula" (wife-initiated divorce, which under Islamic law can require the wife to give up her dower). The husband later argued in the High Court that since it was effectively a khula, his wife should forfeit her right to the dower money—and the High Court agreed, denying her the Rs. 200,000. The Supreme Court, in this order, granted leave to appeal, meaning it agreed to seriously review the case rather than reject it. The Court raised several important legal questions: whether the trial court's findings actually supported a khula ruling, whether dower is automatically forfeited in a khula divorce, whether the wife could still defend her case even if she hadn't formally appealed one specific finding, and whether the High Court could decide on the dower issue at all while a related appeal was already pending elsewhere. This case matters because it addresses how courts should determine whether a divorce counts as khula, and whether women automatically lose financial rights (like dower) in such cases—an issue affecting family law rights across Pakistan.
Read the full judgment →Time period for restoring suit dismissed in default
PLJ 2006 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 39 · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court
This case involved a custody dispute where a father (Sikandar Ali) was seeking to overturn an ex-parte (one-sided) custody decree granted to the mother (Robina Kousar) for their minor child. Background: A custody decree was issued against the father on 18.3.2004 without his participation. He later filed a petition to set this aside, but that petition was dismissed for non-prosecution (failure to pursue the case) on 5.1.2005. An earlier attempt to restore that petition had already failed. He then filed another restoration application on 10.6.2005 — over five months after the dismissal — claiming his junior lawyer had misunderstood which cases were scheduled for hearing. The Court's Decision: The AJ&K High Court upheld the lower court's dismissal. Under Rule XII(II) of the Family Court Procedural Rules, 1998, a court can restore a case dismissed for default only if the restoration application is filed within 30 days and shows sufficient cause. Here, the father's application came five months late, with no explanation for the delay and no application to excuse it. His claim about his lawyer's confusion was unsupported by any affidavit. The Court also noted his own petition admitted an earlier restoration attempt had already failed and become final. Why it matters: This case confirms that strict time limits apply to restoring dismissed cases in family court, and that vague excuses without evidence (like affidavits) or formal delay-condonation requests won't succeed—even in sensitive matters like child custody.
Read the full judgment →What kind of cases family courts can hear
PLJ 2009 SC 626 · Islamabad High Court
**What was this case about?** A husband (Dr. Ejaz Naseem) filed a case for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife (Fareeha Ahmad). In response, the wife filed a written statement seeking divorce through khula, plus recovery of money, jewelry, household goods, maintenance for herself and her two daughters, and educational/maternity expenses. Before evidence was recorded, both parties reached a compromise, and the Family Court passed a decree in 2005 based on that agreement—granting divorce and the wife's other claims. Later, when the wife tried to enforce (execute) this decree, the husband objected, then appealed—390 days late. He argued that the Family Court never had the legal power (jurisdiction) to decide claims like money, jewelry, and expenses based on a written statement; only khula could be claimed that way, and consent between parties cannot create jurisdiction that the law doesn't provide. **What did the Supreme Court decide?** The Court rejected his argument. It held that Section 5 of the Family Courts Act gives Family Courts exclusive jurisdiction over all matters listed in the Act's Schedule—including divorce, dower, maintenance, custody, dowry, and personal property—regardless of whether they're raised as claims or counter-claims. Since the husband never objected to jurisdiction earlier and had voluntarily agreed to the compromise, he was estopped (legally barred) from challenging it now. His 390-day-late appeal was also rightly rejected. **Why it matters
Read the full judgment →Ingredients of a Benami Transactions
PLJ 2001 Karachi 173 · Sindh High Court
**Case Summary: Benami Transaction Dispute** This case involved a property dispute between Qurib Ali and his brother's family (respondents) over land that was officially registered in the name of Qurib Ali's brother, Muhammad Chuttal. **Background:** Qurib Ali worked for the former Khairpur State government. During his employment, government rules barred civil servants from purchasing land in their own names without permission. To get around this restriction, he bought land but registered it in his brother's name—this is called a "benami" transaction, where the person who actually pays for and owns property registers it under someone else's name. Qurib Ali claimed he paid the full purchase price, kept possession of the land, held the original title documents, and paid all government taxes on the property. After being forcibly removed from the land, he sued to be recognized as the true owner. Both the trial court and the High Court initially rejected his claim, saying he lacked sufficient documentary proof. **Supreme Court's Intervention:** The Supreme Court sent the case back, clarifying that documentary evidence isn't always necessary to prove a benami transaction—courts should look at the whole picture. **Final Decision:** On review, the High Court ruled in Qurib Ali's favor. It found that the source of payment, possession of documents, physical possession of the land, and his motive (avoiding the government service ban) all proved he was the real owner. The Court restored his ownership and ordered compensation for lost profits. **Why it matters:** This case clarifies the legal test for identifying benami transactions
Read the full judgment →Landmark case of benami transaction
PLJ 2002 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 1058 (DB) · Peshawar High Court
Here's a plain-language explainer of the case: **What was this case about?** Ikram Shah, an Executive Engineer in the Communications & Works Department, was accused by Pakistan's National Accountability Bureau (NAB) of amassing wealth worth over Rs. 4.29 crore through corruption—far beyond what his government salary could explain. Some of this wealth was allegedly held in the names of his wife and children (a "benami" arrangement, where property is held by one person on behalf of another who actually paid for it). **What did the court decide?** The Peshawar High Court calculated that Shah earned about Rs. 17.46 lakh in salary and Rs. 59.11 lakh from agricultural income over his career—but he had spent nearly Rs. 99.66 lakh more than these legitimate earnings on properties in his own name and his family's names. Since he couldn't satisfactorily explain this gap, the court upheld his corruption conviction, ruling that this unexplained amount was acquired through corrupt practices. Properties bought with this money were ordered forfeited to the government. However, the court reduced his prison sentence from 7 to 4 years and cut his fine from Rs. 3 crore to Rs. 1 crore. **Why it matters** This case clarifies how Pakistani courts handle "disproportionate assets" corruption cases: prosecutors must first establish a credible case of misconduct, after which the burden shifts to the accused to explain the source of unexplained wealth. It also explains how "benami" (pro
Read the full judgment →Nature of suit should not be changed if ammended
PLJ 2000 SC (AJK) 237 [Appellate Jurisdiction] · Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court
**What was this case about?** Two people (Mst. Anwar Begum and Allah Ditta) had gifted land to them cancelled through a "gift deed," and they filed separate lawsuits asking the court to declare that gift deed invalid. The person who received the gift, Mazhar Hussain, argued in his defense that he was in possession of the land, and that a mere "declaratory" suit (asking only for a declaration that the deed was invalid) wasn't enough — the plaintiffs also needed to ask for possession of the land. After years of litigation and after evidence had been recorded, the plaintiffs tried to amend their lawsuits to add a request for possession, since they claimed they'd lost possession during the case. The trial court and then the High Court refused to allow this amendment, saying it was too late (about four years after the objection was raised) and that it would change the fundamental nature of the case. **What did the Supreme Court (AJK) decide?** The Court disagreed with the lower courts. It ruled that adding a claim for possession did not change the essential nature of the suit — the core issue remained the same throughout: whether the gift deed should be cancelled. Possession was just an "additional relief" flowing from that same core dispute. The Court also held that a delay of four years, by itself, was not sufficient reason to reject the amendment. **Why it matters:** This case clarifies that courts should focus on whether an amendment changes the substance of a dispute, not just its technical form, and that delay alone shouldn't block legitimate amendments needed for complete just
Read the full judgment →Student versus a medical university case
PLJ 2008 Lahore 445 (DB) · Lahore High Court
# Plain-Language Explainer: Amir Gul vs. University of Health Sciences (2008) **What was this case about?** Amir Gul was a medical student at Allama Iqbal Medical College, Lahore. He had attempted his 3rd professional M.B.B.S. exam eight times and failed each time, so the university held him back instead of promoting him to the final year. He asked the university to treat him as an "old student" under the previous exam rules and promote him without requiring him to pass two additional subjects—ENT (Ear, Nose, Throat) and Eye—which had later been added to the 4th professional year syllabus through a university notification. He also claimed discrimination, pointing to another student who he said had been promoted under similar circumstances. When the university refused his request, he filed a petition in the Lahore High Court asking the court to order the university to issue him a new result card declaring him successful, and to let him proceed to the final year under the old exam pattern. **What did the court decide?** The court rejected his petition. It ruled that students have no permanent "vested right" to insist that courses and exams remain exactly as described in the prospectus at the time of admission. Universities are entitled to update and revise their rules, syllabi, and examination requirements over time, and students must follow the current rules. The court held that Amir Gul must pass the ENT and Eye subjects in his 3rd professional exam before he can be promoted to the final year, in line with existing regulations. **Why does this matter?** This case confirms that educational institutions—including medical colleges—have
Read the full judgment →When a child is legal?
· Lahore High Court
**What was this case about?** A man (the petitioner) was ordered by a Family Court to pay maintenance (financial support) to two children. He challenged this order in the Lahore High Court, denying that he was the father of the minors. He claimed the children were actually born from the mother's previous husband, not from him. **What did the court find?** The High Court examined the evidence and found that the man and woman had lived together as husband and wife, and the children were born during this cohabitation. The woman had consistently maintained that she was his legally wedded wife. Importantly, the man never filed a legal case (called a "suit for jactitation of marriage") to formally dispute or disprove her claim of marriage — something he could have done if he genuinely believed the marriage wasn't valid. The court also noted that he had previously sent maintenance money for the children through money order while they lived in another city, which contradicted his denial of paternity. **What did the court decide?** The High Court ruled that the children were legitimate offspring of the man, born from a lawful marital union. It dismissed his petition, upheld the maintenance order, and even imposed additional costs on him — criticizing his conduct as "shameful" for trying to avoid his legal and moral duty to support his own children. **Why it matters:** This case shows how courts determine a child's legitimacy using evidence of cohabitation and marital status, and reinforces that fathers cannot evade financial responsibility for their children through denial alone.
Read the full judgment →NEPRA REGULATIONS, 2012
· Not specified
This is not a court judgment—it is a set of procedural regulations (subordinate legislation) issued by Pakistan's National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) in 2012, under powers granted by the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The regulations establish the process for filing appeals before NEPRA against decisions of a single Member of the Authority, the Tribunal, or a Provincial Inspection office. Key rules include: appeals must be filed within 30 days of the order (with provision for delay if there's sufficient cause); appeals must be sent by registered post or courier to the Registrar, accompanied by a verified affidavit, a certified copy of the challenged order, and a Rs. 1,000 fee; documents must be typed, paginated, and submitted in four sets. The regulations also detail how the Registrar screens appeals for defects, how notice is given to the opposing party (respondent), how respondents may reply within 10 days, and how hearings and adjournments are handled—including dismissal of an appeal if the appellant doesn't show up, subject to restoration on valid grounds. This matters because it creates a clear, standardized procedure for consumers, licensees, or other affected parties to challenge electricity-related regulatory decisions, ensuring fairness, transparency, and timely resolution of disputes within Pakistan's electric power regulatory system. Since it is a regulatory framework rather than a judgment, there is no "case" outcome or ruling to report—only the
Read the full judgment →Can a bound employee leave Government?
PLJ 2012 · Islamabad High Court
# Can a Government Employee Break a Scholarship Bond to Take a University Job? **What the case was about:** Dr. Babur Wasim Arif worked as a Statistical Officer in the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS), a Government of Pakistan department. He was sent abroad on a scholarship (funded via the Government of Japan) to earn a PhD, and in exchange he signed an undertaking promising to serve the Government of Pakistan for at least five years after returning from training. After completing his PhD, he applied for a lecturer position at Quaid-e-Azam University (QAU) without going through proper departmental channels, and his employer refused to forward his application or grant him a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to switch jobs. He argued that QAU, being government-funded, should count as "government service," so moving there wouldn't violate his bond. **What the court decided:** The Islamabad High Court rejected his appeal. It held that: 1. He had bypassed the required procedure (Rule 3 of the Government Servants Rules) by applying without proper permission. 2. His five-year service bond had not yet expired. 3. Most importantly, QAU is **not** part of the Government of Pakistan—it is an independent institution, not a ministry or division under government hierarchy—so joining it would not fulfill his obligation to serve the government. **Why it matters:** The ruling clarifies that employees who receive government-funded scholarships with service bonds cannot use a technical argument (like "the new employer is also government-
Read the full judgment →If abduction is not proved, the accused can be set free
PLJ 2009 FSC 66 · Federal Shariat Court
**Case Explainer: Abdul Majeed v. State (PLJ 2009 FSC 66)** This case involved a man convicted by a trial court for an offence related to zina (unlawful sexual relations) under Pakistan's Hudood Ordinance. The allegation was that the accused, along with others, forcibly abducted a young woman named Zahida from her home at gunpoint, using a car, with the intent to commit zina-bil-jabr (forced sexual intercourse). The trial court convicted him under Section 10(2) of the Zina Ordinance and sentenced him to seven years in prison plus a fine. On appeal, the Federal Shariat Court closely examined the evidence and found serious gaps in the prosecution's case. Key issues included: the victim's refusal to have her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (a safeguard meant to ensure voluntary testimony); the lack of independent evidence proving abduction or enticement; and crucially, evidence suggesting the victim had at one point acknowledged being married to the accused, which would make any relationship between them lawful rather than criminal. The court also noted suspicious conduct by witnesses and missing evidentiary links. Because the abduction element wasn't proven and evidence of marriage created reasonable doubt, the court gave the accused the benefit of the doubt and accepted his appeal, meaning his conviction was overturned. This case matters because it shows how courts must carefully verify claims of abduction and forced sexual relations, especially
Read the full judgment →