P L D 2013 Balochistan 75
Before Qazi Faez Isa, C.J. and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, J
HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION and others ---Petitioners
Versus
GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Secretary, Home and Tribal Affairs
Department and 6 others ---Respondents
Constitutio nal Petition No.682 of 2011, decided on 5th March, 2013.
(a) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 4 ---Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law ---Scope ---
Interpretation of Art.4 of the Constitution ---Article 4 of the Constitutio n, though not stipulated as
a Fundamental Right, might also be categorized as one on account of the language used therein
i.e. it was the inalienable right (of every citizen) to enjoy the protection of the law and
to be treated in accor dance with the law.
(b) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199(2) & Part. II, Chap. 1 [Arts.8 to 28] ---Jurisdiction conferred upon High Court under
Art.199 of the Constitution for enforcement of any Fundamental Right ---Scope ---Such
jurisdiction cou ld not be abridged or taken away because the Constitution had forbidden it ---Any
amendment made to the Constitution too might not abridge a Fundamental Right and the power
of the High Court to enforce it ---In respect of matters of Fundamental Rights no pro cedural or
ceremonious trappings or fetters could be placed upon the High Court.
(c) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199(1) ---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court ---Availability of adequate alternate
remedy ---Scope ---Jurisdiction (under Art. 199 of the Constitution) might only be invoked if the
High Court was satisfied that no other adequate remedy was provided by law, but this was not an
absolute bar since it was to the satisfaction of the High Court to determine the adequacy of the
alternati ve remedy.
(d) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 ---Constitutional petition filed before High Court ---Non-compliance with any
procedural requirement, condonation of ---Scope ---High Court, might in appropriate cases
condone non -compliance with any procedural requirement (for filing a Constitutional petition), if
a good cause was shown ---Each case had to be considered by the High Court on its own merits.
(e) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 184(3) & 199 ---Supreme Court, jurisdiction of ---Words "without prejudice" used in
Art.184(3) of the Constitution ---Meaning --- Words "without prejudice" used in Art.184(3) of the
Constitution meant that the Supreme Court had concurrent jurisdiction, which it might exercise,
provided the matter was also on e of public importance.
(f) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 199 & 184(3) ---Exercise of jurisdiction by High Court under Art.199 of the
Constitution ---Pre-condition ---Scope ---Term "public importance" (as used in Art.184(3) of the
Constitution) di d not find mention in Art.199 of the Constitution and the same was not a
precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction under the Art.199 by the High Courts.
(g) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 ---Constitutional petition filed before the High C ourt under Art.199 of the
Constitution ---Categories ---Filing of petition by an aggrieved party ---Scope ---Most petitions
filed in the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution were adversarial in nature ---Such
petitions had to be filed by an aggrieved pa rty or aggrieved person who was also required to
comply with the procedural requirements contained in Art.199 of the Constitution, including, to
show to the satisfaction of the High Court that there was 'no other adequate remedy' available
and he/she/they were 'aggrieved party' in respect of the remedies sought under Art.199(1)(a)(i)
and (ii) or 'aggrieved person' in terms of Art.199(1)(c) of the Constitution ---Second category of
petitions (filed under Art.199 of the Constitution) were those that sought wri ts of habeas corpus
or quo warranto and for such petitions the procedural requirement of an aggrieved party/person
had been removed, and a personal grievance need not be shown ---Since such a petition fell
within the ambit of public interest litigation the High Court might also initiate action itself (suo
motu) ---Third category of petitions were those where there had been an apparent violation of any
Fundamental Right of a serious or grave nature and the High Court itself intervened to ensure
that the benefi t of the provisions of the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution were not denied
merely because nobody had approached the court ---Affected person(s) might not be aware of
their rights and the protection that the Constitution provided, or they might be sca red to approach
the court, or there might be other compelling circumstances not to do so --- For such category of
cases the procedural requirements would not be a hurdle in the way of the High Court itself, as to
hold otherwise would be to effectively abrid ge the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the
Constitution, which was specifically prohibited by Art.199(2) of the Constitution.
(h) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 --- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution ---
Restrictions ---Legality ---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution could not
be denuded or curtailed, and if an attempt was made the same would be unconstitutional.
(i) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 175(2) ---Jurisdiction of superior courts --- Provision of law ousting jurisdiction of
superior courts, interpretation of ---Scope ---Ouster of jurisdiction of the superior courts was not
to be presumed and any provision in such regard must be strictly construed.
Fazlul Quader Chowdhury v. Muhamamd Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486 and State v.
Zia-ur-Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49 rel.
(j) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 ---Suo motu notice/action by High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution ---
Practicalities of su ch a notice/action ---When the High Court took suo motu notice in respect of a
transgression within its territory it might be able to immediately attend to it ---Provincial
Government's seat of government was the provincial metropolis, which was also the pri ncipal
seat of the High Court, therefore, notices would be promptly attended to and also the requisite
record and/or facts placed before the court, and the court was better placed to monitor any action
that was required to be taken ---Sometimes major transg ressions of Fundamental Rights might not
even come to the notice of the Supreme Court; if they were only reported in the local press or a
letter in such regard had been sent to the High Court ---Element of cost also had to be considered -
--Principal seat of the Supreme Court was at Islamabad (capital city of Pakistan) and the victims
(and even the perpetrators) who were in the province might not have the funds to travel to and
stay at Islamabad or might face other difficulties ---Further the respondents in a s uo motu
petition, if they wanted to assail the decision of the High Court, would be able to approach the
Supreme Court.
(k) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 ---Public interest litigation ---Jurisdiction exercised by High Court in public interest
litigation, nature of ---Nature of jurisdiction that the High Court exercised itself in a public
interest litigation was inquisitorial (and not adversarial) in nature.
(l) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 199 & 184(3) ---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 and jurisdiction of Supreme
Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution ---Distinction ---Article 184(3) did not control Art.199
of the Constitution as the former attended to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court whereas the
latter to the juri sdiction of the High Courts ---Article 184(3) of the Constitution should not be
used as an interpretative tool to determine the scope of Art.199, and also there was no mention of
Art.184(3) in Art.199 of the Constitution.
(m) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 199 & 189 ---Suo motu notice/action by the High Court under Art.199 of the
Constitution ---Legality ---Plea that High Court did not have any suo motu powers under Art.199
of the Constitution in view of various judgments of the Supreme Court ---Validity---Article 199
of the Constitution did not prohibit the High Court itself (or suo motu) from taking notice of the
violation of Fundamental Rights ---Decisions of the Supreme Court which were prior to the 1973
Constitution (which incorporated Art.199(2)) wherein it was observed that the High Court could
not of itself (or suo motu) take notice of the violation of any Fundamental Right or those
decisions which did not specifically consider the scope of Art.199(2) or the specific question of
the suo motu pow ers of the High Court were decisions on facts of individual cases or per
incuriam and could not be categorized as a "decision … to the extent that it decides a question of
law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law" in terms of Art.189 of the 19 73
Constitution.
State v. Inspector General of Police Punjab PLD 2010 Lah. 326; Students of Government
Girls College, Kuchlak v. Government of Balochistan 2010 CLC 168; Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 507; Stat e v. M.D.WASA
2000 CLC 471; Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty 1996 AIR SC 992; Suo
Motu v. State of Rajasthan RLW 2005 (2) Raj 1385; Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab
AIR 2009 SC 984; R v. Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn [1 976] 3 All ER 184 and
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self -Employed and Small Businesses
Ltd. 1982 AC 617 rel.
Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; State v. S.P. Traffic Lahore
2000 PCr.LJ 1290 and Abdul Qadd us Mughal v. Federal Government 2010 YLR 360 ref.
Pakistan v. Ali Afzal PLD 1960 SC 1; Fazl -e-Haq v. State PLD 1960 SC 295; Islamic
Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saeed PLD 1961 SC 192; Shahnaz Begum v. Honourable
Judges of the High Court of Sindh an d Balochistan PLD 1971 SC 677; Akbtar Abbas v. Nayyar
Hussain 1982 SCMR 549; Muhammad Sadiq v. Khairati 1984 CLC 2239; Juvenile Jail Landhi
Karachi's case 1990 PCr.LJ 1231; Manzoor Ahmed Watto v. Abdul Wahabul Khairi PlD 1994
Lah. 466; Asad Ali v. Federati on of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 161 and Ali Muhammad v. Chief
Settlement Commissioner 2001 SCMR 1822 distinguished.
(n) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 --- Suo motu jurisdiction of the High Court ---High Court taking suo motu notice
under Art.199 of the Constitution upon a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or a note put up
before the Chief Justice that identified serious transgression of Fundamental Rights ---
Legality ---Word "application" used in Art.199 of the Constitution, meaning of ---Word
application used in Art.199 of the Constitution could not be limited to mean something written
on a piece of paper (as the Constitution did not state written application) ---Since the word
"application" had not been defined in the Constitution, therefore, the same should be given its
ordinary English language meaning, which did not restrict "application" to mean (something)
only in a written form ---Application was in the nature of a 'submission', 'request' or 'claim' and
could be written or verbal, or expressed in any other form ---Letter addressed to the Chief
Justice of a High Court or a note put up before the Chief Justice that identified serious
transgression of Fundamental Rights, should be deemed to be an "application" as envisaged
under Art.199 o f the Constitution ---Persons who had been wronged or were subjected to
indignities or had suffered atrocities or violence were usually those who did not have knowledge
of their Fundamental Rights or were weak or were not in a position to complain, let alon e resist
the transgression, but were in the fullest sense of the word "aggrieved", therefore, if a letter or a
note was put up before the Chief Justice, the same could be deemed to be one submitted on their
behalf and thus, even if a pedantic view was take n to determine the scope of the words,
"application" and "aggrieved person/party", appearing in Art.199 of the Constitution, both said
conditions were met.
(o) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 ---Suo motu notice/action by the High Court under A rt.199 of the Constitution ---
Scope ---High Court should exercise care when taking (suo motu) action itself under Art.199 of
the Constitution, as there was potential for misuse, and even mischief.
(p) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 199 ---Suo motu notice/action taken by the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution -
--Rules and procedure for such notice/action stated.
High Courts while exercising suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the
Constitution should ensure the following:
(i) If a letter is received that prima facie evidences violation of any Fundamental Right,
an initial examination should be undertaken to ascertain the identity of the person, the nature of
the grievance and whether he is acting bona fide;
(ii) In respe ct of a serious violation of Fundamental Rights reported in the media or
elsewhere, the veracity of such report may be ascertained;
(iii) Where it is considered by the Registrar that the High Court may take notice of the
reported violation of Fundamenta l Rights he should put up a note before the Chief Justice on the
administrative side, and if the Chief Justice deems it necessary he may have the same converted
into a petition, and direct that the same be numbered as such;
(iv) Save the Chief Justice, individual judges should not take suo motu notice, to avoid
confusion and possibly contradictory orders being passed in respect of the same matter;
(v) Depending on the nature of the matter, any person who has the requisite expertise, a
reputable non -governmental organization and / or bar association may by arrayed as petitioner(s)
so that the High Court receives proper and independent assistance;
(vi) Before proceeding with the matter the Federation, Province and/or a local authority,
as the case may be, and any other concerned organization, department or person should be
arrayed as respondents;
(vii) Notices should be also issued to the Advocate General and or the Attorney General
for Pakistan, as the case may require;
(viii) Before issuing not ices, the court should be prima facie satisfied that the information
that has been laid before the court requires examination and pertains to the violation or
infringement of Fundamental Rights;
(ix) Notices issued to the respondents, the Attorney Gener al and/or the Advocate General
must enclose copies of the documents on which cognizance of the matter has been taken, and
they must be provided with an opportunity to submit their respective replies;
(x) The High Court should ensure before making a deci sion that the facts contained in the
letter / report are correct;
(xi) If during the course of hearing any additional information is received, which may
have a bearing on the case, the same should also be provided to the respondents and they should
be given an opportunity to respond thereto;
(xii) The particular Fundamental Right(s) which may have been violated must be
identified to enable the respondents to address the same and these must also be mentioned in the
decision;
(xiii) If during the hea ring of the petition it transpires that there has been no violation of
any Fundamental Right, or there is no case to answer in respect of habeas corpus or quo warranto
the proceedings should be withdrawn / dismissed;
(xiv) The High Court should not exer cise such powers in routine but should do so in
exceptional cases, and particularly where those whose Fundamental Rights have been violated
are the poor, the weak, the disenfranchised, women, children, members of any minority
community, and those who live in fear of force or threat;
(xv) The matter should be heard by a bench of two judges, ideally comprising of the
Chief Justice and another judge;
(xvi) The High Court should not involve itself in any dispute which may adversely affect
any pending liti gation or which may prejudice the private right of any party / person; and
(xvii) A cautious approach should be adopted with a view to ensure that the process of
the court is not abused or misused.
(q) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 19 ---Freedom of speech, restrictions on ---Scope ---Extremist hate literature, wall -
chalking and threatening and spiteful press releases were not permissible because they were
contrary to the injunctions (of Islam), undermined the integrity, security and defence of P akistan,
public order, decency and morality ---Same were also crimes under the laws of Pakistan, and they
incited others to commit crime.
(r) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 184(3), 199 & 189 ---Decisions of the superior courts with regard to the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights which do not have binding effect ---Scope ---Decisions of the superior courts
with regard to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Art.98 of the 1962 Constitution or
Art.170 of the 1956 Constitution and which were give n at a time of purported suspension of
Fundamental Rights or at a time when the High Courts were ostensibly denuded of the power to
issue writs or at a time when the powers of the High Court had been curtailed or an independent
judiciary had been undermine d could no longer be treated as binding precedent with regard to
deciding a question of law or which enunciated a principle of law (in terms of Art.189 of the
1973 Constitution) because they were in conflict with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879).
Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879 ref.
(s) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 4, 9, 14, 15, 20, 25 & 199 ---Anti-Terrori sm Act (XXVII of 1997), S.11 -B---Balochistan
Prohibition of Expressing Matters on Walls Ordinance (LI of 2001), Ss.2 & 3 ---Suo motu
notice/action by High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution concerning murder of 26 persons
belonging to a particular sect in District Mastung by a banned organization ---Victims of the
incident were murdered in contravention of the law and the Constitution, and their Fundamental
Rights to life, liberty, dignity, movement and religion were abused, contravened and violated ---
Both the Provincial and Federal Governments failed to protect the lives of countless citizens and
thus the right to life guaranteed as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution stood violated ---
Organization which claimed responsibility for carrying out the mur ders was a banned
organization under S.11 -B of Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 ---Persons/organizations committing
murder, advocating murder, indulging in hate speech, spreading hate propaganda, instilling fear,
compelling by threat or force of arms their views co ntravened the Injunctions of Islam ---High
Court directed that the investigating team of the murders in question should thoroughly
investigate the matter and trace out the perpetrators, ensure their arrest and prosecute them in
accordance with the law; that all concerned should extend every possible assistance to the
investigating team; that Federal and Provincial Governments should provide requisite resources
to the investigators that would help them in detecting, arresting and prosecuting the criminals;
that telephone and mobile telephone service providers should provide their record in respect of
the crime as required by police; that Federal and Provincial Governments should coordinate and
develop an effective mechanism, including sharing of information, f or monitoring potential
terrorists, and apprehending the perpetrators of present and other terrorist crimes; that Federal
and Provincial Governments should develop and maintain a data -bank with information of
perpetrators/suspects of heinous crimes and ter rorist organizations, including their names,
aliases, parentage, addresses, photographs, thumb impressions, DNA, telephone number,
weapons used, particular type of explosives used and their respective modus operandi; that
access to said data -bank should be provided to senior investigators to help determine similarities
and linkages between different crimes and criminals so that they could be traced, arrested and
prosecuted; that Federal Government should issue requisite instructions to the Frontier Corps
("FC") deployed in the Province to come to the immediate assistance of the local law
enforcement agencies when called upon to do so, and standing operating procedures in such
regard should be developed, which should detail how best an effective cooperation m ethodology
between the local law enforcement agency and the nearest FC post be developed; that a
specialized cell/unit/division should be established in respect of terrorist acts committed in the
Province and such crimes be investigated by senior and exper ienced officers of police and/or
under their supervisions and all Provincial law enforcement personnel should cooperate with
them, including the Levies Force operating in the Province; that in respect of serious crimes or
terrorist acts the local police/le vies should immediately inform the nearest police station, the
Police Headquarters and the office of the Home Secretary, who should in turn immediately
inform the Interior Ministry; that Federal and Provincial Governments should complete the
Forensic Labor atory being setup in the Provincial capital at the earliest; that payment of adequate
compensation should be made to the legal heirs of the victims, if the same had not already been
paid; that strict compliance should be made with the Balochistan Prohibiti on of Expressing
Matters on Walls Ordinance, 2001 and prosecutions must be launched against those violating S.2
thereof; that all local councils through their respective heads/administrators should immediately
remove wall -chalking within the area of their respective jurisdictions; that all Deputy
Commissioners serving in the Province should ensure that the officers of the local councils under
their jurisdiction were bringing prosecutions under S.2 of the Ordinance, and undertaking their
obligations under S.3, failing which disciplinary action against the recalcitrant officers
must be initiated, and that concerned officials of the Provincial Government should seek
periodical reports from the Deputy Commissioners under their jurisdiction with regard to
compliance of the provisions of the Ordinance.
(t) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Arts. 19 & 199 ---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.11 -B & 11 -W---Suo motu
notice/action by High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution concer ning murder of 26 persons
belonging to a particular sect in District Mastung by a banned organization ---Print and electronic
media broadcasting and printing propaganda of banned organizations and extremists ---Plea of
reporters of television channels and ne wspapers that they were threatened (on the telephone) that
if the statement issued by the banned organizations were not prominently announced/printed and
at a particular time or on a particular page they would be attacked, therefore, out of fear the
report s of banned organizations were published ---Validity ---Fear could not be accepted to justify
propagating the views of banned organizations ---Where a threat was extended to media
personnel they should immediately report the matter to the police, but under no circumstances a
threat could be justified to propagate the views of banned organizations ---When the electronic
media and the press published propaganda reports out of fear and propagated the views of
banned organizations they were not acting as good and r esponsible journalists, but as
mouthpieces for malicious and vile propaganda and also contravened S.11 -W of the Anti -
Terrorism Act, 1997 ---High Court directed that both Federal and Provincial Governments should
closely monitor the media in such regard to e nsure strict compliance of S.11 -W of the Anti -
Terrorism Act, 1997; that the concerned Ministry and Federal and Provincial intelligence
agencies should closely monitor extremist and hate literature and its propagation and should
bring the same to the notice of the concerned authorities for proceeding against the perpetrators
in accordance with the law; that Federal and Provincial Government should ensure that the
organizations proscribed under S.11 -B of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 and those in respect of
which observations and orders had been passed under S.11 -D of the Act, must not be allowed to
propagate their views, and strict compliance with S.11 -W of the Act should be made against the
transgressors, including the electronic and print media.
Zahoor A hmed Shahwani, Syed Nazir Agha, Dawood Kasi and Iftikhar Raza Khan for
Petitioners.
Malik Sikandar Khan, D.A.G., Amanullah Kanrani, A.G., Abdul Ghias Nousherwani,
PC., Abdul Aziz Khilji and Amanullah Tareen, Addl. A.Gs., Shai Haq, Asstt. A.G. and Miss
Sarwat Hina, Addl. P.C. for Respondents.
Iftikhar Gilani, Senior ASC, S.M. Zafar, Senior ASC and Zain Sheikh, ASC as Amici
curiae:
Hadi Shakeel, Syed Ayaz Zahoor, Kamran Mullakhail for (Other counsel who were
heard).
Dates of hearing: 16th May, 18 th July, 5th and 24th September, and 16th October, 2012.
JUDGMENT
QAZI FAEZ ISA, C J. ---On 21st September 2011 the Registrar of the Balochistan High
Court put up the following note:
"Attention of the honourable Chief Justice is drawn to the inciden t of 26 persons in the
area of Ghanji Dori, District Mastung on 20th September 2011, when passengers in a bus were
taken down and mercilessly shot. The matter has been widely reported in the press and has
spread wide fear in the general public and traumati zed a particular segment of society. The
newspapers reports attached hereto show that a banned organization i.e. 'Lashkar -e-Jhangvi'
claimed responsibility for the killings. The newspaper reports further disclose that a number of
persons have called upon t he Hon'nle Chief Justice to take notice of the matter as the
administration has failed to protect the lives of citizens.
Sd/- Registrar"
The newspaper reports attached with the above note were taken from ten newspapers all
dated 21st September 2011, i.e. dailies Jung, Mashriq, Balochistan Express, Bakhabar, Century
Express, Himmat, Balochistan News, Zamana, Azadi and Awaam. The following day the Chief
Justice (on the administrative side) directed to:
"Assign constitutional petition number and put u p in court on Monday 26th September
2011. High Court Bar Association and Balochistan Bar Association to be respectively arrayed as
petitioners Nos. 1 & 2 through their respective Presidents / General Secretaries.
The following to be arrayed as responden ts:
(1) Government of Balochistan through Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs Department,
Balochistan Secretariat, Zarghoon Road, Quetta.
(2) Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior, Pak Secretariat Constitution Avenue,
Islamabad.
(3) Provin cial Police Officer/I.G. Police Headquarters, Quetta.
(4) I.G. Frontier Corps Headquarters, Hali Road, Quetta.
(5) Commissioner Kalat Division at Khuzdar.
(6) Deputy Commissioner at Mastung.
(7) Director General Levies, Quetta.
Issue notices to all the parties.
Sd/- Chief Justice."
2. On 26th of September 2011, the petition came up in court before us and inter alia the
following order was passed:
"The Registrar of this court had put up a note stating that in the Ghanji Dori area of
District Mastung a passenger bus was stopped and 26 persons were offloaded and shot on 20th
September 2011. All those who were murdered belonged to a particular community and sect,
which appeared to be the reason why they were targeted. The incident was wid ely reported and
there were calls for this court to take suo motu notice of the event to ensure that a thorough
investigation takes place and the perpetrators identified and prosecuted. The High Court Bar
Association and the Balochistan Bar Association wer e directed to be arrayed as petitioners and
the Governments of Balochistan and Pakistan and their concerned departments/agencies as
respondents."
"An application has been received from Ahmed Ali Kohzad who describes himself as the
General Secretary, Haz ara Democratic Party, through which application he wants to participate
in the proceeding and urges that his party may be arrayed as a petitioner. None oppose the said
application, which is accordingly granted. The office is directed to number the applicat ion and to
array the Hazara Democratic Party through its General Secretary as petitioner No.3."
"Syed Ayaz Zahoor, Advocate states that he is the only member of Pakistan Bar Council
("PBC") from Balochistan and Mr.Kamran Mullah Khail states that he is a member of the
Balochistan Bar Council and they want to address the issue whether this court can take suo motu
notice of matters that have been reported in the press or that otherwise may come to its
knowledge and treat the same as a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. In
this regard they have referred to the statement given by the President of the Supreme Court Bar
Association ("SCBA") Mrs. Asma Jahangir wherein it is reported that the High Court does not
have suo motu powers. They have also referred to the recent statement given by the visiting
International Commission of Jurists ("ICJ") mission regarding exercise of suo motu powers."
"The office is directed to issue notices to the President of the Supreme Court Bar
Association a nd to the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) who may want to assist this
court on the following questions:
(1) Whether under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan this Court can take suo motu
notice of the infringement of the Fundamental Rig hts as stipulated in the Constitution of
Pakistan, including the right to life (Article 9) and dignity (Article 14), the right to movement
(Article 15), right to profess and practice religion (Article 20) and entitlement to equal protection
of law (Article 25) which rights may be in question in this matter?
(2) Whether constitutionalism and the rule of law requires that judicial powers are exercised
to implement guaranteed Fundamental Rights even if a formal written application by an
aggrieved person has not been submitted?"
3. That since the above questions were important, and any decision may have wide
application, precaution was taken to appoint a number of amici curiae to assist the Court. Mr.
Zain Sheikh, Advocate and Mr. Iftikhar Gilani, Senior Adv ocate Supreme Court came to assist
the court and Mr. S.M. Zafar, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, submitted a written note. We are
grateful for the assistance rendered by the learned amici. Notice was also issued to Mrs. Asma
Jahangir, Advocate, whilst she w as holding the post of President of the Supreme Court Bar
Association, but when she came to address the court she was no longer holding the said post,
therefore, notice was also issued to Mr. Yasin Azad, Advocate, who had assumed Presidency of
the Supreme Court Bar Association. Messrs Syed Ayaz Zahoor, Member Pakistan Bar Council,
Kamran Mullah Khail, Member Balochistan Bar Council, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani, President
High Court Bar Association, H. Shakeel Ahmed, former President High Court Bar Association,
Syed Nazir Agha, Vice President High Court Bar Association, and Mr. M.W.N. Kohli,
Advocates were also heard on the aforesaid questions of jurisdiction.
4. We proceed first to decide the scope of Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan and to
answer the questions recorded in paragraph two above. Messrs Syed Ayaz Zahoor and Kamran
Mullah Khail stated that not only this court is empowered to take suo motu notice but should
have taken notice in the instant case. They placed reliance upon the following cases :
Muhammad Sadiq v. Abdul Ghani, 1991 CLC 1310.
Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo v. Abdul Wahabul Khairi, PLD 1994 Lahore 466.
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Muhammad Habib Wahab, 2000 SCMR 1046
State v. S.P. Traffic, 2000 PCr.LJ 1290
Province of Punjab v. An war Ali, 2000 C LC 1363
Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Nawaz Shairf, PLD 2009 SC 284
Ayaz Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 Lahore 236
Al-Jehad Trust v. Lahore High Court, 2011 SCMR 1688
Al-Jehad Trust v. Lahore High Court, 2011 SCM R 1692
Mr. H. Shakeel Ahmed stated that this High Court can exercise suo motu powers
provided an application has been placed before it which can be from any source, including the
Registrar, but such power should only be exercised in relation to the enfo rcement of
Fundamental Rights. This stance was also adopted by Mr. Shai Haq, Assistant Advocate General
and Malik Sikandar Khan, Deputy Attorney General. Syed Nazir Agha, Advocate however,
stated that there are no restrictions whatsoever placed on the High Court and such jurisdiction
can be exercised without any fetters.
5. Mrs. Asma Jahangir traced the history of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and stated that the said provision was similar to Article 98 of the
1962 Constitution and Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution. Learned counsel compared
Article 199 with the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the 1973 Constitution.
She stated that unlike the power of the Supreme Court to take suo mot u notice under Article
184(3), in respect of matters of public importance involving Fundamental Rights, the High Court
did not have any such power. Reliance was placed upon the following cases:
Pakistan v. Ali Afzal, PLD 1960 SC 1
Fazl-e-Haq v. State, PLD 1960 SC 295
Islamic Republic of Pak. v. Muhammad Saeed, PLD 1961 SC 192
Shahnaz Begum v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan, PL D
1971 SC 677
Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar Hussain, 1982 SCMR 549
Muhammad Sadiq v. Khairati, 1984 CLC 2239
Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 SC 161
Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 SC 416
Juvenile Jail Landhi Karachi, 1990 PCr.LJ 1231
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Muhammad Habib Wahab, 2000 SCMR 1046
Ali Muhammad v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, 2001 SCMR 1822
Basharat Ali v. Muhammad Anwar, 2010 SCMR 1210
The learned counsel also pointed out that the High Courts had however, purported to
exercise suo motu powers in the following cases, but t he same was not in accordance with the
provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution:
State v. Inspector General of Police, PLD 2010 Lahore 326
Abdul Qaddus M ughal v. Federal Government, 2010 YLR 360
Students of Government Girls College v. Govern ment of Balochistan, 2012 CLC 168
6. Mr. Zain Sheikh, learned amicus, rendered valuable assistance and traced the evolution of
the subject and stated that the case -law can be divided into three phases. The first phase was
prior to the introduction of pu blic interest litigation when juristic standing was strictly insisted.
The second phase was with the advent of public interest litigation, when juristic standing was not
strictly enforced. And the third phase, which he categorized as the modern phase of su o motu
jurisdiction, when in respect of public interest litigation the Supreme Court of Pakistan did not
require the petitioner to show locus standi. He stated that prior to the introduction of public
interest litigation the superior courts applied the Str ict Juristic Standing Test (Anjuman Araian,
Bhera v. Abdul Rashid, PLD 1973 Lahore 500, and Province of Balochistan v. Murree Brewery
Company Limited, PLD 2007 SC 386). He further stated that although the power to issue writs
granted to the High Court unde r Article 226 of the Indian Constitution was not dependant on the
existence of an aggrieved person or party but in India too, Strict Juristic Standing Test was
applied (Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892). In the initial phase of public interest
litigation the superior courts in Pakistan adopted a somewhat liberal approach to the standing
requirement (Muhammad Aslam Saleemi v. Pakistan Television Corporation, PLD 1977 Lahore
852) and the term "aggrieved party" under Article 199 was judicially def ined to mean either a
personal interest or sufficient interest or the expertise of an individual or a group or of a non -
government organization (NGO) (Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, PLD 1969 SC
223, Multiline Associates v. Adeshir Cowasjee, 1995 SCMR 363 and Adeshir Cowasjee v.
KBCA, 1999 SCMR 2883). Learned amicus stated that in the third or present modern phase the
standing requirement has almost been done away with regard to public interest matters and the
Hon'ble Supreme Court also acted suo motu, for instance upon receiving a letter from Shehla Zia
and a group of concerned citizens and converted it into a constitution petition under Article
184(3) of the Constitution (Shehla Zia v. WAPDA, PLD 1994 SC 693). In the case of Allah Ditta
v. D. C.O, (2009 CLD 825) Allah Ditta and other inhabitants of two villages had written to the
Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, protesting about the effluents being discharged by a
chemical factory, which was treated as a constitutional petition. Learned amicus cited the case of
Shahnaz Begum v. Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan (PLD 1971 SC 677),
Behram Khan Achakzai v. State (2004 PCr.LJ 653) and Ali Muhammad v. Chief Settlement
Commissioner (2001 SCMR 1822) to contend that the Supreme C ourt has held that the High
Court cannot act on its own initiative or suo motu. Learned amicus however stated that the High
Courts have been exercising suo motu powers, such as in the case of Suo Motu Petition
No.15744 of 2009 (2010 YLR 360) and in State v . Inspector General of Police (PLD 2010
Lahore 326). The learned amicus concluded by stating that since the Supreme Court had held
that the High Court does not enjoy suo motu power such powers cannot be exercised.
7. Syed Iftikhar Gilani, learned amicus, attended the court as well as sent a compilation of
the relevant case -law on the subject. We acknowledge with gratitude the assistance provided by
him. He formulated the following propositions and stated that the High Court has complete suo
motu jurisdict ion:
"(1) Jurisdiction and judicial power are two distinct legal terms, as jurisdiction is conferred by
the Constitution or the laws whereas judicial power is inherent in the very existence of a superior
court;
(2) Under our Constitutional dispensation it is not only the function but the duty of the
Superior Courts to safeguard and protect the Fundamental Rights of individuals or a class of
persons;
(3) That 'Access to Justice' is more fundamental than Fundamental Rights which only
superior courts can ensure by their intervention, particularly on behalf of the socially and
economically disadvantageous people."
He placed reliance upon the following cases:
Asma Jilani v. Govt. of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139
State v. Zia -ur-Rehman, PLD 1973 SC 49
A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298
State of W.B. v. Sampat Lal, AIR 1985 SC 195
Chaitanya Kumar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1986 SC 825
Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988 SC 416
Zubaida A. Sattar v. Ka rachi Building Control Authority, 1999 SCMR 243
State v. M.D. WASA, 2000 CLC 471.
Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive, PLD 2000 SC 869
Jamil Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan, 2001 YLR 866
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan v. Go vernment of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 507
State v. Director General FIA, PLD 2010 Lahore 23
Abdul Qaddus Mughal v. Federal Government, 2010 YLR 360
8. Mr. S. M. Zafar, learned amicus, sent a written note to the above queries, which
concluded, as under:
"Therefore any attempt that may ultimately lead the Court to enter the arena of
undertaking factual inquiry is not countenanced by Article 199 of the Constitution of 1973.
The perusal of the note put up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice by the Regist rar upon
which this motion was entertained is suggestive of, beyond doubt, that the incident mentioned
therein would entail full fledged inquiry/investigation and even the recording of evidence which
function the law assigns to some other agency/Deptt and thus out side the domain of this Court.
No doubt the crime committed is gruesome and shocking which has terrorized the region
therefore one would like to see that law enforcing agencies and particularly the Government
takes the matter in full earnest and deals with such crimes with iron hand.
It will be therefore in the fitness of things and consistent with the mood and expectation
of civil society if the Court makes clear and imperative observations that the Government and the
relevant agen cies are under constitutional duty bound to safeguard the life and liberty of its
citizens and therefore the Government should take prompt stern action and if desirable appoint a
commission to probe the causes and unearth the groups involved in this.
It would therefore be consistent with the Constitution, precedents, practice and procedure
to adopt restraint and drop the proceedings."
In his note learned amicus referred to the cases of Tariq Transport Company v. Sargodha Bhera
Bus Service (PLD 1958 SC 437), Fazal -e-Haq v. State (PLD 1960 SC 295), Shahnaz Begum v.
Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan (PLD 1971 SC 677), Teoomal v.
Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1981 Karachi 349), Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar
Hussain (1982 S CMR 549) and Govt. of West Pak. v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish
Kashmiri, (PLD 1969 SC 14).
9. It may be mentioned that a fax was received from Mr. Asad Jamal, Advocate stating that
he would be representing the International Commission of Jurists and h e had sought time,
however, neither Mr. Asad Jamal nor any representative of the International Commission of
Jurists came or submitted a note to record their point of view. This was indeed unfortunate, as
the assistance of a prestigious organization like t he International Commission of Jurists would
have been useful, but the same was not provided despite the fact that visiting members of the
said Commission had deemed it appropriate to publicly state that suo motu powers cannot be
exercised by the superior courts of Pakistan.
10. That before we proceed to examine the matter in the light of the aforesaid questions, it
would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973:
"199. (1) Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other
adequate remedy is provided by law, --
(a) on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order: --
(i) directing a person performing, within the territorial juri sdiction of the Court, functions in
connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from
doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a
Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no l egal
effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order --
(i) directing that a person in custody within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court be
brought before it so that the Court may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custod y without
lawful authority or in an unlawful manner; or
(ii) requiring a person within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court holding or purporting to
hold a public office to show under what authority of law he claims to hold that office; or
(c) on the application of any aggrieved person, make an order giving such directions to any
person or authority, including any Government exercising any power or performing any function,
or in relation to, any territory within the jurisdiction of that Court as ma y be appropriate for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II.
(2) Subject to the Constitution, the right to move a High Court for the enforcement of any of
the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part I I shall not be abridged."
In view of the fact that a number of learned counsel and learned amici had also referred
to Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the said provision is reproduced hereunder:
"184(3). Without prejudice to the provisions of Arti cle 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it
considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 Part II is involved, have the power to make an order
of the nature mentioned in the said Article."
11. It is significant that in the 1973 Constitution sub -Article (2) to Article 199 was inserted,
stipulating that, the right to move a High Court for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental
Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II s hall not be abridged. The Fundamental Rights
contained in Chapter 1 comprise of Articles 8 through to 28. Article 4 of the Constitution, though
not stipulated as a Fundamental Right, may also be categorized as one on account of the
language used therein, r eproduced hereunder:
"4. (1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the
inalienable right to every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time
being within Pakistan.
(2) In particular ---
(a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person
shall be taken except in accordance with law;
(b) no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited
by law; and
(c) no per son shall be compelled to do that which the law does not required him to do."
12. Sub-Article (2) of Article 175 stipulates that, "No court shall have any jurisdiction save
as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law". The High Court may
be conferred with jurisdiction by any substantive or procedural law or by the Constitution. As
regards the jurisdiction conferred by any law is concerned, the appropriate legislature may,
subject to the Constitution, enlarge, restrict or tak e it away, however, the jurisdiction conferred
upon the High Court for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged or
taken away because the Constitution has forbidden it. An amendment made to the Constitution
too may not abridge a Fundamental Right and the power of the High Court to enforce it,
however, this is a matter which is not before us and therefore we need not dilate further on it.
The conferment of jurisdiction on the High Court and the manner in which the same is to be
invoked or utilized requires separate consideration. The jurisdiction on the High Courts has been
conferred by Article 199, and the High Courts can issue directions restraining the authorities
mentioned therein from doing anything which they are not permitted by law or to do anything
which is required by law to be done, declare that any act or proceeding has been done or taken
without lawful authority, secure the production of a person (habeas corpus), call upon a person to
show how he holds a public office (q uo warranto) and to issue directions for the enforcement of
any of the Fundamental Rights. As to who can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 199, under what circumstances and how such jurisdiction is to be exercised are basically
matter s of procedure. For instance, jurisdiction may only be invoked if the High Court is
satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law, but this is not an absolute bar since it
is to the satisfaction of the High Court to determine the adequacy of t he alternative remedy.
Similarly, jurisdiction under Article 199 may be invoked on the application of any aggrieved
party, on the application of any person or on the application of any aggrieved person; the
procedural requirement being the submission of an application which in the different situations
envisaged under Article 199 can be by any person, by an aggrieved party or by an aggrieved
person. The Constitution, however, does not stipulate what the application should contain or
other matters with regard thereto. The Constitution also does not prescribe that court fee be
affixed on such application nor its amount, the language in which the application should be
written, whether the same be submitted along with an affidavit, the number of copies to be file d,
et cetera, however the High Courts have developed methodologies for entertaining such
applications. And the High Courts may in appropriate cases condone non -compliance with any
procedural requirement.
13. In the present case no 'application' was filed and the Registrar of this Court had brought
to the attention of the Chief Justice that a large number of newspapers had reported that 'Lashkar -
e-Jhangvi' an organization, which had been proscribed under the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997, had
publicly acknowled ged carrying out the murderous outrage for the sole and the only reason that
the victims belonged to a particular sect, i.e. the Shiah. A large number of persons were thus
deprived of life, in contravention of the Fundamental Right under Article 9 of the C onstitution.
Other Fundamental Rights that were infringed or violated was the dignity of man (Article 14),
the right of free movement (Article 15), the right to profess and practice religion (Article 20),
entitlement to equal protection of law (Ar ticle 25). In addition Article 4 stipulates that every
person in Pakistan has the right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance
with the law.
14. Those learned counsel who contended that as no person had filed an application,
there fore the court could not act pursuant to Article 199 of the Constitution were confronted with
the rhetorical question, "Whether the dead can file applications?" They responded by stating that
their relatives or friends could have approached the court, but such a response is facetious. And,
what if nobody did or was scared to do so against a vicious armed terrorist organization. We can
also take judicial notice of the fact that at times even in kidnapping for ransom cases the victims
family/friends do not re port the matter to the police faced with threats that their loved ones
would be harmed or killed if they did so. Even a kidnapped person released from captivity, on
the payment of ransom, may be fearful to report the matter to the police. However, if such a
matter comes to the knowledge of the court through any medium, including the media, should
the court not direct for filing of F.I.R. if this has not already been done, and investigating of the
matter, or should the court look away merely because no perso n has approached the court with
an application? If we were to only stand on such procedural necessities the Constitution of
Pakistan and in particular the Fundamental Rights enshrined therein would be rendered
meaningless. Obedience to the Constitution is the obligation of the every citizen, wherever he
may be, and every other person who is for the time being in Pakistan. As judges we take an oath
to do right to all people, according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill -will. If fear
dissuaded j udges from acting, despite the fact that a matter of grave Fundamental Rights
violation came to their notice it would render the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the
Constitution nothing but mere words on paper.
15. Incidentally all the learned counsel co ntended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court could have
taken cognizance of this incident under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. However, if we
examine sub -Article (3) of Article 184 which stipulates that, "without prejudice to the provision
of Artic le 199, the Supreme Court shall .....have the power to make an order of the nature
mentioned in the said Article" the distinction sought to be made by the learned counsel, is not
discernible. The opening words of Article 184(3), without prejudice, in our o pinion simply mean
that the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction, which it may exercise, provided the matter is
also one of public importance. The term public importance does not find mention in Article 199
and the same is not a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 by the
High Courts.
16. Most petitions that are filed in the High Court under Article 199 are adversarial in nature.
These petitions have to be filed by an aggrieved party or aggrieved person who have a lso to
show that they have no other adequate remedy. They may also have to attend to other issues,
which the corpus of precedent law has developed such as approaching the court promptly, so as
not to run foul of the doctrine of laches, show bona fide, not to suppress or conceal material
particulars from the court. Compliance with the other procedural requirements imposed by the
law or the rules of High Courts, include the mode and manner in which the application is written,
verification thereof or the same to be supported by an affidavit, payment of requisite court fee,
etc. However, in respect of what we categorize as the second category of petitions, that seek
writs of habeas corpus or quo warranto the procedural requirement of an aggrieved party/person
has been removed, and a personal grievance need not be shown. The third category of cases are
those where there has been an apparent violation of any Fundamental Right of a serious or grave
nature and the High Court itself intervenes to ensure that the benef it of the provisions of the
Fundamental Rights of the Constitution are not denied merely because nobody has approached
the court. The affected person/s may not be aware of their rights and the protection that the
Constitution provides, or may be scared to approach the court, or there may be other compelling
circumstances not to do so. In this category of cases the procedural requirements would not be a
hurdle in the way of the High Court itself. To hold otherwise would be to effectively abridge the
Fundamen tal Rights enshrined in the Constitution, and the Constitution specifically states that
the same shall not be abridged (sub -Article (2) of Article 199). Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar
noted the magnitude and significance of Article 199(2) in the case of K.B. Threads (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
Zila Nazim, PLD 2004 Lahore 376:
"In my view, the provisions of Articles 199(2) and 184, independent of the general writ
jurisdiction, have saddled the superior Courts with the responsibility to enforce the fundamental
rights i n case of a complaint about their violation; the aggrieved citizen on the basis of the rule
ex debito justitae as a matter of right, can claim the redressal of his grievance and for the
enforcement of his fundamental right and there is little room for disc retion left in such matter."
(At page 395J)
17. We proceed to consider the cases (date wise) cited by Mrs. Asma Jehangir, Advocate,
which, according to learned counsel, hold that the High Court cannot take cognizance of any
violation of Fundamental Right s of itself (or suo motu). The first two cases are both reported in
All Pakistan Legal Decisions of the year 1960, respectively Pakistan v. Ali Afzal (PLD 1960 SC
1) and Fazl -e-Haq v. State (PLD 1960 SC 295). In the case of Ali Afzal the appeal was allowed
on the ground that the High Court had granted relief to the respondent which he had not claimed,
and such relief could no longer be granted since the law had been changed to prevent it,
therefore, it was held that suo motu grant of relief was inappropriat e. However, the question for
consideration herein is altogether different, and it is not a matter of seeking of an individual's (or
private) relief, therefore, the citation is not relevant in the determination of the formulated
questions. The case of Fazl -e-Haq v. State (PLD 1960 SC 295) was decided after the issuance of
the proclamation of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. The question of the
suspension of a High Court Judge and his salary was considered at a time when the 1956
Constitution had been severely undermined by the imposition of Martial 'Law'. It was under such
circumstances that the Supreme Court was constrained to consider the scope of Article 170 of the
1956 Constitution. Since then, a lot of water has flown under the proverbial bri dge and the last
transgression of riding roughshod over the Constitution by General Pervez Musharaf was
categorically and unanimously rejected by fourteen Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court,
including Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice of Pakistan, the author of the
main judgment in the historical case of Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of
Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879) wherein it was held that no curtailment on the independence of the
judiciary will be tolerated. An addition was also made in the Code of Conduct prescribed for the
judges of the superior courts issued pursuant to Article 209(8) of the Constitution, stipulating
that if in future any judge offers any support to any unconstitutional functionary it would also be,
"deemed to be misconduct in terms of the said Article 209 of the Constitution." Therefore, in
view of the independence of judiciary enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973, the Sindh High Court Bar Association judgment and the amended judges Code of
Conduct in our opinion Fazl -e-Haq no longer constitutes a binding precedent.
The next judgment cited by Mrs. Asma Jehangir, Advocate was the case of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saeed (PLD 1961 SC 192). Mr. Justice Ha mood -ur-Rehman
observed that, the promulgation of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, had, "denuded
the High Courts of the wide jurisdiction they possessed under Article 170 of the late Constitution
to issue directions or orders for any purpose to any person or authority including any
Government and left them with the jurisdiction to issue only the writs specified in clause (4) of
Article 2 thereof". For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph this judgment can also not
be relied upon as a bi nding precedent either. It can no longer be envisaged that the jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Article 199 can be denuded or curtailed, and if an attempt was made the
same would be unconstitutional, and therefore must be opposed. The Framers of the C onstitution
of 1973, in their wisdom, also incorporated sub -Article (2) to Article 199, which specifically
stipulates that under no circumstances the right to move a High Court for the enforcement of any
of the Fundamental Rights can be abridged. Moreover, the obedience to the Constitution has
been made an inviolable obligation (Article 5) and any attempt at abrogating, subverting, and
suspending or holding in abeyance the Constitution constitutes the offence of high treason. The
Constitutional (Eighteen Am endment) Act, 2010 has also inserted a new sub -Article (2 A) in
Article 6 of the Constitution, that states that an act of high treason mentioned in clause (1) or
clause (2) shall not be validated by any court including the Supreme Court and a High Court.
Therefore, reliance by learned counsel on a judgment that accepted denuding the High Court of
its jurisdiction under Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution (similar to Article 199 of the 1973
Constitution), and hence to say, that the High Court does not posse ss jurisdiction, is
unacceptable.
In the next citation of Shahnaz Begum (PLD 1971 SC 677) a single judge of the High
Court "in proceedings started suo motu in respect of an investigation which was then pending
into the death of one, Mustafa Zaidi, an Ex C.S.P. Officer" the Hon'ble Supreme Court held (at
page 687), that, under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, "there is no scope of any suo motu
action by the High Court". These observations were made in the context of the case before the
Hon'ble Supr eme Court and therefore clearly per incuriam. However, if for the sake of argument
it is accepted that the said pronouncement has the effect of deciding a question of law or
principle of law (as envisaged in Article 189 of the 1973 Constitution) the observ ation was made
whilst considering Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, that did not contain a provision similar
to sub -Article (2) of Article 199 of the 1973 Constitution, which specifically states that the
enforcement of any Fundamental Rights shall no t be abridged. In Shahnaz Begum a particular
criminal investigation into the death of an individual was going on and the suo motu notice taken
by a single judge of the High Court could have effected the ongoing investigation one way or the
other, thereby prejudicing the right of private parties. Nude photographs of Shahnaz Begum had
been found during the investigation and she had herself approached the court which showed her
justifiable apprehension in this regard. Under the circumstances it was not approp riate to initiate
any suo motu action (as we will be further dilating).
In the case of Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar Hussain (1982 SCMR 549) there was a dispute
between two private parties. The High Court quashed the order of the Additional Rehabilitation
Comm issioner, which order was not challenged before the High Court in the petition before it,
but it was still set aside. Thus, in this context the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the "High
Court cannot issue writ suo motu", which incidentally was also conced ed to by the counsel for
the other side. The judgment does not reveal any discussion on the powers of the High Court;
therefore, it cannot be categorized as deciding or enunciating any principle of l aw.
In Muhammad Sadiq v. Khairati (1984 CLC 2239) a D ivisional Bench of the Lahore
High Court held that, "in exercise of writ jurisdiction the High Court could not suo motu grant a
relief which had not been specifically asked for", by relying upon the case of Akhtar Abbas
(supra), which we have already discu ssed and distinguished.
In Juvenile Jail Landhi Karachi (1990 PCr.LJ 1231) Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian as Chief
Justice of the Sindh High Court, had visited the Juvenile Jail, Landhi and on the basis of his
inspection had formulated certain questions requiri ng judicial consideration including, "Whether
a Juvenile Jail can be converted into a general jail?" It would be useful to reproduce the
following extracts from the said judgment:
"All the above learned counsel are unanimous on the point that this Court under Article
199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution), cannot initiate any proceedings suo motu, as under clause (a) of para 1 of the
above Article 199, it is prerequisite that an applica tion is to be filed by an aggrieved party,
whereas, under clause (b) of para 1 of the above Article, an application can be filed by any
person. In support of their above submission, they have referred to the cases of (1) Fazl -e-Haq,
Accountant - General, We st Pakistan v. The State reported in PLD 1960 SC (Pak.) 295, (2)
Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saeed reported in PLD 1961 SC 192, and (3)
Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another
reported in PLD (sic) SC 677." (Paragraph 4 at page 1234)
"We are inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel that this Court
cannot under Article 199 initiate proceedings suo motu for grant of any of the reliefs provided
for in the above Article. No other provision of the Constitution has been pointed out under which
this Court can in the instant case examine the above quoted questions on the judicial side. It is,
therefore, evident that this Court cannot examine the above -quoted questions on the judi cial side,
either under Article 199 or under any other Article of the Constitution." (Paragraph 7 at page
1235)
The cases that were relied upon by Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian in his judgment, and which formed
the basis upon which the Sindh High Court came to the conclusion that it could not initiate
proceeding suo motu under Article 199, are cases that have already been considered and
discussed hereinabove, which cases in our humble opinion do not specifically bar the High Court
from initiating suo motu action in respect of Fundamental Rights under the 1973 Constitution.
His lordship had noted that, "no other provision of the Constitution has been pointed out under
which this Court can in the instant case examine the above quoted questions." Unfortunately, the
Court's attention was not drawn to the significance of incorporating Article 199(2) into the
Constitution, and if it had been a different conclusion may well have been drawn.
The facts of the case of Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo v. Abdul Wahabul Khairi (PLD 19 94
Lahore 466) were that a single Judge had initiated suo motu proceedings on the basis of
newspaper report regarding purported illegal allotment of land. In paragraph 20 of the judgment
(at page 481) the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, hearing th e 10 Inter Court Appeals,
observed as under:
"There are serious doubts as to whether the matters in relation to which the learned Single
Judge assumed suo motu writ jurisdiction were in any manner related to or connected with the
enforcement of Fundamen tal Rights."
It was also observed that certain private parties had also challenged the said allotments;
therefore, it was not proper to exercise suo motu powers without hearing them as well and those
who were arrayed as respondents. However, whilst dismi ssing the suo motu petition a direction
was issued to hear and dispose of the petitions filed by the other parties.
The above order was assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cited case of
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Muhammad Habib Wahab (2000 SC MR 1046) and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court dismissed the same. Since the High Court had itself concluded that there was
serious doubts as to whether the matter related to or connected with the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights this judgment cannot be cited as a precedent in support of the contention
that the High Courts do not have suo motu powers in respect of the enforcement of Fundamental
Rights. The judgment can also be distinguished on another ground that in respect of pending
private disputes between part ies the High Court ought not to have entered into the fray itself by
exercising suo motu powers.
In the case of Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161) amongst other
matters certain observations were made in paragraph 82 of the judgm ent, reliance whereupon
was placed by Mrs. Asma Jehangir, Advocate. We have gone through the said paragraph and did
not find therein anything restraining the High Court in exercising jurisdiction, as in the instant
case. Their lordships had in the said par agraph dilated upon the power vesting in the Hon'ble
Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the 1973 Constitution and compared the same with
Article 199 and observed that a person may be non -suited by a High Court under Article 199 on
the ground that he has no personal grievance, if he is not aggrieved. Undoubtedly, this is so, but,
it does not follow that the High Courts in appropriate cases where Fundamental Rights are
involved are barred from proceeding merely because an aggrieved party or aggrieved perso n has
not filed an application before it. It should also not be lost sight of that in the said case the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was determining its own jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the
Constitution and not the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art icle 199, which is germane in
this matter, therefore, any observations made therein restricting the High Court to exercise
jurisdiction (which incidentally we did not find) would be in the nature of obiter dicta rather than
ratio decidendi.
As regards t he case of Ali Muhammad v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (2001 SCMR
1822), the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia formulated the question, "Could the High Court
itself make order of allotment in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction?" The Lahore High
Court had granted relief to those who were not parties in the writ petitions. The question
formulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was answered in the negative. It would be useful to
reproduce paragraph 30 of the said judgment (at page 1846):
"Now it wo uld be considered whether learned Judge in Chambers of High Court had
lawfully granted relief to respondents Ismatun Nisa and others while disposing of appeal filed by
Sardar Shahid knowing well that they are not party in the writ petitions filed by them. In this
behalf without dilating in detail on this proposition it is sufficient to observe that in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan High Court
does not enjoy suo motu jurisdiction to grant relief to a party as it has been held in Fazl -e-Haq,
Accountant - General, West Pakistan v. The State (PLD 1960 SC (Pak.) 295) Shahnbz Begum v.
The Hon'ble Judges of High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another (PLD 1971 SC 677),
Akhtar Abbas and others v. Nay yar Hussain (1982 SCMR 549) and Haji Muhammad Sadiq and
others v. Khairati (1984 CLC 2239)."
The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court were in respect of the facts of the
case and reference was made to certain judgments, which we have already c onsidered
hereinabove. Moreover, granting relief to a particular party by the High Court in purported
exercise of suo motu powers cannot be equated with preventing the violation of Fundamental
Rights to a segment of the population that has not approached t he High Court.
18. Mrs. Asma Jehangir learned counsel also cited the case of Benazir Bhutto v. Federation
of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416). Amongst other important matters the decision considered the
scope of the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 18 4(3) and whether the Supreme Court
should in the first instance entertain petitions under the said provisions instead of awaiting the
outcome of the petitions filed before the High Court under Article 199. Having gone through the
judgment we are of the con sidered view that it does not contain anything that stipulates that the
High Court cannot initiate proceedings under Article 199, as has been done in the instant case.
On the contrary the following extracts, respectively from the judgments of the then Hon' ble
Chief Justice Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem and Mr. Justice Abdul Kadir Shaikh suggest that
the fetters, sought to be imposed upon this court, do not exist:
"It is only when the element of "public importance" is involved that the Supreme Court
can exe rcise its power to issue the writ while sub -Article 1 (c) of Article 199 has a wider scope
as there is no such limitation."
"The opening words "without prejudce" in Article 184(3) mean only not affecting,
saving or excepting and when read with the word s following thereafter, "to the provisions of
Article 199" the expression means no more than to save the provisions of Article 199 without, in
any way, superimposing itself on the power of the Supreme Court to decide a question of public
importance relati ng to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights. What it aims at is that
it leaves the power of the High Court under Article 199 intact. It is for the party who is affected
to choose which of the two forums it wishes to invoke, and if it be the Sup reme Court then the
power exercisable is subject to the limitation under Article 184(3), that is, that the element of
"public importance" must be involved in the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. I would,
however, like to make it clear that the power conf erred on the Supreme Court by Article 184(3)
is distinct and has its origin in Article 22 of the 1956 Constitution and is exercisable on its own
terminology. The impression, if there is, that the trappings of sub -Articles 1 (a) and 1 (c) of
Article 199 are also to be read into this Article appears to me to be without substance as there are
no words in Article 184(3) to incorporate them except, of course, the words "make an order of
the nature mentioned in the said Article", which are specifically referable to the nature of the
order in sub - Article 1(c) of Article 199 giving such directions as may be appropriate for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights. The nature of the order, however, is the end -
product of the judicial power exercised. Therefo re, it will not control or regulate, in any way, the
exercise of power so as to make it exercisable only at the instance of the "aggrieved party" in the
context of a adversary proceedings."(At page 488) [Emphasis added by us]
"In this milieu, I am of th e view that the adversary procedure, where a person wronged is
the main actor if it is rigidly followed, as contended by the learned Attorney General, for
enforcing the Fundamental Rights, would become self -defeating as it will not then be available
to pro vide "access to justice to all" as this right is not only an internationally recognized human
right but has also assumed constitutional importance as it provides a broadbased remedy against
the violation of human rights and also serves to promote socio -economic justice which is pivotal
in advancing the national hopes and aspirations incorporated therein, one of which is social
solidarity, i.e., national integration and social cohesion by creating an egalitarian society through
a new legal order." (At page 4 89)
"My Lord the Chief Justice after a detailed discussion with historical background of the
Constitutional provisions has rightly held that the language of Article 184(3) is "open ended",
and the Framers of the Constitution did not intend any rigid or ceremonious observance of the
rules or usage for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, by an individual or a group or
class of persons."
"It is obvious from the language of Article 184(3) that it provides a direct access to the
highest judicial for um in the country for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It caters for an
expeditious and inexpensive remedy for the protection of the Fundamental Rights from
Legislative and Executive interference. It gives the Court very wide discretion in the matter of
providing an appropriate order or direction including declaratory order to suit the exigencies of
particular situations. There can be no doubt that declaration of Fundamental Rights is
meaningless unless there is an effective machinery for the enforcem ent of the rights. It is the
"remedy" that makes the right real. It is often said that without 'remedy' there is no right. It is for
this reason that Constitution -makers provided a long list of Fundamental Rights and the
machinery for their enforcement. T hat machinery is the Superior Courts, namely the High
Courts so far as the Provincial territory is concerned, and the Supreme Court at the apex having
jurisdiction over the entire length and breadth of Pakistan." (At page 569) [Emphasis added by
us]
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Benazir Bhutto's case held that, "sub -Article (1)(c) of
Article 199 has wider scope and there is no such limitation therein". The reference to limitation
was the element of public importance mentioned in Article 184(3). As regar ds the question of
aggrieved party or person mentioned in Article 199 the same was construed in the context of
adversarial proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further stressed, that "to provide access to
justice to all" is not only an internationally re cognized human right but has also assumed
constitutional importance as it provides a broadbased remedy against the violation of human
rights and also serves to promote socio -economic justice which is pivotal in advancing the
national hopes and aspirations incorporated therein. Mr. Justice Abdul Kadir Shaikh, in his
separate but concurring decision, further categorized the aggrieved party/person provisions in
Article 199 as rigid or ceremonious.
19. We now consider the cases in which the High Court has exe rcised suo motu powers
under Article 199 of the 1973 Constitution. In State v. S.P. Traffic Lahore (2000 PCr.LJ 1290)
suo motu notice was taken by the High Court upon a published newspaper report which stated
that the owner of a bus had set fire to it to protest against the illegal gratification consistently
being demanded from him by the traffic police. Unfortunately, there is no discussion in the
judgment on the suo motu powers of the High Court.
In State v. Inspector General of Police Punjab (PLD 201 0 Lahore 326) a police officer
who had been held responsible for the acts of omission and commission in the incident of Gojra,
where a number of Christians lost their lives and many of their houses were burnt, was appointed
as Capital City Police Officer. The Lahore High Court took suo motu notice of his appointment
and struck down the notification appointing him. The relevant portion of the said judgment is
reproduced hereunder:
"From the perusal of the above definition, it is obvious that the powers of High Court for
enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution are wide and in terms of
Article 199 of the Constitution, it can pass any order which would be appropriate in the facts and
circumstances of the case. The expression "as ma y be appropriate for the enforcement of any of
the Fundamental Rights "appearing in the above reproduced article, confers upon the
Constitutional Court a discretion to provide relief under the law to a citizen which may be
necessary. The object of having declaration of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution is that
such rights should be regarded as inviolable under all conditions. According to the above
reproduced Article, the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution are not a mere pious
enunciati on of the principles on which the Constitution is based but are made specifically
justiciable in the clause under reference. They are not liable to be abridged by any legislative or
executive orders except by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution. I t is settled law that were
there is clear abuse of powers/authority, this Court is under constitutional duty to ensure that
people were dealt with in accordance with law." [Emphasis added by us]
In Abdul Qaddus Mughal v. Federal Government (2010 YLR 360 ) suo motu notice was
taken as the price of sugar had shot -up by the Lahore High Court. However, there is no
discussion with regard to the exercise of suo motu powers by the High Court, therefore, this
judgment does not help in determining whether the High Courts can exercise suo motu powers
with regard to Fundamental Rights.
The brief facts in the case of Students of Government Girls College, Kuchlak v.
Government of Balochistan (2010 CLC 168) can be ascertained from the beginning of the
judgment, repro duced hereunder:
"The Registrar of the High Court had put up a note that it had been reported in the daily
Urdu newspaper 'Jang' of 9th August, 2011 that a sizeable portion of the land earmarked for the
Government Girls College Kuchlak ("College") is be ing illegally encroached upon by certain
influential persons."
Notice was issued to all concerned and the allegations raised in the newspaper were found to be
correct, consequently it was held by this court as under:
"That in view of the fact that the publication in the newspaper has been found to be
correct in material respects the same can be considered to reflect the anguish and complaint of
the girls of Balochistan in general and of Kuchlak who may or would seek admission to the
College when it has been constructed and ready for use. Such news report therefore can be
deemed to be an application submitted by them, who undoubtedly would be aggrieved persons,
in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution. The people cannot be deprived of their Fundamen tal
Rights as enshrined in the Constitution merely because they may be unaware of them, or may
not have the wherewithal to approach this court. We are further satisfied that no other adequate
remedy is provided by law to them. One such Fundamental Right i s to be assured of access to the
said educational institutional that is being constructed out of public revenues (Article 22(3)(b))
and if nearly half of the land of such institution is being encroached upon it can be deemed to a
denial of access to the wh ole. Moreover, the owner of the said land, the Education Department of
the Government of Balochistan, did not take any step when from under its proverbial nose almost
half of the College land was bifurcated and encroached upon, and thus violated its mandat e and
disregarded its duty to the public. By permitting, by design, neglect or incompetence,
encroachment and illegal land grab of its property, which was meant for the use and benefit of
girl students, it failed to perform its duty. Such an act whereby it and thus the girl students were
deprived of valuable property violated another Fundamental Right; the protection of property
enshrined in Article 24(1) of the Constitution." (At pages 173 and 174 J)
"In our opinion suo motu notice was justified to be t aken in this case as the matter was of
public interest and involved the taking away and abridging of Fundamental Rights of a segment
of the population. Inaction on our part would have resulted in a public college being deprived of
its valuable property, which in turn would have robbed and dispossessed girl students of the
benefit of a sizable portion of an educational institution that was being constructed out of funds
provided by the public exchequer. To ensure that the Constitution is and remains a liv ing
document the Fundamental Rights stipulated therein must be provided for the benefit of all. It
would be a sad day if the poor, the weak, the disenfranchised, women, children, students or girls
cannot share in the benefits that our Constitution provid es. Sadder still the day when the
dishonest and the corrupt can encroach upon, grab and or convert to their private use public
land. Therefore in appropriate cases, like the present one, if a matter is brought to the attention
of this Court we would loo k to the substance of the powers that the Constitution provides in its
Article 199 and may make appropriate declaration and pass requisite orders." (At page 174 K)
[Emphasis added by us]
In the case of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan v. Governmen t of Pakistan (PLD
2009 Supreme Court 507) a number of petitions had been filed in the Sindh High Court against
the unlawful detention by different land owners of workers, who had failed to repay the loans
advanced to them by the land owners. With regard t o the question in hand the following
paragraphs from the judgment, authored by late M r. Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed, a Judge noted
for his profound intellect, are relevant:
"... It needs to be kept in view that apart from the jurisdiction vested in the Hi gh Courts
by virtue of clauses (a) and (b) of Article 199(1) a special jurisdiction is conferred by clause (c)
[which a High Court shares with the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184(3)] in
the following words:
'On the application of any aggrieved person, make an order giving such directions to any
person or authority, including any Government exercising any power or performing any function
in, or in relation to, any territory within the jurisdiction of trial Court as may be appropriat e for
the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part -II.' " (At page
527O) [Emphasis added by us]
"The power to enforce fundamental rights has been conferred upon the superior Courts
through Articles 199(1)(c) and 184(3) . It may be seen that under Article 4 everybody has to be
treated in accordance with the law and under Article -8, a law inconsistent with fundamental
rights is to be treated as void. Therefore, even in the absence of clause (c) any action by a person
perfo rming functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a province or local
authority, inconsistent with fundamental rights is to be declared without lawful authority under
the clause (a) of Article 199.
The reach of clause (c) however is wide r. It not merely enables a Court to declare an
action of a State functionary inconsistent with fundamental rights to be unlawful but also enables
the Courts to practically enforce such rights by issuing appropriate directives as is evident from
its languag e. Accordingly, this Court after having earlier held that the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Article -17 included the right of a political party to contest elections as a collective
entity was able to issue mandatory directives in the case of Benazir Bhu tto v. Federation of
Pakistan (reported in PLD 1989 SC 66) to the election authorities to amend the election rules to
provide for the same under its powers to enforce fundamental rights under Article -184(3) of
the Constitution. Moreover, such direct ives could be issued to any person including the
Government. In the case of Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (reported in
AIR 1982 SC 1473) it was held that though some of the fundamental rights imposed negative
obligation on the part of the State not to encroach upon individual's liberty etc. there were others
which were positively enforceable against the whole world. We are therefore clearly of the view
that the High Court has plenary powers to positively enforce fundamental rights no t merely
against public authorities but even private parties. Accordingly direction for positive
enforcement of fundamental rights against private parties could only be given by the High Court
in respect of rights guaranteed, inter alia, by Articles 11, 22 etc. which might in most cases
require enforcement against such parties." (At pages 527Q and 528)
In the case reported as State v. M. D. WASA (2000 CLC 471) the Lahore High Court
took notice of a news report which stated that a minor girl's dead body w as retrieved from a
manhole in which she fell because it did not have a manhole cover. The Court took suo motu
notice of the matter and cited other cases where suo motu notice had been taken. Mr. Justice
Tassaduq Hussain Jillani stated as under: --
"This Court has also initiated proceedings on matters like the side effects of Iodised Salt
(The State v. Ittefaq Salt W.P. No.8395 -M/96) the construction of Petrol Pumps and destruction
of Green Belt in Race Course Park Lahore (W.P. No.17008/96) and the Workin g of National
Environmental Council (W.P. No.1655/97)."
It was observed by Mr. Justice Jillani , that:
"It is shocking to know that in 1997 the year of 20th century and in the historic city of
Multan there are 2056 manholes which are uncovered. These are death traps which have been
laid not by an enemy force, this is not an act of terrorism, this is the doing of an authority which
has been entrusted with the task of the development of water and sewerage in the city." (At pages
1708 -1709)
With regard to the reason for taking suo motu notice, and one with which we are in
respectful and complete agreement, was that:
"The rationale behind public interest litigation in developing countries like Pakistan and
India is the social and educational backwardn ess of its people, the dwarfed development of law
of tort, lack of developed institutions to attend to the matters of public concern, the general
inefficiency and corruption at various levels. In such a socio -economic and political milieu, the
non-interven tion by Courts in complaints of matters of public concern will amount to abdication
of judicial authority." (Paragraph 6 at page 1707)
A strong note of caution with regard to suo motu exercise of jurisdiction, with which too
we are in agreement, was als o sounded:
"While taking notice under Article 199 of the Constitution in matters of public interest
Court has to proceed with utmost caution and restraint. The breadth of the realm which is likely
to be unfolded by this field of litigation may unleash f rivolous petitions, complaints with regard
to petty disputes between husband and wife over custody of children and other individual
grievances which if entertained may entail a loss of valuable public time. Moreover, it is likely
that some matters are brou ght before the Court which require technical expertise and in absence
of proper assistance it may lead to orders which may demoralize the administration." (Paragraph
7, page 1707)
20. We may also cite certain well established principles: That ouster of j urisdiction of the
superior courts is not to be presumed and any provision in this regard must be strictly construed.
That the Constitution must always prevail, and the superior courts must ensure this, and the
powers of the constitutional courts (the High Courts and Supreme Court) cannot be curtailed in
this regard. Mr. Justice Hamood -ur-Rahman, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, in the case of
Fazlul Quader Chowdhury v. Muhammad Abdul Haque, (PLD 1963 SC 486) which was
reiterated by him in State v. Zia - ur-Rehman, (PLD 1973 SC 49) made certain pertinent
observations as under:
" ... the consistent rule of construction adopted by all courts that the provisions seeking to oust
the jurisdiction of superior courts are to be construed strictly with a pronou nced leaning against
the ouster." (At page 68) [Emphasis added by us]
The Chief Justice also quoted with approval from the judgment of Mr. Justice S.A.
Rahman in Fazlul Quader Chowdury as under:
"The Judges of the High Court and of this Court are und er a solemn oath to "preserve
protect and defend the Constitution" and in the performance of this onerous duty they may be
constrained to pass upon the actions of other authorities of the State within the limits set down in
the Constitution, not because th ey arrogate to themselves any claim of infallibility but because
the Constitution itself charges them with this necessary function, in the interest of collective
security and stability." (At page 68)
He continued by stating, that:
"... the court does claim and has always claimed that it has the right to interpret the
Constitution and to say as to what a particular provision of the Constitution means or does not
mean, even if that particular provision is a provision seeking to oust the jurisdiction of this Court.
This is a right which it acquires not de hors the Constitution but by virtue of the fact that
it is a superior Court set up by the Constitution itself. It is not necessary for this purpose to
invoke any divine or super -natural right but this judicial power is inherent in the Court itself. It
flows from the fact that it is a Constitutional Court and it can only be taken away by abolishing
the Court itself.
In saying this, however, I should make it clear that I am making a distinction betwee n
'judicial power' and 'jurisdiction' "At page 69).
"In exercising this power, the judiciary claims no supremacy over other organs of the
Government but acts only as the administrator of the public will. Even when it declares a
legislative measure unco nstitutional and void, it does not do so, because, the judicial power is
superior in degree or dignity to the legislative power; but because the Constitution has vested it
with the power to declare what the law is in the cases which come before it. It thus merely
enforces the Constitution as a paramount law whenever a legislative enactment comes into
conflict with it because, it is its duty to see that the Constitution prevails. It is only when the
Legislature fails to keep within its own Constitutional lim its, the judiciary steps in to enforce
compliance with the Constitution. This is no doubt a delicate task as pointed out in the case of
Fazlul Quader Chowdhury v. Shah Nawaz, which has to be performed with great circumspection
but it has nevertheless to be performed as a sacred Constitutional duty when other State
functionaries disregard the limitations imposed upon them or claim to exercise power which the
people have been careful to withhold from them."
21. It would also be useful to examine the decisio ns from our neighbour India where suo
motu are also exercised by the High Courts. In this regard in the case of Shri Bodhisattwa
Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty (1996 AIR SC 922). Mr. Justice Saghir Ahmad, speaking
for the Supreme Court of India held, t hat:
"For the exercise of this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the person who is the victim
of violation of his fundamental right should personally approach the Court as the Court can itself
take cognizance of the matter and proceed suo motu or o n a petition of any public spirited
individual." (Paragraph 3 at page 5)
In Suo Motu v. State of Rajasthan (RLW 2005 (2) Raj 1385) Mr.Justice Mathur, of the
Rajasthan High Court relied upon and restated the above principle:
"For the exercise of its j urisdiction, it is not necessary that a person who is victim of
violation of fundamental rights, should personally approach to this Court. As observed by the
Apex Court in Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC 922 the
Court can its elf take cognizance of the matter and proceed suo motu or on a petition by any
public spirited individual." (Paragraph 17 at page 5)
In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab (AIR 2009 SC 984) the observations of Mr. Justice
S.B. Sinha, of the Indian Sup reme Court, are pertinent:
"The High Court while entertaining the writ petition formed a prima facie opinion as
regards the systematic commission of fraud. While dismissing the writ petition filed by the
selected candidates, it initiated a suo motu publ ic interest litigation. It was entitled to do so. The
nature of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, as is well known, in a private interest
litigation and in a public interest litigation is different. Whereas in the latter it is inquisitorial in
nature, in the former it is adversarial. In a public interest litigation, the court need not strictly
follow the ordinary procedure." (Paragraph 32 at page 993)
22. In the United Kingdom, the traditional bastion of strict rules of locus standi , winds of
change are also blowing. It started in the Court of Appeal with Lord Denning, Master of the
Rolls. In R v Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn, [1976] 3 All ER 184, he sets out the
facts in his inimitable way: "Mr. Raymond Blackburn comes before us once again. This time he
draws to our attention the pornographic films which are being shown openly in London and
elsewhere. They are grossly indecent. They are an offence against the common law of England.
Yet the Greater London Council, the licensing authori ty, are doing nothing to stop them. On the
contrary, he says, they are virtually permitting them." In considering whether Mr. Blackburn had
locus standi to initiate the proceedings Lord Denning rhetorically queried, "On this point, I
would ask: who then ca n bring proceedings when a public authority is guilty of a misuse of
power?" He enunciated the following principle:
"I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that, if there is good ground for
supposing that a government departme nt or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about
to transgress it, in a way which offends or injuries thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any
one of those offended or injured can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have
the law enforced, and the courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate."
(At page 192)
The House of Lords too finally accepted, what was started by Lord Denning. In Inland
Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self - Employed and Small Businesses Ltd.
(1982 AC 617) Lord Diplock of the House of Lords held (at page 644 E to G):
"It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group,
like the federation, or even a single public -spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated
technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate
the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.....It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer
to say that jud icial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is
unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their
functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regard s efficiency and
policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the
lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge." (Paragraphs marked E to G at
page 644)
23. That there are also pra ctical matters that require consideration. When the High Court
takes suo motu notice in respect of a transgression within its territory it may be able to
immediately attend to it. The provincial government's seat of government is the provincial
metropolis, which is also the principal seat of the High Court, therefore, notices will be promptly
attended to and the requisite record and/or facts placed before the Court, and the Court is better
placed to monitor any action that is required to be taken. Sometimes major transgressions of
Fundamental Rights may not even come to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court; if they are
only reported in the local press or a letter in this regard has been sent to the High Court. There is
also the element of cost. The princi pal seat of the Supreme Court is at Islamabad and the victims
(and even the perpetrators) who are in the province may not have the funds to travel to and stay
at Islamabad or may face other difficulties. Also the respondents in a suo motu petition, if they
want to assail the decision of the High Court, will be able to approach the Supreme Court.
24. That with the assistance of the learned amici, the learned counsel and the learned law
officers a thorough and detailed examination of the Constitutional prov isions, precedents of the
superior courts of Pakistan, as well as the judgments from other jurisdictions, was carried out to
determine whether this court can itself (suo motu) take notice of the infringement of
Fundamental Rights. From the said exercise we can derive the following principles:
(1) The Fundamental Rights enshrined in Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter "the Constitution" or "1973 Constitution") are, as
their name suggests, 'fundame ntal', i.e. basic, essential, primary, pivotal;
(2) Article 4 may also be categorized as a Fundamental Right in view of the language used
therein, i.e. that it is the inalienable right to enjoy the protection of the law and to be treated in
accordance wi th the law;
(3) An effective machinery for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights makes the
Fundamental Rights real and effective, and without it the same are illusory;
(4) The Constitution has set in place the machinery for the enforcement of Fundament al
Rights, which are the superior courts, i.e. the High Courts and the Supreme Court;
(5) In respect of adversarial matters agitated under Article 199 of the Constitution between
contending parties or cases which are basically private in nature, the part y/person approaching
the court is required to comply with the procedural requirements contained in Article 199,
including, to show to the satisfaction of the High Court that there is 'no other adequate remedy'
available and he/she/they are 'aggrieved party ' in respect of the remedies sought under Article
199(1)(a) (i) and (ii) or 'aggrieved person' in terms of Article 199(1)(c). There may also be other
procedural requirements imposed by the law and/or by the rules enacted by the High Court that
require comp liance, such as payment of court fee, the form and manner of filing of the
application, requirement as to its verification on oath or being supported by an affidavit. In
addition the principles derived from the corpus of precedents require observance, incl uding
approaching the court within a reasonable time, coming to court with clean hands, not
suppressing material facts, et cetera;
(6) Any person (not necessarily aggrieved) can seek an order under Article 199(b) (i) or (ii),
respectively the writ of hab eas corpus and quo warranto, and since the same fall within the ambit
of public interest litigation the High Court may also initiate action itself (suo motu);
(7) Non compliance of any procedural requirement may be condoned if the High Court is
shown goo d cause and each case is to be considered on its own merits by the High Court;
(8) Sub-Article (2) of Article 199 has no precedent in either the 1962 Constitution or the
1956 Constitution, and the same was consciously inserted into the Constitution by th e Framers of
the 1973 Constitution, therefore it must be treated as singularly important and applied to its full
extent;
(9) Sub-Article (2) of Article 199 stipulates that the right to move a High Court for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights 'shall no t be abridged', therefore, in respect of matters of
Fundamental Rights no procedural or ceremonious trappings or fetters can be placed upon the
High Court;
(10) The nature of jurisdiction that the High Court exercises itself in a public interest litigati on
is inquisitorial (and not adversarial) in nature;
(11) Those decisions of the Supreme Court which are prior to the 1973 Constitution (which
incorporated Article 199(2)) wherein it was observed that the High Court cannot of itself (or suo
motu) take no tice of the violation of any Fundamental Right or those decisions which did not
specifically consider the scope of Article 199(2) or the specific question of the suo motu
powers of the High Court are decisions on facts of individual cases or per in curiam and cannot
be categorized as a "decision ... to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or
enunciates a principle of law" in terms of Article 189 of the 1973 Constitution;
(12) The power of the Supreme Court with regard to th e enforcement of Fundamental Rights
is contained in Article 184 (3);
(13) Article 184(3) does not control Article 199 as the former attends to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court whereas the latter to the jurisdiction of the High Courts. Article 184(3) should
not be used as an interpretative tool to determine the scope of Article 199, and as there is
also no mention of Article 184(3) in Article 199;
(14) The decisions of the superior courts with regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights
under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution or Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution and which were
given at a time of purported suspension of fundamental rights or at a time when the High Courts'
were ostensibly denuded of the power to issue writs or at a t ime when the powers of the High
Court had been curtailed or an independent judiciary had been undermined can no longer be
treated as binding precedent with regard to deciding a question of law or which enunciates a
principle of law (in terms of Article 189 of the 1973 Constitution) because they are in conflict
with the unanimous judgment of the Chief Justice and fourteen judges of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC
879);
(15) Article 199 of the 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the High Court itself (or suo motu)
from taking notice of the violation of Fundamental Rights;
(16) As per the established rules of interpretation and precedents of the superior courts ouster
of High C ourt's jurisdiction is not to be assumed;
(17) The superior courts must ensure that the Constitution prevails, and their power in this
regard cannot be curtailed;
(18) The word application used in Article 199 can not be limited to mean something writte n
on a piece of paper (as the Constitution does not state written application). Since the word
application has not been defined in the Constitution, therefore, the same should be given its
ordinary English language meaning, which does not restrict applicat ion to mean only in a written
form. An application is in the nature of a 'submission', 'request' or 'claim' and can be written or
verbal, or expressed in any other form;
(19) There is no reason that a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of a High Court or a note
put up before the Chief Justice that identifies serious transgression of Fundamental Rights,
should not be deemed to be an application as envisaged in Article 199 of the Constitution;
(20) Those who have been wronged or are subjected to indign ities or have suffered atrocities
or violence are usually those who do not have knowledge of their Fundamental Rights or are
weak or are not in a position to complain, let alone resist the transgression, but are in the fullest
sense of the word aggrieved, therefore, if a letter or a note is put up before the Chief Justice the
same can be deemed to be one submitted on their behalf and thus, even if a pedantic view is
taken to determine the scope of the words, application and aggrieved person/party, appearing in
Article 199 of the Constitution, both these conditions are met;
(21) In view of the fact that there is potential for misuse, and even mischief, the High Court
should exercise care when taking (suo motu) action itself under Article 199 of the Constitu tion;
(22) The High Courts may formulate rules with regard to exercise of (suo motu) jurisdiction
itself under Article 199 of the Constitution and the manner in which to attend to the same,
but till such rules are framed the following should be ensured:
(i) If a letter is received that prima facie evidences violation of any Fundamental Right an
initial examination be undertaken to ascertain the identity of the person, the nature of the
grievance and whether he is acting bona fide;
(ii) In r espect of serious violation of Fundamental Rights reported in the media or
elsewhere, the veracity of such report may be ascertained;
(iii) Where it is considered by the Registrar that the High Court may take notice of the
violation of the reported viol ation of Fundamental Rights he should put up a note before the
Chief Justice on the administrative side, and if the Chief Justice deems it necessary he may have
the same converted into a petition, and direct that the same be numbered as such;
(iv) Save the Chief Justice, individual judges should not take suo motu notice, to avoid
confusion and possibly contradictory orders being passed in respect of the same matter;
(v) Depending on the nature of the matter any person who has the requisite expertise, a
reputable non -governmental organization and / or bar association may by arrayed as petitioner/s
so that the High Court receives proper and independent assistance;
(vi) Before proceeding with the matter the Federation, Province and/or a local authority ,
as the case may be, and any other concerned organization, department or person should be
arrayed as respondents;
(vii) Notices be also issued to the Advocate General and or the Attorney General for
Pakistan, as the case may require;
(viii) Before i ssuing notices, the court should be prima facie satisfied that the information
that has been laid before the court requires examination and pertains to the violation or
infringement of Fundamental Rights;
(ix) Notices issued to the respondents, the Atto rney General and/or the Advocate General
must enclose copies of the documents on which cognizance of the matter has been taken, and
they must be provided with an opportunity to submit their respective replies;
(x) The High Court should ensure before mak ing a decision, that the facts contained in
the letter / report are correct;
(xi) If during the course of hearing any additional information is received, which may
have a bearing on the case, the same should also be provided to the respondents and they be
given an opportunity to respond thereto;
(xii) The particular Fundamental Right/s which may have been violated must be
identified to enable the respondents to address the same and these must also be mentioned in the
decision;
(xiii) If during the hearing of the petition it transpires that there has been no violation of
any Fundamental Right, or there is no case to answer in respect of habeas corpus or quo warranto
the proceedings should be withdrawn/dismissed;
(xiv) The High Court should not exe rcise such powers in routine but should do so in
exceptional cases, and particularly where those whose Fundamental Rights have been violated
are the poor, the weak, the disenfranchised, women, children, members of any minority
community, and those who live in fear of force or threat;
(xv) The matter should be heard by a bench of two judges, ideally comprising of the
Chief Justice and another judge;
(xvi) The High Court should not involve itself in any dispute which may adversely affect
any pending lit igation or which may prejudice the private right of any party / person; and
(xvii) A cautious approach should be adopted with a view to ensure that the process of
the court is not abused or misused.
25. That having determined that this court could tak e notice of the brutal murder of 26
persons in the area of Ghanji Dori, within the precinct of District Mastung, on 21st September
2011, that had been brought to the attention of the Chief Justice by the note of the Registrar
(reproduced above) and whereup on the Chief Justice had directed the same be numbered as a
petition, and the petition was heard by a Divisional Bench of this court, and from time to time
interim orders were passed, some of which are reproduced here under:
Reproduced from Order Sheet dated 4th October 2011:
"The investigation team will also be at liberty to avail the assistance of any intelligence
agency, whether provincial or federal, as well as accessing the record of the mobile companies
regarding this incident through an officer of police of a rank of Superintendent of Police (SP) or
above. In case the investigation team requires any resources either from the Government of
Pakistan or Government of Balochistan, we expect that the same will be made available to them
as it is the p rincipal duty of the State to protect the life of its citizens."
"Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan files Vakalatnama on behalf of petitioner No.3 as well as a
statement on behalf of petitioner No.3, wherein other similar incidents have been mentioned and
states that there may be linkages between the present incident and other incidents and, as such,
investigation with regard to other incidents may also be looked into to see if any clue can be
gathered from the same which will help in the present investigatio n. The I.O. in the said incident
states that the same is a reasonable proposal and they will consider other similar incidents to see
whether there are any commonalties between the same and whether the investigation of the other
incidents may help in the pr esent incident as well. There are certain survivors who were traveling
in the said bus who state that they are prepared to record their statements. Investigation team
should record such statements as the same may provide a clue to their investigation. In v iew of
the fact that the survivors may be traumatized the concerned investigation officer(s)/official(s)
should record their statements at their residence."
"Learned Advocate General further states that after this court took notice of the matter a
publi cation has been printed in the leading newspapers of the province, whereby the Government
of Balochistan has offered Rupees five million reward to anyone who can offer information
which may help in the detection of the perpetrators."
"It is noted that s ome newspapers and electronic media in reporting the matter not only
identifies the organization which claims responsibility for such attacks but also proceeds to
propagate the views of such organization. In C.P. No.102/2010 learned DAG has filed the list of
organizations that had been banned under Section 11 -B of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 ("Act")
and in respect whereof an observation order had been passed under Section 11 -D of the said Act.
Section 11 -W of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 states that the pr inting, publishing or
disseminating any material which instigates hatred or gives projection to any proscribed
organization or an organization placed under observation or anyone concerned with terrorism is
in itself an office. Whist this court is mindful o f the freedom of the press guaranteed in Article 19
of the Constitution of Pakistan, the said Fundamental Right itself restricts such freedom if it
results in the 'incitement to an offence'."
"We have been informed that the organization which claimed re sponsibility for carrying
out the attack was the 'Lashkar -e-Jhangvi', which is a banned organization. Accordingly, the
press and the media should not have printed any propaganda material of such organization as the
same may constitute an offence under sect ion 11 -W of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 as well as
running foul of Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The press and the media are directed
not to print or publish any propaganda of an organization that has been banned or in respect
whereof an obs ervation order has been passed, respectively under sections 11 -B and 11 -D of
the Act. This order is of an interim nature and if any newspaper or media organization feels
aggrieved they may make submissions in this regard."
"Some media representati ves are present today and state that they simply report the
matter and it is for the news editor, chief editor and or the owners of their organization to print or
publish any story. It is further stated that they are threatened on the phone that if the pro paganda
of such organization is not printed they will come under attack themselves and as such out of
fear they publish such report. We however do not consider the same to be a justification for
violating the law and the Constitution of Pakistan and if any one does so he will have to face the
consequences provided in the law. It is also not expected that the media, which is stated to be the
fourth pillar of the State, would undermine or weaken the integrity and the cohesion of the State
and the people residi ng within it."
"Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the President of the Supreme Court Bar
Association and the International Commission of Jurists Geneva. Copies of this order be sent to
the heads of the electronic and print media throug h Press Information Department of the
Government of Pakistan and Director General Public Relations of the Government of
Balochistan. Copy of this order be sent to APNS and CPNE."
Reproduced from Order Sheet dated 18th October 2011:
"Learned Advocate General files progress report and states that a number of statements
have been recorded and further progress in the investigation has taken place and that some
valuable clue has been obtained, however, it would not be appropriate to disclose the same in
court. The object of the present exercise is not to undermine the investigation but to ensure that a
thorough investigation takes place, accordingly any sensitive information that is acquired during
the investigation need not be disclosed. Learned Advocate G eneral also files report on behalf of
respondent No.4. From the said report of Frontier Corps (FC) it transpires that the FC was not
called upon to render any assistance at the time of the attack or thereafter."
"The Government has re -introduced the Lev ies Force in the Province but they appear not
to be equipped to deal with the terrorism or mass murder cases and they do not even know whom
to contact when such an attack happens. We expect that the Government will look into this
blatant discrepancy. It is significant that the attack happened at a close distance from the FC post
but no personnel of Levies contacted FC to come to the assistance of the Levies or to
immediately alert them to check the vehicles involved in the attack. There must be coordination
between the local law enforcement agency and the FC because FC is there to assist whenever
called upon to do so, but for this to happen they need to be contacted."
Reproduced from Order Sheet dated 23rd November 2011:
"Barrister Iftikhar Raza files a document listing the number of deaths that have taken
place since 5 -10-1999 to 4 -10-2011 on account of terrorism. According to him the highest
number of casualties has been in the current year. The document further discloses that such
incidents had reced ed in 2006 and 2007 but started increasing in 2008 onwards. Copy of the said
document has been provided to learned Advocate General."
"In view of the fact that the incidents are increasing shows that the measures in place for
detecting and combating ter rorism are not working. One of the reasons for the same could be that
Balochistan is divided into 'A' & 'B' areas which are respectively under the domain of Police and
Levies. It is reasonable to presume that terrorists who carry out these attacks are invo lved in a
number of attacks and would be looking for the possibility to conduct further attacks. Therefore,
it would be appropriate if the Government sets up a special cell to counter terrorists. Such a cell
would acquire specialization in the subject and maintain detailed records of all terrorist activities,
which would help both in the earlier detection of such crimes and may also prove useful in
preventing the same. Moreover, at times the local investigator does not have the capacity to deal
with such he inous cases and also may not have the date and information about other cases in
which the same criminals were involved."
"Mr. Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani, President High Court Bar Association, Mr. Ayaz Zahoor,
Member Pakistan Bar Council and Mr. Kamran Mulakh ail , Member Balochistan Bar Council
state that if such a cell is set up and dedicated to such type of cases it would be a positive step in
combating terrorism. Such a cell would gather the date of such crimes, phone numbers, cells and
sims used, finger pr ints and other useful information and material for early detection of crimes.
Such a cell could also acquire the technology to trace telephone calls."
"Learned Advocate General states that he will be taking up the matter with the Chief
Secretary, Provin cial Police Officer ("PPO") and other concerned authorities. Learned Advocate
General states that after the earlier orders had been passed by this court the data in respect of
other similar crimes that had been committed was collated and certain clues and commonalities
emerged, which has provided leads that may help in locating the criminals. He however
requested that the report submitted by him may not be made a part of the record. We have gone
through the same and have returned it to him. He further state s that notification No.SO
(Judl:)1(1)/2011/4171 -4200 dated 12th November 2011 has been issued, whereby the
Government of Balochistan has formally announced a cash reward of Rs.5 million for anyone
having information of the attack."
26. We painfully obser ve that until this court had not taken cognizance of this act of pre -
meditated murder, the law enforcement agencies and the government had taken little, if no
interest therein. We learnt that Frontier Corps ("FC"), which has been deployed in Balochistan
for the assistance of the Government of Balochistan by the Federal Government, was not called
upon to provide support and assistance to the local law enforcement agencies, who were not
equipped to combat dangerous, well organized and armed criminals/terroris ts. Another notable
lapse was the failure to complete the Forensic Laboratory in Quetta. The investigation was being
carried out by a Naib Tehsildar, who is a revenue official, because the crime had been committed
in a 'B' Area where the Levies Force has j urisdiction, and the Levies at the local level come
under the revenue officials, and not the police. Apparently the terrorists had blocked the onward
passage of the bus by placing a vehicle driven by them in front of the bus, got onto the bus and
taken dow n members of the Hazara community, they lined them up and shot them in cold blood.
The said official had already recorded the statement of the bus driver, but had not asked him
whether the killers' vehicle had a number plate, and if so, what it was. When a sked as to how
many murder investigations he had carried out he responded by stating that this was the first one.
Revenue officials have not been trained to conduct murder investigations; they do not know what
questions to ask witnesses, how to record stat ements of witnesses, how to take finger prints,
collect bullets and their casings, what to do with them if collected, how to secure evidence, et
cetera. Our criminal justice system requires the prosecution to prove the case against the accused
beyond reaso nable doubt. Under such circumstances if in the off -chance the perpetrators are
arrested the trial court may be constrained to acquit him for lack of evidence, a consequence of
incompetent investigation and the lacunae in the case. Pakistan has one of the lowest convictions
rates in the world due to abysmal prosecutions. The law enforcement agencies have also become
highly politicized and demoralized because honest and efficient officers are transferred at the
whim of ministers and the chief minister. On th e other hand, corrupt and incompetent officers,
who maintain good relations with politicians, are accommodated. The cost of this unholy alliance
is paid for by the people.
27. That unfortunately, effective and immediate steps to apprehend
members of bann ed organizations have not been taken and the situation has progressively
deteriorated since the said incident. Lashkar -e-Jhangvi has become emboldened to carry out
many more killings, mostly of the members Hazara community on account of their religious
beliefs. The following news report is in respect of an incident that took place on 10th January
2013:
"As many as 81 people were killed and 121 injured in suicide and car bomb blasts in
Quetta's Almadar Road area on Thursday night. Earlier in the afternoon , 12 people lost their lives
when a bomb went off near a vehicle of the Frontier Corps at Bacha Khan Chowk. A cameraman
and a reporter of a private news channel, a computer operator of a news agency and nine police
personnel, including two senior police of ficers, were among the dead, while 10 army and FC
personnel were injured in the blasts.
A majority of the people killed in the Alamdar Road blasts belonged to the Hazara Shia
community."('Hazara Killings in Balochistan', DAWN, 11th January 2013)
The members of the Hazara community decided to launch a peaceful protest, supported
by civil society, and refused to bury their dead, compelling the Federation to dismiss the
provincial government, and Governor's rule was imposed; Article 234 of the Constituti on states
that when this is done the President of Pakistan assumes to himself all of the functions of the
Government of the Province or direct the Governor to assume on behalf of the President all or
any of the functions of the Government. However, hardly a month had elapsed when the
terrorists struck again. On 16th February 2013, the markets near Kirani Road in Quetta, the seat
of Government, were bombed with a huge quantity of explosives. Close to a hundred lost their
lives and many hundreds were injured, amongst them a very large number were infants, children
and women. The killers had no remorse. The following extract depicts the mood:
"It is saddening to say that the Hazaras, after every blast, rush to the killing site, collect
their dead bodies, mos t of the time in pieces, wash them carefully, put them in a clean shroud,
bring their dead to the road and start a peaceful protest for justice ... ."
('The Systematic extermination of the Hazaras' by Muhammad Younas, newspaper
DAWN, 23rd Febr uary 2013).
The Hon'ble Supreme Court took notice of the 16th February 2013 bombing under
Article 184 (3) and the case is pending before it.
28. What is so very surprising is that the concept of ministerial responsibility, which is an
important ingred ient of parliamentary democracy, is virtually non -existent in Pakistan. Neither
the government collectively, nor the concerned minister individually, assumes responsibility.
The concept of the Cabinet to be "collectively responsible to the Provincial Assem bly", in terms
of Article 130(6), becomes meaningless when nearly all the Members of the Provincial
Assembly serve in the Cabinet, as in the case of Balochistan.
29. We are constrained to observe that both the Provincial and Federal Governments failed to
protect the lives of countless citizens and thus the right to life guaranteed as a Fundamental Right
in the Constitution stood violated. We are cognizant of the fact that terrorism is a global menace
and not easy to eradicate or control, however, steps ca n be taken that demonstrate the
governments resolve in this regard. There are a number of long, medium, short term and
immediate measures that could be taken to combat and contain the threat of terrorism. Measures
could also be taken to show support and so lidarity with the victims and their loved ones.
30. We do realize that courts do not have the requisite expertise to address the cancer of
extremism and terrorism, but we have throughout the hearing of this petition, and when hearing
certain other petiti ons, directed the government and the concerned authorities to implement the
existing laws, and if they had done so it may have stemmed this menace. It is obvious to even the
most uninitiated that an extremist -terrorist organization desires to impose its ow n views upon the
general public. To enable this to happen they require a vehicle to spread their propaganda (and
justification for their barbarous acts of death and destruction); this they do by writing slogans on
walls, distributing unmarked pamphlets, se nding unmarked letters, but for the widest impact,
they resort to the media. Article 19 of the Constitution tempers "the right to freedom of speech"
and permits placing restrictions thereon in the following circumstances: (1) "in the interest of the
glory of Islam", (2) "integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof", (3) "friendly
relations with foreign States", (4) "public order", (5) "decency", (6) "morality", (7) "in relation to
contempt of court" and (8) "commission of or incitement to an offence". Extremist hate
literature, wall -chalking and threatening and spiteful press releases are not permissible because
the same are contrary to the injunctions, undermine the integrity, security and defence of
Pakistan, public order, decency and mo rality. The same also are also crimes under the laws of
Pakistan, and they incite others to commit crime.
31. We had passed interim orders and issued notices to the entire electronic and press media
of Pakistan as well as All Pakistan Newspapers Society ('APNS') and Council of Pakistan
Newspaper Editors ('CPNE') so that they could avail of the opportunity of a hearing to put across
their point of view in case they objected to the (above) interim orders passed by us or the
restraints that we may impose. Ho wever, only the daily newspaper 'Mashriq' through Mr. W. N.
Kohli, Advocate availed the opportunity and presented their point of view. Mr. Kohli stated that
the media does not have unfettered and unbridled freedom, as envisaged under Article 19 of the
Cons titution. In this regard he placed reliance upon the cases reported as Masroor Hussain v.
Adeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1988 SC 823), relevant portion at pages 880 -D and 1005 -T), Zahiruddin
v. State (1993 SCMR 1718), relevant portion at page 1775 -SS) and Jamil Ahm ed Malik v.
Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board (2004 SCMR 164), relevant portion at page 178 -A). No one
has alleged that freedom of speech expression and freedom of press media is absolute, despite
being offered every opportunity to do so.
32. That whilst media has won its freedom, we painfully observe that at times it is not staying
within the bounds of the law and broadcasts and prints the viewpoint of extremists and killers;
with the competent authority looking the other way. Section 11 -W of the Anti -Terrorism Act,
1997 ("Act") states that the printing, publishing, or disseminating any material to incite hatred or
giving projection to any person for a terrorist act or any proscribed organization or an
organization placed under observation or anyone conce rned in terrorism is in itself an offence.
Lashkar -e-Jhangvi, the organization which claimed responsibility for carrying out the attack has
been banned organization under Section 11 -B of the Act. The learned Deputy Attorney General
provided us a listing of all the organizations that have been banned, which are: (1) Lashkar -e-
Jhangvi (LJ), (2) Sepha -e-Muhammad Pakistan (SM P), (3) Jaish -e-Muhammad (JM), (4)
Lashkar -e-Tayyaba (LT), (5) Sipha -e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), (6) Tehreek -e-Jaafria Pakistan
(TJP), (7) T ehreek -e-Nifaz -e-Shariat -e-Muhammadi (TNSM), (8) Tehreek -e- Islami, (9) Al -
Qaeda, (10) Millat -e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP), (11) Khuddam -ul-Islam (Ex JM), (12) Islami
Tehreek Pakistan (Ex TJP), (13) Jamiat -ul-Ansar, (14) Jamiat -ul-Furqan, (15) Hizb -ul-Tehri r,
(16) Khair -un-Nas International Trust, (17) Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), (18) Islamic
Students Movements of Pakistan, (19) Lashkar -e-Islam, (20) Insar -ul-Islam, (21) Haji Namdar
Group, and (22) Tehreek -e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). We were also provid ed notifications in
respect of the following organizations which are placed under observation pursuant to Section
11-D of the Act, which were: (1) Sunni Tehrik, (2) Jamat -ul-Dawa, (3) Al -Akhtar Trust and (4)
Al-Rashid Trust.
33. On the issue of reporting propaganda of banned organizations, a number of reporters of
television channels and newspapers on 4th October, 2011 stated that they are threatened (on the
telephone) that if the statement issued by the said organization is not prominently
announced/prin ted and at a particular time or on a particular page they will be attacked,
therefore, out of fear the reports of banned organizations are published. With regard to the said
contention we had observed as under:
"We however do not consider the same to be a justification for violating the law and the
Constitution of Pakistan and if anyone does so he will have to face the consequences provided in
the law. It is also not expected that the media, which is stated to be the fourth pillar of the State,
would und ermine or weaken the integrity and the cohesion of the State and the people residing
within it."
However, despite our observations and the clear stipulations in the law we were informed by the
learned counsel that the media is not implementing the same a nd the regulators and the
governments are not launching prosecutions. We do not accept fear to justify propagating the
views of banned organizations. If any threat is extended to media personnel they should
immediately report the matter to the police, but under no circumstances a threat can be justified
to propagate the views of banned organizations. People are brutally murdered and maimed by
members of banned organizations, and then the victims' families and their loved ones to face the
effrontery of the k illers proclaiming success or justifying their inhuman acts, is to say the least
abhorrent in the extreme. If the electronic media and the press publish propaganda reports out of
fear and propagate the views of banned organizations they are not acting as g ood and responsible
journalists, but as mouthpieces for malicious and vile propaganda. They also contravene different
laws of Pakistan, including section 11 -W of the Act, and if they continue to do so they must be
prosecuted in accordance with the law. We, therefore, direct both Federal and Provincial
Governments to closely monitor the media in this regard to ensure strict compliance inter
alia with section 11 -W of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997.
34. Another vehicle for propagation of hate and inti midation is to resort to wall -chalking. The
Balochistan Prohibition of Expressing Matters on Walls Ordinance, 2001 ("Ordinance")
prohibits any expression on walls and where this is done, the violator is punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may ext end to six months or with fine not exceeding Rs.5,000/ -
or with both. Section 3 of the said Ordinance stipulates that within a period of 30 days from the
commencement of the Ordinance every Local Council shall cause to be removed all matters
expressed on t he walls within its jurisdiction the expression of which is prohibited by the
Ordinance. The Ordinance was enacted on 8th December 2001, and the stipulated period of 30
days stood expired on 9th January 2002, but nothing has been done to remove wall -chalk ing.
This law is mostly observed in the breach, despite the fact that this court in a number of cases has
specifically directed compliance therewith.
35. The matter of wall -chalking had also come up before us in a public interest litigation
case (Talat Waheed v. Government of Balochistan in Constitutional Petition No.572 of 2009)
wherein on 21st October 2009, eleven political parties had appeared and stated that, "their
respective parties undertaken not to indulge in wall -chalking in future and have no o bjection if
the slogans etc. are removed". We may also refer to Section 83A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1976 which in its subsection (2) stipulates that, "Wall chalking as a part of an
election campaign is prohibited in all forms." Resort to w all chalking by political parties,
commercial enterprises and banned organizations not only violates the law but also creates an
environment of lawlessness. Citizens abiding by the law are faced with the effrontery of wall -
chalking. In the same petition we had observed that violating the law and writing on public and
private properties without the owner's permission, is contrary to Islamic teachings. Those
adhering to sectarian, ethnic, extremist and terrorist ideologies resort to wall -chalking to spread
their messages of hate, intimidation and terror. To make the public space free of messages of
hatred a cleansing is required; i.e. strict compliance with the provisions of the Ordinance,
without any discrimination. Failure to do so by the concerned administr ation / the administrator
of the local council must be visited upon with consequences on the recalcitrant officers and
disciplinary action initiated against them for inefficiency and failure to comply with the law. We
also reserve the right to initiate con tempt proceedings against them in the case of non -
compliance.
36. In those rare cases that wall -chalking is removed it is by applying whitewash on it, which
in fact facilitates future chalking as it provides a clean slate for writing. We therefore direct that
wall-chalking should be removed in a manner that does not disfigure but restores, therefore,
wall-chalking on (1) brick walls should be removed by scrubbing it off with a wire brush or
grinder, (2) on a painted wall by painting over it with matching paint, (3) on a cement wall by
applying liquid cement and on (4) on mud wall by applying mud thereupon. In view of the fact
that removing wall -chalking may consume public resources, costs thereof could be recovered
from the violators in addition to the fin es imposed upon them, portion whereof could be provided
to the union council, which had launched the prosecution.
37. There is another very important matter that requires consideration. The Lashkar -e-
Jhangvi, like many of the other banned organizations, resorts to murder, slaughter and massacre,
to propagate their beliefs which they mistakenly believe to be ordained by Almighty Allah.
Unfortunately, taking the law into one's own hand and resorting to killing is forbidden by Islam,
as is made clear in no u ncertain terms in the Holy Qur'an. "Never should a believer kill a
believer" (Al Qur'an 4:92). "If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to
abide therein and the wrath and curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful chastisement is
prepared for him" (Al Qur'an 4:92). These verses of the Holy Qur'an use the term believer, and
not Muslim, therefore, their application cannot be restricted. Almighty Allah, through the
Glorious Qur'an, forbids the taking of life and explains the reason fo r the prohibition. "Nor take
life, which Allah has made sacred except for just cause" (such as punishment for murder) (Al
Qur'an 17:33). Life is sacred. The sacredness of the best of Allah's creation is such that:
"Whosoever killeth a human being (anas) fo r other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth,
it shall be as if he had killed all humanity" (Al Quran 5:32) .
38. That another methodology adopted by some banned organizations to kill by carrying out
suicide attacks. Suicide bombers have no pla ce in Islam. There are no exceptions."O you
who believe ...do not kill for destroy) yourselves" (Al -Qur'an 4.29). The sanctity of life is made
supreme. "Take not life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law: Thus
doth He comma nd you, that ye may learn wisdom" (Al Qur'an 6:151). "Nor take life, which
Allah has made sacred" (Al Qur'an 17:33). The person who blows himself up commits crimes
against Allah; as he both kills others and also himself, i.e. sacred lives.
39. That destr oying life is forbidden, whilst the saving of life is one of the most
commendable of acts. "And if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the
whole people" (Al Qur'an 5:32). In matters of faith, even if one believes that one is right and the
other wrong, one can not compel another by force of arms, threats or foul speech, because,
"There is no compulsion in religion" (Al Qur'an 2:256). The Message has to be spread, "With
wisdom and beautiful preaching; and persuade them in ways that ar e best and most gracious" (Al
Qur'an 16:125) . When two Muslims were loudly arguing in disagreement about the meaning of
a Qur'anic verse Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, castigated them, and
said: "People before you perished only because of their disagreement about the Scripture." In his
famous sermon delivered at Arafat he said, that, "Every Muslim is a Muslim's brother and that
the Muslims are brethren." The believers of other faiths too cannot be insulted. "And insult not
those whom th ey worship besides Allah' least they insult Allah wrongfully without knowledge."
(Al Qur'an 6:108). To those who continue their disputations and disregard specific
commandments of Almighty Allah the Holy Qur'an addresses, thus: "Say, Will you instruct
Allah about your religion" (Al Qur'an 49:16), and "Say, Do you know better than Allah?" (Al
Qur'an 2:140). Significantly, these killers do not have the courage of their convictions by
identifying themselves and openly coming forward to enter into discourse to persuade those who
they believe to be on the wrong path.
40. Extremism and terrorism in the name of Islam, do violence to the basic creed of Islam.
The language of the Holy Qur'an is Arabic, and Arabic derives its vocabulary from 'roots'. The
root of Is lam are the letters l and m. Islam is thus, literally, the religion of peace. A Muslim
greets another by saying, "Peace be upon you." The reply used by Muslims to this greeting is,
"And upon you too", though the better reply is "And upon you too and the m ercy and blessings
of Allah." Therefore, the very foundation of Islam is negated by those who secretly kill and
murder in the name of this Glorious Faith.
41. The State appears to have abdicated its responsibility with regard to enabling Muslims to
live, "their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and
to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to
the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah", as provided in the Principles of Polic y of the Constitution (sub -
Article (1) of Article 33), and "to facilitate the learning of Arabic" (sub -Article (2)(a) of Article
33). Few read the translation of the Holy Qur'an, fewer still know the Arabic language.
Surprisingly, even those who attend rel igious schools are not taught Arabic language. Religious
extremism, from which often stems terrorism, needs also to be intellectually addressed, and
defeated. Regretfully, those preaching hatred and violence have come to occupy the public space
and the voi ces of wisdom and sanity, the true adherents of the Faith have been drowned out. The
State must correct the imbalance.
42. For the reasons as detailed above, this petition is disposed of in the following terms:
(i) We declare those traveling by the ill fated bus on 20th September 2011 in the Ganji Dori
area of District Mastung were murdered in contravention of the law and the Constitution, and
their Fundamental Rights to life, liberty, dignity, movement and religion were abused,
contravened and violated ;
(ii) We declare that those committing murder, advocating murder, indulging in hate speech,
spreading hate propaganda, instilling fear, compelling by threat or force of arms their views
contravene the injunctions of Islam;
(iii) We direct the investig ating team of this barbaric crime to thoroughly investigate it and
trace out the perpetrators, ensure their arrest and prosecute them in accordance with the law;
(iv) We direct that all concerned extend every possible assistance to the investigating team ;
(v) We direct the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Balochistan to provide
requisite resources to the investigators that would help them in detecting, arresting and
prosecuting the criminals;
(vi) We direct that telephone and mobile teleph one service providers provide their record in
respect of this crime provide as required by a senior police officer;
(vii) We direct the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Balochistan to coordinate
and develop an effective mechanism, including s haring of information, for monitoring potential
terrorists, and apprehending the perpetrators of this and other terrorist crimes;
(viii) We direct the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Balochistan to develop and
maintain a data -bank with infor mation of perpetrators / suspects of heinous crimes and terrorist
organizations, including their names, aliases, parentage, addresses, photographs, thumb
impressions, DNA, telephone number and telephone details, weapons used, particular type of
explosives used and their respective modus operandi;
ix) We direct that access to the above data -bank be provided to senior investigators to help
determine similarities and linkages between different crimes and criminals so that they can be
traced, arrested and pro secuted;
(x) We direct the Federation of Pakistan, through the Ministry of Interior/Defence, to issue
requisite instructions to the Frontier Corps ("FC") deployed in Balochistan to come to the
immediate assistance of the local law enforcement agencies wh en called upon to do so. Standing
operating procedures in this regard should be developed, which should detail how best an
effective cooperation methodology between the local law enforcement agency and the nearest FC
post be developed;
(xi) We direct tha t a specialized cell/unit/division be established in respect of terrorist acts
committed in the Province and such crimes be investigated by senior and experienced officers of
police and/or under their supervisions and all Provincial law enforcement personn el are directed
to cooperate with them, including the Levies Force operating in Balochistan;
(xii) We direct that in respect of serious crimes or terrorist acts the local police/levies should
immediately inform the nearest police station, the Police Head quarters and the office of the
Home Secretary, who should in turn immediately inform the Interior Ministry;
(xiii) We direct the Federal Government and the Government of Balochistan to complete the
Forensic Laboratory being setup in Quetta at the earlies t;
(xiv) We direct payment of adequate compensation to the legal heirs of the victims of the said
crime, if the same has not already been paid;
(xv) We direct that the Ministry of Information, Press and Publications Department,
Intelligence Bureau, Spe cial Branch and all other intelligence gathering agencies of the
Federation and the Province to closely monitor extremist and hate literature and its propagation
and to bring the same to the notice of the concerned authorities for proceeding against the
perpetrators in accordance with the law;
(xvi) We direct the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Balochistan to ensure that
the organizations proscribed under section 11 -B of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 ("Act") and
those in respect of which obse rvations and orders have been passed under section 11 -D, must not
be allowed to propagate their views, and strict compliance with section 11 -W of the Act be made
against the transgressors, including the electronic and print media;
(xvii) We direct strict compliance with the Balochistan Prohibition of Expressing Matters on
Walls Ordinance, 2001 ("Ordinance") and that prosecutions be launched against those
violating section 2 thereof;
(xviii) We direct all local councils through their respective he ads/administrators to immediately
remove wall -chalking within the area of their respective jurisdictions in terms of Section 3 of the
Ordinance, and wall -chalking be removed in the following manner:
(a) On brick walls by scrubbing it off with a wire bru sh or grinder;
(b) On painted walls by painting over it with matching paint;
(c) On cement walls by applying liquid cement; and
(d) On mud walls by applying mud thereupon.
(xix) We direct all Deputy Commissioners serving in Balochistan to ensure that the officers of
the local councils under their jurisdiction are bringing prosecutions under Section 2 of the
Ordinance, and undertaking their obligations under Section 3 of the Ordinance, failing which
disciplinary action against the recalcitrant off icers be initiated; and
(xx) We direct the Secretary, Local Government, Government of Balochistan and the
Commissioners of all the Divisions in Balochistan to seek periodical reports from the Deputy
Commissioners under their jurisdiction with regard to c ompliance of the provisions of the
Ordinance.
We acknowledge the assistance rendered by all the learned counsel, members of the press
and electronic media, members of the public who came forward, and particularly to the learned
amici who assisted us in this difficult and complicated matter.
This judgment in its paragraphs 2 to 24 attends to whether High Court can itself (or suo
motu) take notice. And, having decided that the High Court has suo motu jurisdiction, the facts
or merits of the case are add ressed in paragraphs 1, 25 to 41 of the judgment.
The declarations and directives issued by us are contained in paragraph 42, which the
respondents and all concerned have to implement. The Office is directed to send copies of
paragraphs 1 and 42 of the judgment ("the said paragraphs") for information and compliance to
the Government of Pakistan, through Cabinet Secretary, Secretary Interior, Secretary Defence,
Secretary Information and Inspector General Frontier Corps Balochistan. Secretary Defence and
Secretary Interior are further directed to send copies of the said paragraphs for information and
compliance respectively to the head of the Inter Services Intelligence and to the heads of the
Intelligence Bureau and Federal Investigation Agency. Secretary Information is directed to
circulate the said paragraphs to all national newspapers, radio and media channels.
Office to also send the said paragraphs for information and compliance to the
Government of Balochistan, through the Chief Secretary, Home Sec retary, Secretary Local
Government, Inspector General of Police, Director General Levies, all Commissioners, all
Deputy Commissioners and Director Press and Information Department. Secretary Local
Government is further directed to circulate the said paragr aphs to all local councils throughout
the province. The Home Secretary is directed to circulate the said paragraphs to all Assistant
Commissioners, Tehsildars, Naib -Tehsildars and Risaldar Majors. Director Press and
Information Department is directed to ci rculate the said paragraphs to all local newspapers, radio
and media channels.
Office to send copies of the entire judgment for information to the Secretary Election
Commission of Pakistan and the International Commission of Jurists.
MWA/21/Q Order accordingly.This judgment is reproduced from a publicly available source for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. If you believe this listing contains an error,
let us know.