P L D 2024 Balochistan 75
Before Gul Hassan Tareen, J
ZAKAULLAH and 6 others ---Petitioners
Versus
GHAZI KHAN and 3 others ---Respondents
Civil Revisions Nos. 244 and 344 of 2020, decided on 26th August, 2022.
(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---
----S. 35 -A---Qanun -e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.57---Recovery of money ---Special costs,
awarding of ---Judgment, relevancy of ---Petitioner/plaintiff sought recovery of money from
respondents/ defendants on the ground that the money was given in consideration of marriage
of his three sons with three sisters of respondents/ defendants ---Petitioner/plaintiff relied
upon ex- parte judgments passed by Family Court ---Judgment and decree passed by Trial
Court was set aside by Lower Appellate Court ---Validity ---Ex -parte judgments of Family
Court reflected that not a single penny was paid to sisters of respondents/defendants by plaintiff/petitioner on account of dower, maintenance or dowry articles ---Existence of
judgments of Family Court were relevant under Art. 57 of Qanun- e-Shahadat, 1984, to prove
non- existence of fact in issue and relevant fact ---Findings of Trial Court on relevant issue
were result of non -reading of evidence and misinterpretation of law, which had rightly been
set aside by Lower Appellate Court ---High Court declined to interfere in judgment and
decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and imposed special cost against petitioner/plaintiff
who unnecessarily and with malafide intention dragged respondents/defendants into
protracted litigation without reasons ---Petitioner/plaintiff was guilty of bad faith by
instituting, false vexatious and baseless claim against respondents/ defendants, therefore was liable to be penalized by imposing compensatory costs of Rs. 200,000/ - (Rupees two hundred
thousand) as compensation to respondents/defendants, as envisaged by S. 35- A, C.P.C. ---
Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.
(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---
----Ss. 17, 21, 22, 30 & 33--- Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S. 17(1)(e) ---Civil Procedure
Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Award, setting aside of ---Un -registered award ---Effect ---Format
of objections ---Petitioner was aggrieved of an un- registered award made rule of the Court by
Lower Appellate Court ---Validity ---Award related to an immoveable property of value more
than Rs. 100/ - ---Such award was compulsorily registerable under S. 17(1) (e) of Registration
Act, 1908---Such award if not registered could not be made rule of the Court under S. 17 of
Arbitration Act,1940--- Written reply, counter affidavit or objections, submitted in reply of
application made under S. 17 of Arbitration Act, 1940 amounted to an application under Ss. 30 & 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Separate application for setting aside the award was not requirement of law ---Provisions of Ss. 30 & 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940, were meant to
provide an opportunity to objector to the award to raise objections with a view to have the award set aside--- Respondent filed objections to the application made under Ss. 14 & 17 of
Arbitration Act, 1940 in which he had raised all the objections ---Objections of respondent
could be considered as an application under S. 33 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Lower Appellate Court while making award as rule of the Court had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the order was result of jurisdictional error ---High Court set aside judgment
and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court ---Revision was allowed, in circumstances.
2007 YLR 245; AIR 1967 SC 526; Messrs Nisar -ul-Haq Associates, Government,
Contractors, Multan Cantt v. Cantonment Board, Multan PLD 2002 SC 747; Farmers Equity Private Limited (FEP) through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Mehboob Alam 2013 CLD 522; Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Shafi and 4 others 2004 YLR 1882 and Hamid Razi Sarwar v. Rohi Sarwar and others 2002 CLC 107 ref.
Farida Malik v. Khalida Malik 1998 SCMR 816; Haji Nawab Din v. Sh. Ghulam
Haider and another 1988 SCMR 1623; Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aeroflot Russian
International Airlines 2018 SCMR 662 and Chiragh Din v. Jilal Din through legal heirs and
others 2004 YLR 1961(2) rel.
Mumtaz H. Baqri and Rasool Bakhsh Baloch for Petitioners (in Civil Revision
Petition No. 244 of 2020).
Jameel Ramzan and Jamila Kakar for Respondents (in Civil Revision Petition No. 244
of 2020).
Muhammad Akram Shah for Petitioners (in Civil Revision Petition No. 344 of 2020).
Jameel Ramzan and Jamila Kakar for Respondents (in Civil Revision Petition No. 344
of 2020).
Date of hearing: 19th August, 2022.
JUDGMENT
GUL HASSAN TAREEN, J. ---Since common questions of law and facts are
involved, therefore, both civil revision petitions are being decided through this common judgment.
2. The Civil Revision Petition No. 244/2020 arises out of judgment and decree dated
08th July, 2020 ("impugned judgment"), passed by the Court of Model Civil Appellate
Court/ Additional District Judge -IV, Quetta, ("appellate Court") in Civil Appeal No.
08/2018, whereby the appellate Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the Suit No. 55/2007, instituted by the predecessor of the petitioners.
3. The predecessor of the petitioners was plaintiff and respondents were defendants in
the Original Suit No. 55/2007.
Following are the facts of the case:
4. The deceased plaintiff instituted suit for recovery of Rs.1,800,000/ - (Rupees eighteen
hundred thousand) against the defendants wherein it was stated that in 1999, the plaintiff agreed for marriage of his three sons (the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3) with the three sisters of the defendants. The Nikah was performed on 20th September, 1999. On 21st September, 1999, plaintiff had paid Rs. 1,800,000/ - to the defendant No.1 for the dowry articles of the brides
(Rs. 600,000/ - for each bride) according to custom, whereas Rs. 300,000/ - had to be paid by
the plaintiff, two months next before the Rukhsati ( ), for wedding feast and refreshment. The Rukhsati could not take place for 3.6 years because of the sudden demise of the family members of both the parties. In 2004, plaintiff approached to the defendants for Rukhsati, however, they sought six months time because the paid amount was statedly spent by them. Finally in June, 2005, the defendants were requested to give Rukhsati which they avoided. Plaintiff made demand for return of the paid amount, which the defendants refused. The plaintiff's brother filed an eviction application against the defendants, due to which, not only, defendants refused to pay back the received amount rather suits for dissolution of marriage of their sisters were instituted against the three sons of the plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed for recovery of Rs. 1,800,000/ - along with interest for the last eight years.
5. The defendants submitted common written statement and expressly denied receipt of
Rs. 1,800,000/ -. On such pleadings, the trial Court framed four issues. Besides recording his
deposition, plaintiff examined three witnesses. In rebuttal, defendants examined two witnesses and the defendant No. 1, appeared as his own witness and as attorney for the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. The defendant No. 1 in his examination in chief tendered in evidence, the ex -parte judgments of the Family Court -I, Quetta as Ex: D/2 to Ex: D/4, the applications
of the plaintiff made in Family Court as Ex: D/5 to Ex: D/7 and two statements of plaintiff and his son as Ex: D/8 and Ex: D/9. Finally the Court of Senior Civil Judge -II, Quetta ("trial
Court") decreed the suit which was set aside by the appellate Court vide impugned judgment.
6. Mr. Mumtaz Hanafi Baqri Advocate, representing the petitioners, in Civil Revision
No. 244/2020 argued that, the judgment of the appellate Court is result of non- reading and
misreading of the record. In rebuttal, Messrs Jameel Ramzan and Jamila Kakar, Advocates
supported the impugned judgment and placed reliance on an arbitration award, the subject matter of Civil Revision No. 344/2020.
7. Arguments heard and record perused. In order to prove his claim, the plaintiff
examined PW- 1, who is brother of the plaintiff. He in his examination in chief stated as
under:
The PW- 1 was in litigation with the defendant No. 1 and is brother of the plaintiff,
therefore, his testimony cannot be relied upon. The PW -2 is the son of the plaintiff; he in
reply of question No. 5 answered as:
The plaintiff claimed that Rs. 1,800,000/ - was paid to the defendants for purchase of
dowry articles and Rs. 300,000/ - was to be paid for food and refreshment whereas, the PW -2
deposed that Rs. 700,000/ - was the dower amount of each marriage contract. Hence, his
testimony has not supported plaintiff's claim. The testimony of PW -3 is not trustworthy
because, according to question No. 1 of his cross -examination, he is the nephew ( ) of the
plaintiff and secondly, the plaintiff has not mentioned his presence at the time of payment, in
his examination, so his presence at the time of payment of Rs. 1,800,000/ - to the defendants,
is doubtful. So far as the statement of the plaintiff is concerned, the same being a self serving
admission/ statement is not relevant under Article 34 of the Qanun -e-Shahadat Order -10,
1984 ("Q.S.O") as such, is inadmissible. Though Article 34, the Q.S.O prescribes exceptions, in which self serving statement is declared relevant, however, the plaintiff's statement does
not fall in any of the prescribed exceptions. If PWs had supported plaintiff's case, then the
statement of plaintiff would have been relevant and carried a legal weight. Since, plaintiff
failed to prove his case through evidence, as such his mere statement cannot be looked into.
8. The burden of proof of payment of Rs. 1,800,000/ - to the defendant was upon the
plaintiff under Article 117 of the Q.S.O, which he failed to discharge.
9. It is a settled equitable proposition of the law that "no one can taken premium of his
wrong." The defendant No. 1 in his examination in chief tendered in evidence three
applications of the plaintiff as Ex: D/ 5 to Ex: D/7, which he made to the Family Court -I,
Quetta in suits for dissolution of marriages instituted by the sisters of defendants against the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3. The applications are stereotyped. The relevant portion of an application is reproduced below:
The plaintiff had claimed in the suit, that the defendants refused Rukhsati of their
sisters, whereas the contents of Ex: D/5 to Ex: D/7 transpire that, the Rukhsati could not take place because his son(s) left home. The plaintiff has not, even mentioned the fact of payment of Rs. 1,800,000/ - in the Ex: D/5 to Ex: D/7. The three suits were not contested either by the
plaintiff or by one among the three, as such were decreed ex -parte vide Ex: D/2 to Ex: D/4.
Hence, suit of plaintiff was not only baseless rather was instituted with mala fide intention to harass the brothers of three helpless sisters who had waited seven years for their Rukhsati (1999 to 30.10.2007 i.e. the date of ex- parte decrees).
10. Even otherwise, the amount allegedly paid, as per plaintiff's own averments, was
meant for dowry articles of the sisters of the defendants. The dowry articles or the amount paid for purchasing them are the exclusive property of bride and the bridegroom or his parents are not entitle to claim back the dowry articles or the amount paid for them. I rely and refer to section 5 of the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976. Reliance is placed on the case of Masud Sarwar v. Farah Deeba, reported in 1988 CLC 1546. The relevant portion is reproduced hereunder:
"Section 5 of the said Act provides that all property given as dowry 'or' bridal gift to a bride shall vest absolutely in her and that her interest in the said property, however, derived, shall not be restrictive, conditional or limited."
11. The ex -parte judgments of the Family Court -I, Quetta, also reflect that not a single
penny was paid to the sisters of defendants by the plaintiff or the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3, on account of dower, maintenance or dowry articles. The existence of the judgments of Family Court are relevant in the instant case under Article 57, the Q.S.O, which proves the non-
existence of fact in issue and relevant fact (i.e. payment of Rs.1,800,000/ -). Hence the
findings of the trial Court on issue No. 2 are result of non- reading of evidence and
misinterpretation of law, which have rightly been set aside by the appellate Court.
For what has been discussed above, the revision petition being devoid of merit is
dismissed with costs throughout as envisaged under section 35 of the Code. Since the
plaintiff had knowledge that his claim for recovery of Rs. 1,800,000/ - is vexatious, whereas,
objection to such claim was raised by the respondents at the earliest stage of the suit, in their written statement. Plaintiff unnecessarily and with mala fide intention dragged the defendants into protracted litigation without reason. Plaintiff was guilty of bad faith by instituting, false, vexatious and baseless claim against the defendants/ respondents, therefore, petitioners being his legal representatives and still seeking recovery of the claimed amount, are liable to be penalized by imposing upon them (equally) compensatory costs of Rs. 200,000/ - (Rupees
two hundred thousand) as compensation to the defendants/respondents, as envisaged by section 35- A, of the Code.
Decree sheet be drawn.
12. The second Civil Revision Petition No. 344/2020, arises out of order and decree dated
06th November, 2020, ("impugned order"), passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Ziarat ("appellate Court") in Arbitration Appeal No. 11/2019, whereby the appellate Court has allowed the appeal of the respondents and made the award as rule of the Court.
The predecessor of the petitioners was respondent ("respondent") and the present
respondent No. 1 was the applicant in the original Arbitration Application No. 02/2011.
Following are the facts of the case:
13. The respondent No. 1 made an application under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940 ("the Act 1940") against the deceased respondent before the Court of Civil Judge, Ziarat ("trial Court") with the averments that they had differences on marriage and divorce of the three sisters of the respondent No. 1. They mutually appointed the respondent No. 2 as a sole arbitrator vide arbitration agreements dated 4th January, 2011. The arbitrator made the award whereby, the deceased respondent was directed to transfer his land situated at Mohal Pechi Karez to the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 finally requested the trial Court, to make the award as rule of the Court. The deceased respondent filed his objections. After framing issues and recording evidence, the trial Court dismissed the application on 27th September, 2019, however, on appeal of the respondent No. 1, the appellate Court has made the award (Ex: R -02-3) as rule of the Court.
14. Mr. Akram Shah Advocate, representing the petitioners, in Civil Revision No.
344/2020, argued that the subordinate Court fell into error while making the award as rule of the court. He argued that the arbitrator has legally mis -conducted for, the arbitrator had not
recorded any evidence nor extended right of audience to the petitioners' predecessor. He argued that since civil suit was pending, therefore, the arbitration without leave of the Court i.e. Senior Civil Judge -II, Quetta, was illegal as such the award could not be made rule of the
court. The learned counsel also argued that the arbitrator, through award has given the properties of the petitioner's family members to the respondent No. 1 whereas such family members were not party to the arbitration proceeding and the reference. He also placed reliance and referred to section 14 subsection (1), the Act 1940, and stated that the arbitration award does not contain the signature of the predecessor of petitioners (deceased respondent) which proves that arbitrator had not given notice under section 14 (1), the Act 1940. Concluding his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on the following case laws:
2007 YLR 245, AIR 1967 SC 526
Messrs Nisar -ul-Haq Associates, Government, Contractors, Multan Cantt v.
Cantonment Board, Multan PLD 2002 SC 747
In rebuttal, counsel for respondent No. 1 Messrs Jameel Ramzan and Jamila Kakar
Advocates argued that the arbitration agreement and proceedings, were not denied by the petitioner's predecessor; the existence and validity of the arbitration award was not
challenged through an application under section 33, the Act 1940; the leave of the Court was
not expedient and Estoppel operates against the petitioners. The respondent No. 1's counsel finally argued that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any jurisdictional error.
15. So far as the Civil Revision No. 344/2020 is concerned, it is an admitted feature of
the case, that differences between the deceased respondent and the respondent No. 1 were referred to the arbitrator i.e. respondent No. 2, during pendency of appeal preferred by the respondent No. 1 and his three brothers against the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 55/2007. The Act, 1940 prescribes four modes of arbitration between the parties, that is to say:
(i) Chapter -II, Arbitration without intervention of Court (sections 3- 19)
(ii) Chapter -III, Arbitration with intervention of a Court where there is no suit
pending (section 20)
(iii) Chapter -V, arbitration in suits (sections 21- 25)
(iv) (section 47 proviso)
Since a Civil Suit No. 55/2007, between the same parties was pending in appeal,
therefore, the Chapter -V of the Act, 1940 is relevant in the case. The relevant section is, 21
which reads:
"21. Parties to suit may apply for order or reference. Where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may at any time before judgment is pronounced apply in writing to the Court for an order or reference"
The impugned arbitration appears to have been undertaken under Chapter II of the
Act, 1940. When a suit/appeal is pending, then resort to arbitration could only be made under section 21 of the Act, 1940. Any arbitration under Chapter -II and III of the Act 1940, during
pendency of lis, without leave of the Court under section 21 of the Act 1940, is not legal and binding upon the parties thereto unless all the parties extend consent for taking it into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by the Court before which the lis is pending, in view of proviso to section 47, of the Act 1940 and Order XXIII, Rule 3, the Code. In this case, the deceased respondent (plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 55/2007) and respondent No. 1 vide arbitration agreements of even date 04th January, 2011 referred the differences to sole arbitrator in violation of section 21 of the Act 1940, therefore, the reference, arbitration proceeding and the arbitration award are illegal. Hence, application made by the respondent No. 1 for making the award as rule of the Court under section 14 read with section 17 of the Act, 1940 was not competent before the trial Court. Since the source of the arbitration was not "Court" in view of section 21, the Act 1940, therefore, the entire arbitration was illegal. Where initial reference is illegal, participation in the proceeding could not cure the illegality and the award given by the arbitrator could be set aside by invoking the provisions of section 30 (c) of the Act, as the same was otherwise invalid. I place reliance on a case law bearing title Farmers Equity Private Limited (FEP) through Chief Executive and 3 others v. Mehboob Alam, published in 2013 CLD 522 [Lahore]. The relevant portion reads:
"----An arbitration agreement without the orders of the court in a pending suit, being a
departure from the mandatory provisions of sections 21 to 25 of the Act cannot be categorized as a lawful agreement. Such an agreement is not enforceable in law and, therefore, application under section 34 of the Act to stay the proceedings of the suit must fail. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Perttri Sttryanaravan & Co. v. Gullapudi China Narsingham and others (4 IC 133) and Vyankatesh Mahadev v. Ramachandara Krishna (27 IC 46). "
In another case bearing title Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Shafi and 4 others
reported in 2004 YLR 1882, the Lahore High Court has held that:
"Proceedings were pending in the court and without intervention of the Court, matter
was referred to arbitrator for decision. Therefore, the moved in the said suit could
have not been filed and the arbitrator could not have been appointed without the intervention of the Court as contemplated in section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In the case as Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Local Government and Rural Development Department and another, PLD 1995 Lah. 204 it
has been ruled that if the arbitrator appointed without the intervention of the court, the
award is void and cannot be made rule of the Court."
Reliance is also placed on case law Hamid Razi Sarwar v. Rohi Sarwar and others
2002 CLC 107 [Lahore], in which it was held:
"9. It can be argued from the petitioner's side, though not so contended, that the word "suit" has been used in section 21 of the Arbitration Act and as in the present case no "suit" was pending and only revision petitions were awaiting decision, therefore, section 21 of the Arbitration Act has no applicability. Suffice it to say that the judgment reported as Messrs United Builders Corporation v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Mineral and Industrial Development Corporation and another 1989 CLC 1825 provides complete answer to this expected argument, wherein, this Court after relying upon enormous case law on the subject, came to the conclusion that the word
"suit" used in section 21 of the Arbitration Act includes an appeal, revision and, thus,
it would include appellate or revisional Court, as the case may be.
10. Being guided by the aforestated case law, I am considered to hold that the
arbitration agreement, dated 11 -10-2000 and award dated 4- 1-2001, are violative of
sections 21, 23 and 47 of the Arbitration Act and the said award procured, while the
proceedings in the revision petitions were pending before this Court, without the intervention of the Court is nullity and as such the same could not be made rule of the Court in accordance with the provisions of sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act.
However, the said award can be used as a compromise/ adjustment of the suit, if all
the parties interested consent to it. "
16. The award was made without intervention of the Court and the arbitration was under
the Chapter -II of the Act 1940. The award relates to an immoveable property of value more
than Rs. 100/ -. The award was compulsorily register -able under section 17(1) (e), of the
Registration Act 1908. An award if not registered cannot be made rule of the Court under
section 17 of the Act 1940. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Farida Malik v. Khalida Malik, published in 1998 SCMR 816, held as follows:
"32. Next objection to the validity of the Award is on account of non- registration of
the same. The award, admittedly, having been made without intervention of the Court, was compulsorily register -able. Such an Award, though in view of the amendment in
section 49 of the Registration Act by Ordinance XLV of 1962 is receivable in evidence but by itself it does not operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent to or in the immovable property. The Award in question was, therefore, ineffective to convey the rights in the properties in favour of respective parties. This very view was also taken in Haji Nawab Din v. Sh. Ghulam Haider and another (1988 SCMR 1623). In this view of the matter, the Award cannot be made rule of the Court."
In the case of Haji Nawab Din v. Sh. Ghulam Haider and another reported in 1988
SCMR 1623, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held as follows:
"The question of registration of the award was a controversial matter in the sub-continent and there were conflicting views on the subject. For example, the Full Bench case Seonarain Lal, v. Prabhu Chand AIR 1958 Patna 252 holding that an award did not create any title or interest in immovable property hence it did not require registration. This view was accepted in Abdul Karim v. Mirza Bashir Ahmad PLD 1967 Lahore 365 but then this view was reversed in Satish Kumar and others v. Surinder Kumar and others AIR 1970 Supreme Court 833, and now is no longer a good law in India. In our country an amendment was made in the Registration Act by Ordinance No. 45 of 1962 which has been fully taken note of and considered in the Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing. Society Ltd. Karachi v. Mst. Anwar Sultana and others PLD 1969 Karachi 474 and what has been held is as follows:
"As in the amended section 49 this clause does not find any place, it is clear that the prohibition contained therein is no, longer operative, with the necessary consequence that the: document Exh.41 would become admissible in evidence although it is not registered as required by section 107 of the Transfer) of Property Act. In view of the law as obtaining at present, this document would not operate to create any right, but it
would certainly be available to prove the nature of the plaintiff's) possession. ".
The result of the amendment is that the award is receivable in evidence but by itself it
will not "operate to create, declare assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent to or in the immoveable property."
The appellate Court has made the award rule of the court, however, failed to take
judicial notice of its being un- registered and passed, in violation of sections 21 and 22 of the
Act, 1940, therefore, committed illegality.
17. The respondent No. 2 through the impugned award directed the deceased respondent,
to transfer the property of Habibullah (predecessor of deceased respondent) in the name of respondent No. 1. Per Ex: RW -1, the property does not belong exclusively to the deceased
respondent rather is common with his brother Ahsanullah. The co- sharer neither executed
any arbitration agreement nor authorized the deceased plaintiff to enter into arbitration on his behalf through a valid power of attorney. The award on this count too is illegal whereas, the appellate Court overlooked it.
18. The contention of Messrs Jameel Ramzan and Jamila Kakar, Advocates to the effect
that the respondent had not challenged the validity of the award through an independent
application, is not well founded. The written reply, counter affidavit or objections, submitted
in reply of application made under section 17 of the Act 1940, amounts to an application under sections 30 and 33, the Act 1940, and a separate application for setting aside the award is not requirement of law. In the case of Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aeroflot Russian
International Airlines published in 2018 SCMR 662, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan
at page Nos. 682 and 683, held as under:
"………It is a settled principle of law that the award of the arbitrator who is chosen as
Judge of facts and of law, between the parties, cannot be set aside unless the error is apparent on the face of the award or from the award it can be inferred that the arbitrator has misconducted himself under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. While making an award the Rule of the Court, in case parties have not filed objections, the Court is not supposed to act in a mechanical manner, like the post office and put its seal on it but has to look into the award and if it finds patent illegality on the face of the award, it can remit the award or any of the matter(s) referred to arbitrator for reconsideration or set aside the same.----- "
19. Sections 30 and 33 of the Act 1940, are preliminary meant to provide an opportunity
to the objector to the award to raise objections with a view to have the award set aside. The respondent had filed objections to the application of the respondent No. 1 made under sections 14/17 of the Act 1940, in which he has raised all the objections. The objections of the respondent can be considered as an application under section 33, the Act 1940. A similar view has been taken in the case of Chiragh Din v. Jilal Din through legal heirs and others, published in 2004 YLR 1961(2).
The appellate Court has exercised jurisdiction, while making the award as rule of the
court, not vested in it by the above referred laws, hence the impugned order is result of jurisdictional error.
For what has been discussed above, the impugned order and decree are not sustainable
which are hereby set aside with no order as to costs.
MH/24/Bal. Order accordingly.This judgment is reproduced from a publicly available source for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. If you believe this listing contains an error,
let us know.