P L D 2016 Balochistan 56
Before Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ
TAHIR HUMAYUN and others ---Appellants
Versus
HIGH COURT OF BALOCHISTAN through Registrar and others ---Respondents
Service Appeals Nos.1 of 2002, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of 2015, decided on 25th April, 2016.
(a) Balochistan Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act (VI of 1989) ---
----S. 5---Judicial officer ---Ad hoc appointment and appointment on regular basis ---Seniority ---
Determination ---Procedure---Services of employees (respondents) was regularized and they were
assigned seniority from the date of their initial appointment on ad hoc basis ---Contention of
appellant was that ad hoc service of a government employee could not be counted for the
purposes of seniority or promotion to affect the rights of other employee who was regularly
inducted into service prior to regularization of ad hoc employee ---Validity ---Service rendered by
the employee on ad hoc basis prior to regularization could not be counted for the purpose of
seniority but seniority should be counted from the date of substantive appointment ---Ad hoc
service unless regularized by the competent authority did not confer any right either for regular
absorption nor same could be counted towards seniority except that it could be counted towards
length of service for the purpose of pension if ultimately regularized---Appellant was appointed
on regular basis prior to regularization of services of respondents (employees) ---Appellant being
selectee of Public Service Commission was required to rank senior to the respondents
(employees) who were regularized through process of Administration Committee of High Court
(Balochistan) ---Administration Committee had no authority to regularize the services of
respondents (emplo yees) from the date of their initial ad hoc appointment retrospectively ---
Government or Administration Committee of the High Court had power to ignore consciously
any section of Act or any rule that might prohibit or restrain it to do what they were attemp ting to
do provided they limited their action to what was just and equitable ---Administration Committee
while regularizing services of respondents (employees) from the date of their initial ad hoc
appointment had exercised its discretionary power in an arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious
manner which had caused injury to the appellant ---Illegal acts would remain illegal and would
not become legal by efflux of time ---Appellant as well as non -appealing judicial officers who
were also appointed on regular b asis prior to the regularization of ad hoc services of respondents
(employees) were declared senior to the respondents (employees) whose ad hoc services were
regularized retrospectively ---Cases of appellant and as well as non -appealing judicial officers
were referred to the Administration Committee of High Court (Balochistan) for consideration of
their promotion to the next grade from the date when respondents were promoted---Appeal was
disposed of accordingly.
Wajahat Hussain, Assistant Director, Soci al Welfare, Lahore v. Province of the Punjab
PLD 1991 SC 82 and The State through National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad v. Haji
Nasim -ur-Rehman PLD 2005 SC 270 rel.
(b) Civil service ---
----"Ad hoc appointment" ---Concept and scope.
(c) Notificati on
----Void notification ---Void notification could not be enforced.
(d) Void order/notification ---
----Limitation ---No limitation had been prescribed to competently and successfully challenge a
void order and notification.
Senate through Chairman v. Shahiq Ahmed Khan 2016 SCMR 460 rel.
(e) Administration of justice ---
----Repository of executive, judicial or quasi -judicial power was required to act in accordance
with law ---Any order which had been passed in violation of law could not be protect ed simply
because the repository of such power had the power to pass such order.
Fazli Hakeem v. Secretary State and Fronteir Regions Division Islamabd 2015 SCMR
795 rel.
(f) Judgment ---
----Judgment in rem ---Scope ---Where any law or statutory rule on being challenged was
interpreted and decided one way or the other by the superior court, such interpretation should be
applied by the concerned public, statutory agencies, authorities, bodies and functionaries ---
Judgment of superior court was not only binding on all the subordinate courts and tribunals but
also on all public and statutory functionaries.
Sikandar A. Karim v. State 1995 SCMR 387 rel.
(g) Public functionaries ---
----Public functionaries were required to treat all citizens placed i n similar circumstances alike ---
Public functionaries had to apply law, rule, regularization, notification or the policy as
enunciated, interpreted and expounded by the superior courts.
(h) Estoppel --
----Principle of estoppel and limitation would not apply to illegal acts.
(i) Words and phrases --
----"Just"---Meaning
(j) Words and phrases ---
----"Equitable" ---Meaning.
Shams -ud-Din for Appellant.
H. Shakil Ahmed for Respondents Nos. 4 and 6.
Muhammad Qahir Shah for Respondents Nos. 7, 12 and 23.
Barrister Muhammad Amir Lehri for Respondent No.11.
Taj Muhammad Mengal for Respondents Nos. 15, 25, 26 and 27.
Gul Hassan Tareen for Respondent No.22.
Shai Haq Baloch, Assistant Advocate General (Official Respondents).
Dates of hearing: 11th September, 30th October, 2015, 25th March, 15th and 22nd April,
2016.
JUDGMENT
MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, J -- Service Appeal No.1 of 2002, carries
the following prayer clause:
"It is, therefore, respectfully prayed keeping in view the aforementioned submissions:
(i) That it may be declared that letter dated 17th November, 2001 issued by the
respondent No.2 and in pursuance of the same Notification dated 10th December 2001
issued by respondent No.1 is invalid and of no legal effect .
(ii) That it may be declared that the rules prescribed for the regularization of the service
are prospective in character. The same cannot be given retrospective effect because it
affects the seniority of the appellant. The ad hoc period of the respondents No.4 to No.27
cannot be counted for the purpose of seniority.
(iii) The regularization of respondents No.4 to No.27 with retrospective effect is a sheer
violation of rules made for the recruitment of such posts. When the law provides a thing
to be done in a prescribed manner the same cannot be done otherwise.
(iv) That it may also be a declared the promotions of respondents from Judicial
Magistrate/Civil Judges to Senior Civil Judges and from Senior Civil Judges to
Additional District and Sessions Judges during the appeal is of no legal effect.
(v) Any other relief which this Honourable Tribunal may deem fit in the circumstances of
the case be given to the appellant in the interest of justice, equity and fair play."
2. Since Service Appeal No.1 of 2002 as well as Service Appeals Nos.6, 7, 8 and 9 of 2015
is outcome of one and the same notification dated 10th December 2001 as well as common
question of law and facts are involved, therefore, the same are being disposed of through this
common judgme nt.
3. The facts, in brief, are that in order to regularize the services of certain Judicial
Magistrates, Civil Judges, Qazis and Additional District and Sessions Judges, who were
appointed on ad hoc basis in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999, the High Court of Balochistan
recommended to the Government of Balochistan that services of such ad hoc appointees be got
regularized. Such proposal was placed before the Provincial Cabinet on 23rd July 2001 and the
decision taken by the said Cabinet was conveyed to the Registrar of the High Court of
Balochsitan vide letter No.S.O.CAB. 447/S&GAD/794- 97 dated 11th August 2001 in the
following words:
"The Honourable Governor informed the Cabinet regarding the above issue. After
detailed discussion the Cabinet decided tha t the cases of those Judicial officers who have
completed two years of their services will be dealt with by the Administration Committee
of Judges for regularization of their appointment in terms of the relevant Service Rules.
This relaxation is being gran ted for one time only and in future all ad hoc appointments
should be cleared through the Public Service Commission within the stipulated time.
However the cases of those Judicial officers who have not completed 2- year service will
be referred to the Publi c Service Commission as per rules."
4. After receiving the said decision the Registrar of the High Court of Balochistan through
letter No.198/H.S.C/2001, requested the Government for deleting the words "in terms of relevant
service rules" contained in the minutes of the said Cabinet's meeting. In pursuance of said
request, a fresh decision was taken by the Governor of Balochistan and the same was conveyed
to the Registrar of the High Court vide letter No.S -11-3(51)/80 S&GAD, dated 17th November
2001. The same speaks as under:
"....Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting held on 23- 7-2001 may be considered to have been
amended to the extent that the words "in terms of relevant service rules" appearing in the
5th line of the decision be deleted. The remaining tex t of the decision will be operating as
such."
5. In pursuance of the aforementioned letter issued by the Government of Balochistan,
Services and General Administration Department ("S&GAD"), the following notification
No.2602/149- Estt:/Admn: dated, 10th D ecember 2001 ("the impugned notification") was issued,
whereby the ad hoc services of the respondents from the date of their ad hoc appointments were
regularized. The notification reads as under:
"In pursuance of letter No.S.11.3 (51)/80- S&GAD dated 17th November, 2001 of the
Government of Balochistan, Services and General Administration Department, Quetta,
the Administration Committee of Hon'ble Judges, High Court of Balochistan has been
pleased to regularize the ad hoc appointment of the following Addit ional District and
Sessions Judges, Judicial Magistrates, Civil Judges and Qazis who have completed two
years satisfactory service from the dates of their ad hoc appointments as mentioned
against each."
6. At this stage, it would be advantageous to reproduce the initial appointment order of
some of the Judicial Magistrates/Civil Judges issued in the year 1997, which reads as under:
"NOTIFICATION.
On the recommendation of the selection committee of the Hon'able Judges and in
pursuance of notification N o.SOR -11 (22)51/S&GAD/2406- 2555 dated the 18th
September, 1997 of the Government of Balochistan, Services and General Administration
Department, Quetta, the High Court of Balochistan is pleased to appoint the following
persons as Judicial Magistrates/Civil Judges (B -17) on ad hoc basis for a period of six (6)
months or till the regular selection is done by the Balochistan Public Service
Commission, which is earlier:-
1. Mr. Muhammad Yahya son of Haji Hameedullah.
2. Mr. Naseer Ahmed son of Ali Sher Bang ulzai.
3. Mr. Muhammad Anawar Baloch son of Muhammad Ishaq.
4. Mr. Abdul Wahid Durrani son of Abdul Latif Durrani.
5. Mr. Ghulam Azam son of Izzatullah Qambrani.
6. Mr. Muhammad Anwar son of Dost Muhammad.
7. Mr. Abdul Saboor son of Maulvi Muhammad Usman.
These orders will not confer on them any right for permanent absorption as Judicial
Magistrate/Civil Judge and claimed to seniority."
It may be noted that the ad hoc employment of the aforementioned respondents as well as the
remaining respondents arrayed in the memo of appeal continued without any break till their
regularization retrospectively.
7. The appellant, as stated above, was appointed on regular basis as Judicial Magistrate on
the recommendation of the Balochistan Public Service Commission ("PBSC") in accordance
with provisions of the Balochistan Civil Judges/Judicial Magistrates Service Rules 1984 ("the
Service Rules of 1984"), being aggrieved of the impugned notification, submitted departmental
appeal, but as the same was no t decided within the statutory period, hence the instant appeal.
8. The moot question for consideration in the instant appeal is that, whether the appellant,
who was, admittedly, appointed as Judicial Magistrate on the recommendations of the BPSC,
could be declared junior to the private respondents, who were selected on ad hoc basis as a result
of scrutiny by the Selection Committee of the High Court in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999?
9. Mr. Shams -ud-Din Achakzai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of t he appellant,
contended that neither the Governor, nor the Administrative Committee of the High Court had
power or discretion to regularize the service of an ad hoc employee with retrospective effect to
the detriment and great prejudice of another employee , who had come on the recommendation of
the BPSC and had joined service on regular basis much prior to the orders passed by the
Administrative Committee. According to the learned counsel, ad hoc service of a government
employee cannot be counted for the purposes of seniority or promotion to affect the rights of
another employee, who is regularly inducted into the government service prior to regularization
of formal induction of such ad hoc employee into government service. While concluding his
arguments, he further submitted that when the respondents were, admittedly, temporary
employees, they could not have been promoted to the next higher scale, particularly when the
appellant, being eligible by all means, was sidetracked by brushing aside all the recogniz ed
canons of law and propriety.
10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents sought dismissal of the
instant appeal on the ground of limitation. They mainly contended that the selection/joining of
the respondents was prior in time i n the department than that of the appellant, therefore, they
were rightly declared senior to the appellant, notwithstanding the fact that their regularization
was made subsequently to the appointment of the appellant by the BPSC on regular basis. They
further submitted that it is an established principle of law that persons selected earlier are senior
to the persons selected later. To substantiate their contention, they further submitted that as the
date of continuous service of the respondents is, admittedly, the years 1997, 1998 and 1999,
whereas the date of continuous appointment of the appellant i.e. selected by the BPSC is 5th
April 2000 and further as the services of the private respondents were regularized with effect
from their initial appointment on ad hoc basis through the impugned notification, therefore, their
seniority should have been from the date of joining service and not from any subsequent date i.e.
the date of regularization of their ad hoc services.
11. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, it is an admitted feature of the case that
right from 1997 till the regularization of services of the respondents, neither any tentative, nor
final seniority list of the Judicial Magistrates and Civil Judges was issued by Registrar of the
High Court. Since the seniority list was not issued, as such, no question of inviting objections or
its circulation among the Judicial Officers arise in the peculiar circumstances of the case. The
appellant came to know about the impugned notification by his own source. Even otherwise, it is
a classical case, where a Judicial Officer, who has to dispense with justice to the general public,
himself has been running from pillar to post for the last about 15 years to seek equity and justice.
It is not a case, where the matter can be set at rest by invoking the provisions regulating the
limitation. Admittedly, the impugned notification has been issued by the Administration
Committee in sheer violation of all the recognized canons of law and propriety and, in such
circumstances, it cannot be ignored altogether that a repository of executive, judicial or quasi -
judicial power is required to act in accordance with law. Any order, which has been passed in
violation of law, cannot be protected simply because the repos itory of such power, has the power
to pass such order. While holding this view, we are fortified from the latest judgment passed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Fazli Hakeem v. Secretary State and
Frontier Regions Division Islamaba d (2015 SCMR 795), wherein it was observed:
"It cannot be ignored altogether that a repository of executive, judicial or quasi judicial
power is required to act in accordance with law. For the very condition for the
conferment of such power is that it ha s to act in accordance with law. If and when it
would go wrong in law it would go outside its jurisdiction. An order thus passed would
be non est. Such order cannot be protected simply because the repository of such power,
has the power to pass such order. "
Needless to observe that it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of occasions
that a void notification cannot be enforced and no limitation is prescribed to competently and
successfully challenge a void order and notification. Referen ce can be made to the case of
"Senate through Chairman v. Shahiq Ahmed Khan" (2016 SCMR 460).
12. Another important question, which requires consideration is that whether ad hoc services
rendered by the private respondents shall be computed for determination of their seniority or
their seniority shall be computed from the date of their regularization in service. The arguments
of the learned counsel for the private respondents were wholly erroneous and misconceived,
therefore, cannot be accepted f or the reason that the private respondents were initially appointed
on ad hoc basis in the years ranging from 1997 to 1999 on different dates and they had continued
in service till their regularization on 10th December, 2001. The appellant was appointed on
regular basis on 5th April, 2000 on the recommendations of the BPSC. He was working as a
Judicial Magistrate on regular basis in the Establishment of the High Court, prior to the
regularization of the private respondents. It is by now settled that the ser vices rendered by the
employees on an ad hoc basis, prior to their regularization, cannot be counted for the purpose of
their seniority. Instead their seniority shall be counted from the date of their 'substantive'
appointment. Ad hoc service unless, regul arized by the "Competent Authority" does not confer
any right either for regular absorption as of right or counted towards seniority except that it is
counted towards length of service for the purpose of pension if ultimately regularized.
13. It is also an admitted feature of the case that the private respondents were appointed as
Judicial Magistrates/Civil Judges by the Selection Committee of the High Court on ad hoc basis
for a period of six months or till the regular selection is done by the BPSC and t heir appointment
letters clearly stipulate that the said orders will not confer them any right for permanent
absorption as Judicial Magistrates/Civil Judges and claim to seniority. The wisdom behind these
conditions was to make it clear at the very beginning that they would neither claim any seniority
on the basis of their ad hoc service, nor would the said service confer any right for regular
appointment and the regularization of their appointment, without the intervention of the BPSC in
terms of above not ed condition, was being made in order to protect their career and further to
save them from being rendered jobless in case of their failure to compete before the BPSC.
14. It may additionally be noted that the appellant was appointed on regular basis aft er proper
recommendations by the BPSC on 5th April 2000, whereas the appointments of the private
respondents were made on ad hoc basis in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 and, thus, continued as
ad hoc employees till regularization of their services in relaxa tion of the rules vide impugned
notification, and were assigned seniority from the date of their initial appointment on ad hoc
basis with the result that the appellant was placed below them in the order of seniority. In such
view of the mater, we are of th e considered view that the appellant, being selectee of the BPSC,
was required to rank senior to the private respondents who were regularized through the process
of Administration Committee of the Judges and that the Committee had no authority to
regulariz e the services of the private respondents from the date of their initial ad hoc
appointment. It may be noted that the decision of the Administration Committee of the High
Court was neither comprehendible by a person of ordinary prudence, nor strictly in li ne with
Article 18 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 ("the Constitution"). There
was absolutely no occasion with the Administration Committee to fix the date of regularization
of their appointments by reference to their first ad hoc appointment going in retrospect to the
years 1997, 1998 and 1999. Our this view is fortified from the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of "Wajahat Hussain, Assistant Director, Social Welfare Lahore v.
Province of the Punjab (PLD 1991 SC 82), wherein it was held:
"It is an established principle requiring not much argument that even the executive
authority does not extend to make the retrospective orders. The Departmental Selection
Committee enjoyed no better position. The 1964 Rule s also do not envisage such
regularization from a retrospective date. It was clearly beyond the power of the
Departmental Selection Committee and the Services, General Administration and
Information Department was wrong in blessing such a performance of th e Departmental
Selection Committee and advising the adoption of it for preparation of the seniority list."
15. M/s H. Shakil Ahmed and Muhammad Qahir Shah, learned counsel for the respondents,
contended that much water has been flown under the bridge and the impugned notification
having taken effect as about 15 years ago. It was a past and closed transaction irrespective of the
fact whether the Provincial Cabinet or the Administration Committee of the High Court was
authorized to regularize services of the respondents from retrospective effect. They further
submitted that there is no provision in any law to limit or abridge the powers of the Government
or the Administration Committee of the High Court to deal with the case of any civil servant in
an uninte rrupted field, so that any limitation or abridgement provided by any section of the Act
or by any rule would not stand in their way to do complete justice. We are afraid that we cannot
subscribe such view of learned counsel for the respondents for the reas on that such powers of the
Government or Administration Committee of the High Court are to be exercised in just and
equitable manner. No doubt, it is the power to ignore consciously any section of the Act or any
rule that may prohibit or restrain the Gover nment or the Administration Committee to do what
they are attempting to do, provided they limit their action to what is just and equitable. The word,
'just' denotes that which is right and proper, that which can be justified in law. Similarly, the
word `eq uitable' means that which is founded in equity, i.e. that which is fair, reasonable,
unbiased and impartial. The Government or the Administration Committee of the High Court, in
appraising the case of a civil servant, can ignore limiting or abridging facto rs contained in the
Act or any rule, but they must confine themselves within the limits of justice and equity, for no
sooner they find they are about to transgress those limits, a cutoff point arises and they must
control and stay further transgression, so that purpose of the law or rule may not be flagrantly
violated or defeated under the guise of its exercise. While considering the case in hand on
touchstone of the aforesaid criteria, we are of the considered view that the Administration
Committee, while regularizing services of the respondents from the date of their initial ad hoc
appointment, has exercised its discretionary power in an arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious
manners, which has caused serious injury to the appellant. Legally speaking, sinc e the very
notification regarding regularization of services of the private respondents was not in order, as
such, the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents were whimsical and superfluous, as
illegal acts remain illegal and do not become legal b y the efflux of time, as such, the principle of
estoppel and limitation would not apply to the illegal acts. The Courts are required to do justice
though the heaven may fall, as has been enshrined in the maxim: 'fiat justitia ruat coelum'.
Reference is mad e to the case of "the State through National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad
v. Haji Nasim- ur-Rehman", PLD 2005 SC 270.
16. Likewise, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the initial
departmental representation filed by appellant Tahir Hamayun was not competent and
maintainable for the reason that at that point of time, the appellant was on probation, is also
devoid of force and misconceived. In this respect, it may be mentioned here that appointment on
probation is not synonymous with ad hoc appointment. The ad hoc appointment means
appointment of a duly qualified person made otherwise than in accordance with the prescribed
method of recruitment, whereas initial appointment to a service or post, not being an ad hoc
appointment is a lways made on probation as may be prescribed. An ad hoc appointment cannot
be on probation and an appointment on probation cannot be ad hoc.
17. It is by now settled that the concept of ad hoc appointments against the posts in public
sector is a stopgap arrangement, which is not the permanent character of the civil service. It is
not proper in the public sector to occupy the posts required is to be filled through the methods
prescribed by the law by making ad hoc appointments and allow the incumbents to c ontinue in
the same position beyond the terms of their employment without taking any steps for filling the
posts through the prescribed manner i.e. BPSC on regular basis. As stated above, the ad hoc
appointment is appointment of a duly qualified person made otherwise in accordance with
prescribed method of recruitment and is made only in exceptional circumstances. This stopgap
arrangement is a temporary measure for a particular period of time, which does not by itself
confer any right on the incumbent for r egular appointment or senility against those civil servants,
who have been appointed by the BPSC in accordance with the prescribed method of recruitment
on regular basis. The appointing authority may in its discretion, if necessary, make ad hoc
appointment s and can also subsequently in peculiar circumstances regularize such appointments,
but not with retrospective effect to disregard the rules.
18. So far as Service Appeals Nos.6, 7, 8 and 9 of 2015 are concerned, although the
appellants have filed the sa me after a period of about 15 years, yet it is an admitted feature of the
case that besides some of the non -appealing Judicial Officers, who were recommended with
appellant Tahir Hamayun by the BPSC, the appellants in the aforesaid appeals were also
appointed on regular basis on the recommendation of BPSC on 28th May 2001, prior to
regularization of services of the private respondents. It is by now settled that dispensation of
justice is not alone function of the Court, public functionaries are equally responsible to treat all
citizens placed in similar circumstances alike. Though under trichotomy of power, it is the
legislature, that makes the law, executive through public and statutory functionary makes
policies and implement law, whereas enunciation, inte rpretation and exposition of law is the
function of judiciary. When a particular law, rule, regulation, policy etc. is expounded and
enunciated by the superior Courts, it is binding on all. For the safe and expeditious
administration of justice, it is duty of the public and statutory functionaries to apply law, rule,
regulation, notification or the policy etc. as enunciated, interpreted and expounded by the
superior Courts with all its implication and ramification affecting person or group of person
coming within its net, whether they have approached the Court or not. In the case of "Sikandar
A. Karim v. State" (1995 SCMR 387), it was held:
"The decision of this Court, in so far it decides a question of law or is based upon or
enunciates a principle of law is binding on all Courts in Pakistan. The decisions on
questions of law or enunciation of principles of law are the generalization of such
questions and principles. There can be no generalization of the facts and circumstances of
any case. The facts and c ircumstances of each case are peculiar to that case and therefore,
provide no guidance in the other cases. On the other hand, the generalized principles of
law or generalized enunciation of principles of law govern all those which fall within
such generali zation. The above observations of the learned Judge are, therefore, not
correct.
19. Admittedly, the judgment in hand is a judgment in rem. It may be noted that where any
law, statutory rule etc. on being challenged, is interpreted and decided one way or the other by
the superior Courts, then such interpretation, application of law, rule etc. not only decide the
right of a person, who had approached the Court of law, but also judgment in rem as regards the
interpretation and application of impugned law, s tatutory rule etc. applied by the concerned
public, statutory agencies, authorities, bodies and functionaries etc. The judgments of the
superior Courts to the extent, it decide a question of law or based upon principle of law or
enunciated/interpret law, s tatutory rule etc. are not only binding on all subordinate Courts and
Tribunals, but are also binding on all public and statutory functionaries etc.; such judgments hold
good and should be applied by all such public and statutory functionaries to all persons or class
of person affected by such law, rule etc. without forcing or driving such person to obtain
reaffirmation of the legal position already declared by the superior Courts in earlier round of
litigation, to which such person/s was not a party, unles s of course, such decision is revisited by
the Court in review, revision, appeal or a larger bench has taken a different view. As stated
above, all persons, placed in a similar situation, affected by any law, statutory rule, regulation,
notification or pol icy etc. are to be treated even handedly and in the like manner. In this respect,
again reference can be given to the case of Sikandar Karim supra, wherein Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed as under:
"The generalized principles of law or generalized enuncia tion of principles of law govern
all those which fall within such generalization."
20. Since the question of giving retrospective effect, while regularizing the services of ad hoc
appointees, has already been set at rest in the paras supra, as such, no f urther discussion is
required, while deciding the fate of the aforesaid appeals.
21. It is, indeed, unfortunate that grievance of appellant Tahir Hamayun remained un -
redressed for a period of over 15 years since issuance of the impugned notification, whereby the
ad hoc services of the respondents were regularized with retrospective effect. In terms of proviso
(b)(1) Section 5 of the Balochistan Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 1989 ("the Act of
1989") and Balochistan Subordinate Judiciary Se rvices Tribunal Rules, 1990, the question of
fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a
higher post is to be determined by the authority (Administration Committee of the High Court in
the instant ca se). However, it may be noted that under Section 6 of the Act of 1989, this Tribunal
has wide powers, as it may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed
against.
22. For the above reasons, without setting aside the impugned notif ication as a whole, the
appellants in all the service appeals as well as non - appealing Judicial Officers, who were also
appointed on regular basis, prior to the regularization of ad hoc services of the private
respondents, are hereby declared senior to the private respondents, whose ad hoc services were
regularized retrospectively in sheer violation of all recognized canons of law and proprietary.
After declaring the appellants as well as non -appealing Judicial Officers as senior to the private
respondents , their cases are referred to the Administration Committee of the High Court of
Balochistan for consideration of their promotion to the next grade from the date when the
respondents were promoted.
The service appeals are, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms.
ZC/32/Bal. Order accordingly.This judgment is reproduced from a publicly available source for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. If you believe this listing contains an error,
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