P L D 2016 Balochistan 44
Before Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Mrs. Syeda Tahira Safdar, JJ
JAMAL UD DIN and 9 others ---Appellants
Versus
Syed FAIZULLAH SHAH and 3 others ---Respondents
R.F.A. No.84 of 2008, decided on 5th January, 2016.
(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---
----O. XXIII, R.2 ---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.120---Withdrawal of suit to file a fresh suit-
--Limitation ---Plaintiffs should be bound by law of limitation in the same manner as first suit had
not been instituted---Pla intiffs had challenged mutation entries of 1967/1968 but had failed to
explain the delay ---Suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by time ---No evidence had been
produced to prove the allegation of fraud against the defendants or any revenue officer ---
Impu gned judgment and decree could not be sustained---Suit filed by the plaintiffs was
dismissed ---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.
Muhammad Saeed Bacha and another v. Late Badshah Amir and others 2011 SCMR 345;
Muhammad Raz Khan v. Government of N.- W.F.P. and another PLD 1997 SC 397; PLD 2015
SC 187; 2015 SCMR 1044; 2010 SCMR 822; Amirzada Khan and others v. Ahmad Noor and
others PLD 2003 SC 410; Government of Balochistan CWPP&H Department and others v.
Nawabzada Mir Tariq Khan Magsi and others 2010 SCM R 115; Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmed
Laghmani 1992 SCMR 1832 and 1997 SCMR 1840 rel.
(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---
----O. XXIII, R.2 ---Withdrawal of suit to file a fresh suit---Cause of action ---Scope---Mere
withdrawal of previous suit and insti tution of fresh one could not be considered to be fresh cause
of action.
(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---
----S. 42--- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.120--- Suit for declaration ---Limitation ---Limitation
to file a suit for declaration was six years.
(d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---
----S. 39 ---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.91--- Suit for cancellation of instrument ---Limitation -
--Limitation to file a suit for cancellation of instrument was three years.
(e) Limitation ---
----If remedy availed was beyond limitation then delay of each and every day had to be
explained.
(f) Constitution of Pakistan ---
----Art. 174---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.79---Unsettled property ---Suit without
impleading government ---Maintainability ---Suit with regard to unsettled property was not
maintainable in absence of impleading the Government.
Government of Balochistan CWPP&H Department and others v. Nawabzada Mir Tariq
Khan Magsi and others 2010 SCMR 115 rel.
Nouroz Khan Mengal for Appe llants.
Qazi Muhammad Haroon for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 2nd November, 2015.
JUDGMENT
MUHAMMAD EJAZ SWATI, J. --The respondents (plaintiffs) filed a suit in
representative capacity against the petitioners for declaration, permanent injuncti on, correction of
entries and possession in respective lands situated in Tehsil Dalbandin. The boundaries with their
respective entries of revenue record being mentioned in the plaint known as `Khaskhain Nali'
(hereinafter referred to as "the property in d ispute"). It was averred in the plaint that respondents
belong to Syed Kalani Taifa. which is divided into Nasirzai and Shamozai and they are residents
of District Chagi from the time immemorial. It was asserted that property in dispute belongs to
Taifa Sy ed Kalani, whereas, on one portion Faqirzai and on the other portion petitioners
(defendants) were their bazgars. Further, the litigation between the parties was started when on
14th April 1966 one of their Bazgar belonging to Faqirzai tribe, namely, Behra m tried to install a
tube well. According to the plaintiffs that the cases remained pending against Faqirzai tribe and
on the directions of the High Court of Balochistan that all the other persons having entries on
their names be impleaded in that case, so when Ghulam Muhammad son of Jamal -ud-Din was
impleaded as a party, who disputed the ownership of the plaintiffs and after coming to know that
other members of Sasoli -tribe, through fraud had also effected entries on their names, therefore,
on the applicat ion of the plaintiffs, in case against Faqirzai tribe, the learned Majlis -e-Shoora,
Chaghi at Noshki on 5th January, 2004, allowed to withdraw the suit against Jamal -ud-Din and
Shah Baig and to file fresh suit to their extent. After that the instant suit w as filed and the
plaintiffs based their claim on the following:
1. A Sanad written in 963 given by Ahmed Shah Abadali to Bala Nosh indicates that
property in dispute belongs to Syed Kalani.
2. That in the year 1901 when Sardar Ali Khan Sanjrani filed a suit against ancestor
of the petitioners, the then elder of Salsoli Tribe, namely Tor Khan son of Jano in his
testimony deposed that property in dispute belong to Syed Faqir son of Fateh Muhammad
and Gohri son of Mir Hassan of Syed Kalani tribe.
3. That on 22 Rabi -us-Sani 1344 (AH) grandfather of defendant namely Jamal -ud-
Din son of Shah Baz had written in black and white that property disputes his ownership
of Syed Baig and Syed Gul Shah son of Faqir Shah of Syed Kalani.
4. The agreement dated 7th Aug ust 2003.
That in the year, 1380 Shah Baig son of Jamal ud Din written that disputed property blonged to
Syed Gul Shah son of Faqir Shah and his father was buzgar, thus bound to pay 1/6th of the
produce to the owner.
2. The appellants (defendants) Nos. 1 to 3, 5 to 10, 14 to 41 and 33 to 35 filed joint written
statement contested the suit by raising legal objections, and also on merit. It was stated that
respondents (plaintiffs) were in litigation with Faqirzai tribe since 1965 and the referred suit was
filed in representative capacity by Abdul Qadir and Abdul Sattar thus both of them were well
aware about the entries in question for the last 50/60 years, therefore, the suit was barred by time.
The documents alleged by the respondent had no nexus with the respondents, neither any Shijra -
e-Nasab attached with the plaint, nor disclosed any relationship with the respondents. That
alleged Sanad has no sanctity. The respondent Nos.4, 11 to 13 and 32 filed their joint written
statement.
3. Out of divergent pl eadings following issues were framed:
4. The respondents/plaintiff's' produced seven witnesses and got recorded their statements
through representative namely Kifayatullah Shah. The plaintiffs/defendants in rebuttal produced
ten witnesses and got recorde d their statements through attorney Jamal- ud-Din.
5. The learned Majlis -e-Shoora, Chagi at Noshki (hereinafter the "trial Court") vide
.judgment dated 28th October 2008 (hereinafter the "impugned judgment and decree") decreed
the suit in favour of the re spondents/plaintiffs.
6. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the suit was time barred; that
respondents themselves filed an application for deciding the fate of the case on special oath as
they had no evidence to substantiate their case : that findings rendered by the trial court were
based on inadmissible evidence: that all the documents were produced in the statement of
attorney for plaintiffs without proving them; that respondents (plaintiffs) were in litigation with
Faqirzai tribe sin ce 1965, and not agitated their claim against them (appellants); that in suit filed
against the Faqirzai tribe, the respondents filed the suit in representative capacity through Abdul
Qadir and Abdul Sattar and in the present suit the respondents represent ed the tribe Syed Kalani,
which negated their version; that no evidence brought on the record to establish fraud and
misrepresentation; that presumption of truth is attached to the long standing entries on the names
of appellants: that some of the properti es were unsettled, therefore, suit without impleading the
Government of Balochistan was not competent: that findings rendered by the trial Court reflect
misreading and non- reading of the evidence, thus, liable to be set aside.
7. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that PW -1, PW -2, PW -3 and PW -4
established that the appellants and their ancestors were making produce to owners and their
possession in the property in dispute was as Buzgar; that Suleman son of Qadir Bakhsh, father of
one of the appellants vide agreement dated 7th August, 2003 admitted the claim of respondents
and that agreement was produced through PW -5 Muhammad Salman (subscriber) and PW -6
Abdul Wahid; that through PW -7 Syed Muhammad Qasim, statement of Tor Khan, which was
recorded before Jirga in the year 1901, was produced; that all the aforesaid documentary
evidence i.e. Sanad of Ahmed Shah Abdali, written/acknowledgment of grandfather of the
petitioners namely Jamal -ud-Din was produced in the statement of representative of the
plaintiffs/respondents which further proves the claim of the respondents; that appellants had not
challenged the sanctity of the documents duly exhibited.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The plaintiffs
challeng ed the mutation entries of the year 1967/68 by way of civil suit with a view to explain
the delay. They averred in the plaint that the said mutation and its attestation were without their
knowledge. They (plaintiffs) came to know when in a suit against Faqirzai tribe one of the Sasoli
was arrayed as a party, who declined the title of the plaintiffs. They after seeking permission
from the trial Court for withdrawal of suit with permission to file fresh suit, had filed the instant
suit. This assertion of the respondents does not inspire confidence because, first, as per the
averments made in the pleadings. the respondents were in litigation with Faqirzai tribe since
1965, they were well aware about the position of the mutation entries on the name of appellants .
Secondly, in the earlier suit filed against the Faqirzai tribe, the appellants Nos.1 to 3 (defendants)
were party and to that extent, the suit was withdrawn with permission to file fresh suit (instant
suit). The order date 5th January 2004 passed in case titled Syed Qadir Dad v. Muhammad Afzal
is reproduced herein below:
9. The attorney Syed Kifayatullah Shah in the instant case - during cross -examination also
admitted as under:
10. From the above it is a fact that respondents (plaintiffs) were well aware about the
'revenue entries since 1965. The mere withdrawal of the previous suit to the extent of aforesaid
parties and institution of the present suit would not considered to be fresh cause of action as
provided by Rule 2 Order XXIII of the Code of C ivil Procedure (C.P.C.), which reads as under:
"Limitation law not affected by first suit-- In any fresh suit instituted on permission
granted under the last preceding rule, the plaintiff shall be bound by the law of limitation
in the same manner as if th e first suit had not been instituted. "
11. In view of the above provision, the question related to exclusion of time arising out of the
earlier suit has clearly been answered that on institution of the fresh suit by virtue of provision of
Rule (2) of Order XXIII, C.P.C, the plaintiffs shall be bound by law of limitation in the same
manner, as if the first suit had not been instituted. In the case titled Muhammad Saeed Bacha and
another v. Late Badshah Amir and others 2011 SCMR 345, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
Pakistan has observed as under: -
"In our considered opinion, the beneficial applicability of the provisions of section 14 of
the Limitation Act would not simply be dependent on the withdrawal of the suit with the
permission of the Court to institu te a fresh suit on the same cause of action; rather, in
view of the provisions of Order XXIII, Rule 2,.C.P.C. on the application of law of
limitation as if the previous suit was not instituted, the plaintiff has to show that the suit
so instituted was with in time but if the same was hit by limitation, the burden would
always be on the plaintiff to show that he had been with due diligence prosecuting
another civil proceedings founded/upon the same cause of action and acted in good faith
in a Court which, for the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature is unable to
entertain it read with the explanations to section 14 of the Limitation Act, to be entitled to
the exclusion of the period consumed in such proceedings."
12. In the instant ease, the attorney/representative of plaintiffs during cross examination
admitted that:
13. The respondents(plaintiffs) challenged the mutation entries of 1967/1968 by way of a
civil suit on 27th March 2004. In view of aforesaid admission, the assertion of the
respondents/plaintiffs that mutation and its attestation were without their knowledge does not
appear to be correct. The limitation to file a suit for declaration in terms of Article 120 of the
Limitation Act, is six years whilst for cancellation thereof in terms of Article 91 of the Act, is
three years. The respondents/plaintiffs had failed to explain the delay in filing the suit. The trial
Court while dealing the issue No.1 related to limitation erred in holding that the suit of the
respondents was within ti me. It has time and again held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
Pakistan that any aggrieved person has to pursue his legal remedy with diligence and if remedy
availed beyond limitation, each day delay has to be explained. The contention of the learned
couns el for the respondents that the impugned mutations were void and limitation would run
from the date of knowledge is not tenable.
14. In the instant case vague explanation was given with regard to knowledge of the
impugned mutation. In the case of Muhamma d Raz Khan v. Government of N. -W.F.P. and
another PLD 1997 SC 397 the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:
"Secondly, there is no cavil to the proposition that normally constraints of limitation do
not apply against void orders as held in cas e of Muhammad Shafi v. Mushtaq Ahmed
1996 SCMR 865. Nevertheless every case is distinguishable on its facts and
circumstances. It is undoubtedly imperative for aggrieved party to persue legal remedies
with utmost diligence and satisfy conscious of the Cour t or quasi -judicial authority for
approaching respective forums beyond prescribed limitation, even if objections to that
effect were not raised. This principle has been discussed in PLD 1985 SC 153 (Hakim
Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmed and others ) and PLD 1993 SC 147
(Province of Punjab and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others). Thus, aggrieved
person seeking redress has legal obligation to justify each day's delay for launching
proceedings, because with lapse of time valuable right accrues to th e opposite side. This
view has been consistently maintained by superior Courts. However, reference may be
made to judgments reported in (i) PLD 1996 SC 292 (Ali Muhammad and others v.
Muhammad Shafi and others), (ii) PLD 1995 SC 396 (Government of Punjab v.
Muhammad Saleem), (iii) 1986 SCMR 930 (Muhammad Feroze Khan v. Khaliq Dad
Khan and 28 others). (iv) PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 13 (Khadim Hussain Khan v. The
Stake)."
15. In the instant case the respondents/plaintiffs had failed to explain the sufficient/plaus ible
reason for filing the suit beyond limitation. The findings of the trial Court related to issue No.l.
are based on the fact that late Suleman father of the appellants Nos.4 to 6 in agreement dated 7th
August 2003 admitted the claim/ownership of the res pondents/plaintiffs, thus the suit filed in the
year 2004 was with in time, is also not tenable. Firstly because the name of late Suleman has not
been mentioned in the impugned mutation challenged by the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint.
Secondly, the agreement was neither produced nor proved as provided under Article 79 of the
Qanun- e- Shahadat Order, 1984. The findings rendered by the trial Court in respect of issue No.1
is contrary to law and facts is hereby reversed and held that the suit filed by t he
respondents/plaintiffs is barred by time, as such the issue is decided accordingly.
16. In respect of issues Nos. 4 and 5 as to whether Syed Kalani are owner of the property in
dispute from their ancestor and the defendants/appellants are their buzgar s and as to whether
some of the predecessors of the defendants acknowledged the ownership of Syed Kalani and
declared themselves their bazgars.
17. The respondents/plaintiffs initially filed an application before the trial Court under
Article 163 of the Order, 1984 on the ground that their witnesses had been expired and having no
evidence in support of their claim and they were ready to take oath pursuant to their claim, and
four of the defendants be asked to take oath in rebuttal. The said application wa s accepted by the
trial Court vide order dated 16th October 2004, however, the said order was set aside by this
Court while deciding Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 03 of 2005 and vide order dated 14th
March 2005, remanded the case to the trial Court for de cision on merits. Besides contending that
they had no witnesses to substantiate their case as expressed in the aforesaid application, the
respondents based their claim pursuant to issues Nos. 4 and 5, on the oral testimony of the
witnesses as well as alleg ed documents mentioned in Para No.2 of this judgment.
18. First, we would consider the testimony of PWs. PW -1 stated that once he along with
Abdul Rehman went to defendants/appellants and the father of Jamal -ud-Din provided two bags
of wheat i.e. 1/6 sha re. This witness during cross -examination failed to point out day, month or
year of receiving 1/6 share. He also admitted that he never went at the disputed property. PW -2
Noor -ud-Din stated that he came to know that Syed Kalani are owner of the property i n dispute,
he has no direct knowledge, therefore, his hearsay evidence is not admissible. PW -3 Muhammad
Waris stated that 30/35 years ago, he went to the disputed property and received his share of
produce from Ghulam Muhammad. This witness had not spoken about the right of the plaintiffs.
PW-4 Saleh Muhammad simply stated that the disputed property belongs to Syed Kalani and the
defendants are bazgars. This witness failed to disclose his source of knowledge. PW -7 Ghulam
Rasool refused to depose on oath.
19. The oral evidence produced by the plaintiffs is not worthy of reliance as their testimony
is based on presumption which cannot be equated with the truth. The other documentary
evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs are as mentioned in Para No.2 of this judgment.
20. First we would deal the purported agreement dated 7th August 2003. This agreement was
produced by PW -5 Muhammad Suleman, who is scribe of aforesaid agreement, his statement
may have supporting value, but was not mandate of law. nor did it meet the test of Article 79 of
the Qanun- e-Shahadat Order, 1984, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case
reported in PLD 2015 SC 187.
21. PW-6 Abdul Wahid was stated to be marginal witness of the agreement, but he during
cross -examinati on admitted that his ignorance about the contents of the covenant. Even
otherwise, two witnesses to prove the agreement was not produced by the respondents, therefore,
this document was not proved as required by Article 79 of Qanun- e-Shahadat Order, 1984.
Reference in this respect is to be made to the case reported in 2015 SCMR 1044.
22. The other aspect on the basis whereof the purported agreement was not in support of the
respondents was that the alleged acknowledgement of late Suleman was not binding upon the
appellants, in whose name questioned mutation entries existed. The other documentary evidence
relied upon by the respondents was produced by DW -7 Muhammad Qasim i.e. statement of 'Tor
Khan son of Jaho' Exh.P/B allegedly recorded before Jirga in the year 1901. The respondents
were with the plea that in the year 1901 when Sardar Ali Khan Sanjrani filed a suit against
ancestor of the appellants, the elder of Sasoli tribe, namely, Tor Khan in his testimony deposed
that property in dispute belong to Syed Faqir son of Fateh Muhammad and Gohri son of Mir
Hassan of Syed Kalani tribe. This documentary evidence was also not helpful for the respondents
for many reasons. Firstly, in the record produced by PW -7, there was no title of the case. The
statement Exh.P /B was neither signed nor attested by any Member of the Jirga. Secondly, in
absence of final decision of that suit no reliance could be placed on such statement. Thirdly, the
respondents had not produced any Shajra -e-Nasab to establish their relationship w ith Syed Faqir
son of Fateh Muhammad or Gohri son of Mir Hassan. In the judgment reported in 2010 SCMR
822, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that, "pedigree table alone is not sufficient to
establish relationship in absence of authentic Shajra -e-Nasab."
23. The representative of respondents, namely, Syed Kifayatullah while recording his
statement besides producing Sanad allegedly given by Ahmed Shah Abdali to Bala Nosh also
produced a document allegedly written by grandfather of the appellants, namely, Jamal -ud-Din
son of Shah Raz on 22 Rabi -ul-Seni 1344 (AH) and statement of Shah Baig. The documents
produced in the statement of respondents was neither permissible nor could be said as proved
documents.
24. All the aforesaid documents produced b y the respondents in their statements were
secondary evidence, therefore, no presumption could be drawn in absence of original documents
as held by the Hon'ble Supreme, Court of Pakistan in case of Amirzada Khan and others v.
Ahmad Noor and others PLD 2003 SC 410 and observed as under:
"We were amazed to find that instead of original document a photostat copy exhibited in
evidence without the leave of the trial Court to lead secondary evidence, after the proof of
loss or destruction of the original one. S ince the respondents did not plead loss or
destruction of the original agreement, we would be legally justified in presuming that
they are guilty of withholding best available primary evidence. We feel, had it been
produced in Court, it would perhaps have been unfavourable to them. Since the original
document has not been placed on record we are not inclined to pass any order for
impounding the same. Assumption of the trial Court as well as the High Court that the
deed of sale being more than 30 years old w as a valid piece of evidence within the
contemplation of Article 100 of Qanun- e-Shahadat Order, appears to be misconceived.
Suffice it to observe that the document itself being inadmissible in evidence, hardly any
presumption of correctness or its validity can be attached to it in the circumstances. In the
absence of original document, in our considered opinion, no presumption of correctness
or its due execution can be drawn in the case."
25. In the instant case, most of the alleged documents were produce d in the statement of the
representative of the plaintiffs, thus, could not be taken into consideration as these documents
were neither produced through any witness nor were proved in accordance with law.
26. Besides above, the representative of responde nts during cross -examination also admitted
that they have no evidence to base their claim and stated as under:
27. The reappraisal of the evidence produced by the respondents reveals that the respondents
(plaintiffs) had failed to establish their claim o n the basis of aforesaid evidence, therefore,
findings rendered by the trial Court in respect of issues Nos.4 and 5 are based on inadmissible
and misconstruction of evidence, which cannot be sustained and hence reversed accordingly.
28. Issue Nos.6 and 7 pertain to authenticity of mutation entries in favour of the appellants
detail whereof had been mentioned in the plaint. The respondents (plaintiffs) sought cancellation
of the questioned entries on the basis of aforesaid evidence, which had already been found
discrepant while deciding issue Nos.4 and 5. The trial Court while deciding issue Nos.4 and 5
had found that in presence of strong rebuttal produced by the respondents (plaintiffs) the
mutation entries in favour of appellants cannot be sustained and decreed the suit as prayed for.
The trial Court while deciding instant issues escaped notice that the respondents (plaintiffs)
besides seeking cancellation of impugned mutation, also claimed property as described under
description mentioned in the plaint. The description provided by the respondents is not only
infinite, but also spread towards East, West, North and South. which include unsettled property.
This fact has also been accepted by the representative of the respondents (plaintiffs) during
cross -examination and admitted that 1/4 of the property in dispute is settled and 3/4 land is
unsettled. In absence of the Government, Provincial or Federal, as the case mad be, suit in
respect of unsettled property was not maintainable, as contemplated under Artic le 174 of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and Section 79 of the C.P.C. Reference in
this respect is to be made to the case titled Government of Balochistan, CWPP&H Department
and others v. Nawabzada Mir Tariq Khan Magsi and other s 2010 SCMR 115, wherein, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held as under:
"A bare perusal of the leave granting order, as reproduced hereinabove, would reveal that
it was mainly granted to consider as to whether the suit was instituted properly pursuant
to the provisions as enumerated in Article 174 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and section 79, C.P.C. as
admittedly the Government of Balochistan was not impleaded as party th rough the
Secretary concerned. The question which needs determination would be as to whether
without impleading the Provincial Government of Balochistan, the suit instituted by the
respondents can be considered a validly instituted suit in view of the provisions as
enumerated in section 79, C.P.C."
At Para 7 of the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed as under:
"Due to non- compliance of the mandatory provisions as enumerated in section 79, C.P.C.
and Article 174 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a suit against the
functionary only is not maintainable as has been done in this case. In view of what has
been discussed hereinabove, the appeal preferred on behalf of Government of Balochistan
is hereby allowed and the ju dgment dated 21- 9-2005 passed by learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Balochistan in Chambers is set aside and the suit filed by the
respondents being non- maintainable is also dismissed."
29. In the instant case the respondents though sought cancell ation of impugned mutation
entries, but did not lead any evidence to prove the allegation of fraud against the appellants or
any revenue officer and that the entries were forged. The appellants produced revenue entries
Exh.D/B, but the trial Court has fail ed to consider presumption of truth attached to said entries.
In case titled Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmed Laghmani 1992 SCMR 1832, the claim made on the
basis of entries made in the revenue record was upheld, as no evidence was led to prove that
those entrie s were collusive or fraudulent. In the judgment reported in 1997 SCMR 1840, the
entries made in revenue record were not interfered with the presumption of truth was attached to
those entries and no strong evidence was led in rebuttal to warrant interferenc e to those entries.
30. In the instant case the trial Court without adhering with the presumption of truth to
mutation entries and without having any evidence in rebuttal interfered the questioned mutation
entries, thus the findings on issues Nos. 7 and 8 are reversed and no benefit in this respect is
given to the respondent (plaintiffs), therefore, impugned judgment and decree cannot be
sustained.
In view of the above, the RFA No.84 of 2008 is allowed, the judgment and decree dated
28th October 2008. passed by the Majlis -e-Shoora Chagi at Noshki is set aside, and suit filed by
the respondents/plaintiffs is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own cost. Decree sheet be
drawn.
ZC/20/Bal. Appeal allowed.This judgment is reproduced from a publicly available source for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. If you believe this listing contains an error,
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