P L D 2012 Balochistan 122
Before Muhammad Hashim Khan.Kakar and Muhammad Noor Meskanzai, JJ
MUHAMMAD RASOOL and another ---Appella nts
versus
THE STATE ---Respondent
Criminal Appeals Nos.202 and 207 of 2009, decided on 30th November, 2011.
(a) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908) ---
----Ss. 4 & 5 ---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.7 & 19(8B) ---Juvenile offender --
-Jurisdi ction of Anti-Terrorism Court ---Scope ---Appreciation of evidence ---Sentence,
reduction in ---Police prosecution witnesses through their straightforward and confidence
inspiring evidence had connected the accused with the crime ---Police Officials having no
ill-will against the accused were competent witnesses and their evidence could not be
discarded only due to their being connected with the Police department -Non-production
of independent witnesses from the locality was immaterial on account of the present t rend
of the society of avoiding poking their nose in such like affairs ---Accused had been
arrested red handed while preparing a bomb and a large quantity of explosive substance
was recovered from their possession, which was to be used in bomb blasts for wh ich they
were making preparations ---Case of accused fell within the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism
Court ---Age of an accused had no relevance to the question of such jurisdiction ---Under
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, court would acquire jurisdiction if the off ence was triable by
it, whereas under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, court would acquire
jurisdiction if offenders were juvenile, irrespective of the nature of the offence committed
by them ---Acquittal of four co -accused in the case was of no help to accused, as the nature
of evidence in respect of acquitted co -accused was quite different than the nature of
evidence against the present accused ---Required sanction for prosecution, if not received
within 30 days of submission of challan in the c ourt, the same would be deemed to have
been accorded within the meaning of S.19(8B) of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 ---Trial
Court, thus, could proceed with the trial of the case ---Accused did not deserve any
leniency ---Conviction of accused was consequentl y maintained ---Sentence of two accused
was also maintained, but the sentence of third accused who was minor at the time of
occurrence was reduced from 14 years' R.I. to 8 years' R.I., as he might have been
involved under the influence of his elder brother ---Appeals were disposed of accordingly.
Yaqoob Shah V. The State PLD 1976 SC 53 ref.
Constitutional Petition No.156 of 2004 distinguished.
(b) Anti -Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) ---
----Ss. 12(1), 6, Third Sched., Cl.(iii) ---Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court ---Attempt to
commit or aid, or abetment of or any conspiracy to commit any of the offences stated in
S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, to be a Scheduled offence, exclusively triable by Anti -
Terrorism Court under S.12(1) of the said Act.
(c) Anti -Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) ---
----S. 12 & Preamble ---Jurisdiction, determination of ---Essentials ---While determining
jurisdiction it would be necessary to examine that the ingredients of the alleged
occurrence have nexus with the object of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for determining
whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or
purpose behind the same has to be seen ---In case of any doubt with regard to the meaning
of any particular provision, the Pr eamble of the Act may be considered to arrive at the
proper conclusion ---Preamble of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, clearly manifests that the
same has been promulgated to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other
heinous offences as defined i n S.6 of the said Act.
(d) Anti -Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) ---
----Preamble & S.32 ---Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), Preamble &
S.14 ---Distinguishing features of the two enactments ---Under. Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997,
courts acquire j urisdiction if the offence is triable by them, whereas under Juvenile
Justice System Ordinance, 2000, courts acquire jurisdiction if offenders are juvenile,
irrespective of the nature of offence committed by them --Provisions of Anti -Terrorism
Act, 1997, un der its S.32 have the overriding effect over all other laws including the
Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, whereas under S.14 of said Ordinance its
provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being
in forc e.
(e) Interpretation of statutes ---
---Removal of doubt ---In case of any doubt with regard to the meaning of any particular
provision, the Preamble may be considered to arrive at the proper conclusion.
Kamran Mullah Khail and Munir Ahmed Lango for Appellants (in Crl.As.Nos.202 and
207 of 2009).
Haji Liaquat Ali for the State (in Crl.As.Nos.202 and 207 of 2009) .
Date of hearing: 23rd November, 2011.
JUJDGMENT
MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, J .--- Appellants Muhammad Rasool,
Asmatullah and Rohul lah have filed these appeals against the judgment dated 24th June
2009, passed by the Special Judge, Anti -Terrorism Court -1, Quetta, whereby they have
been found guilty under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 read with
section 6(b)(2)( ee), punishable under Section 7(b)(ff) and 21 -I of the Anti -Terrorism Act,
1997 to suffer fourteen (14) years' RI each, with confiscation of their movable and
immovable properties in favour of the State. The benefit of section 382 -B of the Cr.P.C.
was exte nded in favour of the appellants. Since common question of law and facts is
involved in the aforesaid matters and that the same are outcome of one and same incident,
therefore, we propose to decide the same by means of this common judgment.
2. Briefly st ated facts of the case, as disclosed in the F.I.R. (Exh.P/7 -A), are that on 21st
July 2008, at about 3 -00 a.m., complainant SIP Abid Hussain Bukhari lodged a report
vide Crime No.178 of 2008, under sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act,
1908 rea d with section 7(a) of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997, at Police Station Sariab,
Quetta, to the effect that the high -ups received secret information about presence of some
terrorists in Quetta, who had come from Afghanistan via different routes to Pakistan f or
the purposes of terrorism and were staying in the house of Muhammad Rasool situated at
Killi Kashmir Abad. They were, reportedly, planning to effect an act of terrorism. On the
instructions of high -ups, the complainant, along with other police officials , under the
supervision , of Pir Muhammad Mengal, DSP/SDPO Sariab, raided the aforesaid
guestroom of the house of Ghulam Rasool, two persons, preparing bomb, were found
present, who were overpowered and they disclosed their names as Asmatullah and
Rohullah. On the spot, one bomb, which was prepared, was defused by the Bomb
Disposal Squad, consisting of 10 explosive packets, one detonator connected with wires
and a mobile phone. From the spot, 11 detonators, 10 packets of explosive, yellow colour
wire, 8 mobi le phones, which were kept for preparing bombs, were secured. From another
residential room, accused Muhammad Rasool, Muhammad Usman and Mehmood
Dawood were arrested. It was further alleged that accused Asmatullah and Rohullah
disclosed that at the exist d oor of annexy, one vehicle bearing registration No.AAC -637,
Quetta, in silver colour, is parked, in which bomb has been planted. Subsequently, from
the four doors, engine and trunk of the vehicle, 28 packets of explosive material,
connected with detonator and one mobile phone, weighing 8 kilo and 700 grams were
recovered, which were taken into possession. Thus, the aforesaid case was registered.
3. After completion of the investigation, the appellants were sent up to face the trial. On
7th November 2008, charge under sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908
(the Act of 1908) read with section 6(b)(2)(ee), punishable under Section 7(b)(ff) and 21 -
I of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 (the Act of 1997) was framed against the appellants, to
which th ey pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. At the trial, the prosecution, in order to prove its case, produced and examined seven
witnesses. P.W.1 Abid Hussain Bukhari, S:I., is 'complainant of the case, who exhibited
his murasila Exh.P/1 -A, on the basi s whereof F.I.R. Exh.P/7 -A was registered. P.W.2
Abdul Khaliq, IP, accompanied the raiding party and is witnessed to the recovery memos
Exh.P/2 -A, Exh.P/2 -B, Exh.P/2 -C and Exh.P/2 -D regarding explosive material,
detonators, wires, mobile phones, cash amoun t, documents of vehicle etc. P.W.3
Mehmood Muhammad, SI, is witness to the disclosure memo Exh.P/3 -B of accused
Muhammad Rasool, in consequence whereof explosive material was recovered on his
pointation from a shop, adjacent to his house situated at Killi Kashmir Abad, Quetta,
which was taken into possession through recovery memo Exh.P/3 -A. P.W.4 is Manzoor
Ahmed, S.I., in whose presence IP Wazir Khan, made personal search of arrested accused
Nanai alias Amir Jan and recovered mobile phone and one ID card v ide recovery memo
Exh.P/4 -A as well as seized pickup vehicle vide recovery memo. Exh.P/4 -B. P.W.5 is
Ibrar Hussain, IP, in whose presence IP Wazir Khan took into possession three Photostat
pages of the confessional statement of accused Asmatullah from Ghul am Farid, SI, vide
recovery memo Exh.P/5 -A. P.W.6 Munir Ahmed Meerani, SI, is witness to the disclosure
memos Exh.P/6 -A and Exh.P/6 -B of accused Asmatullah and. Muhammad Usman as well
as recovery memo Exh.P/6 -C of vehicle bearing registration No.AAA -425 an d recovery
memo Exh.P/6 -D of two Photostat pages of incoming and outgoing calls of mobile phone
No.0303 -3376292 and P.W.7 Wazir Hussain Khan, IP, is the investigating officer of the
case. Then the prosecution closed its side.
5. In their examinations und er section 342 of the Cr.P.C. and statements on oath under
section 340(2) of the Cr.P.C. the appellants denied and controverted each and every
allegation of facts levelled against them by the prosecution and professed their innocence,
however, they did not produce any witness in their defence.
6. On conclusion of the trial, the trial Court found the prosecution's case against the
appellants to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and, thus, they were convicted and
sentenced, as mentioned and detailed above.
7. We have heard M/s Kamran Mulla Khail and Munir Ahmed Lango, learned counsel for
the appellants, Haji Liaquat Ali, Advocate, appearing on behalf of Prosecutor General,
Balochistan and have perused the record with their valuable assistance.
8. Mr. Kamran Mulla Khail, learned counsel for appellants Asmatullah and Rohullah, at the
very outset, contended that in view of the record, appellant Rohullah was less than eighteen
years of age on the day of occurrence and, thus, could only be tried under t he provisions of
Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, enforced on 1st July 2000. He further argued that
the trial of the appellants was illegal for want of prosecution sanction. The offence; so
committed does not fall within the provisions of the Act o f 1997, as mere possession of
explosive substance is not included in the definition of Section 6 thereof. According to his
version, the provisions of Section 6(2)(ee) of the Act of 1997 would only attract, if it
involves use of explosive by any device. He further submitted that even if the prosecution
allegations ., as setout in the F.I.R., are accepted, the offence, allegedly, committed by the
appellants, does not fall within the definition of terrorism as stipulated in Section 6 of the
Act of 1997, rather it is merely a case, at the best, for the prosecution and, at the worst, for
the appellants of possession of explosive substance, punishable under Section 5 of the Act
of 1908 and it does not attract provisions of section 6 of the Act of 1997. He also cont ended
with vehemence that, on the same set of evidence, the other four accused Muhammad
Usman, Mehmood, Dawood, Nanai alias Amir Jan and Mukhtiar Ali have been acquitted of
the charge, thus, the appellants could not be convicted and sentenced on that evide nce,
which has already been rejected by the trial Court. However, in the last limb of his
arguments, he prayed for moderate reduction in the quantum of sentence.
9. Mr. Munir Ahmed Lango, learned counsel for appellant Muhammad Rasool, has
supported the a rguments of Mr. Kamran Mulla Khail, Advocate.
10. Haji Liaquat Ali, Advocate, representing the State, on the other hand, maintained that
the prosecution has brought sufficient evidence on record to connect the appellants with the
commission of the offenc e and, as such, impugned judgment is unexceptional and warrants
no interference.
11. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the record, we
have arrived at a confident conclusion that the prosecution had, indeed, succeeded i n
proving its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The connection of the
appellants with the crime in question is sought to be established by the evidence of P.W. 1
Abid Hussain Bukhari, P. W .2 Abdul Khaliq and P. W . 3 Mehmood Ahmed altho ugh all
the aforesaid witnesses are police officials, yet they have given a straightforward and
confidence inspiring account of the occurrence. The police officials, who have no ill -will
against accused, would be competent witnesses and their evidence cann ot be discarded only
for the reason that they are police officials. They have supported the prosecution case and
there is nothing on record to show that they are deposing against the appellants maliciously
or out of animus. Despite lengthy cross -examinatio n, the defence failed to create any dent
in their veracity, except a few discrepancies, which are of inconsequential in nature and it
cannot reasonably be considered as good ground for disbelieving a straightforward and
confidence inspiring ocular account, furnished by them. Their evidence is not suffering
from any material contradiction, discrepancy or inherent infirmity and is consistent with the
probabilities, materially fitting in with the other evidence, more particularly by the recovery
of huge quanti ty of explosive substance.
12. Undoubtedly, no independent and disinterested witness has been examined from the
locality in spite of prior information, but we are of the opinion that, keeping in view the
peculiar circumstances of the case, where the arre st of the terrorist was of paramount
significance' and need of the hour. Furthermore, the social condition, prevalent in our
society, where people avoid poking their nose in such tike affairs, the non -production of
independent witnesses from the locality w ould not be material. In this context, a reference
can be made to a case of "Yaqoob Shah v. the State" reported in PLD 1976 SC 53.
13. Much emphasis has been laid on the point that case did not fall within the ambit of
Section 6 of the Act of 1997, as th ere was no allegation of use of threat of action as
provided there under. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellants
referred the judgment of this Court, passed by a Divisional Bench in Constitutional
Petition, No.156 of 2004, wherein it was held:
"In view of above discussion, we are of the considered view that simpliciter possession of
arms and ammunition or explosive substance has no nexus with the offences covered
under section 6 of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 and the cognizance taken by the learned
Anti-Terrorism Court No -1 on the assumption that the recovered arms and
ammunition/explosive substance perhaps were intended to be used for the purpose of
terrorism, in absence of any evidence to that effect, was illegal and without ju risdiction,
therefore, we are inclined to allow this petition and direct that the case file be
transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge -I, Quetta for trial, who is directed to
proceed with the trial of offence, as if he had taken cognizance of the offe nce as
provided under Section 23 of Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997.
14. In order to better understand the controversy, it would be appropriate to reproduce
section 6 of the Act of 1997, which defines "terrorism" and the Third Schedule of ibid
which speaks as u nder:
6. Terrorism. -(1) In this Act, "terrorism means the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within the meaning of subsection (2), and
(h) the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or
the publi c or a section of the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or
insecurity in society; or
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic
cause or intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors; business community and
preparing or attacking the civilians, government officials installations, security forces or
law enforcement agencies.
(2) An "action" shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), if it:
(a) involves the doing of any thing that causes death:
(b) involves grievous violence against a person or grievous bodily injury or harm to a
person;
(c) involves grievous damage to property, including government premises, official
installations schools, hospitals, offices or any o ther public property;
(d) involves the doing of anything that is likely to cause death or endangers a person's
life;
(e) involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage -taking or hijacking;
(ee) involves use of explosives by any device including bomb blast;
(f) incites hatred and contempt on religious, sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence or
cause internal disturbance;
(g) involves taking the law in own hand, award of any punishment by an organization,
individual or group whatsoever, not recogni zed by the law, with a view to coerce,
intimidate or terrorize public, individuals, groups, communities, government officials and
institutions, including Law Enforcement Agencies beyond the purview of the law of the land;
(h) involves firing on religious congregations, mosques, imambargahs, churches, temples and
all other places of worship, or random firing to spread panic, or involves any forcible
takeover of mosques or other places of worship;
(i) creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a se ction of the public, or is designed to
frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their
lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil life;
(j) involves the burning of vehicles or any other serious form of arson;
(k) involves extortion of money ("bhatta ") or property:
(l) is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt a communications system or
public utility service;
(m) involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in o rder to force him to
discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties;
or
(n) involves serious violence against a member of the police force, armed forces, civil armed
forces, or a public servant;
(o) involves in acts as part of armed resist ance by groups or individuals against law
enforcement agencies;
(p) involves in dissemination, preaching ideas, teachings and beliefs as per own interpretation
on FM stations without explicit approval of government or its concerned departments.
(3) The use or threat of use of any action falling within subsection (2), which involves the use
of firearms, explosives or any other weapon, is terrorism, whether or not subsection 1(c) is
satisfied.
(4) In this section "action" includes an act or a series of acts,
In this Act, terrorism includes any action done for the benefit of a proscribed organization.
(5) A person who commits an offence under this section or any other provision of this Act,
shall be guilty of an act of terrorism.
(6) In this Act, a "t errorist" means:
(7) a person who has committed an offence of terrorism under this Act, and is or has been
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism:
(a) a person who is or has been, whether before or after the coming into force of this Act.
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, shall also be
included in the meaning given in clause (a) above.
THE THIRD SCHEDULE
(Scheduled Offences)
I. Any act of terrorism within the meaning of this Act including those offences which may
be added or amended in accordance with the provisions of section 34 of this Act.
2. Any other offence punishable under this Act.
3. Any attempt to commit, or any aid or abetment of or any conspiracy to co mmit, any of
the aforesaid offences.
4. Without prejudice to the generality of the above paragraphs. the Anti -Terrorism Court
to the exclusion of any other Court shall try the offences relating to the following
namely: .
(i) Abduction or kidnapping for ransom:
(ii) use of firearms or explosives by any device, including bomb blast in a mosque
imambargah, church, temple or any other place of worship, whether or not any hurt or
damage is caused thereby: or
(iii) firing or use of explosives by any device , including bomb blast in the court premises.
"
A bare perusal of above quoted clause (iii) of the Third Schedule of the Act of 1997
clearly manifest that an attempt to commit or aid, or abetment or any conspiracy to
commit any of the offences stated in Section 6 of the Act of 1997 to be a Scheduled
offence exclusively triable by the Anti -Terrorism Court under section 12. subsection (1)
of the Act of 1997, which speaks as under:
12. Jurisdiction of Anti -terrorism Court. ---(I) Notwithstanding anything co ntained in
the Code or in any other law, a scheduled offence committed in an area in a Province or
the Islamabad Capital Territory shall be triable only by [the Anti -terrorism Court]
exercising territorial. jurisdiction in relation to such area."
15. .Th e judgment passed by a Divisional Bench of this Court inConstitutional Petition
No.156 of 2004 is distinguishable on two counts; firstly the implication of clause (iii) of
the Third Schedule has not been considered or pointed out to the Court at the time o f
arguments and; secondly, in the said case, there was no evidence or allegation that the
alleged recovered arms and ammunitions were aimed to be used for terrorism purpose. On
the contrary in the instant case, the appellants were arrested/red -handed while preparing a
bomb and a huge quantity of explosive substance was recovered from their possession,
which was to be used in bomb blasting. From the perusal of F.I.R., statements of
witnesses, disclosure memos of the appellants falling within the purview of A rticle 40 of
the Qanun -e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and confession of the appellants before P.Ws. wherein
they clearly confessed their guilt and mentioned regarding different blasts made by them
in Quetta City, it can safely be inferred that they were involved i n bomb blast in Quetta
and were apprehended by the police, when they were preparing bomb and making fitting
explosive in the vehicle for the purpose of further blasts.
16. While deciding the question of jurisdiction, it would be necessary to examine that the
ingredients of the alleged occurrence have nexus with the object of the Act of 1997. For
determining whether a particular act is an act of "terrorism" or not, the motivation, object,
design or purpose behind the same has to be seen. It would also suff ice to add here that in
case of any doubt with regard to the meaning of any particular provision, the preamble
may be considered to arrive at the proper conclusion. The preamble of the Act of 1997
clearly manifest that the same has been promulgated to cont rol the acts of terrorism,
sectarian violence and other heinous offences as defined in section 6 of the Act of 1997
and their speedy trial. Thus, while analyzing the case of the appellants on the
aforementioned touchstone criterion, we are of the opinion t hat the same squarely falls
within the jurisdiction of Anti - 1 terrorism Court and the judgment impugned herein
cannot be taken exception to. Even otherwise, an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) or a
bomb is neither a toy, nor can it be taken as a decorati on piece. Malicious intention on the
part of a person having the possession of such substances can safely be assumed. It is a
reached conclusion that there cannot be two opinions about the usage of such substances.
17. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to
try appellant Rohullah, being a minor. The contention of the counsel has no legs to stand
on, as the provisions of section 21 -G of the Act of 1997 furnish a complete answer to the
said contention, which postulate that an offence , of terrorism can be tried only by an Anti -
terrorism Court, constituted under the Act of 1997 and the age of the offender has no
relevance to the question of such jurisdiction. Difference between the Act of 1997 and the
Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000, was that in the former statute, Courts acquired
jurisdiction, if the offence was triable by them, whereas in later statute, Courts acquired
jurisdiction if offenders were juvenile, irrespective of the nature of offence commit ted by
them. Under section 32, the provisions of Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 have the overriding
effect (overall other laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000, whereas
under section 14 of the Ordinance 2000, the provisions of the Ordinance 2 000, shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being enforce.
18. It was next contended by learned counsel for the appellants that four co -accused, viz.
Muhammad Usman, Mehmood Dawood, Nanai alias Amir Jan and Mukhtiar A li
Yousafzai have been acquitted on the basis of same evidence and since the evidence was
not found reliable in respect of the four co- accused persons, therefore, it would not be
reliable in the case of the appellants and, as such, they could not be convi cted and
sentenced on the basis of said evidence. We are of the opinion that nothing could be
farther from the reality than this argument. The nature of the evidence in respect of the
appellants is quite different than the nature of evidence against the ac quitted co -accused
persons. Evidence against co -accused Usman and Mehmood Dawood is only that on the
fateful night, they were arrested from the house of appellant Muhammad Rasool and
nothing incriminating was recovered from-their possession, while the case of prosecution
in respect of acquitted co -accused Nanai alias Amir Jan and Mukhtiar Yousafzai solely
rest upon their alleged confession of guilt before police officials, which is, otherwise, not
an admissible piece of evidence in view of the provisions of Articles 38 and 39 of the
Qanun -e-Shahadat Order, 1984. There is, thus, no question of prosecution evidence,
having not been believed 'in the case of acquitted co -accused persons and yet believed in
the case of the appellants.
19. Similarly the contenti on of learned counsel regarding the prosecution sanction has
also no force, as under section 19(8B) of the Act of 1997, if the required sanction is not
received within thirty (30) days of the submission of challan in the Court, the same shall
be deemed to have been given or accorded and the Court shall proceed with the trial of
the case.
20. Reverting to the last limb of arguments of learned counsel regarding the prayer for
moderate reduction in the quantum of sentence, we hold that no reasons exist, whic h
could justify a sympathetic, lenient or concessional treatment for appellants Muhammad
Rasool and .1 Asmatullah. However, so far as the case of appellant Rohullah is
concerned, admittedly, he was minor at the time of alleged occurrence, as is evident fro m
the record, which could be treated as a mitigating circumstance in the matter of
imposition of the lesser penalty. We are conscious of the fact that, at no stage of the trial, he
pleaded minority, but, being a Court of Appeal, we can take cognizance of t he said fact, the
possibility of the appellant, being involved in such kind of notorious activities, under the
influence of his elder brother, cannot be ruled out, as such, while treating him as juvenile,
reduce his sentence from fourteen (14) years' R.I. to that of eight (8) years' R.I., with the
benefit of section 382 -B of the Cr.P.C.
For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment, with the above modification in the
quantum of sentence to the extent of appellant Rooullah is maintained. The appeals, b eing
meritless, are dismissed.
N.H.Q./169/Q Order accordingly.This judgment is reproduced from a publicly available source for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. If you believe this listing contains an error,
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